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Judgment
Satish K. Agnihotri, J.
Heard learned Counsel for the parties. I.A. No. 1, this is an application for condonation of delay.
Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the consequential benefits as ordered by this Court in W.P. No. 4793/2005 (Padamdhar Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors.) on 15.01.2008, the petitioner has pursued the remedy bonafidely under the other provisions of law. Thus, there is delay in filing this application for review.
In response, learned Counsel appearing for the State/respondents would submit that the delay has not been properly explained and as such, the same deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay.
Having examined all the aspects of the case, I am of the considered opinion that sufficient cause has been shown in filing the review petition belatedly. In the interest of justice, the delay deserves to be condoned. Accordingly, delay is condoned.
This Court, after having heard learned Counsel appearing for the parties, passed the order dated 15.01.2008 in W.P. No. 4793/2005, which is sought to be reviewed for modification of the order. In para 4, it was ordered as under:
In view of the above, this petition stands disposed of in terms of the order dated 2.4.2007 passed by this Court in W.P.(S) No. 5073/2006. The petitioner shall be entitled to consequential benefits flowing from the order dated 31.3.2007. No order, asto costs.
The petitioner was denied consequential benefits for a reasonably long time as the order was passed on 15.01.2008, thus, this Court was moved for determining the specific time for grant of consequential benefits.
Learned Counsel appearing for the State/respondents firstly questions the order which is sought to be reviewed on merit which is not permissible in review petition filed by other side. Secondly, it was urged that since the matter is pending consideration in W.A. No. 94/2008 wherein notice has been issued on application for condonation of delay, the respondent authorities are not obliged to comply with the order passed by this Court on 15.01.2008 in W.P. No. 4793/2005.
It is a trite law that an appeal does not automatically suspend the operation of the order appealed from unless the appellate court stays it or statute conferring right of appeal provides for such a stay. Admittedly, in appeal which appears to have been filed after specified period of limitation, notice on condonation of delay has been issued. There is no order to stay the operation of the order dated 15.01.2008 passed by this Court in W.P. No. 4793/2005.
The principle of law under such situation wherein appeal is pending consideration, however, no notice was issued on merit and no stay of the operation of the order impugned therein was granted, is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Hon''ble Supreme Court.
The Hon''ble Supreme Court, in the matter of Kamla Devi v. Takhatmal observed as under:
...The filing of an appeal does not automatically suspend the operation of an order appealed from unless the appellate court stays it or a statute conferring right of appeal provides for such a stay. Section 40 of the Act confers a right of appeal on an aggrieved party against the final order of a Tribunal to the High Court. The section conferring the said power does not provide for a statutory stay of the order of the Tribunal till the disposal of the appeal..
Further, in the matter of Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd., observed as under:
It is well settled that mere preferring of an appeal does not operate as stay on the decree or order appealed against nor on the proceedings in the court below. A prayer for the grant of stay of proceedings or on the execution of decree or order appealed against has to be specifically made to the appellate court and the appellate court has discretion to grant an order of stay or to refuse the same...
The above ratio as laid down by the Supreme Court has been reiterated in Rafique Bibi (Dead) by LRs v. Sayed Waliuddin (Dead) by LRs,as under:
7...The order may be `a nullity'' and `void'' but these terms have no absolute sense: their meaning is relative, depending upon the court''s willingness to grant relief in any particular situation. If this principle of illegal relativity is borne in mind, the law can be made to operate justly and reasonably in cases where the doctrine of ultra vires, rigidly applied, would produce unacceptable results." (Administrative Law, Wade and Forsyth, 8th Edn., 2000, p. 308.) Secondly, there is a distinction between mere administrative orders and the decrees of courts, especially a superior court. "The order of a superior court such as the High Court, must always be obeyed no matter what flaws it may be thought to contain. Thus a party who disobeys a High Court injunction is punishable for contempt of court even though it was granted in proceedings deemed to have been irrevocably abandoned owing to the expiry of a time-limit.
Applying the well settled principles of law as stated above to the facts of the case, the respondent authorities cannot disobey or refuse to comply with the order passed by the High Court until and unless it is either modified or stayed by the superior Court.
Looking into the conduct of the respondents wherein it appears that the respondents are deliberately not complying with the order dated 15.01.2008 passed by this Court in W.P. No. 4793/2005, it is clarified that the petitioner shall be entitled to consequential benefits flowing from the order dated 15.01.2008 passed by this Court in W.P. No. 4793/2005 within a period of two months from today.
Consequently, the review petition is allowed to the above extent.