Padum Singh vs Smt. Janaki Bai & Ors.

^1. The appellant herein/plaintiff has preferred the present second appeal challenging the judgment and decree dated 24-6-2016 passed by the learned First Appellate Court – Additional District Judge, Kondagaon {Presiding Officer – Mr. Jaideep Garg} in Civil Appeal No.2A/2012 (Padum Singh v. Smt. Janaki Bai and six others), whereby affirming the judgment and decree dated 28-10-2010 passed by the learned Trial Court – Civil Judge Class-II, Bastar at Kondagaon {Presiding Officer – Mr. Harish Kumar Awasthi} in Civil Suit No.44A/2006 (Padum Singh v. Smt. Janaki Bai and six others), the first appeal preferred by the appellant/ plaintiff was dismissed.

^2. Heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission. Perused the memorandum of appeal, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court, as well as the judgment and decree of the trial Court.

^3. Appellant/plaintiff Padum Singh instituted a suit against his deceased biological brother, Soman Singh, through his two wives and children, seeking a declaration of title, permanent injunction restraining interference with his possession, and correction of the revenue records by recording his name in respect of 2.45 acres of land situated at Village Sonabal, Tehsil Kondagaon, District Bastar, which originally stood in the name of their father, “Pursati”. The suit was founded on the plea that Soman Singh had been adopted by their paternal uncle, Sitaram, and, therefore, had no right or share in the property of their biological father, Pursati.

^4. Upon conclusion of the trial and after appreciating the evidence adduced by the parties, the Trial Court, applying the provisions of Sections 6 and 11 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 held that the alleged adoption of Soman Singh had not been proved in accordance with law and, accordingly, dismissed the suit instituted by the appellant/plaintiff.

^5. The appellant/plaintiff preferred a first appeal challenging the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. However, by the impugned judgment, the First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the findings recorded by the Trial Court were justified, as the parties are Hindus and the alleged adoption of Soman Singh was required to be proved in accordance with the provisions of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. Since the alleged adoption was not established in accordance with the statutory requirements, no interference with the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court was warranted.

^6. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, while addressing arguments on admission, contended that both the Courts below failed to examine the material effect of the alleged adoption of Soman Singh by his paternal uncle, Sitaram, particularly its impact on his succession rights in the properties of both his adoptive father, Sitaram, and biological father, Pursati. It was submitted that Soman Singh was claiming a share in the properties of both, but this aspect was not considered by either Court below, giving rise to substantial questions of law warranting admission of the second appeal.

^7. Considered the submissions and perused the record.

^8. The scope of interference by this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is well settled. In Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179, the Supreme Court held that the existence of a substantial question of law is the sine qua non for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC and is a condition precedent for entertaining a second appeal.

^9. The distinction between a question of law and a substantial question of law was further explained in Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545, wherein it was held that a substantial question of law must materially affect the rights of the parties and cannot be equated with a mere question of fact or the application of a settled proposition of law to the facts of a case. The Supreme Court, in Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala, (2020) 19 SCC 57, reiterated that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC, cannot act as a first appellate Court by reappreciating the evidence or interfere with concurrent findings of fact merely because another view is possible.

^10.More recently, in U. Sudheera & Others v. C. Yashoda & Others, (2025) 4 SCC 215, the Supreme Court reiterated that admission of a second appeal is permissible only upon the Court's satisfaction that the case involves a substantial question of law; in the absence of such a question, the appeal is liable to be dismissed at the admission stage itself.

^11. In the light of the aforesaid settled legal position, this Court has examined the grounds raised in the memorandum of appeal and the proposed substantial questions of law in the context of the findings recorded by both the Courts below. In the present case, it emerges from the record of the Trial Court that both the parties belong to the Kshatriya community and are governed by Hindu law. It is also an admitted position that Sitaram, the paternal uncle of the appellant/plaintiff and Soman Singh, had three sons.

^12.In such circumstances, reference to Sections 6 and 11 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, appears relevant, the relevant provision whereof reads as under:

^13.A conjoint reading of Sections 6 and 11 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, shows that the Trial Court record contains no evidence establishing who had given Soman Singh in adoption, whether such person was legally competent to give him in adoption, or whether the person taking him in adoption was legally competent to do so.

^14.Further, in view of the provisions of Section 11, the alleged adoption also cannot be accepted, particularly when Sitaram already had three sons at the relevant time. The statutory requirements governing a valid adoption have, therefore, not been established. Consequently, both the Courts below were justified in declining to accept the appellant/plaintiff's plea regarding the alleged adoption of Soman Singh, and no error can be attributed to their concurrent findings on this aspect.

^15.In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellant/plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of any substantial question of law warranting admission of the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. The concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below do not suffer from any perversity or legal infirmity calling for interference. Accordingly, the second appeal is dismissed at the admission stage itself. No order as to costs.

^16.Let a decree be drawn accordingly.