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K. Raviraja Pandian, J.—W.P. Nos. 31097, 36113 and 37531/2005 are filed seeking for the relief of issuance of a writ of certiorarified
mandamus to call for the notification No. Nil dated 29.8.2005 issued by the fourth respondent, the Assistant Director, District Employment Office,
Salem District, while W.P. No. 33427/2005 is filed to issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to fix the age limit as 45 years for the
post of conductor at par with that of the post of Driver.
As seen from the notification, which is impugned in these writ petitions, dated 29.8.2005, the fourth respondent informed the general public in
order to sponsor the names of the persons, who are having qualification for the post of conductors and drivers, to be appointed as daily wage
earners in the State owned Transport Corporation. In that notice, the qualification prescribed for the appointment of driver as well as the
conductor in the respondents Corporation, has been stated. The grievance of the petitioners in the present writ petitions is that the age qualification
for the post of drivers was fixed as 40 years. Insofar as the conductors are concerned, the age limit has been fixed as 30 years, which is
impermissible, and even for the conductors also, the age limit has to be fixed as 40 years on par with the drivers.
The learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that there is no rationale for fixing the age limit as 40 years for drivers and 30 years for the
conductors, and it should be equal for both the posts. I am not able to countenance the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioners. The
prescription of the qualification of a particular post is purely within the domain of the respondents and not for this Court. Even otherwise, the two
posts which are referred to in the notice, are not similar posts. The work of the one post is totally different from the work of the other post. The
petitioners cannot have a legal right to approach this Court with the prayer as stated above.
When the matter is taken up for orders today, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, placed before this Court the Government
Order issued in G.O. Ms. No. 98 Personnel and Administrative Reforms (S) Department, dated 17.7.2006 to sustain their case that the age limit
for the conductors should at least be extended by another five years. In the said G.O., the Government after referring the G.O. Ms. No. 212
Personnel and Administrative Reforms (P) Department, dated 29.11.2001, banning the filling up of vacant posts in the State and Subordinate
Services by direct recruitment except in respect of certain categories of posts considered essential and further referring to the decision of the
Government that the upper age limit for entering into Government service would be relaxed by five years to enable the unemployed youth affected
by the ban order on recruitment to apply for Government jobs, directed that the upper age limit for entering into Government Service should be
relaxed by five years.
At the first instance, I am not able to countenance the argument of the learned Counsel that the Government Order would be applicable to the
post for which they are informed to apply, the post of conductor, in the Government owned Transport Corporations. But, the above statement
need not be taken as a finding given by this Court. If the petitioners are of the view that the Government Order is applicable to them, and the
Government by virtue of the G.O. is inclined to relax five more years of age limit for entering into the service of the Transport Corporation also,
they would consider the case of the petitioners.
Another aspect of the matter in the writ petitions is that the petitioners have approached the Court without there being any cause of action. It is
not that their names have been not sponsored by the fourth respondent on the ground that they are not qualified. But, age-wise they are not
qualified for sponsoring. It is well established legal principle of law that for every action there must be a cause of action. Without a cause of action,
this Court and even the Constitutional Court could not resolve an issue in vacuum. A useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Supreme
Court reported in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, .
Hence, all these writ petitions are dismissed. However, the dismissal of the writ petitions would not preclude the respondents from considering
the case of the petitioners, if they thought that the G.O. Ms. No. 98 dated 17.7.2006 is applicable to the case of the petitioners also.
No costs. Consequently, connected WPMPs are also dismissed.