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Judgment
S.K. Homchaudhuri, J.—In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the following questions are involved-
(1) Whether or not, the settlement holder is liable 10 pay premium us contemplated under the provision of Rule 40A of the Settlement Rules, under Assam Land & Revenue Regulation, for conversion of land for special cultivation, the settlement of which for ordinary cultivation was taken prior to 24.9.1931?
(2) Whether the premium payable under the provisions of Rule 40A of the Rule, should be determined on the basis of the market value of land prevalent at the time of conversion thereof for special cultivation or at the time of intimation of the proceedings?,
The Petitioner is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act It owns and holds the Panbari Tea Estate in Assam wherein it parries on business of growing and manufacturing tea. For the purpose of cultivation of tea it took settlement of a considerable area of land from the Govt. The Settlement Officer, Sonitpur initiated a proceeding for charging premium under Rule 40A of the Settlement Rules, hereinafter mentioned as the Rules, for conversion of land measuring 423 Bighas 8 Lechas scaled with, the Petitioner for ordinary cultivation, into special cultivation of tea and registered as T.C. No. 20/82-83, The Petitioners case is that it took settlement of the land, in question for ordinary cultivation before 24.9.31 and as such the Petitioner is not liable to pay premium for conversion, of the said land to special cultivation of tea as contemplated under Rule, 40A of the Rules. Petitioner prayed for time to file relevant documents, to satisfy the settlement officer that the settlement of the land in question was taken for ordinary cultivation before 24.9.31 as well as other related documents. But, the settlement officer did not grant further time a id by order dated 22.6.84, assessed the premium to the tune of Rs. 1,59,516.60 p. on the basis of market value of the land prevailing at the time of initiation of lie proceeding and asked the Petitioner to pay the amount. Feeling aggrieved, the Petitioner impugned the said order dated 22.6. 84 passed by the Settlement Officer in an appeal u/s 147 of the Assam Land & Revenue Regulation, hereinafter mentioned as Regulation, before the learned Assam Board of Revenue. The question as to whether or not a settlement holder is liable to pay premium as contemplated under Rule 40A of the Rules for conversion of land to special cultivation settlement of which had been taken for ordinary cultivation prior to 24.9.1931, having been involved in a number of appeals including that of the Petitioner, the question was referred to a Division Bench of the Assam Board of Revenue (hereinafter mentioned as ''the Board''). The Division Bench of the learned Board by the Judgment and order dated 23.2,87 answered the question. Quoting the Rule 40A of the Rules, the Division Bench of the Board held:
The above rule, though not very clearly worded regarding sequencer, implies dial n a plot of land was settled with the tea garden for the ordinary cultivation found to have utilised for lea cultivation without prior conversion, the tea garden concerned shall have to pay premium for conversion of ordinary kheraj period lease to kheraj periodic Lease for special cultivation.
After the aforesaid decision, the Single Bench of the learned Board by the impugned order dated 10.4.87 dismissed the appeal holding that irrespective of the lime of settlement of the land for ordinary cultivation, if such plot of land was brought under special cultivation after 24.9.31, the settlement holder would he liable lo pay premium fixed by the Government as per circular dated 18.8.68. The Petitioner has thereafter approached this Court m this writ petition.
I have heard Mr. K.K. Bhatra, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. B. Choudhury, learned Addl. Senior Govt. Advocate, Assam for the Respondents.
Mr. Bhatra, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the learned Board has committed manifest errors of law apparent on the face of the record in misconstruing the provisions of Rule 40-A of the Rules in holding that irrespective of the year of settlement of the land for ordinary cultivation if the conversion thereof lo special cultivation took place after 24.9.31 provision of Rule 40-A would be applicable for levy of premium for such conversion. Mr. Bhatra submits that from the plain reading of provision of Rule 40-A of the Rules, it is apparent that the provision of Rule 40-A of the Rules has no application for conversion of land into special cultivation if the settlement of the land for ordinary cultivation was taken prior lo 24.9. 31. The learned Board has ignored the plan meaning of the language of Rule 40-A of the Rules and arbitrarily rendered the impugned decision.
Mr. Bhatra further submits that although conversion of the plot of land in question to special cultivation took place long before initiation of the proceedings in the year 1982-83, the Settlement Officer determined the premium arbitrarily on the basis of the market value of the land prevalent at the time of initiation of the proceedings, Mr. Bhatra also submits that the learned Board failed to exercise jurisdiction duly vested in law in not deciding the question as to whether the premium payable under Rule 40-A of the Rules should he determined on the basis of the market value of the land prevalent at the time of conversion of the land to I special cultivation or at the time of initiation of the proceedings under Rule 40-A r of the Rules. According lo the Petitioner the premium payable under the provisions of Rule 40-A of the Rules is to be determined, on the basis of market value of the land prevalent at the lime of conversion thereof to special cultivation.
Mr. B. Choudhury, learned Additional Sr. Govt. Advocate, on the other hand, submits that the learned Board has not committed any error of law apparent on the face of the record in interpreting the provision of Rule 40-A of the Rules holding that Rule 40-A of the Rules will be applicable if the land settled for ordinary cultivation came to be converted to special cultivation after 24.9.31, irrespective of year of settlement of the land for ordinary cultivation. Mr. Choudhury also submits that the learned Board has rightly observed that words of Rule 40-A of the Rules regarding sequence is ambiguous and that reading of this Rule as a whole with Rule 45 of the Rules, correct interpretation of provision of Rule 40-A would be that irrespective of year of taking settlement for ordinary cultivation, if the settlement holder happens to convert the plot of land taken for ordinary cultivation to special cultivation after 24.9.31, he will be liable to pay premium for such conversion of, the land.
I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the Petitioner as well as on behalf of the opposite party and perused the materials on record.
It is well settled that in interpreting provisions of the Acts and Rules, the intendment of the legislature or the framer of the Rules should be gathered primarily from the plain meaning of the words used in the provision of the Acts or Rules and that addition of language is not permissible when the language of the provisions of the Act or Rule is clear and unambiguous. Maxwell in his book- "On the Interpretation of Statute" (10th Edition) at page 2, points out- "if the words of me Statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound these words in their natural ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature."
In the case of Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan reported in AIR J 957 SC 907?, the Hon''ble Supreme Court amongst other held-
The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act.
In the case of Firm Hansraj Nathuram v. Firm Lalji Raja and Sons reported in 1963 SC 1180, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that- the provision has to be interpreted as it is and a Court cannot read it as if its language was different from what it actually is, It is not permissible for the Court to amend the law suggested.
In the case of Workmen of The Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. Vs. The Management and Others, the Hon''ble Supreme Court amongst other held-
A statute or for the matter of that even a particular section, has to be interpreted according to its plain words and without doing violence to the language used by the legislature.
The above view has consistently been held by the Hon''ble the Supreme Court in a catena of decisions. It is not desirable to burden the Judgment by quoting all those decisions.
The Govt. of Assam in exercise of power u/s 20 of the Regulations by the notification No. 3052 R framed and inserted Rule 40A in the Settlement Rule. The said notification was published in the Assam Gazette on 24.9.91 is as follows:
40A The settlement holder of any land taken up for ordinary cultivation after the date of publication of this notification of this in the Assam Gazette, and found to be under special cultivation shall be liable to pay premium at the rate fixed by the local Government for that locality. Premium shall be payable immediately and without reference to the area limits prescribed in Rule 41. or to the period of settlement mentioned in Rule 45.
On a plain reading of Rule 40A as drafted, it becomes apparent that a settlement holder of any land is liable to pay premium under the following conditions:
(i) if settlement of land taken up for ordinary cultivation after the date of publication of the notification No. 3052 R in the Assam Gazette: and
(ii) such land is found to be under special cultivation,
(iii) the premium shall be paid at the rate fixed by the Govt.
The draftsman must be presumed to have used the clearest language to express the intention of the framers of the Rules. In the absence of ambiguity no exposition should be made which is contrary to the express words of Rule 40A of the Rules, that cut off date namely 24.9.1931 referred therein relates to the date of taking settlement of the land for ordinary cultivation by the settlement cultivation, other interpretation is neither warranted nor permissible. Had it been intendment of the framers of the Rule that land settled for ordinary cultivation if found to have been converted to special cultivation after 24.9.31, the settlement holders of the land would be liable to pay premium that intendment would have been expressed in Rule 40A. The learned Board in my opinion has committed manifest errors of law apparent on the fact of the face of the record in ignoring the plain meaning of the language of the provision of Rule 40-A of the Rule and adopting hypothetical construction thereof that irrespective of the year of taking settlement of land for ordinary cultivation, conversion of such land into special cultivation a after 24.9.31 would entail payment of premium as contemplated under Rule 40-A of the Rule.
As to the question whether the premium contemplated under Rule 40-A of the Rule should be determined on the basis of market value of the land prevalent at the time of conversion of the land from ordinary cultivation to special cultivation or at the time of initiation of the proceedings for levy of premium, I find force in the submissions of Mr. Bhatra that premium should be determined on the basis of the market value of the land prevalent at the time of conversion, In fact the learned Addl. Senior Govt. Advocate does not dispute the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner.
For the reasons staled above, I have no hesitation to hold that the provision of Rule 40-A of the Settlement Rules has no application in cases where the settlement of the land for ordinary cultivation was taken prior to 24.9. 31 and has subsequently been converted to special cultivation. In other words, the premium for conversion of a piece of land to special cultivation as contemplated under Rule 40-A of the Rules can not be levied on the settlement holder, if he had taken settlement of the land for ordinary cultivation prior to 24.9.31.1 also hold that, premium payable by a settlement holder under Rule 40-A of the Rules is to be determined on the basis of the market value of the land prevalent at the time of conversion of the land to special cultivation.
The petition is, therefore, allowed and the impugned order passed by the learned Board and the Settlement Officer, are set aside. 1 make no order to costs.
The case is remitted back to the Settlement Officer, Sonitpur with the direction to pass appropriate order in the proceeding after giving reasonable opportunity to the Petitioner to satisfy that settlement of the plot of land in question wits taken for ordinary cultivation prior to 24.9.31. In case it is found that the settlement of the land in question had been taken by the Petitioner for ordinary cultivation prior to 24.9.31, the proceedings for levy of premium shall be dropped. If, however, the settlement of the land in question for ordinary cultivation is found to have taken after 24.9.31, the Settlement Officer will determine the premium payable for conversion of the land on the basis of market value of the land prevalent in the year of conversion thereof to special cultivation.