Oriental Insurance Company Ltd vs LH Of Decd Parubhai Vichhiyabhai Bhabhor & 2 Other(S)

Gita Gopi, J

Rule returnable forthwith.

Heard Mr. Hardik P.Mehta, learned advocate for the applicant.

This is an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 22 days which has occurred in preferring the captioned First Appeal.

Learned advocate for the applicant submitted that the impugned judgment and award was pronounced by the learned tribunal on 21.11.2019 and the certified copy was applied on 06.12.2019 and the same was ready for delivery on 09.12.2019 and it was delivered on the same day i.e. on 09.12.2019. The attending advocate of the appellant – applicant sent the certified copy alongwith the opinion on 23.12.2019 to the applicant’s office, which was received on 23.12.2019. The applicant in turn sent the same to the Regional Office, Ahmedabad, on 04.02.2020. The Regional Office, Ahmedabad, thereafter decided to have a legal opinion whether to file an appeal or not from its empanelled advocate on 18.03.2020. The opinion was received by the Regional Office, Ahmedabad, on 24.07.2020 due to nationwide lock-down and peculiar circumstances due to pandemic. Thereafter the Regional Office, Ahmedabad, decided to file the appeal and appointed the empanelled lawyer, who received the file on 31.08.2020. Learned advocate for the applicant stated that due to aforesaid reasons the delay of 22 days has been caused in preferring the appeal which is occurred due to administrative exigencies of the applicant company, and therefore, prays that this Court may be pleased to condone the delay of 22 days in preferring the captioned appeal.

Considering the submissions made by the learned advocate for the applicant and in view of the averments made in para 6 and 7 of the application and also considering the fact that the delay has been sufficiently explained; this Court is of the opinion that the delay caused in preferring the First Appeal deserves to be condoned.

In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another v. Mst. Katiji and Others reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 it has been observed as under :-

“3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice--that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:-

Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

"Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing- on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits.”

Thus, taking into consideration the principle as laid down in the above referred judgment and when the delay of 22 days is sufficiently explained, the same is condoned. The application is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs.