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Judgment
M.H.S. Ansari, J.—Heard Sri K. Lakshmi Narasimha, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri G. Raghuram, learned Senior Counsel for Respondents 1 and 2 and Sri B. Nalini Kumar, learned Counsel for Respondent No. 3.
Brief facts relevant for resolving the controversy in the above writ petition are that the petitioner was employed as a Clerk in the pay-scale of Rs. 475-760/- in the Office of the Bar Council. By her letter dated 5-10-1993 addressed to the Chairman - 2nd respondent, the petitioner submitted her resignation. A month later, an application dated 4-11-1993 was sent by the petitioner requesting that the petitioner may be permitted to retire voluntarily from service for the reasons stated in her letter dated 5-10-1993. In the said letter, it was also requested that proportionate pension under Rule 147-A of the Bar Council Rules may be provided. By order dated 8-12-1993, 2nd Respondent held that the petitioner has not put in more than 10 years of service as required under Rule 147-A and that therefore she is not entitled to pensionary benefits. This decision was sought to be communicated to the petitioner by letter dated 14-12-1993 by Registered Post with Ack. Due as well as through Special Messenger. Six months after her letter of resignation dated 5-10-1993, the petitioner sent an application dated 30-3-1994 purporting to withdraw her resignation letter dated 5-10-1993 and requesting that she may be treated as in service and may be permitted to join duty immediately. The Chairman-2nd respondent directed the said letter of the petitioner dated 30-3-1994 to be placed before the Executive Committee along with the petitioner''s resignation letter dated 5-10-1993 which was earlier accepted by the Chairman. The Executive Committee which met on 16-7-1994 ratified the action of the Chairman dated 5-10-1993 accepting the petitioner''s resignation.
The letter dated 11-10-1993 issued by the 3rd respondent - Secretary informing the petitioner that the resignation dated 5-10-1993 submitted by the petitioner was accepted by the Chairman has been questioned in the above Writ Petition as illegal, arbitrary and void. The petitioner seeks consequential directions to the respondents to take the petitioner back into duty with all consequential benefits.
Sri K. Lakshmi Narasimha, learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended that the Executive Committee is the appointing authority in so far as the petitioner is concerned and that as the resignation letter dated 5-10-1993 was addressed to the Chairman and not to the Executive Committee, there is no sanctity for the resignation letter and that the Chairman has no jurisdiction or authority to accept the resignation. It is only the Executive Committee which is competent either to accept or reject the letter of resignation. Therefore the 2C impugned letter dated 11-10-1993 of the Secretary - 3rd respondent informing the petitioner that the Chairman - 2nd respondent has accepted the resignation letter is illegal, void and without jurisdiction, it is urged.
Let us now briefly look at the rule position.
The Bar Council of the State of Andhra Pradesh in exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 15 and 28 of the Advocates Act, 1961, has made rules called "Rules of the Bar Council of the State of Andhra Pradesh" (for short "the Rules"). Chapter IX of the Rules deals with staff of the Council. Rule 113 specifies the staff with their scales of pay and salary. Rule 114 specifies 3G the Appointing Authority. It lays down that the Appointing Authority for the posts other than (a) and (b) specified in Rule 113 shall be the Executive Committee. The petitioner, admittedly, falls under the category of posts for which the Appointing Authority is the Executive Committee.
Chapter XI of the Rules deals with powers and duties of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Secretary. Under Rule 165, it is stated the Chairman shall exercise general control and supervision over the affairs of the Council. Under Sub-rule (e) of Rule 165, power is conferred on the Chairman of appointing the staff on behalf of the Council or the Executive Committee as the case may be subject to its ratification.
Sri G. Raghu Ram, learned Senior Counsel, relying upon the above rule position, contended that the Chairman having been conferred general control and supervision over the affairs of the Council, as also the power of appointing staff, it cannot be contended that the resignation letter addressed to Chairman 4! was of no significance and could not be acted upon. The contention is well founded. The Chairman has been conferred the power of general control and supervision over the affairs of the Council as also the power of appointing staff and therefore the letter of resignation so addressed and submitted to Chairman cannot be said to be of no consequence (nonest) nor can it be said that the same cannot be acted upon. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner to the contra has therefore to be rejected, in the light of the rule position.
As regards the power and jurisdiction of the Chairman to accept the resignation of the petitioner, it is the contention of Sri G. Raghu Ram, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents, that under Sub-rule (e) of Rule 165, the Chairman has been conferred the power of appointing the staff on behalf of the Council or the Executive Committee as the case may be subject to ratification. The power thus available to Chairman of appointing the staff on behalf of the Committee and subject to its ratification, power inheres in the Chairman to accept the resignation on behalf of the Executive Committee subject to its ratification. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that the letter of resignation dated 5-10-1993 was accepted by the Chairman on the same day in the presence of the petitioner. The same has been specifically stated in paragraph 3(B) of the Counter affidavit of the Chairman - 2nd respondent. A controversy, however, has been raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there has been no such communication of the orders accepting the resignation by the Chairman. Nevertheless, the impugned letter which could not be communicated to the petitioner, a copy thereof is filed amongst the material papers and its invalidation is sought in the above writ petition. In this connection, Sri G. Raghu Ram, learned Senior Counsel, referred to the specific averments contained in the counter affidavit of the 2nd respondent therein. The efforts made by sending the communication to the petitioner of acceptance of her resignation both by Registered Post as well as by Special Messenger. The registered letters were returned with the postal endorsement, "party 7 days absent, returned to senders address". The communication of acceptance of the resignation sent through Special Messenger to the address of the petitioner, it was informed that the petitioner was absent, though the petitioner''s mother was present in the house, she refused to take the letter and also prevented the Special Messenger to affix the same on the door of the petitioner''s house. It is, however, noteworthy that the petitioner has not attended office on and from the date she submitted her letter of resignation dated 5-10-1993 which as asserted by the 2nd respondent was accepted on the same day on 5-10-1993 in the presence of the petitioner. In the light of the factual conspectus, it has to be held that the letter of resignation of the petitioner was accepted by the Chairman on 5-10-1993 to the knowledge of the petitioner. At any rate the petitioner is aware of the acceptance of the resignation by the Chairman before its ratification by the Executive Committee.
Next, it is contended that the letter of resignation having been withdrawn by the petitioner''s letter dated 30-3-1994, the same could not be considered by the Appointing Authority - Executive Committee. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Appointing Authority alone could have accepted the resignation and that before its acceptance or even before its consideration by the Executive Committee, the petitioner has by her letter dated 30-3-1994 withdrawn the resignation letter and therefore the Executive Committee could not have accepted the resignation of the petitioner. The actions of the Executive Committee have not been questioned in the above writ petition. Only the order communicating the acceptance of the petitioner''s resignation by the Chairman is questioned.
As already noticed, power is conferred on the Chairman under Sub-rule (e) of Rule 165 of appointing the staff on behalf of the Executive Committee subject to ratification by the Executive Committee. General supervision and control has also been conferred on the Chairman over the affairs of the Bar Council. In the light of the same, it has to be held that power inheres in the Chairman to accept the resignation on behalf of the Executive Committee and is subject to ratification by the Executive Committee. The power of appointment on behalf of the Executive Committee having been delegated to the Chairman under Rule 165 (e), the power to accept resignation would inhere in the Chairman as a delegate of the appointing authority and in exercise of the powers of general supervision and control conferred on him. The said power, however, would be subject to the same limitations as the power of appointment. That is to say, power to accept resignation if exercised by the Chairman would also require to be ratified by the Executive Committee in the same way as the appointments made by the Chairman. The ratification alone would put the seal of approval on the action of the Chairman and validate his actions in that behalf.
Alternatively, it was contended that the Chairman could only have forwarded the resignation letter dated 5-10-1993 to the Executive Committee for its decision. I cannot accept the said contention, in the light of the discussion above as to the power inherent in the Chairman to accept resignation on behalf of the Executive Committee by virtue of the delegated authority vested in the Chairman to make appointments on behalf of the Executive Committee, subject of course to ratification by it. It is not as though there is any specific rule relating to resignations or acceptance thereof in the Rules nor is there any authority enumerated for acceptance of resignations. Therefore if the petitioner seeks the importation of the general principles of service jurisprudence to canvass that the Appointing Authority alone is the competent authority to terminate services and therefore can accept letters of resignation, the said principle has necessarily to be extended to the delegate of such power, the Chairman by Rule 165 (e) is conferred the power to appoint the staff.
The further submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the letter of resignation having been withdrawn before its consideration by the Executive Committee, there was no resignation in the eye of law. The said contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that on 5-10-1993 when the petitioner submitted the letter of resignation, it was accepted by the Chairman to the knowledge of the petitioner and it was in her presence and as evidenced by her subsequent conduct in not attending the office thereafter. What remained after the acceptance of the letter of resignation by the Chairman is the ratification by the Executive Committee. The letter of withdrawal dated 30-3-1994 is after acceptance of resignation dated 5-10-1993 by the Chairman and awaiting ratification by the Executive Committee.
The fallacy in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner lies in mis-construing the role of the Executive Committee. The Executive Committees role was either to ratify or not to ratify the action of the Chairman accepting the resignation. The Executive Committee was not considering the acceptance of resignation per se, but the act of acceptance thereof by the Chairman. The agenda before the Executive Committee was with respect to ratification of the action of the Chairman.
"Ratification" is in legal effect, the adoption of the act of one by the other. Ratification implies the approval of the act of another. For "to ratify" means to confirm or approve of something that has already been done and in essence it is the recognition or confirmation of that which has been done. The ratification being an act subsequent to the act accomplished by another and upon ratification relates back to the inception of the action and has retroactive efficacy unless otherwise provided by rules or the instrument governing the same. That, in short, is the essence and purport of ratification.
In the circumstances, the letter of withdrawal which is later in point of time to the acceptance of the resignation letter by the Chairman would not fetter the powers of the Executive Committee to ratify as it did the act of acceptance of the resignation of the petitioner by the Chairman. The letter of withdrawal, if at all, was one of the documents or material which was to be considered along with any other material to arrive at a decision by the Executive Committee whether or not to ratify the action of the Chairman.
By its (Executive Committees'') act of ratifying the action of the Chairman accepting the resignation, even if there was any infirmity in the action of the Chairman, after ratification, the said act of Chairman stands as an authorised one and makes the whole act good from the beginning. The consequence of ratification is that as if the act ratified had been fully authorised in the beginning. The Executive Committee by ratifying the action of the Chairman gave its seal of approval to the act of the Chairman accepting the resignation of the petitioner retroactively from the date when the Chairman - 2nd respondent so accepted the resignation.
The instant case, is not one such where there is inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Chairman. The power is, at best, inadequate or not being complete in the sense that it is subject to ratification by another body so expressed or implied from the rules governing the service. Therefore, on the contingent event of ratification by the Executive Committee, the initially incomplete power gets validated in whole by the ratification. In the context of the instant case, the acceptance of the letter of resignation by Chairman and subsequent ratification of the same by the Executive Committee, the ratification related back to the date of acceptance. Therefore, the acceptance gets validated retrospectively w.e.f., 5-10-1993, the date of acceptance by the Chairman. As already noticed, the Executive Committee''s action of ratification has not been questioned by the petitioner in the above writ petition.
In the light of the above, the above writ petition is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. But in the circumstances without costs.