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Judgment
Subhash Chandra, Presiding Member
This Appeal under Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short “the Act”) assails the order dated 19.01.2018 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Gujarat (for short “the State Commission”) in Complaint No.94 of 2015.
There is a delay of 103 days in filing of the present Appeal. IA 11242 of 2018 has been filed by the Appellant seeking condonation of delay stating that the certified copy of the impugned order dated 19.01.2018 was received by the Appellant, admittedly, on 24.01.2018. The Appeal, however, has been filed on 07.06.2018 and the delay is sought to be explained on the ground that the file was forwarded to the Head Office on 23.02.2018 and it took time to translate the documents since there was a shortage of Translators and that the relevant translation could not sent only on 23.03.2018 to the Head Office. Thereafter, it took time for the Head Office to seek information from empanelled Advocate to respond to queries raised and to locate lawyer before the State Commission in view of the courts being on vacation. The delay of 103 days is sought to be justified on the basis of the judgment of . It is broadly argued that a very technical view of the facts need not be taken in refusing to condone the delay in view of the fact that the Appellant represents a Public Sector entity dealing with insurance since the delay was not intentional or deliberate.
This application for condonation of delay was strongly opposed by the learned Counsel for the Respondent on the ground that the delay had not been sufficiently explained and that the internal processes of the Appellant could not be accepted as the basis for condonation of delay. It was argued that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in several landmark judgments has emphasized that the delay of each day needs to be sufficiently explained in order to justify the case for condonation of delay. It was also contended that the argument that the delay was caused because translation of documents from the vernacular to English took time, was not justifiable since no documents had been brought on record which was in vernacular along with the translated copies. It was, therefore, submitted that the delay of 103 days did not warrant to be condoned.
In Ram Lal and Ors. vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
“It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.”
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in another case of R. B. Ramlingam vs. R. B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC), has stated that a court has to apply the basic test while dealing with the matters relating to condonation of delay, whether the Petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence or not. The court has held as under:
"We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition.”
While dealing with the matters under the Act, it has been held in the case of Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, (2011) 14 SCC 578, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the special nature of the Act has to be kept in mind while dealing with the special period of limitation prescribed therein. The court has held as under:
“It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Fora."
The objective of the Act include inter alia to provide “speedy and simple redressal to consumer disputes” and Section 24A of the Act provides for a period of limitation which is intended to ensure a speedy redressal of consumer disputes. Section 24 A has been held to be a legislative command by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The exception to the provisions of Section 24 can be considered only when cause shown is sufficient and has been specifically explained. In the instant case, no documents in the vernacular that were sought to be translated on account of which the delay in filing of the Appeal is relied upon, has been filed. The order dated 19.01.2018 was admittedly received by the regional office of the Appellant on 24.01.2018. Thereafter, the file was moved to the Head Office only a month later, as per the application for the condonation of delay. Therefore, the argument that the Appellant acted with due alacrity in the matter is not supported by any evidence and cannot, therefore, be accepted. Therefore, the reasons advanced for seeking condonation of delay are not sufficient and cannot be accepted.
In view of the following, the delay of 103 days is not condoned. The Appeal is, therefore, dismissed in limini.
