P. Pichan vs The Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Villupuram, The Special Officer, V.P. Agaram (PACB) and Shahjahan

K.P. Sivasubramaniam, J.—The petitioner prays for the issue of a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the first respondent dated

11.7.1995 and to quash the same.

The short facts which are sufficient for the disposal of the writ petition is that the third respondent, then Secretary of the Primary Agriculture Co-

operative Bank, was terminated from service. However, by virtue of the impugned order dated 11.7.1995, he was reinstated in service subject to

the disciplinary proceedings against him.

As against the said order, the petitioner who is the member of the Society has come forward with the above writ petition, contending that the

impugned order was beyond the jurisdiction of the respondents and was not in terms of Section 19 and 152 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative

Societies Act. The grievance of the petitioner is that by virtue of the impugned order, the dismissal order passed as against the third respondent had

been set aside. Such order has been passed not consistent with any provision of law. According to the petitioner, the third respondent did not take

any steps to file any appeal or revision against his order of dismissal and the impugned order was also not passed at the instance of the third

respondent. On the other hand, an Association or Union appears to have represented on behalf of the third respondent and the third respondent

has been reinstated in service. Hence, the above writ petition.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Section 153 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act provides for revision only in two

contingencies namely, either on suo motu basis or by a petition by the aggrieved persons. Section 153 of the Act does not contemplate any

revision at the instance of other third parties. In this context, learned counsel relies on the order of the learned single Judge of this Court dated

15.10.1969 in W.P. No.2196 of 1969. In that case, the question which arose for consideration is as regards the effect of Section 21(7) of the

Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 which is in pari materia with Section 153 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act.

In that judgment the learned Judge was concerned with the proceedings which were initiated at the instance of the second respondent one

Duraisami, who was a stranger not at all concerned with the proceedings impugned therein. The learned Judge after examining the provisions u/s

21(7) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, held that sub-section 7 of Section 21 makes it clear that the

provisions can be availed of only by a person who was directly aggrieved and to whom the order or proceedings were communicated. It was

further held that it would necessarily mean that the person who could move by way of revision should have been a party to the proceedings.

I am unable to apply the said ruling to the facts of the present case considering that in this case a recognised Union has taken steps to move the

Society to have the order of dismissal set aside. The Society after taking into account the said representation appears to have felt that the order of

dismissal as against the third respondent had been passed without complying with the principles of natural justice. It is not disputed before me that

the Union which took up the case of the third respondent is a recognised Union. Therefore, the example of a total third party as in the case of the

order relied on by learned counsel for the respondents cannot apply to the facts of the present case.

Further reason why I am unable to attach much importance to this objection is as follows: Subsequent to the filing of the writ petition, the

disciplinary proceedings which were pending at the time when the third respondent came to be reinstated in service, has also come to an end. The

Society by its resolution dated 28.10.1996, has resolved to reinstate the petitioner. It was ordered that the period of suspension to be treated as

punishment, for which he shall not be entitled for any salary.

It is also to be noted that the impugned order is only a consequential order passed by the Joint Registrar, directing reinstatement of the third

respondent. The impugned order of the Joint Registrar directing such reinstatement has not been questioned by the petitioner.

Therefore, taking the overall circumstances and also the subsequent events, I do not find any ground to interfere with the proceedings.

In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.