P. Chithambaram vs Managing Director, TAFCORN, Karur Road, Mallachipuram, Kambarampatti, Tiruchirapalli and The Regional Manager, TAFCORN, Subramaniapuram 5th Street, Karaikudi, Sivagangai District

S. Manikumar

Challenge in these writ petitions, is to orders of suspension, dated 09.11.2009, passed by the Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Forest Plantation Corporation Limited, under Rule 56(6) of the TAFCORN Staff Regulations.

Assailing the correctness of the order of suspension Mr. D. Sivaraman, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that when the petitioners were working as Special Grade Office Assistant and Superintendent respectively, in the Office of the Regional Manager, TAFCORN, Karaikudi, Sivagangai District, the second respondent herein, on 26.08.2009 at 5.30 p.m., a surprise inspection was made by the Vigilance and Anticorruption Wing of Police, Sivagangai. Based on the inspection, a case in Crime No. 7 of 2009 was registered for the offences under Sections 7,13(1), A&D r/w 13/2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act r/w Section 102 of Corp., against five persons, including the Regional Manager, TAFCORN, Karaikudi, Sivagangai District. In the criminal case, it was alleged that the petitioners were caught red-handed with a sum of Rs. 100/-and Rs. 2700/-respectively alleged to have been given, as bribe, for disbursement of two cheques to the value of Rs. 90,050/-and that the said bribe amount was received from a Forest Ranger. Learned counsel further submitted that at the time of inspection, the petitioners in W.P.(MD)Nos.11791 & 11792 of 2009 were having money for their personal use and some amount was retained for remittance in the bank.

Inviting attention of this Court to the contents of the First Information Report, dated 27.08.2009 in Crime No. 7 of 2009, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that when the First Information Report, alleges involvement of the Regional Manager, TAFCORN, Karaikudi, Sivagangai District and four others for the offences stated supra, only the petitioners, who were working as Special Grade Office Assistant and Superintendent respectively, were selectively suspended and whereas, A1, A3 and A4 were allowed to continue to work, which exhibits a biased approach, on the part of the Managing Director, TAFCORN, Karur Road, Mallachipuram, Tiruchirapalli, the first respondent herein, and that the said selective suspension is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. According to him, there is no fairness in the administrative action and in support of the above said contention, he has placed reliance on the decisions made in Kunj Behari Lal v. District Judge, Gorakhpur and Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 257 , in Man Singh Vs. State of Haryana and Others, in P. Chithambaram Vs. Managing Director, TAFCORN, Karur Road, Mallachipuram, Kambarampatti, Tiruchirapalli and Another, reported in (2009) 8 MLJ 1144).

Placing reliance on a decision in N.Nandagopal Vs. The Secretary to Government, Personnel and Administrative Reforms (Q) Department, Chennai, reported in ( 2007 WLR 52 ) he submitted that if all the five persons named in the FIR were involved in the offences under Sections 7,13(1), A&D r/w 13/2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act r/w Section 102 of Cr.P.C., the department should have taken action against all of them and that the discretion exercised by the Managing Director, TAFCORN, Tiruchirapalli, the first respondent herein, to suspend only two persons and giving a clean chit to others, is not only erroneous but shows bias and mala fide on the part of the first respondent. Reiterating the averments in the supporting affidavits filed on behalf of the petitioners, he further submitted that when the counter affidavit is totally silent about the manner in which the discretion exercised, in placing the petitioners under suspension, it amounts to admission of the averments pertaining to bias, on the part of the first respondent and for the above said reasons, prayed that the impugned orders be quashed.

Per contra, based on the averments in the counter affidavit filed by the Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Forest Plantation Corporation Limited, Tiruchirapalli, Mr. Saidque Raja, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that on 27.08.2009 a fax message was received from the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anticorruption, Sivagangai, to the effect that, on 26.08.2009 between 17.30 and 23.45 hours, a surprise check was made in the Office of the Regional Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Forest Plantation Corporation Limited (TAFCORN), Karaikudi, Sivagangai District by the officials of the District Inspection Cell, Ramanathapuram with the assistance of Vigilance and Anticorruption Wing, Sivagangai and that they seized a sum of Rs. 40,950/-from the staff of the Regional Manager, TAFCORN, Karaikudi, Sivagangai District, the second respondent herein. He further submitted that a Forest Ranger has also given a statement to the effect that, he had paid a sum of Rs. 2,700/-as bribe, to Mr. D. Jayachandran, Office Superintendent, the petitioner in W.P.No.1172/09, as commission, at the rate of 3% on the value of amount to be paid to the Ranger, and a sum of Rs. 100/-to Mr. P. Chidambaram, an Office Assistant, writ petitioner in W.P.No.1171/09, as Mamool, for disbursement of two cheques to the value of Rs. 90,050/-/ He further submitted that after recording the statement of the Ranger, by the Deputy Inspection Cell Officer, on return to the Office of Vigilance and Anticorruption, Sivagangai, a case has been registered against Mr. M. Nainar Mohammed, the then Regional Manager, Mr. D. Jayachandran, Superintendent (Writ Petition in W.P.No.1172/09, Manoranjitha Kalaichelvi, Assistant, Razia Begum, Assistant and P. Chidambaram, Office Assistant (Writ petitioner in W.P.No.1171/09) in Crime No. 7 of 2009, for the offences under Sections 13(1)(a)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and u/s 102 of Cr.P.C. When the allegations of demand and acceptance were made only against the writ petitioners and that when they were arrested and kept in judicial custody, for more than 48 hours, the competent authority, viz., the Managing Director, TAFCORN, Kambarampatti, Tiruchirapalli, has placed the petitioners under suspension. He further submitted that even during the surprise inspection by the officials of the District Inspection Cell, Ramanathapuram, along with the Staff of Vigilance and Anticorruption Wing, Sivagangai, the second respondent, Mr. Nainar Mohammed, Regional Manager was not in his office. On information, he returned to the Office and inspection was done in his presence.

Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the second respondent had voluntarily produced his salary amount totalling to Rs. 1,94,100/-and other accounts. The above said sum was taken from the residence of the second respondent, under suspicious circumstances. In respect of another accused, Manoranjitha Kalaichelvi, learned counsel further submitted that she was also not present at the time of occurrence. The petitioners were suspended, as there was a specific statement made by the Forest Ranger, to the effect that a sum of Rs,2700/-was paid as bribe to the said Mr. D. Jayachandran and Rs. 100/-to Mr. P. Chidambaram, Office Assistant, as mamool for disbursement of two cheques to the value of Rs. 90,050/-. He further submitted that both of them were arrested on the specific allegations and sent to judicial custody. In such circumstances, he submitted that even though the First Information Report has been registered against five persons, as specific allegation of receipt of bribe was made only against the two persons, who were arrested and sent to Judicial custody, all the persons named in the First Information Report, cannot be said to be identically placed and hence, suspending the petitioners for accepting bribe, excluding others, cannot be said to have been made arbitrarily or without any basis. He denied the contentions of bias and mala fide. He also submitted that though the First Information Report was registered against five persons, except the writ petitioners, some of them were not available, in the office, when the police and the inspection team, inspected the office of the second respondent at 17.30, hours on 26.08.2009. He further contended that the amount taken from the residence of Nainar Mohammed, Regional Manager, was under suspicious circumstances and that therefore, action was not taken. For the above said reasons, he submitted that merely because suspension was not invoked for others, the petitioners cannot claim any legal right, that they should also be allowed to work, notwithstanding arrest and detention for more than 48 hours. For the above said reasons, he prayed for dismissal of the writ petitions.

Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record.

Pleadings and materials on record shows that on receipt of an information from a Forest Ranger, who has given a statement that a sum of Rs. 2700/-was paid as bribe amount to Mr. Jayachandran, Superintendent, (writ petitioner in W.P.(MD).No.11792 of 2009) as bribe (mamool) for disbursement of two cheques for the value of Rs. 90,050/-, the District Inspection Cell Officer, Ramanathapuram, along with two assistants of the Vigilance and Anti-corruption Department, Sivaganagi, has conducted a surprise check on 26.08.2009 between 17.30 hours and 23.45 hours, in the Office of the Regional Manager, Tamil Nadu Forest Plantation Corporation Limited (TAFCORN), Karaikudi, Sivagangai District and seized a sum of Rs. 40,950/-from the staff working in the office of the second respondent. A criminal case has been registered against Mr. Nainar Mohammed, the Regional Manager, Mr. Jayachandran, Superintendent, Mrs. Manoranjitha Kalaiselvi, Assistant, Mrs. Razia Begum, Assistant and Mr. P. Chithambaram, Office Assistant, in Crime No. 7 of 2009 under Sections 7, 13(1)(a) and (d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and u/s 102 of Cr.P.C. Mr. Jayachandran, Superintendent and Mr. P. Chithambaram, Office Assistant have been arrested and detained in Judicial custody for more than 48 hours.

Though a criminal case has been registered against all the five officials of TAFCORN, serious allegations of receipt of bribe were made only against the petitioners, who were arrested and kept in judicial custody for more than 48 hours. According to the Managing Director, TAFCORN, Tiruchirapalli, during the surprise visit by the officials of the District Inspection Cell, Ramanathapuram, along with the assistance of the Vigilance and Anti-corruption Wing, Sivagangai, in the Office of the second respondent at 17.30 hours on 26.08.2009, the Regional Manager was not in the office. Only on information, he had come to the office and present during the inspection. The other staff Mrs. Manoranjitha Kalaiselvi, was not present at the time of surprise check. No serious allegations were levelled by the informant, Forest Ranger, against Mrs. Razia Begum, Assistant and other persons were not arrested and detained in judicial custody. When Mr. P. Chithambaram, Office Assistant, the petitioner in W.P.No.11791 of 2009, was suspended on 31.08.2009 by the Regional Manager, TAFCORN, the same has been challenged in W.P.(MD).No.9866 of 2009 on the grounds inter alia that (i) he has been suspended on the ground of his implication in a criminal case for the alleged offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, vide the impugned order passed by the Regional Manager, TAFCORN, who himself has been implicated as one of the accused (A1) in the very same case and as such, the impugned order was not sustainable and (ii) the first accused, who has passed the impugned order of suspension against the petitioner, was not suspended on the basis of his implication in the very same criminal case for the alleged offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act and as such the impugned order amounted to selective suspension. Though the said writ petition was opposed on merits, this Court held that the Regional Manager, TAFCON, implicated as A1 in the criminal case, has no authority to pass an order of suspension against Mr. P. Chidambaram, the writ petitioner therein and arrayed as sixth accused in the criminal case. The contention that there was selective suspension by the Regional Manager, TAFCORN has been accepted. When the abovesaid order was set aside by this Court with a direction to the respondents therein to take fresh action in the manner known to law, the Managing Director of TAFCORN has stepped in and in exercise of the powers of TAFCORN Service Regulation 56(6), has placed the petitioners under suspension, taking into consideration of the pendency of the investigation in Crime No. 7 of 2009 and the Judicial custody of the petitioners for more than 48 hours.

Perusal of the First Information Report, dated 27.08.2009, registered in Crime No. 7 of 2009 on the file of the Vigilance and Anticorruption Wing, Sivagangai District, shows that during Inspection at 5.30 p.m. on 26.08.2009, the Regional Manager was not present in the Office and on verification, it was found that he had gone to his house. Thereafter, on intimation he had returned to the Office. Cash has been seized from Mr. Jayachandran, petitioner in W.P.(MD).No.11792 of 2009 and on enquiry, he was not in a position to offer proper explanation to the same, but he has stated that the amount was borrowed from one Mr. Baskaran, Ranger and that the same was retained for repayment. Immediately, the police had contacted the said Ranger and when he was enquired in the Office of the Vigilance, he has categorically stated that no amount was lent by him and that Mr. Jayachandran, did not owe any money to him. On the contra, the complainant has categorically stated that, as usual, 3% of the amount due and payable to the complainant is Rs. 90,050/-, was given as commission in a cover and that a sum of Rs. 100/-was also paid to Mr. P. Chidambaram, as bribe. The complainant has also identified his handwriting, on the cover. In addition to the above, in the handbag of the Superintendent, the petitioner in W.P.9mD)11792 of 2009 the Police has also found a small chit, wherein amounts representing 3% commission were written and for the above said particulars, Mr. Jayachandaran, Superintendent, was not able to give proper explanation. When Mr.P.Chithambaram, Office Assistant, the petitioner in W.P.(MD)No.11791 of 2009 was checked, the officials have found amounts in various denominations, such as Rs. 100/-, Rs. 50/-, Rs. 20/-and Rs. 10/-and that he was also not able to offer proper explanation. Likewise, when the handbag of Mrs. Razia Begum, Assistant was checked, through a woman police, the inspection team has found a sum of Rs. 2300/-, for which, she could not offer proper explanation. There was also a similar chit representing 3% commission, but no proper explanation has been offered by the said Assistant. In respect of Mrs. Manoranjitha Kalaiselvi, though she was stated to have left the Office, earlier, after taking permission, there was no permission letter, but her signature was found in the attendance register. When her bureau and handbag were checked, there were two covers which contained Rs. 6,900/-and 2,500/-respectively. In addition to the above, a sum of Rs. 1,600/-was also found. Since she was not available in the Office, the Police had tried to contact her over mobile phone, but it was not responded and hence the Inspection team could not enquire her. That apart, they have also seized a pay bill from a handbag containing the details of the various sections written in initials and the details of the payments to be made. When the police enquired Mr. Jayachandran, Superintendent, the petitioner in W.P.(MD).No.11792 of 2009, he has identified the signature of Mrs. Manoranjithia Kalaiselvi and also seemed to have stated that the chit contained the details of the shares and payments to be made to each one of the employees in the office. As regards, physical search on the Regional Manager, TAFCORN, the Inspection Team has found a sum of Rs. 2,445/-in his pocket, which has been accounted for, as his personal cash. When he was taken to his house for enquiry, he had also given details of the amounts deposited in the banks and offered explanation that it was the sale proceeds of a portion of his land. Several documents had been seized from the office of the Regional Manager, TAFCORN, Karaikudi, Sivagangai District. After conducting inspection and physical search including the Regional Manager, TAFCORN, Karaikudi, Sivagangai District, and after seizing cash and documents, a case in Crime No. 7 of 2009, under Sections 7, 13(a) &(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, read with Section 102 of Cr.P.C has been registered by the investigating officer, of the Vigilance and Anticorruption Wing.

Pursuant to the directions of this Court, the Managing Director, TAFCORN by order, dated 28.08.2011 in exercise of his power under Rule 56(b) of the Tamil Nadu Forest Plantation Corporation Staff Regulation Rules has placed Mr. Jayachandran, Superintendent, under suspension with effect from 27.08.2009 on the ground that disciplinary proceedings against the said Mr. Jayachandran is under contemplation for receipt of bribe of Rs. 2,700/-for the disbursement of two cheques to the value of Rs. 90,050/-at 3% commission. Perusal of the order of suspension order, dated 28.08.2009, passed in reference No. 7659/2009/E1, enclosed at Page 45 in the typed set of papers filed along with supporting affidavit shows that the said order has been served in the prison Sivagangai. Yet another order in reference No. 4155/2009/E, dated 31.08.2009, suspending Mr.P.Chithambaram, Office Assistant, has been issued by the Regional Manager, TAFCORN, Karaikudi, the second respondent herein and that the said order has also been served on Mr.Chithambaram, petitioner in W.P.(MD).No.11791 of 2009, on 01.09.2009, in prison, Sivagangai. When the suspension order issued to the Office Assistant was challenged in W.P.(MD).No.9866 of 2009 on the grounds stated in the foregoing paragraphs, this Court, vide order dated 28th October, 2009, held that when the Regional Manager himself has been implicated as one of the accused in the very same criminal case, and therefore, he cannot pass the order of suspension. In my considered view, the reported judgment in P.Chidambaram''s case, cannot be interpreted to mean that it has laid down a proposition of law that if there are more than one accused in a Vigilance and Anticorruption case and if suspension is not invoked against all those arrayed as accused in the criminal case, then nobody should be suspended. The judgment also does not indicate as to whether the suspension of Mr. Jayachandran, Superintendent, by the Managing Director was brought to the notice of this Court, when a contention of selective suspension was said to have been made by the Regional Manager, TAFCON, who himself was the first accused in the above said crime. Therefore, in the above said circumstances, when a specific pleading was made by the petitioners therein that the Regional Manager, TAFCORN had selectively suspended, the Office Assistant alone, when he himself was, an accused in the crime, this Court has found force in the contention putforth by the learned counsel for the petitioner therein.

At this juncture, it is also relevant to consider some of the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the grounds of selective suspension, unfairness and discrimination in suspending only two employees working in the office of the Regional Manager, TAFCON, Karaikudi, Sivagangai District, when the First Information Report has been registered against 5 persons, including the Regional Manager.

In K. Sukhendar Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another, , a member of Indian Administrative Service was placed under suspension under Rule 3(1) & (3) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, in contemplation of a departmental enquiry. About a month and week later, it was found that no departmental enquiry was contemplated against him, but in view of his prima facie involvement in a criminal case registered in Crime No. 327 of 1996 under Sections 468, 471, 409 & 420 read with Section 120-B IPC of Anakapalli Town Police Station, the earlier order of suspension was substituted by another letter, dated 13.02.1997, under Rule 3(3) of the All India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969. Yet another factor placed on record before the Supreme Court was that in the criminal case, many more Senior IAS officers, even senior, to the appellant, were likely to have been involved, but nothing positive or definite was said that the investigation would be completed, at the earliest, even after, two and half years. In the above said circumstances, where many more senior officers were likely to have been found involved, the Apex Court held that Government could not be permitted to resort to selective suspension and it cannot be permitted to place an officer under suspension, just to exhibit and feign that action against the officers, irrespective of their high status and service in the hierarchy. Reading of the reported judgment, it could be inferred that when the action of the Government was only against the appellant therein, resorting to selective suspension, despite involvement of many more officers, the Apex Court has come to the conclusion of selective suspension.

But, in the case on hand, the complainant of Mr.Baskaran, Ranger, to the Vigilance Police, was only against two persons viz., Mr. D. Jayachandran, Superintendent, who has been alleged to have received a sum of Rs. 2700/-as 3% commission on Rs. 90,050/-due and payable to the defacto complainant and Mr. P. Chidambaram, Office Assistant, who has been alleged to have received a sum of Rs. 100/-from the complainant. No doubt certain amounts and incriminating documents, such as chits and amounts, not properly accounted for by the petitioners and other employees, have been seized by the Vigilance Police and also recorded the First Information Report in crime No. 7 of 2009. Merely because, the other persons including the Regional Manager, TAFCON, Karaikudi, Sivagangai District, the second respondent herein, was not placed under suspension, it cannot be contended that the petitioners, who were alleged to have received bribe from one Mr.Baskaran, Ranger of the Forest Department, should not be placed under suspension. Though the registration of a criminal complaint is sufficient to place the Government servant or employee of an undertaking, Corporation, etc., as the case may be, under suspension pending investigation or trial, merely because some of the accused were not placed under suspension, that would not clothe any right to the petitioners to contend that they should also be not placed under suspension. As per the pleadings and first information report, the petitioners, who were alleged to have received bribe from the Forest Ranger, alone have been arrested and detained in judicial custody for more than 48 hours. As against others, there is no specific complaint. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court is not inclined to subscribe to the contention of the respondents that suspension is not totally warranted in respect of others, who were not able to offer adequate explanation for possession of extra amount and found to have been in possession of certain chits regarding, as to how the amount should be shared. Certainly, it is a matter to be examined by the Managing Director, TAFCON, Tiruchirapalli, as to whether the other persons have to be retained in service or not, pending investigation into a crime under the Provision of Prevention of Corruption Act. However, it is also a matter for investigation by the Vigilance and Anticorruption Department, as to whether the other employees including the Regional Manager, TAFCON, Karaikudi, Sivagangai District, have committed offences under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1908.

In N.Nandagopalan Vs. The Secretary to Government, Personal and Administration Reforms (Q) Department, Chennai, reported in (2007 Writ L.R. 52), the petitioner, who was working in Rural Development Department was placed under suspension, on 29.07.1999, on the ground that an enquiry into grave charges was contemplated. In G.O.Ms.No.43, the Government have ordered continuation of suspension, as enquiry was still under progress. However, considering his representation, Government issued orders, revoking the suspension. Thereafter, a charge memorandum was issued under rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, alleging that during the period from 09.04.1983 to 19.07.1989, there was some irregularity in placing certain orders, which was in violation of Panchayat Union Rules, Norms and procedures and it caused revenue loss to the Government. On 31.03.1991, the petitioner attained the age of superannuation and that he was permitted to retire without prejudice to the continuation of the disciplinary proceedings. Explanation to the charge memorandum was submitted, denying all the allegations. Besides, he also pointed out that the Divisional Development Officers and Block Development Officers, were responsible for the alleged loss.

Subsequently, the Government revived the charges by issuing fresh orders. After conducting an enquiry, a punishment of withholding his pension at the rate of Rs. 200/-per month for a period of 12 months was imposed in G.O.2(D)No.56, Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, dated 11.09.1998. The said order was challenged by way of an Original Application before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, Chennai and subsequently, transferred to this Court.

Placing reliance on G.O.(D)No.28, Rural Development (E2) Department, dated 09.02.2002, a submission has been advanced that when the Government issued orders to drop disciplinary action against 28 other persons, who were involved in the same allegation, out of which, six officials had already expired and 17 other officials have already retired from service, and there cannot by any discrimination in the matter of concluding the disciplinary proceedings, against the petitioner therein and that when there is identity of charges, the department should proceed against all or should not proceed against any one. Discrimination was alleged in the matter of imposition of penalty. On the facts and circumstances of the above case, and following the decisions of the Supreme Court in The Director General of Police and Others Vs. G. Dasayan, and in T.R.Venkatachary Vs. The Special Officer, Corporation of Madurai and another reported in (2002 WLR 449), this Court, interfere with the penalty.

In the case on hand, the petitioners have been arrested and detained for more than 48 hours and therefore, they are deemed to have been placed under suspension. If a government servant or an employee of a public sector company, Corporation or any other authority, is arrested and detained in judicial custody for more than 48 hours then by application of the provision, he is deemed to have been placed under suspension and strictly speaking, no separate order, need be issued by the appointing or the disciplinary authority. Suspension comes into effect, the moment, he is detained for more than 48 hours. Even assuming that no orders have been passed by the competent authority, persons detained for more than 48 hours cannot make any claim against the competent authority, that they should be allowed to work, after the release from judicial custody for more than 48 hrs. The deeming provision will automatically come into effect.

In Union of India (UOI) Vs. Rajiv Kumar, , the Supreme Court, has considered the effect of deeming suspension under rule 10(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965, for custodial detention exceeding forty-eight hours, and the period of its effectiveness. At paragraph Nos.14 to 16, it has been held as follows:

"14. Rule 10(2) is a deemed provision and creates a legal fiction. A bare reading of the provision shows that an actual order is not required to be passed. That is deemed to have been passed by operation of the legal fiction. It has as much efficacy, force and operation as an order otherwise specifically passed under other provisions. It does not speak of any period of its effectiveness. Rules 10(3) and 10(4) operate conceptually in different situations and need specific provisions separately on account of interposition of an order of a court of law or an order passed by the appellate or reviewing authority and the natural consequences inevitably flowing from such orders. Great emphasis is laid on the expression "until further orders" in the said sub-rules to emphasise that such a prescription is missing in sub-rule (2). Therefore, it is urged that the order is effective for the period of detention alone. The plea is clearly without any substance because of sub-rules (5)(a) and (5)(c) of Rule 10. The said provisions refer to an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made. Obviously, the only order which is even initially deemed to have been made under Rule 10 is one contemplated under sub-rule (2). The said provision under Rule 10(5)(a) makes it crystal clear that the order continues to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by an authority competent to do so while Rule 10(5)(c) empowers the competent authority to modify or revoke also. No exception is made relating to an order under Rules 10(2) and 10(5)(a). On the contrary, it specifically encompasses an order under Rule 10(2). If the order deemed to have been made under Rule 10(2) is to lose effectiveness automatically after the period of detention envisaged comes to an end, there would be no scope for the same being modified as contended by the respondents and there was no need to make such provisions as are engrafted in Rules 10(5)(a) and (c) and instead an equally deeming provision to bring an end to the duration of the deemed order would by itself suffice for the purpose.

Thus, it is clear that the order of suspension does not lose its efficacy and is not automatically terminated the moment the detention comes to an end and the person is set at large. It could be modified and revoked by another order as envisaged under Rule 10(5)(c) and until that order is made, the same continues by the operation of Rule 10(5)(a) and the employee has no right to be reinstated in service. This position was also highlighted in Balvantrai Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra. Indication of the expression "pending further order" in the order of suspension was the basis for the aforesaid view.

Reference has been made to sub-rule (5)(b) of Rule 10. According to the High Court the same appears to have been made "ex majore cautela". Conceptually, sub-rules (5)(a) and (5)(b) operate in different fields and for different purposes i.e. when more than one disciplinary proceedings come to be initiated to cover all such situations. Both the provisions have to be read harmoniously. Otherwise, sub-rule (5)(a) would become meaningless and sub-rule (5)(c) purposeless and both provisions would be rendered otiose and superfluous. "

20.On the aspect, as to how and when a provision to be interpreted, the Supreme Court, after referring various judgments, further held at paragraphs Nos.17 to 25, which reads as follows:

"17. View of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court that the legal fiction created ceases to be effective for the purpose of suspension while operative for other purposes is clearly unsustainable and we do not approve of the same.

It is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision or rewrite a provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute or any statutory provision is the determinative factor of legislative intent of policy-makers.

Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute or any statutory provision is to ascertain the intention of the legislature or the authority enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse.) The intention of the maker is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner, courts cannot aid the legislature''s defective phrasing of an Act; they cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (Also see State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel.) It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. [See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd.] Rules of interpretation do not permit courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of a doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn, L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans, quoted in Jumma Masjid v. Kodimaniandra Deviah.)

The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended, but what has been said. "Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid" Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage.) The view was reiterated in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama.

In D.R. Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commr., it was observed that courts must avoid the danger of an a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation.

While interpreting a provision, the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See CST v. Popular Trading Co.) The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process.

Two principles of construction -one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute/statutory provision as a whole -appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself. But, at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result", said Danckwerts, L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou (All ER p. 544 I), "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". Where to apply words literally would defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC where AC at p. 577 (All ER p. 664 I) he also observed: "This is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges."]

It is then true that,

"when the words of a law extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening, but do to those which often happen, it is good reason not to strain the words further than they reach, by saying it is casus omissus, and that the law intended quae frequentius accidunt". "But", on the other hand, "it is no reason, when the words of a law do enough extend to an inconvenience seldom happening, that they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more frequently, because it happens but seldom" (see Fenton v. Hampton). A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save in some case of strong necessity. Where, however, a casus omissus does really occur, either through the inadvertence of the legislature, or on the principle of quod enim semel aut bis existit praetereunt legislatores, the rule is that the particular case, thus left unprovided for, must be disposed of according to the law as it existed before such statute -casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni juris communis relinquitur; "a casus omissus", observed Buller, J. in Jones v. Smart (ER p. 967), "can in no case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws".

The golden rule for construing wills, statutes, and, in fact, all written instruments has been thus stated:

"The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further." (See Grey v. Pearson) The latter part of this "golden rule" must, however, be applied with much caution. "If", remarked Jervis, C.J.,

"the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, in our judgment, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though they do lead, in our view of the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied, where their import is doubtful or obscure. But we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning". [See Abley v. Dale (ER p. 525).]

Finally, the Supreme Court, while considering the duration or efficacy of the period of suspension and as to whether it could be restricted only to the period of actual detention, at paragraphs 26 to 27, held as follows:

The inevitable conclusion therefore is that the order in terms of Rule 10(2) is not restricted in its point of duration or efficacy to the period of actual detention only. It continues to be operative unless modified or revoked under sub-rule (5)(c), as provided under sub-rule (5)(a).

Rule 10(5)(b) deals with a situation where a government servant is suspended or is deemed to have been suspended and any other disciplinary proceeding is commenced against him during continuance of that suspension irrespective of the fact whether the earlier suspension was in connection with any disciplinary proceeding or otherwise. Rule 10(5)(b) can be pressed into service only when any other disciplinary proceeding is also commenced than the one for and during which suspension or deemed suspension was already in force, to meet the situation until the termination of all such proceedings. In contradiction, Rule 10(5)(a) has application in relation to an order of suspension already made or deemed to have been made. Rule 10(5)(b) has no application to the facts of the present case and no inspiration or support could be drawn for the stand taken for the respondents or the decision arrived at by the High Court. It is Rule 10(5)(a) alone which has application and the deemed suspension would continue to be in force till anything has been done under Rule 10(5)(c). Similarly, Rules 10(3) and 10(4) operate in different fields and merely because a specific provision is made for its continuance, until further orders in them itself due to certain further developments taking place and interposition of orders made by court or appellate and reviewing authority to meet and get over such specific eventualities, in given circumstances and that does not in any way affect the order of suspension deemed to have been made under Rule 10(2).

While considering the submission that the suspension was for a longer period and that it renders the same, as invalid, at para 29, it has been held as follows:

Another plea raised relates to a suspension for a very long period. It is submitted that the same renders the suspension invalid. The plea is clearly untenable. The period of suspension should not be unnecessarily prolonged but if plausible reasons exist and the authorities feel that the suspension needs to be continued, merely because it is for a long period that does not invalidate the suspension.

In Deputy Inspector General of Police Vs. G. Pandian, , the Sub-Inspector of Police was suspended following detention in judicial custody for more than 48 hours. A preliminary enquiry was conducted on the allegation that a car, which was a case property and under police custody, was taken away by the respondent therein, without permission. Complaint was filed and on 11.05.1993 the Sub-Inspector of Police was placed under suspension on 07.07.1993. When he moved the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, the suspension was stayed till 21.07.1993. However, he was arrested on the same day and some of the parts allegedly missing from the car were seized from him. In respect thereof, a criminal case was registered against him and he was detained in custody from 21.07.1993 to 08.08.1993 and he was granted bail.

In the meantime, on 04.08.1993, he was suspended from service. He moved the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, Chennai and challenged the second suspension. The Tribunal, by its order dated 01.07.1994, set aside the same and directed the appellant therein to reinstate him in service, from the date, on which he was enlarged from custody.

When the correctness of the order was tested, with reference to rule 3(e)(2) of the Tamil Nadu Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal)Rules, 1955, the Supreme Court, at para 6 held as follows:-

Inasmuch as the respondent was detained in custody on a criminal charge for a period longer than 48 hours, he was, by reason of the aforesaid provision, deemed to have been suspended. He was detained in custody on a criminal charge that related to the seizure from his custody of a car allegedly belonging to someone else. The first charge had related to the parts of another car and was altogether different from the second charge.

At para 7, the Apex Court further further held that having regard to the terms of the provision aforequoted, which are crystal clear, the Tribunal ought not to have passed the impugned order. Rule 3(e)(2) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, considered by the Supreme Court, reads as follows:-

A member of a service, who is detained in custody whether on criminal charge or otherwise, for a period longer than forty-eight hours shall be deemed to have been suspended under this Rule.

Even assuming that there is a failure on the part of the Managing Director, Tiruchirapalli, that he has committed an illegality in not placing the Regional Manager, TAFCORN, and other employees under suspension, inspite registration of a crime, under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, it is a well settled principle of law that there cannot be any equality in irregularity or illegality. Perpetrators of law, against whom there is a specific complaint of receipt of bribe has been levelled and those who were remanded to judicial custody have been placed under suspension and that they cannot claim equality, on the ground that others have not been placed under suspension.

All the persons working in the Regional Manager''s office cannot be placed on the same footing, in sofar as the specific complaint of acceptance of bribe, is concerned. But, at the same time, when incriminating materials have been seized, and some of them were not able to give proper explanation, then, as stated supra, the same has to be addressed. In the absence of any clean chit given by the police, the Head of the Department ought to have considered the contents of the FIR and should have explained in the counter affidavit, as to why appropriate orders were not passed against some of the employees, who were in possession of incriminating materials.

In Man Singh Vs. State of Haryana and Others, relied on by the petitioner, the Supreme Court considered the concept of equality in administrative and quasi judicial action. In the reported case, the appellant therein was Sub-Inspector of Police. He along with another Head Constable, were required to proceed from Chandigarh to Hyderabad, in connection with repair of two Government vehicles. The Head Constable, was the driver of one of the vehicles. While passing through Rajasthan, the Head Constable, purchased 12 bottles of liquor for his personal consumption, and concealed them in dickey without the appellant''s knowledge and consent. Liquor was detected by the excise staff of Andhra Pradesh.

A criminal case was registered against the Sub-Inspector of Police as well as the Head Constable. The charge against the appellant was that he failed to exercise requisite supervisory control over his subordinate. Punishment of stoppage of two increments was imposed on the appellant. His appeal and revision petitions were also rejected by the higher authorities. The Head Constable, was acquitted in the criminal case and the appellate authority also removed the punishment imposed on him. In the net result, the appellant, Sub-Inspector of Police, was punished, whereas perpetrator of misconduct i.e., Head Constable was let-off both in the criminal case, as well as in the departmental proceedings. When the appellant challenged the punishment, the High Court dismissed his plea on the ground that scope of interference in the departmental enquiry was very limited. Testing the correctness of the order, with reference to the facts of the above case, the Supreme Court at paragraph No. 20, held as follows:

"20. We may reiterate the settled position of law for the benefit of the administrative authorities that any act of the repository of power whether legislative or administrative or quasi-judicial is open to challenge if it is so arbitrary or unreasonable that no fair-minded authority could ever have made it. The concept of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India embraces the entire realm of State action. It would extend to an individual as well not only when he is discriminated against in the matter of exercise of right, but also in the matter of imposing liability upon him. Equals have to be treated equally even in the matter of executive or administrative action. As a matter of fact, the doctrine of equality is now turned as a synonym of fairness in the concept of justice and stands as the most accepted methodology of a governmental action. The administrative action is to be just on the test of ''fair play" and reasonableness.

The Supreme Court, at paragraph No. 21, further observed that the appellant and the Head Constable, Vijay Pal, were both similarly situated persons. In fact, Head Constable Vijay Pal was the real culprit who, besides the departmental proceedings, was an accused in the excise case filed against him by the Excise staff of Andhra Pradesh, for violating the Excise Prohibition Orders, operating in the State. The Supreme Court further observed that when the real culprit was let-off, the order of the disciplinary authority imposing punishment upon the appellant, the Sub-Inspector of Police, for exhibiting slackness in the discharge of duties during his visit to Hyderabad, when the said Head Constable was found involved in Excise offence, and the view that both the appellate and revisional authorities in confirming the order of punishment imposed on the appellant, was not fair and reasonable and that in the above said circumstances, held that the said orders were against the doctrine of equality.

At this juncture, it is to be borne in mind that doctrine of equality is a positive concept and it cannot be extended to a case wherein, an irregularity or illegality if committed by the administrative authorities and that if benefits are obtained by same person, by such illegal or irregular orders, it should be extended to others also. In this context, this Court deems it fit to extract few judgments of the Supreme Court on the aspect, as to how the concept of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, has to be applied.

(i) In Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee reported in (1996 SCC (2) 459), it has been held as follows:-

"There appears to be some confusion in respect of the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees equality before law to all citizens. This guarantee of equality before law is a positive concept and it cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. To put it in other words, if an illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of any individual or a group of individuals, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this Court, that the same irregularity or illegality be committed by the State so far such petitioners are concerned, on the reasoning that they have been denied the benefits which have been extended to others although in an irregular or illegal manner. Such petitioners can question the validity of orders which are said to have been passed in favour of persons who were not entitled to the same, but they cannot claim orders which are not sanctioned by law in their favour on principle of equality before law. Neither Article 14 of the Constitution conceives within the equality clause this concept nor Article 226 empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it shall amount to directing to continue and perpetuate an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending similar benefits to others. Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in this process there has been a discrimination."

(ii) In Kastha Niwarak Grahnirman Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit, Indore Vs. President, Indore Development Authority, , it has been held as follows:-

8..........Two wrongs do not make one right. A party cannot claim that since something wrong has been done in another case direction should be given for doing another wrong. It would not be setting a wrong right, but would be perpetuating another wrong. In such matters, there is no discrimination involved. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be pressed into service in such cases. What the concept of equal treatment presupposes is existence of similar legal foothold. It does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring both wrongs on a par. Even if hypothetically it is accepted that a wrong has been committed in some other cases by introducing a concept of negative equality the appellant cannot strengthen its case. It has to establish strength of its case on some other basis and not by claiming negative equality. (See Union of India v. International Trading Co.)

(iii) In Directorate of Film Festivals and Others Vs. Gaurav Ashwin Jain and Others, , the Supreme Court has held as follows:-

"22. When a grievance of discrimination is made, the High Court cannot just examine whether someone similarly situated has been granted a relief or benefit and then automatically direct grant of such relief or benefit to the person aggrieved. The High Court has to first examine whether the petitioner who has approached the court has established a right, entitling him to the relief sought on the facts and circumstances of the case. In the context of such examination, the fact that some others, who are similarly situated, have been granted relief which the petitioner is seeking, may be of some relevance. But where in law, a writ petitioner has not established a right or is not entitled to relief, the fact that a similarly situated person has been illegally granted relief, is not a ground to direct similar relief to him. That would be enforcing a negative equality by perpetuation of an illegality which is impermissible in law. The principle has been stated by this Court in Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh thus:

Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent Authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent Authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent Authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to lawindeed, wherever it is possible, the court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with lawbut even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent Authority to repeat the illegality, the court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioners'' case is similar to the other persons'' case. But then why examine another person''s case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another person''s case, which other person is not before the case nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a coursebarring exceptional situationswould neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles."

(iv) In Shanti Sports Club and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , the Supreme Court has held as follows:-

"14. Equality before law. The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. The concept of equality enshrined in that article is a positive concept. The Court can command the State to give equal treatment to similarly situated persons, but cannot issue a mandate that the State should commit illegality or pass wrong order because in another case such an illegality has been committed or wrong order has been passed. If any illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this Court and seek a direction that the same irregularity or illegality be committed in their favour by the State or its agencies/instrumentalities. In other words, Article 14 cannot be invoked for perpetuating irregularities or illegalities. In Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh this Court made a lucid exposition of law on this subject. The facts of that case were that the respondents, who had given the highest bid for 338 sq yd plot in Sector 31-A, Chandigarh defaulted in paying the price in accordance with the terms and conditions of allotment. After giving him opportunity of showing cause, the estate officer cancelled the lease of the plot. The appeal and the revision filed by him were dismissed by the Chief Administrator and the Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh respectively. Thereafter, the respondent applied for refund of the amount deposited by him. His request was accepted and the entire amount paid by him was refunded. He then filed a petition for review of the order passed by the Chief Commissioner, which was dismissed. However, the officer concerned entertained the second review and directed that the plot be restored to the respondent. The latter did not avail benefit of this unusual order and started litigation by filing writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed on 18-3-1991. Thereafter, the respondent again approached the estate officer with the request to settle his case in accordance with the policy of the Government to restore the plots to the defaulters by charging forfeiture amount of 5%. His request was rejected by the estate officer. He then filed another writ petition before the High Court, which was allowed only on the ground that in another case pertaining to Smt Prakash Rani, the Administrator had restored the plot despite dismissal of the writ petition filed by her. While reversing the order of the High Court, this Court observed as under: (Jagjit Singh case, (2005 SCC)1) 745.

We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, if it can be called one, on which the writ petition has been allowed by the High Court is unsustainable in law and indefensible in principle. Since we have come across many such instances, we think it necessary to deal with such pleas at a little length. Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent Authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent Authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. (emphasis in original) The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent Authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to lawindeed, wherever it is possible, the court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with lawbut even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. (emphasis supplied) By refusing to direct the respondent Authority to repeat the illegality, the court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioner''s case is similar to the other person''s case. But then why examine another person''s case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another person''s case, which other person is not before the case (sic court) nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a coursebarring exceptional situationswould neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial world.

Similar is the ratio of the judgments in Narain Das v. Improvement Trust, Amritsar; Gursharan Singh v. NDMC, Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain, Yadu Nandan Garg v. State of Rajasthan, State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann, Faridabad CT Scan Centre v. D.G. Health Services, Style (Dress land) v. UT, Chandigarh, State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, Union of India v. International Trading Co., Ekta Shakti Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, Sanjay Kumar Manjul v. UPSC, K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P., National Institute of Technology v. Chandra Shekhar Chaudhary, Vice-Chancellor, M.D. University v. Jahan Singh, State of Kerala v. K. Prasad, Punjab SEB v. Gurmail Singh and Panchi Devi v. State of Rajasthan."

On the aspect of suspension, relating to corruption, this Court in R. Ravichandran v. Addl. Commr. Of Police, Chennai reported in 2010 CIJ 553 IPJ, has formulated certain issues for consideration,

"(i) Whether the authority, who has placed a government servant under suspension is statutorily bound to review the suspension, when he is facing investigation into a criminal case/trial of an offence, involving moral turpitude, like corruption, embezzlement, misappropriation or for such other serious offences before the Criminal Court and if review of suspension is not done by the authority, who has placed the government servant under suspension or by the higher authority, whether the said order would become automatically invalid?

(ii) Whether the time limit prescribed for review of suspension in G.O.Ms.No.40, dated 30.01.1996 is applicable to criminal cases?

(iii) What is the right of a government servant during the period of suspension pending enquiry into the charges, under contemplation/pending investigation/trial?

(iv) When the appointing/disciplinary, authority/government can exercise his discretion to place a government servant under suspension and what are all the factors to be taken into consideration?

(v) Whether the order of suspension is administrative or quasi-judicial nature?

(vi) When the power of judicial review exercised by Courts in adjudicating the legality or correctness of an order of suspension passed by the appointing/disciplinary, authority/government, pending contemplation of the charges/enquiry/investigation/trial, what is the extent of discretion to be exercised by Courts?

(vii) Whether the Courts can merely strike down orders of suspension issued against the government servant and continued, pending disposal of the investigation/trial of offences involving moral turpitude, particularly, corruption, on the sole ground that there is no progress in the investigation or trial for a considerable period, there is no likelihood of tampering with the witnesses or prolonged suspension, pending investigation or trial, causes agony and humiliation?

(viii) Whether a government servant placed under suspension for involvement in serious offences/misconduct, involving moral turpitude can seek for retention in service in any insignificant post or seek for transfer, on the sole ground that the suspension is prolonged pending investigation/trial?

In the above reported case, this Court has not only considered the question pertain to corruption, but also considered the powers of the authority, while considering the need to place the government servant under suspension. This Court has also considered the right of the government servant to seek for restoration, when criminal case is registered. While answering the above issues, at Paragraphs 78 to 91, this Court has held as follows:

Corruption is forbidden by law, an offence involving moral turpitude or exactly opposite of dishonesty involving intentional disregard to law. When the misconduct of the government servant attracts criminal liability, for which, penal laws provide for severe punishments, like sentencing to rigorous imprisonment, the period depending upon the gravity of the offence, like in the instant case, imprisonment for a maximum period of 7 years, besides fine or both, it should be left to the absolute discretion of the appointing/disciplinary authority/government to place a government servant under suspension, pending investigation/trial. Persons involved in serious charges of corruption, embezzlement, misappropriation of government funds or crimes attracting severe punishments cannot be equated with others, discharging their duties honestly. Courts should not obstruct the powers of the appointing/disciplinary, authority/government, from forbidding such persons from discharging their duties, atleast till the trial is over. In M.K. Dange v. Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Oil and Natural Gaz Corporation reported in 2006 (2) MLJ 34, has held that even after acquittal, suspension does not automatically come to an end, until the order is revoked by the authorities.

The object of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the purpose of empowering the authorities to place the government servant, under suspension, pending investigation or trial, of criminal offences, involving corruption and other grave offences, involving moral turpitude, should not be defeated by restoring them in service. It should be noted that persons with criminal antecedents are not even inducted in service. They are prevented entry into government servant and police verification of antecedents helps the employer for this purpose. While that be the settled position, a government servant, after entering into service, faces trial for grave offences, should be kept out of the sphere of activities, with reference to discharge of duties and privileges attached to the post, pending trial. The provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act and the powers conferred on the authorities to place him under suspension are intended to maintain clear administration and in public interest and in such circumstances, there is no question of considering the private interest, of the government servant, which is temporarily deprived of his duties.

No Government servant, particularly a person charged with a misconduct of corruption, has right to insist that he should be retained in service and allowed to discharge his duties and enjoy the privileges of the post held by him, during the pendency of the enquiry into grave charges or trial, involving moral turpitude and it is the absolute discretion of the appointing/disciplinary authority or the Government to suspend such government servant from discharging the duties attached to the post and to forbid him from exercising the privileges, except to the extent of payment of salary, regulated in the Statute or rules, applicable to the case of such Government servant.

For the purpose of suspension, it is sufficient that the competent authority has arrived at a prima facie conclusion that the Government servant has committed a serious misconduct, which entails major penalties, like dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, etc., from service. Illustrative cases, where action has to be taken immediately, are persons, involving in serious acts of misdemeanor, such as, (a) offence or conduct involving moral turpitude, (b) corruption, embezzlement or misappropriation of Government money, (c) possession of disproportionate assets, (d) misuse of official powers for personal gain, (e) serious negligence or dereliction of duty, (f) desertion of duty and (g) refusal or deliberate failure to carry out written orders of superior officers; (h) apprehension of tampering with witnesses or documents or likelihood of causing prejudice to an inquiry, investigation or trial; (j) likelihood of subversion of discipline in office; (k) involvement of scandals, and (l) likelihood of ultimate conviction out of departmental proceedings, and in all these illustrative cases, it is the matter of necessity and public interest, involved and therefore, it which must be left to the absolute discretion of the competent authority, with whom, the power is vested to suspend and that such discretion exercised in public interest should not be interfered with lightly.

When the criminality of the government servant is adjudicated before the Court of competent jurisdiction and when the Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department has launched prosecution or proposed to launch for imposing appropriate punishment under the penal laws, the appointing/disciplinary authority/government, should be allowed to exercise their discretion to place the government servant under suspension, which is a step in aid, to complete the investigation/trial. Courts have consistently held that even if the materials are not adequate for prosecution or even after acquittal, when the appointing/disciplinary authority/government is empowered to place the government servant under suspension, the power can be exercised on proper consideration of relevant materials, in public interest.

Once the objective consideration of the allegations, the material on record, warrants suspension, till the completion of enquiry or trial, in public interest, it is not for this Court to examine the nature of the allegations, the evidence and to record any finding thereon, which would hamper the progress of the departmental enquiry or investigation or trial against the government servant.

No doubt, the exercise of discretion, should be rational, should not be arbitrary and that there is also a legal duty cast upon the appointing/disciplinary authority/Government to apply its mind before exercising such discretionary power. However, when the government servant against whom, an enquiry into grave charges or an investigation into an offence or trial is pending and such charge/charges, involves moral turpitude, then the competent authority can exercise his discretionary power under Rule 17 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules and place the government servant under suspension, pending enquiry into grave charges under contemplation into charges/enquiry into formulated charges/investigation/trial.

In this context, it is pertinent to extract the observations of Lord Denning, as found in Wade on Administrative Law,

"The discretion of a statutory body is never unfettered. It is a discretion which is to be exercised according to law. That means atleast this : the statutory body must be guided by relevant consideration and not by irrelevant. If its decision is influenced by extraneous considerations which it ought not to have taken into account, then the decision cannot stand. No matter that the statutory body may have acted is good faith, nevertheless the decision will be set aside."

The duty of the Court is restricted only to the limited extent to see that where the appointing/disciplinary authority has taken into consideration the nature of the charge, its complexity, the public interest involved in retaining the government servant, against whom, serious imputation of corruption, misappropriation, embezzlement, etc., are levelled and whether retention of such person, would be scandalous to the department or sub-serve the discipline in the department or affect the morale of other government servants.

The appointing/disciplinary, authority /government is entitled to exercise the control and maintain the master and servant relationship. To suspend an employee, as an interim measure for anyone of the reasons stated supra, which are illustrative, is the absolute right of an employer and no employee can insist that he must be allowed to be retained in service and discharge his duties and enjoy the fruits or privileges attached to the post. While testing the correctness of the order of suspension, all that has to be seen by the Court is whether the power of the appointing/disciplinary authority, in controlling the employees, has been exercised reasonably, without any mala fide and that there should not be any lack of jurisdiction. Any action taken by the appointing/disciplinary authority, in public interest to maintain a clean and honest administration, cannot be interfered with lightly. Even though the government servant is put to mental agony, it is only to the limited extent of restricting him from discharging his duties and enjoy other privileges attached to the post and it is only an interim measure, till he is cleared off of the imputations levelled against him. The suspension cannot be attacked on the ground that the facts stated therein are not correct. It is well settled that the High Court cannot delve into the factual details, while adjudicating the correctness of an administrative order.

The order of suspension for a misconduct, involving moral turpitude, in the instant case, alleged act of corruption and the further order, refusing to revoke the order of suspension, both being discretionary and administrative in nature, should not ordinarily be interfered with by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Allowing a person charged with serious acts of corruption or any other misconduct, involving moral turpitude, to discharge his duties and enjoy the fruits of the post, would be against a public policy and it would not be in public interest or to maintain a clean and effective administration.

Cases involving serious charges of corruption and misappropriation of money, certainly involve moral turpitude, where there is implied depravity and villiness of character. As rightly observed by the Supreme Court, by allowing a government servant, facing serious charges of corruption or misappropriation or embezzlement, etc., to be retained in service, public interest would be affected. Allowing such persons to be retained in service, in my view, would give a signal to the erring government servants that if the trial is not taken up, for sometime, then the order of suspension would be revoked automatically. A person charged with a serious offence of corruption, for which, punishment may even extend to 10 years, cannot at any stretch of imagination, be inducted or retained in the department, pending disposal of the trial, as the very conduct, reputation of the person is questionable.

In the case on hand, powers exercised in good faith and for legitimate reasons in public interest and social interest and to effectuate the purpose for which it is conferred on the authorities, cannot be said to have been exercised arbitrarily. Courts being the custodian of law should not interfere with the orders of suspension, in the case of corruption, embezzlement or misappropriation of government money and retention of such persons would pollute and contaminate the department. The effect of retention of such persons in service, pending trial would demoralise the other government servants, frustrate the object of Prevention of Corruption Act. Therefore, the action of the respondent, in keeping such government servant away from the sphere of his activities, no matter whether the trial is prolonged for a considerable time, cannot clothe any right to seek for retention in service. Though Courts are designated exclusively for the purpose of dealing with corruption cases, for so many reasons, sometimes not bona fide, they are delayed. No doubt, pendency of the trial for an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, causes agony and humiliation, but it is always open to the government servant to approach the Court, seeking for early disposal of the trial.

It is the responsibility of the appointing/disciplinary, authority/government to take into consideration that other employees/servants of the department are not de-moralised and restoring the services of such person, in service, would be certainly deleterious to the efficiency of others. Powers exercised by the appointing/disciplinary authority in rejecting the request, cannot be said to be arbitrary. The appointing/disciplinary authority/government has to maintain honesty, good conduct, efficiency in administration and to keep away persons, facing serious charges.

The abovesaid judgment has been further elaborated by His Lordship Justice K.Chandru, in a batch of Writ Petitions in W.P.(MD)Nos.10882 of 2009, etc., dated 01.11.2010 [R. Sakunthala v. The State of Tamil Nadu] and the relevant portions of the above order are extracted hereunder:

15.Before proceeding to deal with the main case, it is seen from records that in this batch of writ petitions, in most of the writ petitions, interim stay has been granted on identical grounds. In that a reference was made to the judgment of this court in The State of Madras Vs. K.A.Joseph reported in AIR 1970 Mad 155. In that case, the respondent Joseph was placed under suspension pending contemplation of enquiry. Since suspension lasted for more than 10 months, he moved this court. This Court directed that charges should be framed within three months and if that was not done, he can again approach the court for redress. When no charges were framed by the competent authority, he filed another writ petition. This court while entertaining that writ petition, by an interim order revoked the suspension order.

An appeal was filed by the State in W.A.No.45 of 1969. The appeal was finally disposed of by a division bench of this court which came to be reported as The State of Madras Vs. K.A. Joseph, . The short order contained only three paragraphs. In paragraph 1, the court dealt with the facts of the case, which is as follows:

".... It is sufficient for us to observe that a period of nearly ten months had elapsed since the Officer was first placed under suspension, and that, on an earlier representation, the Court directed that charges should be framed within three months, and that, if that was not done, the petitioner could approach the Court, again for redress, and, the outcome is the order from which the writ appeal is sought to be filed.

Repelling the objections raised by the State regarding the power of judicial review over such order, in paragraph 2, it was observed as follows:

2....On the contrary, in our view there is a very clear and distinct principle of natural justice, that an Officer is entitled to ask, if he is suspended from his office because of grave averments or grave reports of misconduct, that the matter should be investigated with reasonable diligence, and that charges should be framed against him within a reasonable period of time.....

When the Government Pleader in that case expressed his difficulty about the embarrassment if the Government servant resumed duty in the same place, the court moulded the relief in the following manner:

3.... The learned Government Pleader submits that there may be great difficulty in permitting the Officer to resume duties in the very post, when the performance of those duties by him in the past, had led to the imputation of grave irregularities, we are unable to see any real difficulty in the matter. We clarify the position by stating that it is open to the Government to permit the Officer to resume duty in that identical post, or, any post of equal grade and emoluments, which may be available for making an order of resumption of duty.

It can be seen from the above case that there was initial disobedience of the order passed by this court in not framing the charges. Thereafter, the suspension was revoked. There was objection for restoration of service on the ground that this court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the suspension which was rejected. Thirdly when the embarrassment of restoration of a Government servant facing serious charges to the very same place was made, the court also directed his being posted to some other post in the very same status and salary.

From a reading of the very short judgment, it is clearly seen that the court was only concerned about the delay in framing of charges by the department. It did not deal with any case involving criminal prosecution that too on corruption charges. Secondly, the court gave an opportunity to the respondent to frame charges and not to be merely contended keeping a person under suspension. When that was not forthcoming and the order of the court was violated, the court revoked the suspension order, but also took care in granting liberty to the Government to post that person in some other place.

The above referred judgment has been taken on appeal and the same was confirmed by the Division Bench in W.A.(MD)No.84 of 2011, dated 21.01.2011, where the relief was to revoke the order of suspension.

In C. Balasubramanian v. The Commissioner, Tiruchirappalli Corporation reported in 2011 (1) CWC 319, the Division Bench of this Court has declined to interfere with the order of suspension, passed against the appellant therein, who indulged in corrupt practices and who was facing criminal trial under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

In a recent decision of His Brother Justice N. Paul Vasanthakumar, in E.S. Mathiyan v. The Joint Director of Medical and Rural Health Services and Family Welfare reported in 2011 (2) LLN 782 (Mad), the learned Judge considered the correctness of the suspension order passed under Rule 17(e) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, pending investigation into the criminal trial booked u/s 392 IPC. After considering the catena of decisions and the Division Bench judgment made in W.A.(MD)No.84 of 2011, dated 21.01.2011, this Court held that the impugned order of suspension cannot be quashed. The decisions relied on by the learned Judge are extracted hereunder:

"(i) A Division Bench of this Court considered Rule 17(e) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules in W.A.No.1114 of 2007 (the Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu and others v. N. Shanmugasundaram) and by Judgment dated 5.11.2007 upheld the order of suspension pending investigation/trial of criminal offence.

(ii) A Division Bench of this Court in the case of M. Rajambal Vs. The Principal District Judge, held that Rule 17(e) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, contemplates that a member of a service may be placed under suspension from service, where an enquiry into grave charges against him is contemplated, or is pending or a complaint against him or any criminal offence is under investigation or trial and if such suspension is necessary in the public interest. In the said Judgment, the decisions of the Supreme Court in The Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi and Others Vs. Hotel Workers'' Union, and in R.P. Kapur Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, were followed and upheld the similar order of suspension.

(iii) In W.A.No.1818 of 2009, dated 15.12.2009, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of S.Jeevanantham vs. the Government of Tamil Nadu and others considered an identical issue and confirmed the order of a learned Single Judge dismissing the Writ Petition, which was filed challenging the order of suspension.

(iv) Suspension orders were also upheld in the case of D. Gnanasekaran and M. Anantharamasubramanian Vs. The Chief Educational Officer, and in the case of S. Jeyasingh Rajan v. President, Kalloorani Panchayat reported in 2006 (4) MLJ 59.

(v) The Supreme Court in the case of Allahabad Bank and Another Vs. Deepak Kumar Bhola, , upheld the order of suspension of a bank employee, who was facing a criminal offence involving in moral turpitude. In the said Judgment, the order of the Allahabad High Court, quashing the order of suspension was set aside and the appeal filed by the bank was allowed.

(vi) The Supreme Court in the decisions in R.P. Kapur Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, ; Balvantray Ratilal Patel Vs. The State of Maharashtra, ; A.K.K. Nambiar Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, ; V.P. Gidroniya Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, ; The Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs and Others Vs. Tarak Nath Ghosh, ; Government of A.P. Vs. V. Sivaraman, ; Uttar Pradesh Rajya Krishi Utpadan Manti Samiti Parishad v. Sanjiv Rajah reported in 1993 (2) LLN 11; State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty reported in 1994 (1) LLN 889; State of Madhya Pradesh and Others Vs. Shri Ram Singh, ; State Bank of India and Another Vs. Rattan Singh, ; K.C. Sareen Vs. C.B.I., Chandigarh, ; Union of India (UOI) Vs. Rajiv Kumar, , held that a person involved in a criminal case can be placed under suspension till he is exonerated and she can claim only subsistence allowance and he cannot demand revocation of suspension as a matter of right.

(vii) A Division Bench of the Madurai Bench of this Court in W.A.(MD)No.84 of 2011 dated 21.1.2011 (R. Sakunthala v. The State of Tamil Nadu) following the above cited decisions, confirmed the order of the learned single Judge dismissing the writ petition, seeking revocation of the suspension order."

In the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court, explaining concept of equality in administrative action, the judgment in Man Singh''s case, (cited supra) relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner would not lend any support to the facts of this case.

In E.S.Mathiyan Vs. The Joint Director of Medical and Rural Heal Services and Family Welfare ((/C), Dharma Uri, reported in ( 2011 (2) LLN 782 (Mad) , the petitioner therein, was involved in a criminal case, along with a Police Head Constable, Dearer, in Crime No. 194/2010, for an offence u/s 392 I.P.C. The petitioner was a Sanitary worker in a Government Hospital. The facts of the case are that on 09.10.2010 at 02.15 a.m., one Mr.C.Napolean, a Police Head Constable, who is incharge of Police Station, received a complaint from one Mr. John Jeramious, stating that he is the owner of a Mini Truck and that on 08.10.2010, he took a vehicle for repair to Pennagaram and while he was carrying with some goods, some persons were standing near a Indica Car, one person directed the vehicle to be stopped stating that he is a Police person and the said person asked him to show the licence. The petitioner, the Sanitary worker, and other three persons have snatched a watch, worth about Rs. 300/-, from the complainant and again, stopped another TVS-50 and attempted to rob the said person, who was riding the TVS-50 vehicle. When he had no money, the scooterist was beaten by the police and the complaint given by the said Mr. John Jeramious, the Police registered a case in crime No. 194/2010 for the offence of robbery, u/s 392 I.P.C., and the Head Constable, as well as the Sanitary Worker were suspended by invoking the relevant Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules.

Thereafter, on investigation, a charge-sheet was also filed. However, though the Head Constable was an accused in the crime, the Superintendent of Police Dharmapuri, has chosen to revoke the order of suspension. Alleging discrimination that the petitioner therein (Sanitary worker) was kept under suspension, he has filed the writ petition on the ground of discrimination.

After considering the several Division Bench Judgments, a learned Judge observed that revocation of the suspension in favour of a co-accused would not help the petitioner. The Court, at Paragraph No. 10 of the Judgment further observed that "since the petitioner therein was relying upon the order passed in favour of a Police Head Constable, revoking the order of suspension by the Superintendent of Police, Dharmapuri, the Director General of Police, Chennai as well as the Home Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu, Chennai, were directed to consider and take an appropriate decision ie.., whether the Superintendent of Police is justified in revoking the order os suspension of a Police Head constable, who was facing an allegation of robbery. A copy of the order was also directed to be sent to the Director General of Police, Chennai and to the Secretary, Home Department, Government of Tamil Nadu, Chennai. The said judgment can be made applicable to the facts of this case. In that case, this Court held that just because one of the co-employees has been reinstated in service, by the disciplinary authority that would not clothe any right to the petitioner.

In the result, following the decisions of the Supreme Court on the concept of equality, the petitioners, who were admittedly arrested and detained in judicial custody for more than 48 hrs on the specific complaint of receipt of bribe, cannot claim equality. The interim stay granted is vacated. These writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed.