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Judgment
V. Kanagaraj, J.—Both the above writ petitions are filed praying to issue Writs of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records of the
second respondent respectively in O.Mu.No.96160/2001 and O.Mu.No.94043/2001, both dated 28.12.2001 and quash the same and direct the
respondents to renew the petitioners licences to store diesel for the period from 1.1.2002 to 31.12.2004.
On a perusal of the materials placed on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for both, it comes to be known that both the petitioners
were granted licences by the second respondent under the Petroleum Act to import 2000 litres of petroleum Class-B on 28.7.1992 and they were
renewed periodically; that when the second respondent cancelled their licences by proceedings dated 21.6.1999, they filed W.Ps.11239 and
11350 of 1999 before this Court and a learned single Judge of this Court, by a common order dated 14.9.1999 allowed both the writ petitions on
ground that the second respondent has not issued any notice to the petitioners, before cancelling their licences, but, however, given liberty to the
second respondent/D.R.O. to take further action, if necessary, after giving due opportunity and notice to the petitioners.
It further comes to be known that thereupon, by the orders dated 4.2.2000, the D.R.O. cancelled the licences of the petitioners relying on a
communication received from the first respondent dated 31.5.1999, which reads that the issue of licence for retail sale of motor spirit and high
speed diesel by D.R.O. is violative of Clause 3(vii) of Motor Spirit and High Speed Diesel (Regulation of Supply and Distribution and Prevention
of Malpractices) Order 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the Control Order) and hence to take corrective action immediately. Challenging the said
cancellation of their licences, the petitioners again filed W.P.Nos.4413 and 4416 of 2000 before this Court and a learned single Judge of this
Court, by order dated 10.8.2000, allowed the said writ petitions and since the main contention of the petitioners therein is that though the
respondents have relied on the order of the first respondent dated 31.5.1999, they have not been furnished with a copy of the same, the learned
Judge directed the authorities to furnish copy of the said proceedings dated 31.5.1999 to the petitioners and pass orders after giving opportunity to
the petitioners. Afterwards, the respondents issued notices to the petitioners dated 25.10.2000 thereby furnishing a copy of the order of the first
respondent dated 31.5.1999, and the petitioners submitted their explanations on 16.11.2000. Thereupon, the second respondent, by his
proceeding dated 13.12.2000 cancelled the licences issued to the petitioners. However, the petitioners, on 5.12.2001, have filed petitions seeking
renewal of their licences as though their licences were still in force, in spite of the fact that their licences have been cancelled, as aforementioned,
for which the second respondent has rejected their applications for renewal of their licences as per the impugned orders dated 28.12.2001 with the
remarks that since their very licences have been cancelled as per his order dated 13.12.2000 itself, the question of renewal of the same for a
further term does not arise at all.
The main contention of the petitioners is that they were granted the licences under the Petroleum Act and now, the second respondent cancelled
their licences pursuant to the order of the first respondent dated 31.5.1999, which says that granting of licences by the DRO is violative of Order 3
(vii) of the Control Order. The said Control Order, according to the petitioners, cannot have any overriding effect over the Petroleum Act and
hence their licences cannot be cancelled based on such an order passed by the first respondent.
In support of their contention, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners would rely on a judgment of the Bombay High
Court delivered in The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited and Others, , wherein by a
notification No.P.104, dated 4.5.1950 issued u/s 31 of the Petroleum Act, 1934, the operation of Section 394 of the Bombay Municipal
Corporation Act, 1888 was restricted, insofar as it related to storage and transportation of petroleum products and the Bombay High has held:
There was a repugnancy between the Central Act i.e. Petroleum Act and the State Act i.e. The Corporation Act ... it is clear that to the extent of
notified category, there is a conflict between the two enactments and therefore to the extent of notified category, S.394 of the Corporation Act will
have no application. The Petroleum Act therefore will supercede the provisions of S.394 of the Corporation Act, by virtue of Art.254 of the
Constitution.
On 4.7.2002, when the above writ petitions came up for admission in the presence of the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioners and the Additional Government Pleader taking notice on behalf of the respondents and resisting the same, emphasis was laid on the part
of the petitioners to the prayers of the writ petitions to quash the impugned orders dated 28.12.2001 and to renew the petitioners'' licences to store
diesel for the period from 1.1.2002 to 31.12.2004.
The impugned orders dated 28.12.2001 are nothing but replies to the request of the petitioners made on 5.12.2001 to renew their licences to
keep diesel and petrol in the addresses mentioned therein, since their licences were to expire on 31.12.2001, for a further term of three years i.e.
till 31.12.2004.
In answer to the said renewal for three years requested by the petitioners as per their applications dated 5.12.2001, the impugned orders dated
28.12.2001 have been passed by the second respondent not only revealing that as early as on 13.12.2000 itself, the petitioners'' very licences
were cancelled as seen in reference No.2 of the orders impugned but also asserting that the petitioners are not entitled to get anymore licences of
that sort since possession of the essential commodities such as diesel or petrol by the petitioners or granting of the very licences by the authorities is
violative of Order 3 (vii) of the Control Order.
In the above scenario, the petitioners, in spite of having known that their licences have been cancelled by the order of the authority dated
13.12.2000 itself, after one year of such cancellation, had filed applications to the same authority, the District Revenue Officer, for renewal of the
licences for a further period of three years, which is nothing but a fraud and cheating perpetrated by the petitioners on the designated authority in
spite of knowing that their licences were cancelled as early as on 13.12.2000 and they could not be renewed any further much less by those
applications made after one year of such cancellation.
It is under these circumstances, in reply to such fraudulent applications filed on the part of the petitioners, the second respondent/District
Revenue Officer and the Licensing Authority had passed the impugned orders stating thereby that since the licences issued in their favour had been
repugnant to or violative of Order 3(vii) of the Control Order and further on account of the same reason their licences had already been cancelled,
the question of renewing the same does not at all arise, thus expressing his inability to renew the licences which were non-existent on the date of the
applications of the petitioners for renewal.
It is relevant to note that many writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners in the past and directions have been issued in every such writ
petition to the second respondent and ultimately, in full consideration of all the representations made on the part of the petitioners, the second
respondent had passed the ultimate orders dated 13.12.2000 thereby cancelling the licences of the petitioners and in spite of full knowledge of the
cancellation of the said licences, the petitioners had filed applications for renewal of the cancelled licences as per their applications dated
5.12.2001 i.e. roughly after one year of the cancellation of the licences thereby giving an impression to the second respondent Licensing Authority
as though the said licences had been in force and were only expiring on 31.12.2001, which is nothing but a calculated fraud played by the
petitioners with the Licensing Authority. In the above circumstances, the lower authority has not only declined to pass any order on such renewal
applications but also has disclosed the fraud perpetrated on the part of the petitioners making the Licensing Authority believe that their licences
(which had been cancelled as early as on 13.12.2000) were still in force and were going to expire only on 31.12.2001 thus seeking the renewal of
the same, which must be taken serious note of.
While such being the fact, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners would strive hard to convince the Court, citing a
judgment of the Bombay High Court reported in AIR 1993 Bombay 53 wherein by a notification dated 4.5.1950 issued u/s 31 of the Petroleum
Act, 1934, the operation of Section 394 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 was restricted insofar as it related to storage and
transportation of petroleum products and the said High Court observed that `there was a repugnancy between the Central Act i.e. Petroleum Act
and the State Act i.e. The Corporation Act'' further remarking that `it is clear that to the extent of notified category, there is a conflict between the
two enactments and therefore to the extent of notified category, Section 394 of the Corporation Act will have no application and the Petroleum
Act will supercede the provisions of Section 394 of the Corporation Act by virtue of Section 254 of the Constitution of India.''
The above judgment has absolutely no application to the cases in hand since there is neither repugnancy nor conflict between a Central
legislation and the State legislation in the cases in hand. It is only the Petroleum Act and the directive issued by the Commissioner, civil Supplies
pursuant to Clause 3(vii) of the Control Order which are relevant in the cases in hand and the said Control Order has been passed well in exercise
of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act,1955, which is yet another Central legislation. Therefore, citing the above
judgment and arguing as though the Central legislation and the State legislation are in conflict with each other so as to bring in the arguments of
repugnancy or conflict are absolutely of no application to the context of the cases. Further more, the petitioners have neither seem to have
challenged the cancellation order dated 13.12.2000 nor had the said orders been cancelled and therefore they have become final and holds good
till date, much less on 5.12.2001 when the petitioners filed their renewal applications before the Licensing Authority, the 2nd respondent.
Moreover, the petitioners having committed fraud and cheating of the Government authority in seeking renewal of licences that were already
cancelled and dead, does not have locus standi either to file the above writ petitions or to testify the validity of the law on the subject as they have
done in the above writ petitions. Having failed to perpetrate their fraudulent acts with the Licensing Authority and the District Revenue Officer,
Dharmapuri, now the petitioners have come up to play the same fraud on the High Court by means of the above writ petitions and hence the above
writ petitions deserve only to be dismissed with exemplary costs.
In result,
(i)Both the above writ petitions are not only absolutely devoid of merit but also an attempt to play fraud on the judicial process and therefore each
of the above writ petitions is dismissed, at the admission stage itself, with an exemplary cost of Rs.10,000/= (Rupees Ten Thousand Only).
(ii)The District Revenue Officer, Dharmapuri, the second respondent herein, is hereby directed to initiate prosecutions against the petitioners
through the Civil Supplies C.I.D. Police, Dharmapuri District within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and report
compliance to this Court.
Consequently, W.P.M.P.Nos.32948 to 32950 of 2002 are also dismissed.