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K.C. Bhanu, J. - This Writ Petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is filed challenging the order, dated 17.04.2014, in Original Application No.2619 of 2014 passed by the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad (for short, ''the Tribunal'')
Petitioners herein filed the aforesaid Original Application to declare the action of the respondents in not considering their applications for the Special recruitment drive for filling up of the vacancies of General Purpose Employees (Sewerage) and Water Supply in the respondent Board pursuant to G.O.Ms.No.33, Municipal Administration & Urban Development (C) Department, dated 29.01.2014, as arbitrary and illegal despite they are willing to forego their monetary benefits pending cases and consequently, direct the respondents to consider the application forms of the petitioners to the post of General Purpose Employees (Sewerage) and (Water Supply) in the respondent Board.
The Tribunal, after considering the material on record, dismissed the Original Application on the ground that it is not maintainable as per Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985(for short, ''the Act'').
Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that Section 19 of the Act is a procedural one and substantive provisions of Section 15 of the Act have to be followed and hence, he prays to set aside the impugned order. He also placed reliance on various decisions, which will be referred to, at appropriate time.
On the other hand, learned Government Pleader for Services appearing for the respondents contended that Special recruitment drive is only for NMRs and as the petitioners are not NMRs, they are not entitled to appointment and hence, he prays to dismiss the Writ Petition.
Section 19 of the Act reads as follows:
"Applications to Tribunals :- (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance.
Admittedly, in this case, the persons aggrieved, who are the applicants in the Original Application, have not challenged any order. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners show that Section 19 of the Act is a procedural one, but substantive provisions are Sections 14 and 15 of the Act.
Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on Full Bench judgment of the Honourable Madras High Court in Government of Tamil Nadu And Others V. P.Hepzi Vimalabai And Others, 1995 (1) SLR 168, wherein it was held thus (para 32):
"S.19 of the Act, which deals with the making of applications to the Tribunals, is merely procedural and in our opinion, the said provision is wide enough to cover any matter which falls within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. We have already explained the scope and jurisdiction of the Tribunal to deal with all disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public service and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union and the State. Section 19 of the Act cannot control the substantive provisions of Sections 14 and 15 of the Act. Form I, which was framed under Section 19 of the Act, cannot also, in our view, be pressed into service to understand the scope of jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Sections 14 and 15 of the Act."
He also placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in K.Naga Raja And Others v. The Superintending Engineer, Irrigation Department, Irrigation Circule, Chittoor, AIR 1987 Andhra Pradesh 230 wherein it was held thus (para 6):
"The counsel for the petitioners strongly relied on the expression "person employed: used in para 7 of the Presidential Order to contend for the position that the Tribunal was authorised to receive representations for the redress of their grievances only from persons employed in service of the Government and, therefore, the writ petitioners were not precluded from invoking the writ jurisdiction of this court to seek the appropriate relief. This contention overlooks what precisely is the meaning of the expression "person employed" used in para 2 (1) (d) of the Presidential Order is meant to remove any'' doubt on this question, and it reads as follows:
"person employed" means an individual in relation to whom the Tribunal has jurisdiction in respect of the matters specified in para 6 of this order."
It is evident that the expression "person employed" is used in a comprehensive sense for the sake of convenience to avoid repetition. Though at the first flush the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioners would appear to be attractive, even in the absence of the definition in para 2 (1) (d) of the Presidential Order, a careful analysis of the language guardedly used in sub-para (1) of para 7 thereof, would indicate that the persons employed are persons who are entitled to approach the Tribunal with "representations for the redress of their grievances relating to matters within its jurisdiction" which implies that the right of the persons to seek redressal extends to all matters within its jurisdiction. The provisions contained in sub-para (2) of para 7 of the Presidential Order are also of some relevance. The combined effect of cls. (3), (4) and (7) of Article 371-D of the Constitution and paras 2 (1) (d), 6 and 7 of the Presidential Order is that the Administrative Tribunal, and Administrative Tribunal alone, has jurisdiction to entertain matters with respect to appointment inclusive of selection process for being appointed to the post in service of the Government. It has to be noticed that para 7 of the Presidential Order is one which lays down procedure than one conferring any right or jurisdiction. It is, in fact, an enabling provision which gives guidance as to what the Tribunal was expected and authorised to do when a person invokes its jurisdiction in terms of para 6 (1) of the Presidential Order. It would be absolutely unreasonable to hold that the intention of using the expression "person employed" is to restrict the jurisdiction of the Tribunal."
He also placed reliance on a judgment of the Honourable Karnataka High Court in Kshama Kapur v. Union Of India, Laws (KAR) 1986-11-15 wherein it was held thus (para 3):
"�������. That being the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, Section 19 of the Act which provides for making an application only against orders and Section 20 which provides that application against an order under Section 19 should not ordinarily be entertained unless the civil servant had exhausted all the remedies available under the service rules, but could be entertained if no order is passed by the higher authority on the appeal or representation preferred under the relevant rules within six months after the presentation, being procedural provisions, cannot have the effect of diminishing the jurisdiction of the Tribunal conferred under Section 14 or Section 15 of the Act, as the case may be. Therefore, in cases where the complaint is not against any order but it is against inaction by the authority concerned, an application could be made invoking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 14 or Section 15 of the Act to such an application against inaction. Section 21, which prescribes limitation, also would not be attracted, for, unless an order is made, the period of limitation would not commence. But in such cases the Tribunal could decline to exercise its jurisdiction applying principles like inordinate delay, laches, acquiescence etc., which were governing the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution."
He also placed reliance on a judgment of the Honourable Haryana High Court in Union Of India v. Lal, IPS And Others, 2001 LAB.I.C.3088 wherein it was held thus (para 22):
"It is thus clear that the Tribunals continue to have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain all types of service disputes and complaints subject, of course, to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to directly entertain petitioners under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, there does not appear to be any valid ground to give a restricted meaning to the provisions of Sections 14 and 15 read with Section 3 (q) and 19 of the 1985 Act so as to confine jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunals to entertain applications which directly affect the service matters/service conditions of the applicant. If a narrow view is taken about the authority and jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain applications only against actions, decisions or orders which directly affect the applicant, then the very object of creating special machinery for adjudication of the service disputes will get defeated because in that even, more than one judicial forums will have the jurisdiction to entertain different types of service disputes. This will totally destroy the scheme of the 1985 Act. Therefore, keeping in view the well recognised rule that if two interpretations of a status are possible, then the Court would adopt the one which furthers the object of the legislation and makes it purposeful and discard that which may defeat its object, we hold that the Tribunals constituted under the 1985 Act have the jurisdiction to entertain the complaints or dispute in respect of recruitment, matters relating to recruitment, service matters and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto."
He also placed reliance on a judgment of the Honourable Madhya Pradesh High Court in Usha Narawariya (Dr.) v. State Of M.P. And Others 1994 (1) Services Law Reporter 142, wherein it was held thus (para 6):
"The learned counsel for the petitioners, on the other hand, placed reliance on Betalisingh Mahore''s case (supra), the Chairman, Railway Recruitment Board, Madras v. S.Ruban Peter (1990 LIC 1759) and submitted deriving assistance from Vijay Singh Jadon v. State of M.P. (1989 MPLJ 255) that matters relating to ''pre-recruitment stage'' cropping up for consideration at the instance of persons who are not ''in-service'' do not lie within the jurisdiction of the State Administration Tribunals, as ''recruitment and matters concerning recruitment'' occurring in sections 14 and 15 of the Act were circumscribed in their application and covered the persons who had been appointed to public service or who were holding posts in connection with affairs of the Union or the State etc; the Act having been enacted pursuant to the powers conferred on the Parliament by Article 323- A of the Constitution of India."
He also placed reliance on a judgment of the Honourable Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sis Pal v. Union Of India And Others, 1996 (2) Services Law Reporter 540 wherein it was held thus (para 5):
"During the course of hearing a question arose as to whether this Court can hear a petition like the present one which involves appointment in the service of the Railways. This issue arose in view of the provisions contained in Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (for short, ''the Act''). Argument of Shri Ishwar Lal, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that appointment on compassionate grounds is not regulated by statutory provisions and the same does not form part of the conditions of service of the employees and, therefore, it does not fall within the ambit of Section 3 (q) of the Act. Another facet of the submission of Shri Ishwar Lal is that the petitioner is not an employee for the purposes of the provisions of the Act and, therefore, he cannot file an application under Section 19 of the Act.
Section 28 of the Act reads as under:-
"28. Exclusion of jurisdiction of courts except the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
On and from the date from which any jurisdiction, power and authority becomes exercisable under this Act by a Tribunal in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any Service or post or service matters concerning members of any Service or persons appointed to any Service or post, no Court except-
(a) the Supreme Court; or
(b) any Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other authority constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any other corresponding law for the time being in force, shall have or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to such recruitment or matters concerning such recruitment or such service matters."
The above decisions have the following the points emerge (1) Section 19 of the Act cannot control the substantive provisions of Sections 14 and 15 of the Act. (2) Administrative Tribunal has alone jurisdiction to entertain the matters with respect to redressal of grievance of Government employees with respect to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment and all service matters in connection with the affairs of the State. (3) An employee can invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal not only against any order but also inaction of the Government on an application filed before it. (4) Tribunal will have jurisdiction to entertain complaints or disputes in respect of recruitment, matters relating to recruitment and service matters connected therewith.
Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on clause (1) of Section 15 of the Act, which reads as follows:
"15. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of State Administrative Tribunals:- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, Administrative Tribunal for a State shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to �
(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any civil service of the State or to any civil post under the State;
(b) all service matters concerning a person [not being a person referred to in clause ( c) of this sub-section or a member, person or civilian referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section appointed to any civil service of the State or any civil post under the State and pertaining to the service of such person in connection with the affairs of the State or of any local or other authority under the control of the State Government or of any corporation [or society] owned or controlled by the State Government;
(c) all service matters pertaining to service in connection with the affairs of the State concerning a person appointed to any service or post referred to in clause (b), being a person whose services have been placed by any such local or other authority or corporation [or society] or other body as is controlled or owned by the State Government at the disposal of the State Government for such appointment."
None of the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners is applicable to the facts of the present case.
Case of the petitioners is that their applications were not considered for the Special recruitment drive for filling of the vacancies to the post of General Purpose Employees (Sewerage) and (Water Supply). Admittedly, no notification was issued for filling up of post of General Purpose Employees (Sewerage) and (Water Supply) under Special Drive recruitment. There cannot be any dispute that recruitment commenced from the date of issuance of notification calling for application. The right of petitioners to consider their applications for appointment is not begun. Therefore, they have no locus standi to approach the Tribunal. Since there is no special recruitment drive, question of process of applications of the petitioners may not arise. Therefore the Tribunal rightly dismissed the Original Application and that order needs no interference by this Court.
Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this Writ
Petition shall stand closed.