Pandya Jashwantlal M. and Others vs District Superintendent of Police and Others

P.M. Chauhan, J.—Petitioners claim to have been selected and included in the select list for the appointment as Armed Police Constables in the interviews held from December 22, 1987 to December 24, 1987 and pray for writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, directions or order in the nature of mandamus by directing the respondent No. 1 not to cancel the select list of the Armed Police Constables and to appoint the petitioners who are included in the select list.

Petitioners were called for the interview for appointment to the post of Armed Police Constables from December 22, 1987 to December 24, 1987 and after the select list was prepared but it was officially not published and the petitioners were also not informed of having been included in the select list. At the time of selection requisite educational qualifications as per the Constable (Armed Branch, Unarmed Branch and Women Branch) Recruitment Rules, 1979), for the post of Armed Police Constable was passing of Std. VI, but by Notification dated February 15/19, 1988 by the Constable (Armed Branch, Unarmed Branch and Women Branch) Recruitment (Amendment) Rules, 1988, the educational qualification for appointment to the post of Armed Police Constable was changed and the requisite qualification for appointment to the post of Armed Police Constable is "passed Secondary School Certificate Examination or its equivalent". According to the petitioners, they have come to know that they are included in the select list. Not only that they are included in the select list but they satisfy the changed criteria for the educational qualification for the recruitment to the post of Armed Police Constable, as all the petitioners have passed Secondary School Certificate Examination. Inspite of the fact that the petitioners have been selected and included in the list and 48 vacant posts are available and 33 new posts of the Police Constables are created, the petitioners are not being appointed and the respondents have decided to cancel the select list without offering appointment to the petitioners and accordingly the petitioners are denied this legitimate right to get appointment to the post of Armed Police Constables. Out of 144 candidates who were selected for the post of Armed Police Constable, 60 are appointed in the month of February 1988. In case the select list is cancelled, they will lose the chance for appointment to the post of Armed Police Constable and their career will be ruined. According to the petitioners, as other selectees who did not satisfy the changed requisite criteria after the amendment in the Rules are appointed and the petitioners who satisfy the same criteria are denied appointment, the equality clause under Articles. 14 and 16 of the Constitution is violated and the petitioners are discriminated against. The petitioners assert that in past the select list was never cancelled till all the candidates were appointed, and in case the selected list is cancelled the problem about overage for the petitioners for other selection would arise as the age limit is 22 years for unreserved class and 27 for reserved classes.

Admittedly, the select list of 44 candidates was prepared on December 24, 1987 and at that time the requisite educational qualification was Std. VI pass. When the list was prepared, there were 101 vacancies of Armed Police Constables, but subsequently because of the change of the policy of posting Armed Guards at the Treasury, 47 vacancies were not available and 10 posts were kept vacant because of the order of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 2608 of 1987 and, therefore, at that time 44 posts were actually vacant and were required to be filled in and were filled in by order dated February 20, 1988. After that 17 vacancies arose because of the transfer of 17 Armed Constables to unarmed branch and, therefore 17 selectees were appointed in August 1989. Subsequently 57 vacancies arose as the system of posting armed guards at Treasuries was reintroduced and the Special Civil Application No. 2608 of 1987 was dismissed, but the said 57 vacancies were available in late 1988. According to the respondents, the Recruitment Rules were amended in February 1988 and the educational qualification was changed and, therefore, the Director General of Police by letter dated September 7, 1988 instructed the District Superintendent of Police to cancel the select lists and in pursuance of the said directives, the District Superintendent of Police cancelled the select list. It is also contended by the respondents that as per the policy laid down in Government Resolution dated July 5, 1982, the select list remains in force for one year after it is prepared or till the new waiting list is prepared whichever is earlier. As the list was prepared on December 24, 1987 it expired on December 23, 1988 and after that the appointment of the selectees included in that list cannot be made. It is asserted that mere inclusion of the names in the select list does not create any right in favour of such selected candidates and therefore, the petitioners have no legal or fundamental right to be appointed to the post of Armed Police Constables much less it can be enforced by writ mandamus. It is admitted in the affidavit dated December 28, 1988 of Geetha Johri, District Superintendent of Police Sabarkantha, that when the affidavit was filed there were 58 vacancies of the Armed Police Constable in Sabarkantha District. From the Affidavits of Geetha Johri. D.S.P. and J.B. Chauhan, Deputy Superintendent of Police, it transpires that the petitioners were included in the select list and the appointments were made rom the select list even after the Amendment in the Recruitment Rules and the select list is cancelled on or about September 7, 1988 on the instructions of the Inspector General of Police, as the educational qualification criteria was changed.

From the facts and circumstances of the instant matter, the moot questions requiring considerations are-

(1) Whether the petitioners have right to be appointed to the post of Armed Police Constable, on the basis of their selection and inclusion in the select list,

(2) Whether the respondents have right to cancel the select list merely because the educational qualification criteria for the selection was changed by subsequent amendment in the Rules and not to consider the candidates who are placed in the select list, who even satisfy the requisite qualification as per the Amended Rules for the appointment.

(3) Whether the petitioners are discriminated against as the other selectees are appointed even after the amendment in the Recruitment Rules and petitioners denied the appointment after September 1988, even when the list was in force.

(4) Whether the petitioners can assert the right of being appointed after the period of one year when the select list has expired as such select list should remain in force only for the period of one year as per the Government Resolution dated July 5, 1982.

(5) Even if the petitioners have right to be appointed, can be respondents be compelled by writ of mandamus to appoint the petitioners as Armed Police Constables.

The Police force consists of such number of several ranks and the recruitment and all other conditions of service are such as may be determined by the State Government by general or special order, as specified in Section 5 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951. In exercise of the power u/s 5 of the Bombay Police Act the Government of Gujarat enacted the Constable (Armed Branch, Unarmed Branch and Women Branch) Recruitment Rules, 1979. The requisite educational qualification for appointment to the post of Armed Police Constable was Std. VI passed, but by the amendment in the said Rules, by the Constable (Armed Branch, Unarmed Branch and Women Branch) Recruitment (Amendment) Rules, 1988 published by Government Notification dated February 15/19, 1988, the requisite educational qualification for appointment to the post of Armed Police Constable has been changed and is "passed Secondary School Certificate Examination or its equivalent" Rule 2 of the said Rules provides that appointment to the post of Constable (Armed Branch, Unarmed Branch and Women Branch) in the Gujarat Subordinate Service, Class HI, in the Police Department shall be made by direct selection. Rule 5 specifically provides that the selected candidates shall be on probation for two years and Rule 6 provides that the selected candidate shall have to undergo such training as may be prescribed by the Government from time to time. Rule 7 provides that the selected candidate shall be required to pass a departmental examination and an examination in Hindi and Gujarati or both in accordance with the Rules prescribed by the Government from time to time. Rule 8 imposes the condition of service for three years after the training. It specifically provides that a candidate appointed by direct selection who will be imparted training at the Government cost shall be required to serve the Government for a period of three years and shall be required to execute a Security and Surety bond for such amount as may be prescribed by the Government. Rules, therefore, provide the method of selection, the eligibility criteria including educational qualifications and physical fitness, the training and the execution of bond at the time of appointment. Considering the Recruitment Rules, it is apparent that these candidates satisfying all the requisite qualifications are included in the select list after the competitive test found fit to the appointed for the post of armed Constable and only a formal appointment order is required to be issued by the appointing authority. The appointing authority has nothing further to do for the selection and has to issue only the formal appointment order. The question is as to whether in such circumstances the appointing authority can deny the appointment even if the vacancy exists. If the vacancies do not exist the question of appointment does not arise. If as per the Rules or the Government guidelines the select list expires'' because of the expiry of the period for which it is supposed to remain in force, the question for consideration may be entirely different as in that case it is required to be considered as to whether the selected candidate has any right to be continued in the select list, even after the list has expired, but the consideration would be quite different when the list has not expired and is in force, vacancies are available and the appointing authority has nothing more to do except to issue the appointment orders. Should such candidates who have proved their merits and are placed on the select list, be denied the appointment? If it is answered in the affirmative such deserving persons would be left to the mercy of the appointing authority which has nothing further to do except to issue the formal appointment order. Can such a situation be allowed to exist in a public appointment in given circumstances as discussed above? This Court is concerned here with the situation that when the petitioners filed this petition, the select list had not expired and the vacancies did exist and not the situation in which vacancies did not exist till the select list expired because of the afflux of time for which it should have remained in force because of the Government policy decision or preparation of new select list. In a case in which the select list has expired for want of vacancies the circumstances may be quite different and the selected candidates may not have right to continue in the select list for indefinite period of time inspite of the policy decision of the Government, but that point is not being considered not required to be considered in this matter. In a democratic society in which equality of opportunity for employment to office under the State is enshrined in the Constitution which is Supreme Law of the land, it can hardly be contended and accepted that in a public employment by the State, te selected candidate has absolutely no right for being appointed, especially when the vacancy exists and other reasons like misconduct, disqualification, etc. for denying the appointment do not exist. If that is accepted it would be doing violence to the provisions of Articles. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Article 16 of the Constitution specifically provides for the equality of the opportunity for all citizens in the matter relating to the employment or appointment to any office under the State. If select list operate, vacancy exists and the selected candidate is not appointed to the post despite no other disqualification and subsequently other persons are sought to be selected for the same vacant post, it would amount to denial of equality of opportunity in the employment to the office under the State and would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

It is submitted on behalf of the respondents that more inclusion of the name in the select list does not create any vested right much less any fundamental right in the petitioner for being appointed as Armed Police Constables. In support of the submission Mr. Antani, learned Asstt. Government Pleader referred Jatinder Kumar and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others, In that matter, on consideration of materials on record the learned single Judge had come to the conclusion that there was neither any vacancy in the quota of direct recruits of Assistant Sub-Inspectors nor a single post meant for direct recruits was manned by an ad hoc employee and that no case of mala fides or favouratism, had been made out and that there was no violation of Articles. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed. The point for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether the person selected by the Subordinate Service Selection Board for direct appointment to the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police has got an unfettered right to be appointed on the basis of the recommendation made by the said Board. The Government requested the Board to select and recommend certain specified number of suitable persons for the post of Assistant Sub-Inspectors of Police and accordingly the Board recommended the panel of 140 candidates, but because of certain circumstances anticipated temporary vacancies were not available and about 48 posts were offered to the candidate recommended by the Board. The remaining candidates recommended by the Board were not offered appointment as there were no vacancies and therefore, the disgruntled candidates filed two petitions in the High Court. The High Court held that there was no vacancy in the quota of direct recruits. Supreme Court considered the provisions of Article 320 of the Constitution of India and the purpose of establishing the independent body like the Public Service Commission and observed that the selection by the Commission, however, is only a recommendation of the Commission and the final authority, for appointment is the Government, and the Government may accept the recommendation or may decline to accept the same. But in case it chooses not to accept the recommendation of the Commission the Constitution enjoins the Government to place on the table of the Legislative Assembly its reasons and report for doing so, and the Government is made answerable to the House for any departure vide Article 323 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court then proceeded on to observe:

....This, however, does not clothe they appellant with any such right. They cannot claim as of right that the Government must accept the recommendation of the Commission. If, however, the vacancy is to be filled up, the Government has to make appointment strictly adhering to the order of merit as recommended by the Public Service Commission. It cannot disturb the order of merit according to its own sweet will except for other good reasons viz. bad conduct or character. The Government also cannot appoint a person whose name does not appear in the list. But it is open to the Government to decide how many appointments will be made. The process for selection and selection for the purpose of recruitment against anticipated vacancies does not creates a right to be appointed to the post which can be enforced by a mandamus. We are supported in our view by two earlier decisions of this Court in A.N. D''silva Vs. Union of India (UOI), and The State of Haryana Vs. Subash Chander Marwaha and Others, The contention of Mr. Anthony to the contrary cannot be accepted.

It is clearly observed by the Supreme Court that it is within the powers of the Government to accept the recommendations of the Board or not to accept the same, and to decide the number of appointment to be made and that the process of selection for the anticipated vacancies does not create any right to be appointed to the post. In the instant matter, the question of accepting the recommendations does not arise as the petitioners are already selected and are allocated to Sabarkantha District and only appointments are to be made. The question of existence of vacancy also did not arise as admittedly there were clear vacancies on which the appointment could be made. The observations in Jatinder Kumar (supra) regarding right of being appointed therefore, are not applicable to the facts of the instant case. Whether such right can be enforced by mandamus will be discussed at later stage.

Mr. Antani, learned Asstt. Govt. Pleader referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in The State of Haryana Vs. Subash Chander Marwaha and Others, asserted that merely because the names of the petitioners are included in the select list that itself does not confer any right upon them for appointment to the post and they have no right of appointment as Armed Police Constables. In that case the list was prepared for making further selection for appointment and during the process of further selection, Government laid down the different criteria which was within the competence of the Government and therefore, considering that aspect, the Supreme Court observed that the mere fact that the candidate''s name appeared in the list does not entitle him to be appointed. The list was merely to help the State Government in making the appointments and the stage for selection for the appointment was to come thereafter. In the instant case not only the candidates are selected, but they are allocated to Sabarkantha District and only formal appointment order was to be made by the District Superintendent of Police, Sabarkantha and nothing more was required to be done.

On behalf of the respondents judgment of this Court in A.S. Patel and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. 1986 GLH 52 is referred and it is asserted that the petitioners have no right to be appointed to the post. That was the case in which the petitioners were not selected for the post and the selection was for one year and no one was appointed in pursuance of the selection and the period of one year had expired and even the petition had become infractuous. In light of that, the observation was made by the Court that no one has right to be selected or appointed and even if a person is selected and his name appears in the select list, he does not get any right to be appointed to the post. The point was not directly under consideration of the learned single Judge and the observation was an obiter.

In a subsequent judgment learned single Judge of this Court in Chaudhari Govabhai Nathubhai and Ors. v. Banaskantha Jilla Panchayat Seva Pasand Samiti and Anr. 1988 (1) GLH 14 directed to make the appointments. In that case the select list as to remain in operation until fresh select list was prepared but no such subsequent select list was prepared and the vacancies were available and accordingly it was directed that if there were vacancies available, the appointment should be made from amongst the candidates who were in the select list, observing that it was not proper to deny the appointment to the petitioners of that case, when the vacancies were available, merely on the ground that the process for the preparation of fresh select list was started by issuing fresh advertisement. It appears that no contention as to whether mandamus can be issued by Court in such fact situation was raised and canvassed in that matter and therefore, the learned Judge has not considered and decided that legal aspect.

Mr. Y.N. Oza, learned Advocate for the petitioners referring the judgment in Kamla Pareek v. Rajasthan Agricultural Marketing Board, Jaipur 1982 (2) SLR 792 submitted that in similar circumstances the High Court issued the writ of mandamus and directed the appointment. In that case the final list for recruitment was prepared and the petitioners were allotted to Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Jodhpur, and only appointment letters were required to be issued and no further procedure for the appointment was to be made. The learned Judge on the fact of that particular case, accepted the submission by the learned Advocate of the petitioners that in the facts and circumstances of that case, the observations by the Supreme Court in The State of Haryana Vs. Subash Chander Marwaha and Others, could be distinguished and directed to make the appointments.

Relying on the judgment in Dr. A.V. Venkataratnam and Ors. v. The Chancellor, University of Mysore and Anr. 1981 Lab. IC 848, by Karnataka High Court, it is submitted that the petitioners have right of being appointed as the appointing authority was bound to make appointment as per the select list. The learned Judge of the Karnataka High Court was considering the provisions of Sub-section (6) of Section 49 of the Karnataka State University Act which provided for the selection by the Board, preparing the list and forwarding it to the Chancellor "who shall make appointment in accordance with the same". In view of the learned Judge, the Chancellor was bound to make appointment as per the list and had no discretion to reject the candidates except that the list is prepared in contravention of law or the procedure was not followed, etc. In view of the learned Judge once the select list is properly prepared and in absence of any procedural illegality, or want of qualification or existence of disqualification in the selected candidate, Section 49(6) of the Act created right in favour of the candidates selected by the Board and a corresponding duty on the part of the Chancellor to appoint a candidate selected for the post for which the appointment was intended. These observations are made by the learned Judge in reference to the provisions of Sub-section (6) of Section 49 of the Act. However, it is clear that even though Section 49 (6) or the Act did not specifically provide for creating the right the learned Judge observed that such right is created in favour of the candidates and corresponding duty in the appointing authority to make the appointment. Ultimately, writ of mandamus is issued by the learned Judge.

In S. Govindaraja v. Kerala Road Transport Corporation and Anr. 1986 Lab. IC 1191, the facts were that the appellant was selected for the appointment as a Conductor in Kerala State Road Corporation and his name was placed in the select list prepared by the committee. He was not given regular appointment but was appointed to work as conductor in temporary vacancy and he continued to work for a period of more than 240 days. While in service as a conductor, his services were terminated on the ground of unsuitability and further that the appellant would forfeit his chance for appointment in terms of selection and his name shall stand deleted from the select list. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition. Allowing the Appeal it was observed by the Supreme Court that "once a candidate is selected and his name is included in the select list for appointment in accordance with the regulations he gets a right to be considered for appointment as and when vacancy arises."

As the petitioners were selected in accordance with the Rules and they even satisfy the requisite educational qualification as per the Amended Rules and there was no reason for not appointing them as Armed Police Constables, they have a right to be considered for appointment. As discussed above, the Recruitment Rules were amended on February 15/19, 1988 and even after that several appointments were made from the existing select list. The Inspector General of Police, then by letter dated September 7, 1988 instructed the District Superintendent of Police, Sabarkantha, to cancel the select list and accordingly the District Superintendent of Police, Sabarkantha respondent No. 3, cancelled the select list. It transpires that the select list was cancelled as, by the amendment, the requisite educational qualification incorporated is Secondary School Certificate Examination passed or its equivalent. It is not necessary for this Court to consider as to whether the subsequent change in the criteria for selection would affect the candidates already selected and included in the select list for being appointed to the post of armed constable, as in the instant matter, it is the contention of the petitioners that all of them satisfy requisite educational qualification even under the Amended Rules and that fact is not controverted.

The District Superintendent of Police, Sabarkantha respondent No. 1 had to cancel the select list only under the instructions of the Superior Officer, respondent No. 2. The respondent No. 2 directed to cancel the select list prepared prior to the Amendment of the Rules probably because at that time the requisite educational qualification was less, but the respondent No. 2 was not the authority preparing the select list. As provided in Rule 70 of the Gujarat Police Manual, the selection is required to be made by the Board consisting of the Officers specified in it. Apart from the fact that the selection was by other independent authority, the respondent No. 2-Director General of Police could not have directed to cancel the entire select list including the names of those who satisfied the requisite educational qualification even after the Amendment in the Rules. By the amendment the stringent provision for selection was incorporated and therefore, the entire select list could not have been directed to be cancelled. The instructions issued by the respondent No. 2-Director General of Police; are therefore, arbitrary, unauthorised and void. The respondent No. 1-District Superintendent of Police, Sabarkantha, being the Subordinate Officer, had to follow such arbitrary instructions and, therefore, the act of the respondent No. 1 in cancelling the list and in not making the appointment inspite of the fact that the petitioners satisfied the requisite educational qualification and that there was no other reason for not making the appointment despite the vacancies were available, is also unauthorised illegal, arbitrary and void.

After the amendment, the appointments of the candidates included in the select list were made and subsequent to the instructions by the Director General of Police, the select list was cancelled and the appointments were not made. That would certainly discriminate the petitioners vis-a-vis the other selectees included in the said select list and appointed as Armed Police Constables.

The contention of respondents is that list continues to be in force only for a period of one year and after that period it lapses. The Select List was prepared on December 24, 1987 and even if it is accepted that as per the Government instructions the select list was operative for one year, it should have been operative upto December 23, 1988. However, even prior to that, it was cancelled in September 1988. The present petition was filed on December 19, 1988 and at that time the period of one year was not over. If at all the respondent No. 2 would not have instructed the respondent No. 1 to cancel the select list, the respondent No. 1 would have certainly considered for appointment of the petitioners and in all probability made the appointments as the vacancies were available and there was as such no other reason for not appointing the petitioners as Armed Police Constables. Not only the right of appointment but even the right of being considered for appointment is denied to the petitioners during the period of operation of list by arbitrary orders respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Merely because subsequently, during the pendency of the proceedings period of one year was over, that by itself, should not be a ground for denying the appointment to the petitioners as Armed Police Constables.

The question, however, remains to be considered as to whether this Court by mandamus should direct the respondents to appoint the petitioners. As discussed above, it is the right of the petitioners to be appointed as Armed Police Constables, but can it be said that it is the corresponding duty of the respondents to make the appointment. The law on jurisdiction for writ of mandamus is now well settled by catena of judgments of the Supreme Court, that for the writ of mandamus the legal right must vest in the petitioner and corresponding duty to be performed by the person against whom mandamus is sought. In Rai Shivendra Bahadur Vs. The Governing Body of the Nalanda College, the provisions of Section 20 of the University of Bihar Act and the Statutes thereunder which did not create any legal right to get an order of appointment or reinstatement and corresponding duty on the governing body, were being considered by the Supreme Court and in that light it is observed by the Supreme Court that "in order that mandamus may issue to compel the respondents to do something it must be shown that the statutes impose a legal duty and the appellant has a legal right under the Statutes to enforce its performance".

In The Praga Tools Corporation Vs. Shri C.A. Imanual and Others, the Supreme Court observed:

....Articles 226 provides that every High Court shall have power to issue to any person or authority orders and writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, etc. or any of them for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution and for any other purpose. But it is well understood that a mandamus lies to secure the performance of a public or statutory duty in the performance of which the one who applies for it has a sufficient legal interest. Thus, an application for mandamus will not lie for an order of reinstatement to an office which is essentially of a private character nor can such an application be maintained to secure performance of obligations owed by a Company towards its workmen or to resolve any private dispute.

It is further observed:

...Therefore, the condition precedent for the issue of mandamus is that there is in one claiming it a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by one against whom it is sought. An order of mandamus is, in form, a command directed to a person. Corporation or an inferior Tribunal requiring him or them to do a particular thing therein, specified which appertains to his or their Office and is in the nature of a public duty. It is, however, not necessary that the person or the authority on whom the statutory duty is imposed need be a public official or an official body. A mandamus can issue for instance, to an Official of a society to compel him to carry out the terms of the statute under or by which the society is constituted or governed and also to Companies or Corporations to carry out duties placed on them by the statutes authorising their undertaking. A mandamus would also lie against a company constituted by a statute for the purposes of fulfilling public responsibilities (Cf Halsbury''s Laws of England (3rd Ed.), Vol. II, p. 52 and onwards).

In the The State of Haryana Vs. Subash Chander Marwaha and Others, , while agreeing with the observations in the case of Dr. Rai Shivendra Bahadur (supra), it is observed by the Supreme Court that:

....In order that mandamus may issue to compel an authority to do something, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on that authority and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. Since there is no legal duty on the State Government to appoint all the 15 persons who are in the list and the petitioners have no legal right under the rules to enforce its performance the petition is clearly misconceived.

In Jatinder Kumar (supra), the Supreme Court while agreeing with above views in Subash chandra Marwaha''s case (supra) observed that no such right is created which can be enforced by mandamus.

Even though it is a right of the petitioners to be considered for the appointment or even to be appointed as the Armed Police Constables, it was not the corresponding duty of they appointing authority to appoint and, therefore, the mandamus cannot be issued to make the appointments of the petitioners. This Court, therefore, should not issue mandamus directing to make the appointment. However, it is clear that the respondent No. 1 authority did not even consider the cases of the petitioners for appointment as the list was required to be cancelled by arbitrary and unlawful instructions by the respondent No. 2 necessary directions should be given and relief to consider for appointment be granted.

The directions by the respondent No. 2 to cancel the select list, to the respondent No. 1 and the action by the respondent No. 1 in cancelling the select list of the candidates are quashed and set aside. The respondent No. 1-District Superintendent of Police, Sabarkantha, is directed to apply mind and consider the petitioners for appointment as Armed Police Constables. While considering the petitioners for appointment as Armed Police Constables, the respondent No. 1 may verify the educational qualification of the petitioners and ascertain as to whether each of the petitioners satisfied the requisite educational qualification as per the Amended Rules on the date when the appointment of last candidate from the select list was made. If the petitioners or any one of them do not satisfy the said requisite educational qualification at above referred time, the question of considering such petitioners or petitioner for appointment, does not arise, as this Court has proceeded on accepting the claim of the petitioners that they satisfied by requisite educational qualification even under the Amended Rules. The respondent No. 1, however, shall not reject the claim of the petitioners for being appointed as Armed Police Constables only on the ground that the period of one year has expired and, therefore, the select list has ceased as the Respondent No. 1 did not consider the appointment of the petitioners even during the period of one year, when the vacancies were available for the appointment as Armed Police Constables. The respondent No. 1 is directed to consider the petitioners for appointment as Armed Police Constables within one month from the receipt of writ of this Court.

This petition is accordingly allowed and the rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent, with no order as to costs.

Mr. Dave learned Addl. Govt. Pleader prayed for staying the operation of the order. As period of one month is already given to respondents to give effect to the order, the prayer for staying the operation of the order is rejected at this stage.