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Judgment
Charles Arnold White, Kt., C.J.—One of the points first raised in this appeal is not altogether free from difficulty, but as we have made up
our minds about it, we do not think anything is to be gained by further consideration. The two points which have been raised by Mr.
Govindaraghava Ayyar on behalf of the appellant arise under the second issue in the case, viz., whether the second defendant, the Collector, was
entitled to notice of suit u/s 49 of Madras Act I of 1902; and if so, was a valid notice served on him. Section 49 is in these terms ""No suit relating
to the person or property of any ward shall be instituted in any civil court until the expiration of two months after notice in writing has been
delivered to or left at the office of the District Collector specified in the notification u/s 19 or the Collector appointed u/s 46, as the case may be.
Mr. Govindaraghava Ayyar has argued first that no notice is necessary; and secondly, if notice was necessary, the notice which the evidence
shows was given in this case was sufficient. As regards the first point, the question turns on the construction of the words ""No suit relating to the
person or property of any ward shall be instituted, etc.,"" and the question we have to consider is what is the meaning of the words ""relating to the
person or property of any ward"" for the purpose of the section. Mr. Govindaraghava Ayyar has pointed out that the words are ""relating to the
person or property"" and not ""affecting or which may affect the person or property"" of a ward. The suit before us is a money suit, a claim on a
promissory-note, in which it was sought to make the ward or the estate of the ward liable. There can be no question that if the plaintiff succeeds in
this suit the estate of the ward will be affected because execution will have to go against the estate. But the words are not ""affecting"" but"" relating
to."" It is quite clear if we adopt Mr. Govindaraghava Ayyar''s construction we shall have to exclude from the scope of the section every money
suit, because such a suit according to him, though the result may affect the estate, does not relate to the estate. But a suit for money in which a
decree may be realised in execution against the estate of the ward seems as much within the mischief of the section as a suit relating to the specific
property of any ward which according to Mr. Govindaraghava Ayyar is what the legislature meant. According to Mr. Govindaraghava Ayyar so
far as I can see the suits which come within the section would be limited to mortgage suits and ejectment suits. However that may be, a suit for
money would certainly be excluded from the operation of the section.
On the other hand, the construction which Dr. Swaminadhan on behalf of the respondent contends is the right construction no doubt leads to
this. It is difficult to think of a suit against a ward which does not relate to the person or property of the ward, and that being so, his construction to
a great extent, if not entirely, renders the words ""relating to the person or property of any ward"" superfluous or meaningless and section might as
well well run: ""no suit against a ward shall be instituted in any Civil Court."" Dr. Swaminadhan suggests, and there is some force in the suggestion,
that the words ""relating to the person or property"" were adopted as a compendious form of expression having regard to the general scheme and
scope of the Court of Wards Act which gives protection to the person and property of the ward. The conclusion I have come to, although the
point is not altogether free from doubt, is that the learned Judge is right in the construction which he adopted that a suit for money is a suit relating
to the property of a ward within the meaning of Sub-section (1) of Section 49 of the Madras Act I of 1902.
Our attention has been called to a few authorities. I do not think that the decision in Sri Venhatachallapathy Sahaya Viyavasaya Co. v.
Kanahasabapathia Pillai ILR (1910) Mad. 494 to which Mr. Govindaraghava Ayyar called our attention helps him much. That was a case in which
a question as to the construction of the words ""relating to trust"" within the meaning of Article 18 of the Schedule II to the Provincial Small Cause
Courts Act arose, and it was there hold that the suit in that case was not a suit relating to a trust. A case which is more in point is an English case--
In re Siaines (1886) 33 Ch. D. 172. The question there was with reference to the construction of Order LI, Rule 1 of the English Rules of the
Supreme Court. That rule provides that if in any cause or matter relating to any real estate it appears necessary that the real estate should be sold
the Court or a Judge may order the same to be sold. The question was whether the ""cause or matter"" in question related to real estate. The action
was by the next friend of: an infant claiming an account of the personal estate and rents and profits of the real estate. North, J., held that that was
not a cause or matter relating to real estate. He said it was really an action for the recovery of rents and profits and that the Court had no power to
sell an infant''s real estate merely because it thought it would be for his benefit that it should be sold. The words of Order LI, Rule 1 are ""relating to
real estate."" Here the expression is much wider ""relating to person or property."" The property may be real or personal. As has been pointed out
the legislature could not haveiadopted wider or more comprehensive words than ""relating to"" and I am of opinion that the words ""relating to the
person or property "" are wide enough to include a case in which a claim for money is made against a ward.
the second point I can dispose of very shortly. Here again I think the learned Judge was right. It seems to me that neither Exhibit B read alone
nor Exhibit E read by the light of the other documents and the other facts proved pr admitted can be said to constitute a notice of suit for the
purpose of Section 49 of Madras Act I of 1902. They all come to nothing more than a demand and cannot be said to amount to a notice of suit.
That being so it is really unnecessary to consider whether the notice was bad on the further ground that it was not delivered to or left at the office of
the District Collector and it is not necessary to consider whether in a case where the evidence shows that notice was given to the manager and
brought to the knowledge of the Collector it is enough for the purpose of the section.
On both the points I think the learned Judge was right and 1 dismiss the appeal with costs, one set to first respondent and Its. 50 to respondents
Nos. 3 to 5.
Sankaran Nair, J.
I agree.