P. Ramadoss and R. Lavanya vs The Revenue Divisional Officer, The Special Deputy Collector (Stamps) @ District Collectorate and The Inspector General of Registration

N.V. Balasubramanian, J.—C.M.A.No.896/2004 is preferred against the order passed by the 3rd respondent in No.6061/N3/2004 dated

February 2004. C.M.A.No.897/2004 is preferred against the order passed by the 3rd respondent in No.5867/N3/2004 dated February 2004.

2.In both the orders, the 3rd respondent has rejected the appeals preferred by the appellants on the ground that the orders of the Revenue

Divisional Officer, Sivakasi are dated 18.11.2003, but the appeals were preferred beyond the period of two months as provided under Sections

47A of the Indian Stamps Act 1899.

3.We heard Mr.A. Sivaji, learned counsel appearing for the appellants and learned Government Advocate for the respondents and with the

consent, the appeals are taken up for hearing.

Mr.A. Sivaji, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the orders of the 3rd respondent are not sustainable as the said officer

has taken into account the date of the order for the purpose of deciding the question whether the appeals were filed in time or not but omitted to

take note of the date of service of the orders and if that is taken into account, the appeals preferred are within time. Learned counsel appearing for

the appellants also submitted that the Personal Assistant to the Collector has signed the orders on 10.12.2003 and even if that date is taken into

account, the appeals filed would be within time.

Learned Government Advocate submits that if the date 10.12.2003 is taken into account, the appeals preferred on 30.1.2004 would be within

time.

We find from the Xerox copy of the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Sivakasi, though the orders are dated 18.11.2003, the Personal

Assistant has signed the same on 10.12.2003 and there is an endorsement made by the appellants for the receipt of the order on 23.12.2003. It is

clear that if the date of signature of the Personal Assistant, namely, 10.12.2003 is taken into account, the appeals which were filed on 30.1.2004

are within time. As per Section 47 A of the Indian Stamps Act, 1899 read with Rule 9 of the Tamil Nadu Stamps (Prevention of Under Valuation

of Instruments) Rules, it is open to the appellants to file an appeal within two months from the date of the order. The 3rd respondent has

proceeded on the basis of the date of the order is the date which the order bears. But, it is well settled that for the purpose of computing the

limitation in preferring the appeals the date of service of the order is relevant and not the date which the order bears. In Raja Harish Chandra Raj

Singh Vs. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Another, the Supreme Court construed the expression, ''the date of the award'' found in

section 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 to mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or known to him either

actually or constructively. The Supreme Court after considering earlier decisions held as under:-

A similar question arose before the Madras High Court in Annamalai Chetti v. Col.J.G. Cloete, ILR 6 Mad 189. Section 25 of the Madras

Boundary Act XXVIII of 1860limited the time within which a suit may be brought to set aside the decision of the settlement officer to two months

from the date of the award, and so the question arose as to when the time would begin to run. The High Court held that the time can begin to run

only from the date on which the decision is communicated to the parties. ''If there was any decision at all in the sense of the Act,'' says the

judgment, ''it could not date earlier than the date of the communication of it to the parties; otherwise they might be barred of their right of appeal

without any knowledge of the decision having been passed''. Adopting the same principle a similar construction has been placed by the Madras

High Court in Swaminathan alias Chidambaram Pillai Vs. Lakshmanan Chettiar and Another, on the limitation provisions contained in Ss. 73(1)

and 77(1) of the Indian Registration Act XVI of 1908. It was held that in a case where an order was not passed in the presence of the parties or

after notice to them of the date when the order would be passed the expression ''within thirty days after the making of the order'' used in the said

sections means within thirty days after the date on which the communication of the order reached the parties affected by it. These decisions show

that where the rights of a person are affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved

against the said order by reference to the making of the said order, the making of the order must mean either actual or constructive communication

of the said order to the party concerned.

We, therefore, hold that the date of the order u/s 47-A for the purpose of deciding the limitation for filing appeals should be construed to mean the

date of the service of the order. Hence, the date of order under Rule 9 of the said Rules shall be construed to mean the date of service of the order

for the purpose of determining the time limit to prefer the appeals.

Moreover, in the instant case, the Personal Assistant has signed the order on 10.12.2003 for despatch to the appellants and the orders could

not have been despatched prior to 10.12.2003. It is apparent that if 10.12.2003 is taken into account, the appeals preferred would be within time.

The orders suffer from other infirmities as the third respondent without giving an opportunity to explain as to how the appeals preferred were within

time, rejected the appeals. In our view, it is not necessary to quash the orders on the ground that they were passed in violation of the principles of

natural justice as we hold that the view entertained by the third respondent that the date of order means the date which the order bears, and not the

date of service of the order to determine the time limit for preferring the appeals is not legally sustainable. Hence, the orders of the 3rd respondent

holding that the appeals preferred were beyond the period prescribed u/s 47-A of the Stamps Act are not sustainable. Consequently, the orders

challenged in both the appeals are set aside and the matters are remitted back to the 3rd respondent to consider the same on merits.

Consequently, both the appeals stand allowed. C.M.P.Nos.5384 and 5384/2004 are closed. No costs.