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Judgment
Gokal Chand Mital, J.—The main point for consideration which arises in this set of 10 writ petitions (No. 739, to 743 and 794 to 798 of 1979), is whether an order passed by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (hereinafter called the Act) would operate as res judicata in the subsequent proceedings before the Labour Court between the same parties.
The workman in Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 739 to 743 and 794 to 798 of 1979, had filed an application alongwith other workmen under Sections 15 and 16 of the Act claiming wages for the month of December, 1969, from Messrs Oswal Spinning and Weaving Mills Limited (hereinafter called the Mills) and besides the Mills, its Manager and one Shri Gurdial Singh as respondent No. 3 were impleaded. That application was tried initially by Shri H.S. Ahluwalia, P.C.S., who was appointed at the Authority under the Act. Before the Authority under the Act, the defence of the Mills was that on 30th June, 1969, all the workmen had submitted a joint resignation which was duly accepted by the Mills and all the workmen were paid their dues and receipts were obtained from each one of them, with the result that with effect from 1st July, 1960 they were not the workmen of the Mills and were serving as workmen of Gurdial Singh, respondent No 3, and therefore, Gurdial Singh was responsible for payment of their dues for the month of December, 1960. The workmen disputed the stand of the Mills and asserted that they never submitted any resignation nor their dues were paid as alleged by the Mills and all this was a bogus affair and Gurdial Singh, respondent, No. 3, was none-else than an employee of the Mills and they have been wrongly shown to be in the service of Gurdial Singh, which was again a camouflage. On the contest of the parties, the following three issues were framed:
Whether petitioners No. 20 to 23 are employees of the respondents?
Whether the petitioners gave up their jobs with the respondent No. 1 and 2 from 30th June, 1969 and joined with Shri Gurdial Singh respondent No. 3. If so, what is its effect?
To what amount of wages and compensation are the petitioners entitled to?
Shri H.S. Ahluwalia found, by order dated 13th January, 1972 (Annexure P. 10), that the workmen had submitted their resignations which were duly accented by the Mills and the Mills had made full and final settlement with them and that the workmen were the employees of Gurdial Singh, respondent No. 3. Against the aforesaid order of the Authority, the workmen filed an appeal which came up for consideration before Shri H.L. Randev, Additional District Judge, Ludhiana who allowed the same by order, dated 4th February, 1976 (Annexure P. 11) on a technical ground and sent back the case to the Authority under the Act for re-decision of the matter after affording fresh opportunity to both the parties to lead evidence on the new pleas raised before the Appellate Authority. After remand, the case came up for consideration before Shri Mohinder Singh Luna, P.C.S. as Authority under the Act, who by order dated 21st May, 1976, (Annexure P. 12) decided issue No. 2 in favour of the workmen and came to the conclusion that all the workmen were in fact the employees of M/s. Oswal Spinning and Weaving Mills Limited, Ludhiana, and not of Gurdial Singh and that the contractorship of Gurdial Singh was a mere camouflage. On the basis of this finding, the Mills were directed to pay all the wages to the workmen for the month of December, 1969. Against the aforesaid order which was against the Mills no appeal was filed, although an appeal was competent before the District Judge and, therefore, this order became final between the parties. Since the workmen were not being allowed to join their duties and the Mills were contending that they had terminated their services with effect from 5th January, 1970, they moved the State Government for referring the dispute to Labour Court and finally the Government of Punjab in exercise of powers u/s 10(1)(a), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 referred the following question with regard to 10 workmen to the Labour Court, Ludhiana:
Whether the termination of the services of the workmen mentioned above is justified when the ten references came up before the Labour Court, Ludhiana, on the contest of the parties, the following issues were framed:
Whether the reference is invalid and incompetent as alleged in the preliminary objections of written statement?
Whether the workmen left service of respondent on 30th June, 1960 after receiving all their dues in full and final settlement?
If previous issues are not proved, whether the termination of services of she workman is justified and in order?
Relief.
By award, dated 22nd September, 1978, Annexure P-1, the Labour Court decided issue No. 1 against the Mills as the same was not pressed; issue No. 2 was decided in favour of the workmen and it was held that the workmen had not received their dues in full and final settlement and had not resigned; issue No. 3 was decided against the Mills and in favour of the workmen on the basis of the finding given under issue No. 2 and under issue No. 4, all the references were accepted and the workmen were ordered to be reinstated with full back-wages and continuity of service from the date of their termination till their reinstatement. Specific direction was also made for making payment to the workmen at the rates specified in the award. The present writ petitions have been directed at the instance of the Mills against the award of the Labour Court, Ludhiana.
Dewan Chetan Das, learned counsel for the Mills, has urged three points before me:
(i) that the Labour Court committed an error patent on the face of the record in recording the following findings:
In this case no other evidence has been led by the management and they had only relied upon on the findings given in Ex. M-38. Independent evidence regarding resignation and full and final settlement ought to have been led by the management in this Court which is completely lacking. The persons in whose presence the full and final settlement took place have not come into the witness-box and only certain copies of documents have been tendered. It was the duty of the management to prove its assertion by leading evidence but no such evidence is forth-coming and I am left with no option but to hold that the management has failed to prove this issue.
(ii) that the Labour Court was in error in considering the Order, Annexure P-12, which is equal to Exhibit P.W. 5, as being final between the parties. According to the learned counsel, the authority under the Payment of Wages Act had no jurisdiction to decide whether the letters of resignation and acceptance thereof were genuine or bogus documents and. therefore, the decision given by that Court and contained in Exhibit P-12 is not binding on the parties with the result that the Labour Court should have given independent decision on that matter; and
(iii) that there was no material before the Labour Court as to at what rate the workman were entitled to the back wages barring the case of Pritam Singh, workman. In case the workman are to be granted fresh opportunity to lead evidence, then the Mills should be allowed the opportunity to show that during the period the workmen were out of service of the Mills, they were gainfully employed and to that extent deduction will have to be made from the back wages payable to them.
After hearing the learned counsel for the parties at length, on the three points, I proceed to decide them seriatim as follows.
The learned counsel for the Mills is right that the Labour Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the Mills had not produced any evidence regarding the resignation and payment to the workmen in full and final settlement of accounts. The file of the Labour Court shows that the Mills had produced Rajinder Singh, Moharrir of the Court of Senior Sub Judge, Ludhiana, as MW 2, who brought the summoned file of dispute between the parties under the Payment of Wages Act and the counsel for the Mills wanted to rely on certain documents from that file and the Labour Court directed him to produce the certified copies on which reliance was placed on behalf of the Mills. The certified copies of a large number of documents from the file of the Payment of Wages Court were obtained and were produced in this case which are in the form of vouchers showing the payment and settlement of accounts of the workman. The other witness produced by the Mills is Krishan Lal, their Manager, who appeared as M.W. 3. He produced the original resignation Exhibit M. 11 and stated before the Labour Court that the workmen gave a joint resignation in his presence. He further stated that the same was accepted by Shri Raj Pal, Director of the Mills, vide endorsement No. M. 11/A. Thereafter, he stated that the workmen received their dues in full and final settlement and the copies from the file of Payment of Wages Court were tendered as M. 12 to M. 38. The witness in cross-examination besides other matters stated that the workmen had put their signatures or thumb impressions on the letter of resignation in his presence. The aforesaid state of affairs from the record of the Labour Court shows that the original resignation letter and the endorsement of the Director accepting the same were produced on the file besides producing the certified copies of the vouchers showing payment of full dues to the workmen, after the original file had been summoned. This clearly shows that the Labour Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the Mills had failed to produce the original documents, the concerned witnesses or the relevant documents. However, it may be pointed out that no evidence was led by the Mills that the services of the workmen were terminated on 5th January, 1970. Therefore, I decide the first point raised by the counsel for the Mills in their favour.
Whether the decision of first point in favour of the Mills would entitle them to any relief from this Court would depend on the decision on the second point. If the second point is also decided in favour of the Mills, then of course, the case will have to be sent back to the Labour Court to reappraise the evidence adduced by the Mills along with the evidence produced by the workmen and then to give a final decision, but in case under the second point it is held that the decision contained in Annexure P-12 would be binding on the parties before the Labour Court, then in spite of the decision on the first point, the award of the Labour Court reinstating the workmen will have to be maintained. Therefore, I proceed to decide the second point raised on behalf of the Mills.
In the resume of facts, I have already detailed that before the Authority under the Act, there was a definite issue whether the workmen had given up their jobs under the Mills from 30-6-1989, and had joined Gurdial Singh and whether the workmen would be entitled to wages for the month of December, 1969 from the Mills. In the first instance, this matter was decided by Order Annexure P-10 in favour of the Mills but on remand by the Appellate Authority by order Annexure P-12, the matter was decided against the Mills and in favour of the workmen. While the workmen had filed an appeal against the order Annexure P 10 the Mills did not file any appeal against the order Annexure P-12 and allowed the same to become final. Faced with this situation Dewan Chetan Dass, the learned counsel for the Mills has strenuously urged that the order of the Authority under the Act (Annexure P-12) is wholly without jurisdiction and therefore non-est inasmuch as the Authority had no jurisdiction to go into the matter whether the documents which purported to show that the workmen had resigned and had accepted payments in full and final settlement of the accounts were genuine or not as this matter could either be gone into by the Labour Court or by a Civil Court. In support of this submission, reliance has been placed on the following decisions:
(i) Payment of Wages Inspector Payment of Wages Inspector Vs. Surajmal Mehta and Another,
(ii Anthony Sabastin Almeda Vs. R.M. Taylor and Another,
(iii) M/s. E. Hill & Co. (P) Ltd. Mirzapur v. City Magistrate, Mirzapur 1980 Lab. I.C. 873. Allahabad decision;
(iv) Union of India and others v. Joginder Singh 1964 L.L.J. 304, a Division Bench judgment of this Court, and
(v) Harnam Singh v. M/s. Rama Krishna Wadding Mills AIR 1570 P&H. 349, a single Bench decision of this Court.
A reading of all these decisions shows that on the facts of each one of them, it was held that the respective disputes raised therein could not be allowed to be decided by the Authority under the Act. In each one of the aforesaid cases, the decision of the Authority under the Act, was challenged either in appeal or by filing a writ petition in the High Court or SLP in the Supreme Court of India. Therefore, the final decision given in these cases would bind the parties. However, no case has been cited before me by the counsel for the Mills where the decision of the Authority under the Act remained unchallenged in appeal or by filing a writ or SLP and when the matter came up in another Court, it was ruled that the decision of the Authority under the Act would be non-est and would not bind the parties in the subsequent proceedings. I am saying so for the reason that the wording of Section 15 of the Act, as it stands after amendment made by the Central Act No. 53 of 1964, clearly goes to show that the Authority under the Act while deciding the matter of deduction from the wages or delay in payment of wages. is empowered to decide all the matters incidental to such claims because the following words were added at the conclusion of sub-section (1):
of persons employed or paid in that area, including all matters incidental to such claims.
This matter was pointedly noticed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Maruti Mahipati, Mahipati Mullick and another v. Ms. Poison Ltd. 1970 Lab. I.C. 308, and the learned Judges, because of the Amendment and certain decision of the Supreme Court, came to conclusion that the Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Anthony Almeaa''s case (supra) no longer was a good law.
The matter can be examined from another point of view. Suppose the Mills had filed an appeal against the order (Annexure P-12) and had raised the point before the Appellate Authority that the Authority under the Act had no jurisdiction to decide whether the resignation and the vouchers showing the settlement of accounts with the workmen were genuine or bogus and the matter was decided against the Mills, could the Mills still say that even the order of the Appellate Authority is without jurisdiction in view of the decisions relied upon by the counsel for the Mills. To my mind, to hold in other independent proceedings that the order would be wholly without jurisdiction is wholly wrong because this very matter can be taken further Suppose against the order of the Appellate Authority, the Mills had filed a writ Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and this Court had found that the matter could be decided by the Authority under the Act and fell within the scope of the words "all matters incidental to such claims", could the Mills take stand that the order of the High Court would also be non est, since the matter did not fall within the ambit of Section 15(1) of the Act. It is not a simple case of coming to the conclusion where the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Act is ousted on a bare look on the facts and the section, but it would be a matter of long drawn arguments whether it may not be a fit case to be decided by the Authority under the Act or it would be desirable to direct the parties to go either before the Civil Court or under the Industrial Disputes Act. If the matter is so complicated, which to my mind is, I would not be inclined to hold that the decision of the Authority under the Act would be held to be without jurisdiction in subsequent proceedings arising between the parties. To avoid this, the general principles of res judicata, as embodied in Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, which otherwise do not apply to authorities or tribunals other than Civil Courts have been extended by various decisions of the Supreme Court on general public policy and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. The Supreme Court has held that even under the Industrial Law, the general principles of res judicata are applicable, and for this matter reference may be made to Workmen of the Workmen of The Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Vs. Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd., and Bombay Gas Company Limited v. Jaganath Pandurang 1975 L.L.J. 345. The relevant passage from the Bombay Gas Company''s case (supra) deserves to be reproduced:
The doctrine of res judicata is a wholesome one which is applicable not merely to matters governed by the provisions of the CPC but to all litigations. It proceeds on the principle that there should be no unnecessary litigation and whatsoever claims and defences are open to parties should all be put forward at the same time provided no confusion is likely to arise by so putting forward all such claims It was observed by this Court in Denial Modi v. Sales Tax Officer, ((sic) (1) S.C.R. 686):
The general principle underlying the doctrine of res judicata is ultimately based on considerations of public policy. One important consideration of public policy is that the decisions pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction should be final, unless they are modified or reversed by appellate authorities; and the other principle is that no one should be made to face the same kind of litigation twice over, because such a process would be contrary to considerations of fair play and justice, vide Daryao and Others Vs. The State of U.P. and Others, .
A reading of the facts of the Bombay Gas Company''s case (supra) shows that the learned Judges applied the doctrine of constructive res judicata also because it was held as follows:
We are, therefore, of opinion that the question of overtime wages should be deemed to have been dealt with and disposed of by the Tribunal on whatever the basis of the claim for overtime wages may be.
But on the facts of the present case, what I find is that there was a specific issue about the validity of the resignation of the workmen, which was gone into by the Authority under the Act, which issue in the first instance was decided in favour of the Mills, but on remand went in favour of the workman and that very matter was again sought to be agitated before the Labour Court on behalf the Mills. Therefore, I find that it is a case of applicability of the direct principle of res judicata inasmuch as the matter which was in issue between the parties in the earlier dispute ought to have been final between the parties in the subsequent dispute, that is, in the reference under the Industrial Disputes Act.
For the reasons recorded above, I come to the conclusion that the decision (Annexure P-12) to the effect that the workman had not submitted any resignation and that they were not paid their dues and continued to be the workmen of the Mills would be binding on the Mills in the present litigation. Once the finding recorded by the Authority under the Act operate as res judicata against the Mills, the Labour Court was justified in relying on Annexure P-12, copy of which was placed before it as Exhibit P.W. 5, in coming to the conclusion that the story of resignation and having received the dues in full and final settlement by the workmen from the Mills and having joined Gurdial Singh was all false and a made up story and that the workmen continued to be the workmen under the Mills. Accordingly, the second point is decided against the Mills and in favour of the workmen.
This brings me to the consideration of the third point. For proving the wages payable to the workmen, only one of the workman, namely, Pritam Singh, had appeared as WW. 3 and stated that his average wages were Rs. 250/- per month. He did not state about the wages of the other workmen, nor other workmen appeared in the witness box. No evidence worth the name has been produced to show as to what were the wages payable to the other workmen. What appears in this case is that the Labour Court while awarding the back wages took notice of the decision given by the Authority under the Act, namely, Annexure P-12. On a look at Annexure P-12 and the award of the Labour Court, Annexure P-l, I find there is a disparity in them also. Therefore I do not think that the Labour Court was correct in awarding the back-wages at the rites which were not proved in the cases of all he workmen Therefore, in the interest of justice this matter will have to be gone into afresh by the Labour Court and for that matter the case have to be sent back to the Labour Court for decision of this matter.
For the aforesaid reasons, I uphold the award of the Labour Court that the workmen are entitled to be reinstated with full back-wages and continuity of service from the date of termination of their services i e. with effect from 5th January, 1970 till they are reinstated However, the remaining part of the award of the Labour Court is quashed with a direction to it to grant opportunity to the workmen to prove their wages. Similarly, the Labour Court would grant opportunity to the Mills to prove if the workmen concerned have been gainfully employed during all this period. The Labour Court thereafter would decide how much is payable to the workman after making due deduction, if any, for the amount for which they were gainfully employed during this period as may be proved by the Mills. The parties through their counsel, are directed to appear before the Labour Court, Ludhiana, on 12th February, 1981. The parties are left to bear their own costs as there has been divided success.