Pankaj vs State Of Govt Of NCT Of Delhi & Anr.

AFFIDAVIT-CUM-NO OBJECTION CERTIFICATE

I, Ravindra Dahiya, S/o Late Sh. Gulab Singh, R/o RZ-40/8, Gali No. 5, Dada Chatri Wala Marg, Raj Nagar, 1st Palam Colony, Palam Village, South-West, Delhi-110045, aged about 55 years, do hereby solemnly affirm and declare as under:

1.

That I am the deponent herein and I am well acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the present case and competent to swear this affidavit.

2.

That on 09.04.2026, at about 07:00 PM, while I was returning to my residence from my office in my car and had reached near the CNG petrol pump situated at Yashwant Palace, I slowed down my vehicle and was in the process of taking a left turn after giving due indicator signal. At that point in time, the Petitioner, namely Pankaj, who was riding a motorcycle, came into contact with my vehicle, which resulted in a minor accident, following which a brief verbal altercation took place between us. Due to the heat of the moment and sudden circumstances, the said altercation momentarily escalated into a minor scuffle.

3.

That I state that there was no prior enmity, ill-will, or dispute whatsoever between me and the Petitioner before the said incident. The occurrence was purely accidental in nature and arose out of a trivial issue without any premeditation or intention on the part of either party.

4.

That I further state that I sustained only simple injuries in the said incident. I was fully conscious, oriented, and in stable condition at the time of my admission to the hospital. I went to the hospital with my friends and family for medical examination and treatment. After receiving necessary medical care and prescribed medicines, I was discharged on the same day. The injuries sustained were not grievous in nature, nor were they caused by any dangerous weapon or blunt object with any intention or knowledge of causing death.

5.

That I state that the matter has now been amicably settled between me and the Petitioner out of our own free will, without any pressure, coercion, undue influence, or inducement from any quarter. Both parties have decided to maintain peace and cordial relations in the future.

6.

That I further state that I do not wish to pursue the present case any further as the dispute arose out of a misunderstanding, and I have no grievance remaining against the Petitioner. I am a peace-loving citizen and do not intend to prolong the litigation unnecessarily.

7.

That I hereby give my full consent and no objection to the quashing of FIR No. 51 of 2026 and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, pending before the Hon'ble Court, in the interest of justice.

“61.

The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. … However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. … In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

“29.

In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1.

Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2.

When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.5.

While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6.

Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. …”

“19.

We thus sum up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 CrPC where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences “compoundable” within the statutory framework, the extraordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 CrPC or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 CrPC. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind:

19.1.

Nature and effect of the offence on the conscience of the society;

19.2.

Seriousness of the injury, if any;

19.3

Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; and

19.4

Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.”

“8.

Although the offence under Section 110 BNS cannot be treated as strictly ‘in personam’, and it touches upon public concerns rather than being confined to individual grievances, the Court must also account for the practical realities of securing a conviction in the present case. The Supreme Court has consistently held that in cases where the complainant has entered into a voluntary and bona fide settlement, and is no longer inclined to support the prosecution, the prospect of securing a conviction becomes exceedingly remote. In such circumstances, continuing the prosecution may not only prove futile, but would also serve no worthwhile public interest.

9.

Respondent No. 2 has categorically expressed his unwillingness to pursue the matter further and has confirmed the settlement as voluntary and devoid of any coercion. He has also stated that the scuffle occurred on the spur of the moment and that there was no pre-existing motive on behalf of the Petitioner. Although the MLC reflects the injuries as grievous in nature, the investigation record does not reveal the use of any weapon, nor does it indicate that the act was preceded by planning, targeting, or any deliberate attempt to cause harm of a fatal nature. The suddenness of the altercation, the absence of premeditation, and the circumstances in which the injuries were inflicted collectively cast doubt on the presence of the intention or knowledge required to establish an offence under Section 110 BNS. At this stage, while this Court refrains from recording any conclusive determination on merits, these factors substantially weaken the likelihood of proving the requisite mens rea for an “attempt to commit culpable homicide”. When viewed together with the complainant’s unequivocal stance, the prospect of the prosecution securing a conviction becomes exceedingly remote. Given this background, the continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an empty formality, adding to the burden of the justice system and consuming public resources unnecessarily.”

“8.

In the present case, petitioner No. 1 and respondent No. 2 were known to each other. A quarrel ensued upon a relatively small traffic accident, in which the injuries sustained were simple in nature. The parties have also expressed a desire to put the past dispute behind them. There does not appear to be any overriding public interest in keeping the proceedings alive. Applying the tests laid down by the Supreme Court, it may be observed that the respondent No. 2 has also categorically affirmed the voluntary nature of the settlement before the Court. In these circumstances, the criminal proceedings are unlikely to result in conviction, and its continuation would be an empty formality, adding to the burden of the justice system and consuming public resources unnecessarily.”