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Judgment
G. Satapathy, J.
MACA No.1311 of 2018 & IA No.1207 of 2019
This judgment shall not only dispose of the instant Appeal, but also the application filed U/S.5 of the Limitation Act in IA No.1207 of 2019 seeking condonation of an inordinate delay of 891 days in preferring the Appeal against the impugned judgment dated 22.04.2016 passed by the learned Second Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Cuttack (in short, the “Tribunal”) in Misc. Case No.554 of 2002 awarding compensation of Rs.3,24,000/- together with interest @ 7% per annum w.e.f. date of filing of the claim application on 31.07.2002 till its actual realization within one month thence.
Heard, Mr. G.P. Dutta, learned counsel for the Appellant-petitioner and Mr. Antaryami Dash, learned counsel for R-1 to 3-cum-OPNos.1 to 3 in the matter and perused the record. None appears for R4-cum-OPNo.4, but notice against her stands dispensed with in view of the provision under Order XLI Rule 14(4) of the CPC, since R4-cum-OPNo.4, the registered owner of the offending vehicle did not contest the claim and she was set ex-parte in the proceeding before the learned Tribunal.
After having considered the rival submissions upon perusal of record, there appears no dispute about the Appellant-insurance company filing the Appeal with delay of 891 days, and the grounds put forth for condonation of such delay are stated in paragraphs-3 to 8 of the IA, which runs thus: -
“3.That after the judgment was passed the same was forwarded to the dealing counsel for opinion and the dealing counsel submitted his Opinion on dated.22.08.2016.
4.That the Divisional office after receipt of the Opinion from the dealing counsel processed the file and after obtaining necessary administrative sanction from the competent Authority forwarded it to the Regional office at Bhubaneswar for filing appeal.
5.That it is submitted by the petitioner that during the transit, some of the documents were misplaced for which the same was not received by the Regional Office at Bhubaneswar and accordingly the Regional Office requested ‘the Divisional office to send those documents.
6.That the Regional office after processing the file and after obtaining necessary administrative sanction from the competent Authority, forwarded it to the counsel for filing appeal vide letter dtd.16.08.2018.
7.That the counsel after receipt of the file requested the Divisional office to hand over all the relevant documents and after receipt of the same drafted the memorandum of appeal and after cessation of work call was lifted, the appeal was accordingly filed.
8.That in the process there has been a delay of 891 days in filing the appeal.”
It is, however, submitted for the Appellant that the delay was neither intentional nor deliberate; rather it was due to the reason beyond the control of the Appellant and, accordingly, it is prayed to take a liberal approach in condoning the delay, but the learned counsel for the Respondent-claimants strongly opposes such argument by arguing that a delay of 891 days cannot be brushed aside under the pretext of misplacement of documents and delay in processing the file, which in fact deprived the claimants of their legitimate due in the form of compensation even after more than 20 years of the accident.
There is in fact no quarrel over the position of law that an applicant can establish “sufficient cause” for not filing an Appeal within the prescribed statutory time limit, but the Court while dealing an application for condonation of delay should adopt a pragmatic approach to promote justice, however, the expression of “sufficient cause” cannot be stretched to cover the cases of absolute apathy, utter negligence or institutional complacency. In the context of misplaced documents, this Court considers it profitable to refer to the decision in State of Madhya Pradesh Vrs. Bherulal; (2020) 10 SCC 654, wherein the unavailability of the documents and the process of arranging documents have been advanced as reasons for condonation of delay, besides referring that bureaucratic process of work inadvertently causes delay, but rejecting the aforesaid pleas, the Apex Court has refused to condone the delay 663 days and dismissed the SLP by reiterating the principle of Post Master General and others Vrs. Living Media India Ltd. and another; (2012) 3 SCC 563. It is also not in dispute that what document(s) was/were misplaced has never been specifically stated in the application for condonation of delay, but a mere bald statement like in this case the documents were misplaced, a liberal approach cannot be adopted. There cannot be any discrimination for adopting different method(s) in considering the condonation of delay, but the Courts absolutely treat everyone in the same standard of scale, be it a corporate body or a private individual or a privileged person. Accordingly, the Government bodies, large corporation, and Tech Savvy entities are to be considered in the same legal standard as ordinary citizens in the matter of condonation of delay, however, the corporate entities like the Appellant in this Appeal cannot use the internal administrative mis-management, misplacement of files/documents or slow bureaucratic movement or delay in getting approval/sanction to file a litigation, as a shield to bypass the law of limitation. The law applies uniformly and large corporate entities or Government bodies do not enjoy a special status or a longer limitation period than an ordinary citizen. In Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by Legal Representatives and others Vrs. Special Deputy Collector (LA); 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 / (2024) 12 SCC 336, the Apex Court emphasized that the discretion U/S.5 of the Limitation Act must be exercised judiciously, while summarizing the followings in paragraph-28 for consideration of application for condonation of delay: -
“28.On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
28.1.Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
28.2.A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
28.3.The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
28.4.In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
28.5.Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
28.6.Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
28.7.Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
28.8.Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamount to disregarding the statutory provision.”
Examining the present case on these parameters, the explanation provided by the insurer is entirely unconvincing and structurally deficient and the application for condonation of delay lacks precise chronological details and it fails to explicitly state the reasons for the delay. In the context of condonation of delay, this Court is also considered it apposite to refer to the decision in Post Master General (supra), wherein the Apex Court in paragraph-29 has explicitly stated and observed as under: -
“29.In our view, it is the right time to inform all the Government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept their usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/ years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The Government Departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the Government Department. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.”
What is interesting is that probably the insurer woke up from the slumber after receipt of notice in the Appeal of the claimants only to end up with this Appeal with delay of such long duration. In this situation, condoning the unexplained delay of such a long duration by way of liberal approach would just like paying premium on the institutional latches or negligence attributable/imputable to a Public Sector Company like the Appellant in this Appeal for its sheer gross negligence and utter apathy towards poor claimants. In other words, mere administrative negligence cannot constitute a “sufficient cause” and these assertion regarding internal files moving from one table to other table do not fulfill the legal requirements of explaining an inordinate delay. In view of the above facts and circumstance and on consideration of the averments taken in the application for condonation of delay, this Court does not find any reasonable explanation as offered by the insurer to condone the delay, but condoning such immense or unmitigated delay without a legitimate day-to-day breakdown and without having any reasonable explanation, it would completely frustrate the principal objective of the Limitation Act, which is sounded on public policy to ensure finality to the litigation and protect legal rights from enduring vulnerability. In this situation, the Latin maxim “Dura lex sed lex” which means the law is harsh but it is the law stands attracted to the case of the Appellant-insurer. The aforesaid Latin maxim epitomizes that valid laws must be followed and enforced strictly, even if the outcome is severe, unfair, or inconvenient to a party in a specific case. Consequently, this Court finds that the Appellant-insurer has completely failed to demonstrate “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the application lacks merit and is a clear example of gross institutional negligence. Hence, delay of such a long duration cannot be condoned merely because it is stated in the application that the delay was on account of misplacement of documents and processing the file. Hence, it is ordered.
The IA No.1207 of 2019 for condonation of delay of 891 days is, hereby, dismissed. As a necessary consequence, MACA No.1311 of 2018 stands dismissed as barred by law of limitation at the admission stage. No order as to costs. The statutory deposit together with the accrued interest thereon be refunded to the insurer upon production of proof of deposit of such modified compensation.