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Judgment
Aruna Jagadeesan, J.—This Writ Petition has been filed by a practising Advocate of this Court as probono publico, praying to issue a Writ
of Quo Warranto against two employees of this Court, who have been promoted to the cadre of Assistant Registrar recently. Before embarking
into other aspects of the case, the first legal point that arises for consideration is ''whether any Writ Petition under the name and style of ''Public
Interest Litigation'' will lie in service matters''.
Mr. Haja Mohideen Gisthi, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the First Respondent would vehemently argue that in service matters, no
Public Interest Litigation will lie and the present Writ Petition filed under the name and style of Public Interest Litigation is, therefore, not
maintainable. He would further submit that there is no locus standi for the Petitioner to file this Writ Petition. In support of his contentions, he would
rely on certain judgments of the upper forums of law, which we would discuss in due course. On such arguments and relying on the said judgments,
the learned Standing Counsel for the First Respondent would pray to dismiss this Writ Petition being a misconceived, vexatious and frivolous one.
Mr. A. Navaneethakrishnan, learned Advocate General would also endorse the views expressed by the learned Standing Counsel appearing on
the First Respondent and would submit that since the service matters are essentially and exclusively the matters between the Employer and
Employee, no lis at the instance of a third party, totally unconnected to the administration, could either be filed or maintained. He would also pray
to dismiss this Writ Petition.
In Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and Others Etc. Etc. Vs. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and Others Etc. Etc., a Three-Judge Bench of the Honourable Apex
Court has held that ''in service matters PILs should not be entertained''.
In Ashok Kumar Pandey Vs. The State of West Bengal and Others, , the Honourable Apex Court has held as follows:
As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the Petitions, which though titled as Public Interest Litigations are in essence something else. It is
shocking to note that Courts are flooded with a large number of so-called Public Interest Litigations where even a minuscule percentage can
legitimately be called Public Interest Litigations. Though the parameters of Public Interest Litigation have been indicated by this Court in a large
number of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, Courts are entertaining such Petitions and wasting valuable judicial time which,
as noted above, could be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and Others Etc. Etc. Vs. Jitendra Kumar
Mishra and Others Etc. Etc., , this Court held that in service matters, PILs should not be entertained, the inflow of so-called PILs involving service
matters continues unabated in the Courts and strangely are entertained. The least the High Courts could do is to throw them out on the basis of the
said decision.
In N. Veerasamy Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , while considering a Public Interest Litigation filed by a treasurer of a political party,
praying to take action again Mrs. Lakshmi Pranesh, IAS, the Fifth Respondent therein, under the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,
1969, for allegedly making allegations against leader of a political party in a Suit filed before the Honourable Apex Court, following the above
judgments of the Honourable Apex Court, a Division Bench of this Court has held that:
It is settled law that no Writ in the form of Public Interest Litigation will lie under Article 226 of the Constitution in service matters. The Petitioner
has no locus standi to file the Public Interest Litigation. The extraordinary powers of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution in matters of
this kind is required to be used sparingly and only in extraordinary cases.
The service matters are essentially between the employer and the Employee and it would be for the State to take action under the Service Rules
and there is no question of any public interest involved in such matters.
The Petition is not only not maintainable either in law of facts but also would amount to abuse of the process of Court.
Further, in Surinder Singh Vs. Kapoor Singh (Dead) th. Lrs. and Others, , another Three-Judge Bench of the Honourable Apex Court has held
that ''unless an aggrieved party is under some disability recognized by law, it would be unsafe and hazardous to allow any third party, be it a
member of the Bar, to question the decision against third parties.''
In view of the catena of judgments on the point and following the above judgments of the Honourable Apex Court and that of this Court, we
have no hesitation to hold that this Writ Petition, filed as Public Interest Litigation, in a service matter, is not maintainable and that the Petitioner has
no locus standi to file this Petition.
Though on this point of maintainability and locus standi itself, this Writ Petition filed as PIL is liable to be dismissed, since the learned Counsel
appearing for the Petitioner has argued the case on other aspects also, we proceed to deal with the same.
It is the case of the Petitioner that the Respondents 2 & 3 have pursued their law courses, while in service and therefore, the promotions
awarded to them by the First Respondent is illegal.
When we posed specific question to the Registrar General of this Court, who is present in the Court about the above said allegations of the
Petitioner, he has fairly submitted that there are many precedents in the Registry in ratifying the action of its employees in pursuing their law course,
while in service, without obtaining prior permission, by exercising the vested statutory powers conferred under the Madras High Court Service
Rules. He has also submitted that pursuant to ratification of such of the actions of the employees, many employees were promoted to the higher
cadres in the registry and pursuant to such of the orders of the High Court, on administrative side, ratifying the actions of its employees in pursuing
their law degrees, many consequential orders have been passed, according monetary and service benefits not only to such of the employees whose
action in pursuing the law course has been ratified by the High Court, but also to other employees, who claimed pay parity with some of their
juniors. He has also submitted that the action of the Respondents 2 & 3 in pursuing their law degrees while in service was also ratified by the High
Court on administrative side, as an ''employer'', under the vested statutory rights conferred under the Madras High Court Service Rules, after
judiciously judging all the facts and circumstances and therefore, according to him, there is no illegality or irregularity either in the action of the High
Court in ratifying the action of the Respondents 2 & 3 in pursuing their regular law degrees while in service and in conferring certain service benefits
attached thereto to the Respondents 2 & 3, since the Respondents 2 & 3 possess the required qualification of law degree to hold the post.
It is not and in fact cannot be the case of the Petitioner that the Respondents 2 & 3 did not possess the required qualification of Law Degree
since the employer himself has accepted the law degrees of the Respondents 2 & 3, after ratifying their action in pursuing their law course while in
service. But, his only allegation is that they have pursued their law course, while in service and therefore, the same should not have been accepted
by the First Respondent.
At this juncture, it is relevant to mention that when cases of some of the employees of this High Court in pursuing their regular Law degrees
while in service were ratified by the Chief Justice of this Court, on administrative side, under the statutory powers conferred on him under the
Madras High Court Service Rules and consequential service benefits were allowed flow to such of the employees, the same was challenged before
this Court in R. Shanmugham v. The High Court of Judicature at Madras, rep. by the Registrar, W.P. Nos. 8362, 14717 & 14419 of 1993 &
W.A. Nos. 934 & 1378 of 1993 and a Division Bench of this Court, by the common order dated 23.8.1994, has upheld the decision of the High
Court, on administrative side in ratifying the action of such of the employees and conferring, on them, certain service benefits. In this judgment, the
Division Bench has also held that such power of the Chief Justice ''to grant permission retrospectively is not under challenge and indeed could not
be challenged.'' The Division Bench has also rejected the similar contentions, as are being urged before us by the learned Counsel for the
Petitioner, that the Respondents therein (whose action in pursuing their regular law degrees while in service was ratified by the High Court) were
not holding validly conferred degree. This order of the Division Bench of this Court was upheld by the Honourable Apex Court in SLP Nos.
21364 & 21365 of 1994, dated 21.4.1997. This judgment squarely applies to the facts of the present case.
Therefore, when, as the ''employer'', the High Court has ratified the action of the Respondents 2 & 3 in pursuing their law degrees, while in
service, with retrospective effect, by applying the judicious mind and considering all the facts and circumstances and the entire gamut in the manner
known to law, that too under the statutory powers conferred on the Chief Justice under the Madras High Court Service Rules, which power of the
Chief Justice, as held by the Division Bench of this Court in the above referred case, cannot be challenged, we are not able to appreciate any of
the contentions raised and urged on the part of the Petitioner. As the action of the High Court, in ratifying the action of the Respondents 2 & 3 in
pursuing their law degrees, while in service, with retrospective effect, is well within the statutory powers conferred under the Madras High Court
Service Rules and also following the legal and procedural precedents, it cannot be said that there is any deviation by the High Court from the well
established principles of law and therefore, the judgment relied on by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner in H.C. Puttaswamy and others Vs.
The Hon''ble Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court, Bangalore and others, , has no application to the facts of the case on hand. Further, since the
Respondents 2 & 3 possess the required qualification to hold the post, it cannot at all be said that their promotion is contrary to statutory
provisions/Rules. Therefore, the question of issuance of quo warranto against the Respondents 2 & 3 will not at all arise.
During the course of arguments, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner also relied on an unreported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court
in H. Sheik Sardar v. The Chairman of the Tamil Nadu Bar Council, W.A. No. 330 of 2006, dated 23.1.2008 delivered by one of us (Elipe
Dharma Rao, A.C.J.) wherein the decision of the Bar Council rejecting the enrolment of the Appellant/Petitioner, who, at the time of pursuing his
law course was working as Headmaster, was the subject matter and the said decision of the Bar Council was upheld by the Division Bench of this
Court.
In the said case before the Division Bench, no such statutory power was reported to have been vested with the ''employer'' of the Appellant/
Petitioner to say that the said power has been judiciously exercised by the ''employer'' so as to ratify the action of the ''employee'' in pursuing his
law course while in service. Thus, it was not a case of ratification of the action of the employee by the employer under any conferred statutory
powers, as is the case in hand. Further, the case on hand is not pertaining to the question of enrolment with the Bar Council, but the question
involved is pertaining to the conferment of certain service benefits on its employees by the High Court as the ''employer'', by exercising its statutory
powers duly conferred under the Madras High Court Service Rules and by following the earlier legal and procedural precedents. Therefore, the
above said judgment of the Division Bench of this Court has no application to the facts of the case on hand.
It is to be pointed out that along with the Writ Petition, the Petitioner, a practising Advocate, has filed the official communication of the High
Court, dated 31.12.2012, whereby and whereunder the Respondents 2 & 3 were promoted as Assistant Registrars. Our specific question put to
the learned Counsel for the Petitioner as to how the Petitioner came into possession of the said document and what is his source of information, has
emanated no answer from the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. This clearly establishes that some persons in the Registry of this High Court are
behind the present litigation and the present litigation is not at all a Public Interest Litigation but only a ''Person(s) Instigated Litigation''. We came to
this firm conclusion given the fact that without the active support of some hidden personnel, who indulged in shadow boxing, the Petitioner would
not have come into possession of the said communication so as to be filed as a document in the typed set of papers.
At this juncture, it is relevant to quote the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court in Gurpal Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Others, wherein it
has been held as follows:
As noted supra, the time has come to weed out the Petitions, which though titled as Public Interest Litigations are in essence something else. It is
shocking to note that Courts are flooded with a large number of so-called Public Interest Litigations where only a minuscule percentage can
legitimately be called as Public Interest Litigations. Though the parameters of Public Interest Litigation have been indicated by this Court in a large
number of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, High Courts are entertaining such Petitions and wasting valuable judicial time
which, as noted above, could be otherwise utilised for disposal of genuine cases. Though in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and Others Etc. Etc. Vs. Jitendra
Kumar Mishra and Others Etc. Etc., , this Court held that in service matters PILs should not be entertained, the inflow of so-called PILs involving
service matters continues unabated in the Courts and strangely are entertained. The least the High Courts could do is to throw them out on the
basis of the said decision. The other interesting aspect is that in the PILs, official documents are being annexed without even indicating as to how
the Petitioner came to possess them. In one case, it was noticed that an interesting answer was given as to its possession. It was stated that a
packet was lying on the road and when out of curiosity the Petitioner opened it, he found copies of the official documents. Whenever such frivolous
pleas are taken to explain possession, the Court should do well not only to dismiss the Petitions but also to impose exemplary costs. It would be
desirable for the courts to filter out the frivolous Petitions and dismiss them with costs as aforestated so that the message goes in the right direction
that Petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the Courts.....
(Emphasis supplied)
It has also been held in this judgment as follows:
It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the Courts, innumerable days are wasted, which time
otherwise could have been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine litigants. Though we spare no efforts in fostering and developing the
laudable concept of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights
are infringed and violated and whose grievances go unnoticed, unrepresented and unheard; yet we cannot avoid but express our opinion that while
genuine litigants with legitimate grievances relating to Civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees and substantial rights
and Criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death facing the gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to life imprisonment and
kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering from undue delay in service matters Government or private, persons awaiting the disposal of
tax cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorised collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenus expecting their release from
the detention orders, etc. etc. are all standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the Courts and having their
grievances redressed, the busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no real public interest except
for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break
the queue muffling their faces by wearing the mask of Public Interest Litigation and get into the Courts by filing vexatious and frivolous Petitions of
luxury litigants who have nothing to lose but trying to gain for nothing and thus Criminally waste the valuable time of the Courts and as a result of
which the queue standing outside the doors of the court never moves, which piquant situation creates frustration in the minds of the genuine
litigants.....
(Emphasis by us)
Public Interest Litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to
see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an
effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of Public Interest Litigation should not
be allowed to be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not
publicity-oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, Court must be careful to see that a body of persons or member of the
public, who approaches the Court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique
consideration. The court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations by masked phantoms who monitor at times from
behind. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper
motives and try to bargain for a good deal as well as to enrich themselves. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap
popularity. The Petitions of such busybodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary
costs....
(Emphasis supplied)
In Neetu Vs. State of Punjab and Others, also, the Honourable Apex Court has held as follows:
When a particular person is the object and target of a Petition styled as PIL, the Court has to be careful to see whether the attack in the guise of
public interest is really intended to unleash a private vendetta, personal grouse or some other mala fide object.
Both the above judgments of the Honourable Apex Court squarely apply to the case on hand, as in the case on hand also, there are some
''hidden forces'' behind the present litigation and as has already been pointed out supra, such persons have indulged in shadow-boxing with the
Respondents in general and with the Respondents 2 & 3 in particular.
When, as the ''employer'', the High Court has ratified the action of the Respondents 2 & 3 in pursuing their law course while in service and
conferred certain service benefits on them, by recognising their law degrees, after applying its judicious mind in the manner known to law and under
the vested statutory rights conferred under the Madras High Court Service Rules, the question of reversing the said service benefits or directing
initiation of any Disciplinary action against the Respondents 2 & 3 for their action of pursuing their law course during their employment with the
High Court, will not at all arise, since by the act of ratification of their action in pursuing their law degrees while in service, by the High Court on
administrative side, long back, a legitimate expectation has been created in their favour, which cannot be taken away since the Administration
cannot be expected to perpetrate and cannot be directed to act in the manner less favourable to the employees.
Further, it has been established before us by the First Respondent that only after due consideration of the suitability and lawful qualification
possessed by them, the Respondents 2 & 3 were accorded promotion by the First Respondent, wherein we find no illegality or irregularity.
No bias or mala fide can also be attributed to the High Court, in ratifying the action of the Respondents 2 & 3 and conferring certain service
benefits on them, on administrative side, after duly weighing all the facts and circumstances of the cases and duly exercising the statutory powers
conferred under the Madras High Court Service Rules and following the legal and procedural precedents, as stated above.
In view of the specific submissions made on the part of the First Respondent before us, as extracted supra, that many consequential orders
have also been passed, conferring monetary and service benefits on other employees also who claimed pay parity and other things pursuant to
ratification of action of such of its employees in pursuing their law courses while in service, we have no hesitation to say that settled issues cannot
be permitted to be unsettled, that too to the detriment of interest of the employees. Except the above discussed points, no other argument or
objection has been raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner for our consideration and discussion.
For all the above reasons, we see no ground to entertain this Writ Petition. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs.