High CourtsDivision Bench(2015) 03 GUJ CK 0001

Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Kirit Dharamsibhai Modi

Gujarat High Court · Decided on 5 March 2015 · Citation: (2017) AAC 98

HON’BLE JUDGES
Mr. M.R. Shah and Mr. R.P. Dholaria, JJ.
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
First Appeal No. 3309 of 1996 With Cross Objection No. 6 of 2003 With First Appeal No. 764 of 2002 To First Appeal No. 766 of 2002 With First Appeal No. 4833 of 2007 With First Appeal No. 2109 of 2006 To First Appeal No. 2110 of 2006 With First Appeal No.

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Judgment

220 paragraphs · 16,240 words

Mr. M.R. Shah, J. - As common question of law and facts arise in this group of First Appeals, all these appeals are decided and disposed of by this common judgment and order. For the sake of convenience First Appeal No.3309/1996 be treated as the main matter.

2.

Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and award passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Main), Vadodara (hereinafter referred to as "Tribunal") in Motor Accident Claim Petition No.548/1992 by which the learned Tribunal has held the appellants herein - original opponent No.3 - Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. to pay the compensation for the death of the employee of the insured (owner of the vehicle involved in the accident) by covering the risk of the employee of the insured - owner of the vehicle involved in the accident has preferred the present First Appeal No.3309/1996.

2.1 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned common judgment and award passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kheda @ Nadiad in Motor Accident Claim Petition Nos.1502/2001, 2845/2000 and 2859/2000 by which the learned Tribunal has held the appellant herein - original opponent No.3 - National Insurance Company Ltd. to pay the compensation covering the risk of the deceased and the injured claimants who were travelling in the insured jeep No.GJ6JJ864 being employees of the insured, the appellant herein - original opponent No.3 has preferred the present First Appeal Nos.2108/2008 to 2110/2008.

First Appeal No.5195/2008, which can be said to be cross appeal to First Appeal No.2108/2008, has been preferred by the appellants herein - original claimants of Motor Accident Claim Petition No.1502/2001, feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and award passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kheda @ Nadiad in Motor Accident Claim Petition No.1502/2001 insofar as quantum of compensation is concerned and to enhance the amount of compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal.

2.2 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned common judgment and award passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kheda @ Nadiad in Motor Accident Claim Petition Nos.672/1991 to 674/1991 holding the appellant herein - original opponent No.3 - New India Assurance Co. Ltd. to pay the compensation for the death of the employees of the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident, who were travelling in the vehicle of the owner / insured, the appellant herein - original opponent No.3 - New India Assurance Co. Ltd. have preferred the present First Appeal Nos.764/2002 to 766/2002.

2.3 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and award passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Main), Kheda @ Nadiad in Motor Accident Claim Petition No.1329/1991 in holding the appellant herein - original opponent No.3 - New India Assurance Co. Ltd. to pay the compensation for the death of the employee of the insured - owner of the vehicle involved in the accident and he was travelling in a said vehicle, the appellant herein - original opponent No.3 - New India Assurance Co. Ltd. has preferred the present First Appeal No.4833/2007.

2.4 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and award passed by the learned Motor Accident Claim Tribunal (FTC No.8), Ahmedabad (Rural), at Navrangpura, Ahmedabad in Motor Accident Claim Petition No.309/1994 insofar as holding the appellant herein - original opponent No.3 - United India Insurance Co. Ltd. to pay the compensation for the injuries sustained by the employee of the insured - owner of the luxury bus involved in the accident, the appellant herein - original opponent No.3 has preferred the present First Appeal No.1027/2006.

2.5 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and award passed by the learned Tribunal in M.A.C.P. No.810/1992 by which the learned Tribunal has partly allowed the said claim petition and has awarded a total sum of Rs.7,69,000/towards compensation for the death of deceased Chandraprakash Narang, who died in a vehicular accident occurred on 12.05.1992, the original claimants have preferred the present First Appeal No.989/2011 requesting to enhance the amount of compensation.

Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid impugned judgment and award passed by the learned Tribunal passed in MACP No.810/1992 insofar as holding the United India Insurance Company liable to pay the compensation, the insurance company has preferred the First Appeal No.2110/2006.

3.

Facts leading to the First Appeal No.3309/1996 which is to be treated as a lead matter in nutshell are as under:

3.1 That the original claimant - Kirit Dharamsinhbhai Modi was serving with the original opponent No.2 - Rabamin Pvt. Ltd. That on the day of the alleged occurrence of the accident, at the relevant time, he was coming from Halol and going towards Vadodara in the Car No.GJ17A7614 (the car owned by the insured - original opponent No.2, which was insured with the original opponent No.3 - insurance company - Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.) being driven by the original opponent No.1 with excessive speed and in rash and negligent manner. When the said car came near the scene of occurrence, the original opponent No.1 lost control over the car and so it fell in the ditch and then turned turtle. That during the accident he received the injuries which according to the original claimants was a result of the rash and negligent act on the part of the original opponent No.1 while driving the aforesaid car at the relevant time. Therefore, the original injured claimants filed MACP No.548/1992 before the learned Tribunal claiming Rs. 45 lakh towards compensation for the accidental injuries sustained by him in aforesaid motor vehicular accident which occurred on 29.05.1992.

3.2 That the claim petition was opposed/resisted by the original opponent No.3 - insurance company of the motor car involved in the accident by filing the written statement at Exh.17. The insurance company emphatically resisted the claim petition by denying its liability to pay the compensation to the injured claimant who was an employee travelling in the vehicle of the insured. That on appreciation of evidence more particularly the insurance policy and the terms and conditions of the insurance policy the learned Tribunal has held the original opponent No.3 - insurance company of the car involved in the accident to pay the compensation to the injured claimant for the injuries sustained by him while he was travelling in the car owned by the original opponent No.2 which was insured with original opponent No.3 - appellant herein.

3.3 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and award passed by the learned Tribunal in holding the appellant herein - original opponent No.3 - insurance company to indemnify the award and/or to pay the compensation to the injured claimant - employee of the insured while he was travelling in the car owned by the insured, the appellant herein - original opponent No.3 has preferred the present First Appeal. So far as the other First Appeals are concerned, the learned Tribunal in respective claim petitions has held the insurer - respective insurance companies liable to pay the compensation for the death of the deceased employee travelling in the vehicle of the insured or the injured claimant - employee of the insured travelling in the vehicle of the employer as the case may be, the respective insurers - insurance companies have preferred the respective aforesaid First Appeals. As observed herein above, one First Appeal bearing First Appeal No.5195/2008 is an appeal preferred by the original claimants to enhance the amount of compensation.

4.

At the outset it is required to be noted that in all these First Appeals a common question of law which arises for consideration of this Court is with respect to liability of the insurance company to indemnify the award and/or to pay the compensation for the death of the deceased employee travelling in a vehicle of the insured - employer and owner of the vehicle involved in the accident either in case of fatal and/or in case of injuries sustained by the employee of the insured and if at all the insurance company is held liable to pay the compensation, to what extent?

5.

Shri Rajni H. Mehta, Shri Vibhuti Nanavati, Shri Maulik Shelat, Shri Sunil Parikh, learned advocates have appeared on behalf of the respective insurance companies and Shri MTM Hakim, learned advocate has appeared on behalf of the original claimants and Shri Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Advocate has appeared with Shri Hiren Modi, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd. insured - owner of the vehicle in First Appeal Nos.2109/2006 to 2110/2006.

5.1 Shri Rajni Mehta, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant - insurance company in First Appeal No.3309/1996 - Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. has vehemently submitted that the learned Tribunal has materially erred in holding the appellant - insurance company liable to pay the compensation to the original injured claimant - employee of the insured while travelling in the car involved in the accident.

5.2 It is submitted that the appellant - insurance company issued the insurance policy for private car to the original opponent No.3 - M/s. Rabamin Pvt. Ltd. for Maruti Car No.GJ17A7614. It had a sitting capacity of 4 + 1 meaning thereby 4 passengers + 1 driver. It is submitted that company charged premium as under:

1.

Rs. 3,950/for own damage to the car;

2.

Basic of Rs. 160/;

3.

Rs. 100/for Personal Accident Benefits as per endorsement IMT 5 for number of passengers death benefits;

4.

Rs. 15/for legal liability of to paid driver as per endorsement IMT 19 It is submitted that the policy had following Indian Motor Tariff (hereinafter referred to as "IMT") Endorsements and Memorandum.

1.

IMT 24 (Replacement of parts);

2.

IMT 26 Compulsory Excess (Commercial Vehicle Policies only wrongly typed this endorsement) as this is private car policy;

3.

IMT 5 Personal Accident Cover to unnamed passengers other than the insured and his paid driver or cleaner;

4.

IMT 19 Legal Liability to paid driver employed in connection with operation of motor vehicle.

It is submitted that as per the Indian Motor Tariff - General Regulation No.27, Rs. 5 was charged per year / per person for insured capital sum of Rs. 10,000/when insurance cover is taken for Rs. 50,000/, Rs. 25 was charged for one person. It is submitted that the sitting capacity of the maruti car as expressly stated in the policy was 4 persons excluding the driver. It is submitted that cover was taken and premium of Rs. 100/had been charged. It is submitted that, that means each persons covered under IMT 5 was charged at Rs. 25/person and for 4 persons, Rs. 25 x 4 = Rs. 100/. It is submitted that therefore insurer''s 100% risk cover of each person was Rs. 50,000/. It is submitted that the maximum insurance covered under IMT 5 was limited to capital sum insured of Rs. 2 lakh per person, if the premium is paid at the rate of Rs. 5 per person for cover of Rs. 10,000/. It is submitted that the policy excluded cover to the claimant who was employed as Research and Development Manager.

5.3 Shri Mehta, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant - insurance company has heavily relied upon the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jugal Kishore reported in (1988)1 SCC 626 with respect to the meaning of "comprehensive policy" more particularly para 6 of the said decision.

It is submitted by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant - insurance company that it had issued the motor insurance policy for Maruti Car in favour of the original opponent No.2 - owner of the Maruti Car which was registered as private vehicle and the said policy was a comprehensive policy. It is submitted that the injured claimant, the Research and Development Manager was travelling in the said vehicle being employee of the insured during course of his employment with insured. It is submitted that therefore the risk of the injured claimant - employee travelling in the insured private vehicle - maruti car during his course of employment was not required to be covered under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1988") and in fact not covered under the policy in question.

5.4 It is submitted by Shri Mehta, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the insurance company that the statutory liability of the appellant - insurance company would be as per section 147 of the Act, 1988. It is submitted that the risk of employee travelling in vehicle is not required to be covered under the Act, 1988 and in fact not covered by the policy. It is submitted that as such and as a matter of fact the risk is specifically excluded by the policy. It is further submitted that one of the important conditions of the policy with regard to liability to third parties is that the company shall not be liable where such death or injury arises out of and in the course of employment of such person by the insured.

5.5 It is submitted by Shri Mehta, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the insurance company that it is a settled legal position of law that when insurance company is not statutorily liable to pay the compensation and where statutory liability is specifically excluded under Section 147 of the Act, 1988 then the Tribunal/Court is required to see terms of the contract - policy and then decide liability of parties as per terms of contract. It is submitted that as per the terms and conditions of the policy, it is amply clear from reading Clause II(1)(i) of policy, risk of employee carried in insured''s private vehicle during course of his employment is specifically excluded from policy in question. It is submitted that therefore under the contract/policy, even in comprehensive policy the appellant - insurance company was not supposed to cover the risk of the injured employee in carried in vehicle in question as the same was specifically excluded under the contract policy. It is submitted that even it was not the case of anyone that insured had paid any additional premium to cover the risk of such employee carried in private vehicle during his course of employment then insurance company is not contractually liable to pay compensation for injury of such employee who was carried in vehicle during course of his employment and therefore, the insurance company was not contractually liable to pay any compensation for injury of such employee who was carried in vehicle during course of his employment. In support of his above submissions, Shri Mehta, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the insurance company has heavily relied upon the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramashray Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2003)10 SCC 664 (Para 14).

Shri Mehta, learned advocate has also heavily relied upon another decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Meena Variyal & Ors. reported in (2007)5 SCC 428 (Paras 10, 11, 12, 17, 18 and 20) in support of his above submissions.

5.6 Shri Mehta, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant - insurance company has further submitted that considering the aforesaid two decisions of the Hon''ble Supreme Court, the Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal No.2214/1999 in its judgment dated 07.02.2012 and another decision in the case of New India Assurance Company Limited v. Gitaben Mukeshbhai Pathak reported in 2013 ACJ 1216 (Guj) had an occasion to consider similar issue as involved in present appeal and considering the terms of the policy had held that the insurance company is not liable to pay the compensation in case of death/injury of the employee carried in vehicle of employer - insured. It is submitted that the Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal Nos.1743/2002 to 1745/2002 in its judgment dated 18.04.2012 had an occasion to consider similar issue in comprehensive policy as in the present appeal, and has inter alia held considering Section 147(1) of the Act, 1988 read with terms of the policy Clause II(1)(i) that the risk of the employee carried in the vehicle during course of the employment is not covered.

5.7 It is further submitted by Shri Mehta, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant - insurance company that in the recent decision the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Sanjeev Kumar Samrat v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. reported in AIR 2013 SC 1125 had an occasion to consider the liability of the insurance company vis-a-vis the employee travelling in the vehicle of the insured during the course of his employment. Shri Mehta, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant - insurance company has heavily relied upon paras 19 and 20 of the aforesaid decision. That the ratio of the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Meena Variyal (Supra) has not been disturbed by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in its recent decision in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Balakrishnan & Anr. reported in (2013)1 SCC 731. It is submitted that the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Meena Variyal (Supra) does not state that the judgment is of the Act policy. It is submitted that in the aforesaid decision in para 17 the Hon''ble Supreme court has quoted the circular issued by IRDA dated 16.11.2009 which specifically excludes "...the Company shall not be liable where such death or injury arises out of and in the course of employment of such person by the insured."

5.8 It is further submitted by Shri Mehta, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the insurance company that risk of the occupant (gratuitous passenger) of the car may be covered, provided he is not insured''s employee travelling in the car as his risk is not required to be covered under the Act, 1988 and in fact not covered by the terms of the policy and as a matter of fact his risk is specifically excluded by the policy. Therefore, the risk of employee of the insured though occupant of the car is not required to be covered by the Act, 1988 and is also not covered by the comprehensive policy. It is submitted that similarly occupant of the car carried for hire and reward is also not covered by the Act, 1988 and also not covered by the policy. It is submitted that statute does not need to provide insurance cover for employees travelling in the vehicle and circular of IRDA dated 16.11.2009 also does not provide such cover in the comprehensive policy. It is submitted that therefore the observation of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in para 23 of the aforesaid decision in the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra) that in comprehensive policy the liability would be fastened on the insurer is in consonance of the Act, 1988 or IRDA circular and as a matter of fact when such risk is specifically & expressly excluded by the terms of the policy.

5.9 It is further submitted that in para 15 of the subsequent judgment of the same Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Surendra Nath Loomba reported in AIR 2013 SC 483, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has specifically observed that whether the insurer would be liable or not would depend upon the nature of the policy when it is brought on record in a manner as required by law. It is submitted that nature of policy would also include the terms of the policy keeping in view the provisions of the Act, 1988 and the IRDA circular.

5.10 It is submitted that once the Act, 1988 and IRDA circular does not cover the risk of employee travelling in private vehicle and when such risk is specifically excluded by the comprehensive policy, the liability on the insurance company cannot be fastened.

Making above submissions and relying upon above decisions, it is requested to allow the present First Appeal and quash and set aside the impugned judgment and award insofar as holding the appellant - insurance company liable to pay the compensation to the injured claimant - employee of the insured.

6.

First Appeal No.3309/1996 is vehemently opposed by Shri MTM Hakim, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original claimants. It is submitted that so far as the contention on behalf of the insurance company relying upon the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Meena Variyal (Supra) and two decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gitaben Mukeshbhai Pathak (Supra) and Smitaben Wd/o. Bhogilal Jagjivandas Gadhia (Supra) that the insurance company has no liability under the Act, 1988 and the policy/contract of insurance qua the employees of the insured, other than as provided under proviso to Section 147 of the Act, 1988, travelling in private car, owned by the insured is concerned, in view of the subsequent decision of Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra), the aforesaid has no substance and may not be accepted. It is submitted that as such the issue involved in the present appeal is squarely covered by the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra).

6.1 It is submitted that admittedly the policy of the insurance in the present case is "comprehensive policy". It is also known as "package policy". It is submitted that therefore the issue of the liability qua employees of the insured other than as provided under proviso to Section 147 of the Act, 1988, carried as occupants in private care of the insured is decided and concluded by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra). It is submitted that by the said judgment, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that the insurer would be liable. It is submitted that in the said decision though the contention of the restricted liability upto Rs. 2 lakh was an issue, i.e. for the entire compensation is assessed, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has not restricted the liability to any extent. It is submitted that therefore the liability of the insured would be unlimited.

6.2 It is submitted by Shri Hakim, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original claimants that the Hon''ble Supreme Court in para 1 of the decision in the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra) recorded the issue arising for consideration and recorded that the issue is whether the first respondent, the Managing Director of a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, is entitled to sustain a claim against the appellant - insurer for having sustained bodily injuries? It is submitted that in para 3 the Hon''ble Supreme Court again noted the fact that injured claimant was Managing Director of the company. It is submitted that after considering various decisions of the other High Courts and even after considering the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Meena Variyal (Supra), in para 26 the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that the insurer would be liable for payment of compensation for the occupants in a car in case of a "comprehensive / package policy". It is submitted that from the aforesaid it is evident that the Hon''ble Supreme Court has considered and treated the employees of insured as "occupants" per se and no distinction between occupants being gratuitous and occupants being employees, as contended by insurer herein, is accepted. It is submitted that thereafter in paras 27 and 28, after observing that there was no discussion whether the policy in the said case was an "Act Policy" or "Comprehensive / Package Policy", the Hon''ble Supreme Court remitted the matter to the Tribunal to scrutinize the policy. It is submitted that therefore the issue involved in the present appeal is no longer res integra and the liability of the insurer qua the employees of the insured, as provided under Section 147 of the Act, 1988 also, travelling as occupants in private car of the insured in relation to the "comprehensive / package policy" is covered. It is submitted that therefore, the said liability can be fastened upon the insurer.

6.3 It is further submitted by Shri Hakim, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original claimants that in another decision the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Surendra Nath Loomba (Supra), the same Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court also held that the insurer would be liable, qua gratuitous occupant carried in private car. It is submitted that only distinctive feature of the said judgment, differentiating it with Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra) is that in the case of Surendra Nath Loomba (Supra), the case was that the injured claimant was not carried as an employee of the insured, but as a gratuitous occupant in a private car. It is submitted that in the said decision the Hon''ble Supreme Court had also referred to the judgment in the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra). It is submitted that thereafter after holding that the insurer would be liable qua occupants travelling in private car, the Hon''ble Supreme Court remitted the matter for production of policy and evidence in that regard. It is submitted that therefore in view of the aforesaid two decisions of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra) and Surendra Nath Loomba (Supra) in relation to "comprehensive / package policy", the insurer would be liable qua occupants carried in private car.

6.4 It is submitted that in the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra), the Hon''ble Supreme Court after reproducing in its entirety the TAC/IRDA circular and Clause II(1)(i) as contained therein and considering the same, has not carved out any distinction between occupants i.e. either being gratuitous and employees of the insured.

6.5 It is further submitted that even after taking note of distinctive facts in the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra) being Managing Director of the insured i.e. employee of the insured and in the case of Surendra Nath Loomba (Supra) being merely a gratuitous occupant and not an employee of the insured, has fastened liability upon the insurer. It is submitted that therefore the proposition of law as laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court is that the liability of the insurer qua the "occupants", carried in private car of the insured stands covered and it does not in any manner get whittle down on account of the fact that occupant is employee of the insured or otherwise.

It is submitted that aforesaid proposition as laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court has been subsequently followed by the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in its reported decision in the case of New India Assurance Company Limited v. Shanti Bopanna and Ors. reported in 2014 ACJ 219, in the case of deceased employee of the insured carried as occupant in private car of the insured.

6.6 Shri Hakim, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original claimants has also heavily relied upon the observations made by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhagyalakshmi and Ors. v. United Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. reported in (2009)7 SCC 148 as well as the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of General Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. M. Laxmi reported in (2009)17 SCC 301 with respect to distinction between "Act Policy" and "Comprehensive / Package Policy".

6.7 It is further submitted by Shri Hakim, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original claimants that in the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra), the Hon''ble Supreme Court has specifically and categorically held that the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Meena Variyal (Supra) is in relation to "Act Policy" and therefore, did not apply the ratio of the said decision in relation to "comprehensive / package policy". It is submitted that therefore the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Meena Variyal (Supra) would not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand and as such the decision in the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra) would squarely apply. It is submitted that similarly the other two decisions of the Division Bench of this Court would not be applicable, which have been relied upon by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the insurance company.

6.8 It is further submitted that even the submissions made on behalf of the insurance company with respect to Clause II(1)(i) of the policy is just contrary to the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra). It is submitted that in the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra), the Hon''ble Supreme Court has reproduced the entire TAC/IRDA circular including Clause II(1)(i), as contained therein and thereafter has held that qua employee / Managing Director of the insured, the insurer would be liable. It is submitted that therefore as the Hon''ble Supreme Court has not interpreted Clause II(1) (i) to mean that the same provides for an exception and excludes the liability arising out of and in course of employment of the employee of the insured, therefore, the same would be impermissible and against the judicial discipline and settled precedent.

6.9 Shri Hakim, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original claimants has submitted that though the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra) has not elaborated on Clause II(1) (i) however, still even on true interpretation of Clause II(1)(i), the liability qua employees of the insured may not be excluded.

It is submitted that for the aforesaid, it is most important to consider the language of Clause II(1)(i) which came to be incorporated i.e. after decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi & Ors. v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. (P) Ltd. reported in (1977)2 SCC 745 and further thereafter corresponding to amendments in Act, 1988. It is further submitted that Clause II(1)(i) provides for exception with respect to death or bodily injury to any person and so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and to that the company shall not be liable where such death or injury arises and in the course of the employment of such person by the insured. It is submitted that therefore the exception is so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is submitted that therefore the language of Clause II(1)(i) and the corresponding changes are indicative of the fact that Clause II(1)(i) only provides for the extent of liability i.e. as provided under the Motor Vehicles Act. It is submitted that therefore it provides that the extent of liability qua employees of the insured would be so as to meet the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act existing as on that date.

It is submitted that the other very significant indicative fact to substantiate the said interpretation and reading of Clause II(1)(i) as contended herein, is that Clause II(1) starts with "subject to the limits of liability".

It is further submitted that the aforesaid exposition to the meaning of the term "but except so far as it is necessary to meet the requirements of Motor Vehicles Act" has been explained by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Amrit Lal Sood v. Kaushalya Devi Thapar reported in (1998)3 SCC 744. It is submitted that in the said decision, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that in relation to comprehensive policy, "gratuitous passengers/occupants" would come within the term "Any Person". It is submitted that therefore Clause II(1)(i) restricts and limits the liability of insurer to the extent of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 under "Act Only Policy", but would recover legal liability under "Comprehensive Policy".

6.10 It is further submitted that to interpret Clause II(1)(i) of the insurance policy/contract, the import and meaning of the term "occupant" used therein as contra distinguished from the term "passenger"used at other places in the Act, 1988 and the policy/contract of insurance is required to be considered. It is submitted that the meaning of "occupant" as provided in Merriam Webster Dictionary is "a person who occupies a particular place in a room, vehicle etc.". It is submitted that according to Oxford Dictionary, "occupant" is "A person who resides or is present in a house, vehicle, seat, etc. at a given time". It is submitted that the meaning of "passenger" in the Merriam Webster Dictionary is "a person who is travelling from one place to another in a car, bus, train, ship, airplane etc. and who is not driving or working on it". It is submitted that Oxford Dictionary "passenger" means "A traveller on a public or private conveyance other than the driver, pilot or crew". It is submitted that from the aforesaid, it becomes evident that the connotations of the term "occupant" and "passenger" are completely different. It is submitted that "occupant" would include even the driver of the vehicle and also insured. Whereas the term "passenger" would only include person carried in the vehicle other than driver, client and to a large extent other than insured.

6.11 It is submitted that the most important part of Clause II(1)(i) is "...but except so far as it is necessary to meet the requirements of Motor Vehicles Act....". It is submitted that the said expression in Clause II(1)(i) is the guiding factor, as to the meaning, interpretation and understanding of Clause II(1)(i). It is submitted that therefore it becomes explicitly evident that Clause II(1)(i) provides for coverage of occupants inclusive of driver and insured. Therefore, as the liability qua driver under the Motor Vehicles Act is as prescribed under Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 i.e. as provided by proviso to Section 147 of the Act, 1988, Clause II(1)(i) provides for the clause "....but except so far as it is necessary to meet the requirements of Motor Vehicles Act....", qua the limits of liability for employees of the insured, such as driver of the vehicle.

6.12 It is further submitted that to interpret and read Clause II(1)(i) to mean that it provides for exception and exclusion of carrying employees of insured in private car, would be reading "casus omissus" and thereby prohibition in Motor Vehicles Act i.e. carrying the employees of insured in private car, would be reading "casus omissus" and thereby prohibition in Motor Vehicles Act i.e. of carrying the employees of the insured, arising out of and during the course of employment, even though no such prohibition in the Motor Vehicles Act is provided. It is submitted that therefore the only plausible and legal interpretation that can be given to the Clause II(1)(i) and which also appears from the same is that the exception and exclusion in Clause II(1)(i) only provides for the extent of liability qua employees of the insured, covered by proviso to Section 147 of the Act, 1988, as required by the Motor Vehicles Act. It is further submitted that therefore as no restriction to any extent of liability is provided under the Act, 1988 qua the employees of the insured, other than as provided in proviso to Section 147 of the Act, 1988, as per Clause II(1)(i) of the insurer would be unlimited, against all sums and as incurred.

It is therefore submitted that neither the ratio in the case of Meena Variyal (Supra) nor that of the two judgments of the Division Bench of this Hon''ble Court are applicable to the facts of the present case. It is submitted that as admittedly the policy of the insurance in the said decisions was "Act Policy/Policy in terms of the Act" / "Statutory Policy", whereas in the decision of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra) and in present case the policy is "comprehensive policy/package policy". It is submitted that therefore the contention of the appellant - insurer of no liability based upon the decisions in the case of Meena Variyal (Supra) and three judgments of Division Bench of this Court cannot be accepted.

6.13 Now, so far as the contention on behalf of the insurer that in any case its liability would be restricted is concerned, Shri Hakim, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original claimants has submitted that the same has no merits. It is submitted that in none of the judgments referred to herein above and otherwise, where qua "comprehensive / package policy" the insurer is held liable, the liability is in any manner restricted. It is submitted that as such aforesaid issue was raised before the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra), as recorded in para 9 therein, however the said contention has not been accepted by the Hon''ble Supreme Court. It is further submitted that even on merits also the aforesaid cannot be accepted. It is submitted that liability qua occupants, who may also be employees of the insured is covered under Clause II of the policy /Contract of insurance. It is submitted that Clause II of the policy/contract of insurance does not in any manner restricts liability of insurer, but on the contrary provides for liability of insurer, but on the contrary provides for liability "against all sums which the insured shall become legally liable to pay". It is submitted that therefore the issue of limited and/or restricted liability does not arise at all.

6.14 It is further submitted that as contended by the appellant - insurer, the issue of limited and/or restricted liability qua occupants, who may also be employees of the insured, arises only qua personal accident coverage. It is submitted that the personal accident coverage is provided in Clause III of the insurance policy / contract, whereas the liability other than personal accident coverage is provided in Clause II of the insurance policy / contract. It is submitted that moreover, the liability under Clause III of the insurance policy / contract is exclusive of and in addition to the liability under Clause II of the insurance policy / contract and if an additional contract is entered for the same, by payment of additional premium. It is submitted that therefore the liability under Clause III and Clause II of the insurance policy / contract are mutually exclusive of each other. It is submitted that therefore, neither of the same can be read into and/or considered into each other. It is submitted that the said distinction of liabilities as submitted herein above is evident from the Standard Form for policies as relied upon during the course of submissions. It is submitted that moreover, the same is also in extenso considered and decided in the case of Royal Sundaram Alliance Company v. A. Pappathi reported in 2011 ACJ 557 particularly para 29 of the said judgment and in the case of Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. C. Ramesh reported in 2014 ACJ 721 (Madras).

6.15 It is therefore submitted that since the additional premium of Rs. 100/( qua 4 passengers) is received by the appellant - insurer and the policy/contract of policy is issued subject to IMT Endorsement No.5. It is submitted that the appellant therefore is liable to pay fixed compensation of Rs. 50,000/, in pursuance to contractual liability under Clause III of Policy/Contract of insurance and on acceptance of additional premium. It is further submitted that the said contractual liability under Clause III of Policy/Contract of insurance, is in addition to Clause II of Policy/Contract of insurance liability i.e. liability under "Comprehensive / Package Policy". It is submitted that therefore the award of compensation qua liabilities under both Clauses II and III of policy / contract of insurance is required to be awarded.

6.16 It is further submitted that the contentions raised by the appellant are also required to be considered in consideration of the fact that the Act, 1988 is a social and benevolent legislation and therefore, the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Act, 1988, the policy/contract of insurance issued and executed thereunder and the exposition of the same by the Courts of law, which furthers the purpose of the Act, 1988 by providing the benefits to the victims of the accident is to be accepted and adopted; whereas the interpretation which negates the purpose of providing benefits to the victims of accident and thereby promotes the business of insurer is required to be avoided. It is submitted that the aforesaid purposive interpretation of the benevolent provisions of the Act, 1988 is settled proposition of law and for the same, following decisions are cited.

1.

Big Insurance Company Ltd. v. Captain Itbar Singh AIR 1959 SC 1331 (A 3-Judges Bench of Hon''ble Supreme Court)

2.

Motor Owners Insurance Company Limited v. Jadhavji Keshavji (1981)4 SCC 660 (A3 Judges Bench of Hon''ble Supreme Court)

3.

Skandia Insurance Company Limited v. Kokilaben Chandravardhan (1987)2 SCC 654

4.

National Insurance Company Limited v. Swaran Singh and O (2004)3 SCC 297

It is submitted that in all the aforesaid decisions the Hon''ble Supreme Court has reiterated and reaffirmed the principles of interpretation of benevolent and social welfare legislations. It is most humbly submitted that the ratio of all the aforesaid decisions inter alia is that the interpretation of Act, 1988, a benevolent and social welfare legislation should be to alleviate and not augment the sufferings of victims of accident.

It is submitted that in view of the aforesaid, the interpretation of Act, 1988, the contract/policy of insurance, TAC/IRDA Circular and Clause II(1)(i) in particular has to be read in order to promote the purposive interpretation of providing benefits to the victims of accident being carried in private car, who also may happen to be the employees of the insured. It is submitted that as against that, the restrictive interpretation of providing the said benefits only to the occupants, other than employees of the insured carried as occupants in the private car, would be reading and interpreting the benevolent provisions with the non-benevolent eye. It is further submitted that it would not alleviate the sufferings of the victims of the accident who may also be employees of the insured carried in private car, but would result into augmenting the sufferings of such victims, even though there is no prohibition.

6.17 Now, so far as the decisions relied upon by the appellants is concerned, it is submitted by Shri Hakim, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original claimants that the decision of Meena Variyal (Supra) is distinguishable on facts as stated herein above i.e. in view of the subsequent decision in the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra).

6.17.1 It is further submitted that the decision in the case of Ramashray Singh (Supra) is not applicable to the facts, circumstances and issues arising before this Court, since the decision in the case of Ramashray Singh (Supra) is in relation to liability qua proviso (I) to Section 147 of the New Act under the Workmen''s Compensation Act. Therefore, it is submitted that it cannot be considered in case of liability qua Act, 1988. It is submitted that in that context the ratio of a 3 Judges Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Company Limited v. Prembhai Patel reported in (2005)6 SCC 172 is very important. It is submitted that in the said decision the Hon''ble Supreme Court considered the interpretation of Section 147 of the Act, 1988, and held that under Section 147(1)(b) and proviso that the liability of insurance company would be restricted to Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923, qua the employees specified therein, but on payment of higher premium contractual liability would exceed the liability under the Workmen''s Compensation Act.

6.17.2 It is further submitted that the decision in the case of Sanjeev Kumar Samrat (Supra) relied upon by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant is also not applicable to the facts, circumstances and issues in the present case as the same pertains to interpretation of liability qua "goods vehicles" whereas the issued before this Court is in relation to the liability qua "private car/vehicles".

6.18 Making above submissions and relying upon above decisions, it is requested to reject the contention on behalf of the insurance company of exclusion of employees of the insured on the basis of the exclusion claimed to be provided in Clause II(1)(i).

7.

Shri Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Advocate has appeared with Shri Hiren Modi, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the insured company - respondent No.5, respondent No.3 and respondent No.2 in First Appeal Nos.2110/2006, 2109/2006 and 989/2011 respectively. It is vehemently submitted that the issue involved is squarely covered by the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra); Surendra Nath Loomba (Supra) and the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Yash Pal Luthra and Anr. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr. reported in 2011 ACJ 1415 as well as the decision of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in the case of Shanti Bopanna (Supra).

It is vehemently submitted by Shri Joshi, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the concerned insured that even considering Clause II(1)(i) of the insurance policy/contract, the exclusion would be applicable to such death or injury arising out of and in the course of employment of such person by the insured. It is submitted that the question arises as to whether the death of the deceased can be said to have occurred arising out of and in the course of the employment of the company? It is submitted that the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Private Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mohmmed Issak reported in (1969)2 SCC 607 (Para 5) has explained the words "in the course of the employment" and "arising out of the employment". It is submitted that merely because the employee was travelling in a vehicle owned by the employer/insured may be either from factory to head office, it cannot be said to have occurred arising out of the employment. It is submitted that the insurance company cannot be held liable in the case where the death or injury arising out of and in the course of the employment and hence, the expression, "arising out of" and "in the course of employment" both are required to be satisfied.

Adopting submissions made by Shri Hakim, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original claimants to avoid any further repetition and making above further submissions, it is requested to dismiss the appeals preferred by the insurance company.

8.

Other learned advocates appearing on behalf of other insurance company and/or the original claimants have adopted the submissions made by Shri Rajni Mehta, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the insurance company and Shri MTM Hakim, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original claimants as the case may be.

9.

Now, so far as First Appeal No.989/2011 is concerned, it is required to be noted that the same is arising out of the impugned judgment and award passed by the learned Tribunal by which all the opponents are held jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation including the insurance company. The present appeal has been preferred by the original claimants requesting to enhance the amount of compensation.

9.1 It is the case on behalf of the original claimants that while awarding the future loss of income the learned Tribunal has materially erred in not considering the future rise in income.

9.2 It is submitted that the learned Tribunal has materially erred in assessing the income of the deceased at Rs. 6200/per month only while awarding future loss of income.

9.3 It is submitted that the deceased was serving as a Senior Manager in the Torrent Pharmaceuticals and at the time of accident his salary was Rs. 6200/per month. That he was aged 37 years. It is submitted that therefore, 50% of the actual income at the time of accident was required to be added towards future rise in income and while considering the prospective income and while awarding future loss of income. Therefore, it is requested to allow the present appeal to the aforesaid extent.

10.

Shri Maulik Sheltat and Shri Sunil Parikh, learned advocates appearing on behalf of the insurance company - appellant in First Appeal Nos.2109/2006, 2110/2006 and First Appeal Nos.2108/2008 to 2110/2008 respectively have vehemently submitted that as such they adopt the submissions made by the learned advocates appearing for respective insurance companies so far as the liability of the insurance company is concerned. They have vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case and as the deceased was employee of the employer/owner of the vehicle involved in the accident, considering the insurance policy, the learned Tribunal has materially erred in holding the insurance company liable to pay the compensation. Now, so far as the amount of quantum of the compensation is concerned, they have left it ultimately to the Court.

11.

Heard learned advocates appearing on behalf of respective parties at length. A short question which is posed for consideration of this Court in the present First Appeals is with respect to liability of the insurance company to pay the compensation in case of death and/or bodily injury of an employee of the insured travelling in the motor vehicle of the insured.

11.1 To appreciate the submissions made by learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties and while deciding the aforesaid issue, the relevant provisions of the Act, 1988 more particularly, Section 147 of the Act, 1988 and the relevant terms and conditions of the insurance policy are required to be considered which are as under:

"147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability.(1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which

a) is issued by a person who is an authorized insurer; and

(b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in subsection (2)-

i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;

(ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;

Provided that a policy shall not be required

(i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee

(a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or

(b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or

(c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or

(ii) to cover any contractual liability.

Explanation. - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident, if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place."

One of the important conditions of the policy with regard to liability to third parties read as under:

"1. The Company will indemnify the insured in the event of accident caused by or arising out of the use of the Motor Car against all sums including claimants costs and expenses which the insured shall become legally liable to pay in respect of

(i) death of or bodily injury to any person including occupants carried in the Motor Car provided that such occupants are not carried for hire or reward but except so far is necessary to meet the requirement of section 92 and section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The Company shall not be liable where such death or injury arises out of and in the course of employment of such person by the insured."

From the policy it appears that the company charged premium as under:

1.

Rs. 3,950/for own damage to the car;

2.

Basic of Rs. 160/;

3.

Rs. 100/for Personal Accident Benefits as per endorsement IMT5 for number of passengers death benefits;

4.

Rs. 15/for legal liability of to paid driver as per endorsement IMT19

That the policy had IMT endorsements and memorandum as under:

"1. IMT 24 (Replacement of parts);

2.

IMT 26 Compulsory Excess (Commercial Vehicle Policies only wrongly typed this endorsement) as this is private car policy;

3.

IMT 5 Personal Accident Cover to unnamed passengers other than the insured and his paid driver or cleaner;

4.

IMT 19 Legal Liability to paid driver employed in connection with operation of motor vehicle."

The contents of IMT 5 which are printed in the policy are as under:

"I.M.T. 5. Personal Accident cover to unnamed passengers other than the insured and his paid Driver or Cleaner. In consideration of the payment of an additional premium, it is hereby understood and agreed that the Company undertake to pay compensation on the scale provided below for bodily injury as hereinafter defined sustained by any passenger other than the insured and/or his paid driver attendant or cleaner and/or a person in the employ of the insured coming within the scope of the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 and subsequent amendments of the said Act and engaged in and upon the service of the insured at the time such injury is sustained whilst mounting into dismounting from or travelling in but not driving the motor car and caused by violent accident external and visible means which independently of any other cause shall within three calender months of the occurrence of such injury result in:

Scale of compensation

a) Death only....

100%

b) Total and irrecoverable loss of:

i) Sight of both eyes or of the actual loss by physical separation of the two entire hands or two entire feet, or of one entire hand and one entire foot or of such loss of sight of one eye and such loss of one entire hand or of one entire foot.

100%

ii) Use of two hands or two feet, or of one hand and one foot or of such loss of sight of one eye and such loss of use of one hand or one foot.

100%

c) Total and irrecoverable loss of:

i) The sight of one eye or the actual loss by physical separation of one entire hand or one entire foot.

50%

ii) Use of a hand or a foot without physical separation.

50%

NOTE:

For the purpose of Clause (b) and clause (c) above, "physical separation" of a hand or foot means separation at or above the wrist and/or of the foot at or above the ankle respectively

d) Permanent total disablement from injuries (other than named above) which shall as direct consequences thereof permanently, totally, absolutely disable the insured from engaging in any employment or occupation of any description.

100%

Provided always that:

1) Compensation shall be payable under only one of the items (a) to (d) above in respect of any such person arising out of any one occurrence and the total liability of the Company shall not in the aggregate exceed the sum of ..... during any one period of insurance.

2) Such person is not less than 16 years not more than 65 years of age at the time of such injury.

3) No compensation shall be payable in respect of death or injury directly or indirectly wholly or in part arising or resulting from or traceable to (1) intentional self injury suicide or attempted suicide physical defect or infirmity or (2) an accident happening whilst such person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs.

4) Such compensation shall be payable only with the approval of the insured and directly to the injured person or to his/her legal representative whose receipt shall be a full discharge in respect of the injury to such person.

5) Not more than .... Persons are in the said motor car at the time of occurrence of such injury. Subject otherwise to the terms exceptions conditions and limitations of this policy.

NOTES:

(1) The sum to be inserted is calculated by multiplying the death benefit by the full seating capacity of the vehicle ("excluding the driver''s seat").

2) The scale of compensation must be inserted on the Endorsement."

IMT - General Regulations No.27 regarding personal accident reads as under:

27 P.A. Cover under Motor Policies:

It is permissible to grant P.A. Cover under Motor Tariff by way of extension of the Motor Policies, subject to the following rules.

1.

Any P.A. insurance for 24 hours duration should be taken as per P.A. Tariff in force. No. 24 hours cover can be issued Motor Policy.

2.

P.A. cover only for limited duration whilst connected with the use of the vehicle including mounting into dismounting from or travelling in the vehicle in any capacity as stated below:

Description of benefits

% of Capital sum assured

Premium per year/per person for Capital Sum Insured of Rs. 10000/-

For Pvt.Car

Mot Scooter

Comm. Vehs.

i)

Death only 100%

ii)

Loss of Two Limbs or Sight of two eyes or one limb and sight of one eye

100%

iii)

Loss of one Limb or Sight of one eye

50%

5.00

7.50

6.00

iv)

Permanent Total Disablement from injuries other than named above.

100%

The maximum cover is limited to capital sum Insured of Rs. 2 lakh per person.

"(a) If the Policy is for named persons the rates mentioned above should be charged for each person.

(b) If the Policy is desired for unnamed persons the cover should be taken

i) in case of private car / taxi for the number of persons the vehicle is authorized to carry (including driver), ii) In case of motor cycle/scooter without the side car for minimum two persons the vehicle is authorized to carry.

Following endorsements may be used:

for named persons.............4

for unnamed persons..............5

for paid drivers, conductors & cleaners...............6

for unnamed hirer/driver or Pillion Passenger under Commercial Vehicle

Tariff..................................................64"

11.1.1 It can be seen from the aforesaid that Rs. 5 has been charged per year / per person for insured capital sum of Rs. 10,000/when insurance cover is taken for Rs. 50,000/, Rs. 25 is charged for one person.

The sitting capacity of the vehicle as expressly stated in the policy was 4 persons excluding the driver. The cover was taken and premium of Rs. 100/has been charged. It means that each persons covered under IMT 5 is charged at Rs. 25/person and for 4 persons Rs. 25 x 4 = Rs. 100/. From the aforesaid it appears that maximum insurance covered under IMT 5 is limited to capital sum insured of Rs. 2 lakh per person, if the premium is paid at the rate of Rs. 5 per person for cover of Rs. 10,000/. From the aforesaid it also appears that the policy excluded cover to the claimant who was employed as Research and Development Manager.

12.

While considering the first question it is required to be considered whether the policy is an "Act Policy" or "Comprehensive / Package Policy", as much depends upon whether the policy is an "Act Policy" or "Comprehensive / Package Policy". Whether a policy can be said to be a comprehensive policy and/or the meaning of comprehensive policy came to be considered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Jugal Kishore (Supra). In para 6, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has observed and held as under:

"6. Even though it is not permissible to use a vehicle unless it is covered at least under an "act only" policy it is not obligatory for the owner of a vehicle to get it comprehensively insured. In case however, it is got comprehensively insured a higher premium than for an "act only" policy is payable depending on the estimated value of the vehicle. Such insurance entitles the owner to claim reimbursement of the entire amount of loss or damage suffered up to the estimated value of the vehicle calculated according to the rules and regulations framed in this behalf. Comprehensive insurance of the vehicle and payment of higher premium on this score, however, do not mean that the limit of the liability with regard to third party risk becomes unlimited or higher than the statutory liability fixed under sub-section (2) of Section 95 of the Act. For this purpose a specific agreement has to be arrived at between the owner and the insurance company and separate premium has to be paid on the amount of liability undertaken by the insurance company in this behalf. Likewise, if risk of any other nature for instance, with regard to the driver or passengers etc. in excess of statutory liability, if any is sought to be covered it has to be clearly specified in the policy and separate premium paid therefore. This is the requirement of the tariff regulations framed for the purpose."

12.1 From the record it emerges that the insured had not paid any additional premum to cover any additional risk of employee travelling in the insured vehicle. Clause 1 of the terms of the policy pertain to liability to third parties and provide that subject to the limited liability as laid down in the Motor Vehicles Act, the insurance company will indemnify the insured, in the event of accident caused by or arising out of the use of the motor vehicle. The policy also contained such general clauses of exceptions. Clauses 2 & 3 are reproduced herein above.

12.2 Combined reading of the terms of the policy would reveal that the same was made to cover only statutory liability contained under the Motor Vehicles Act and no further. In particular, it provided that the Insurance Company shall not be liable in respect of death arising out of and in the course of employment of a person in the employment of the insured.

12.3 Even considering proviso to subsection (1) of section 147 in clear terms provides that the policy shall not be required to cover liability in respect of death arising out of and in the course of employment of the employee of a person insured by the policy. In the present case, the deceased was travelling in the vehicle insured by the policy of the Insurance Company as employee of the owner.

12.4 It cannot be disputed that the insurance company is liable to pay compensation statutorily as provided under section 147 of the Act, 1988 and not otherwise. As observed herein above, proviso to subsection (1) of section 147 in clear terms provides that the policy shall not be required to cover liability in respect of death arising out of and in the course of employment of the employee of a person insured by the policy. It also cannot be disputed that when the insurance company is not statutorily liable to pay compensation and where the statutory liability is specifically excluded under Section 147 of the Act, 1988 then the Tribunal/Court is required to see terms of the contract policy and then decide liability of the parties as per the terms of the contract. As per the terms and conditions of the policy and on combined reading of the terms of the policy more particularly clauses 2 & 3 reproduced hereinabove, risk of the employee carried in insured''s private vehicle during the course of his employment is specifically excluded from the policy in question.

12.5 From the aforesaid it appears that therefore, the policy is an ''Act Policy''. Assuming that it is ''Comprehensive Policy'', in that case also, as per the terms and conditions of the insurance policy referred to herein above, more particularly clauses 2 & 3 with respect to the liability to third parties contained in the policy, the risk in respect of the death arising out of and in the course of employment of a person or bodily injuries sustained by such person arising out of and in the course of such employment has been specifically excluded. It is required to be noted that it is not the case of anyone that insured had paid an additional premium to cover the risk of such employee carried in private vehicle during the course of employment. Then the insurance company is contractually liable to pay the compensation for the death or bodily injury of such employee who was carried in vehicle during the course of his employment.

12.6 Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the legal position, the decisions of the Hon''ble Supreme Court which have been relied upon by the learned advocates appearing on behalf of respective parties more particularly in the case of Meena Variyal (Supra), the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gitaben Mukeshbhai Pathak (Supra) and Smitaben Wd/o. Bhogilal Jagjivandas Gadhia (Supra) and decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra) and the decision of the Delhi High Court and Jammu & Kashmir High Court in which the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra) has been considered, are required to be considered.

12.7 The Hon''ble Supreme Court in paras 9 to 12 in the case of Meena Variyal (Supra) has observed and held as under:

"9. Before we proceed to consider the main aspect arising for decision in this Appeal, we would like to make certain general observations. It may be true that the Motor Vehicles Act, insofar as it relates to claims for compensation arising out of accidents, is a beneficent piece of legislation. It may also be true that subject to the rules made in that behalf, the Tribunal may follow a summary procedure in dealing with a claim. That does not mean that a Tribunal approached with a claim for compensation under the Act should ignore all basic principles of law in determining the claim for compensation. Ordinarily, a contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity. When a car belonging to an owner is insured with the insurance company and it is being driven by a driver employed by the insured, when it meets with an accident, the primary liability under law for payment of compensation is that of the driver. Once the driver is liable, the owner of the vehicle becomes vicariously liable for payment of compensation. It is this vicarious liability of the owner that is indemnified by the insurance company. A third party for whose benefit the insurance is taken, is therefore entitled to show, when he moves under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, that the driver was negligent in driving the vehicle resulting in the accident; that the owner was vicariously liable and that the insurance company was bound to indemnify the owner and consequently, satisfy the award made. Therefore, under general principles, one would expect the driver to be impleaded before an adjudication is claimed under Section 166 of the Act as to whether a claimant before the Tribunal is entitled to compensation for an accident that has occurred due to alleged negligence of the driver. Why should not a Tribunal insist on the driver of the vehicle being impleaded when a claim is being filed? As we have noticed, the relevant provisions of the Act are not intended to jettison all principles of law relating to a claim for compensation which is still based on a tortious liability. The Tribunal ought to have, in the case on hand, directed the claimant to implead Mahmood Hasan who was allegedly driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. Here, there was also controversy whether it was Mahmood Hasan who was driving the vehicle or it was the deceased himself. Surely, such a question could have been decided only in the presence of Mahmood Hasan who would have been principally liable for any compensation that might be decreed in case he was driving the vehicle. Secondly, the deceased was employed in a limited company. It was necessary for the claimants to establish what was the monthly income and what was the dependency on the basis of which the compensation could be adjudged as payable. Should not any Tribunal trained in law ask the claimants to produce evidence in support of the monthly salary or income earned by the deceased from his employer Company? Is there anything in the Motor Vehicles Act which stands in the way of the Tribunal asking for the best evidence, acceptable evidence? We think not. Here again, the position that the Motor Vehicles Act vis-a-vis claim for compensation arising out of an accident is a beneficent piece of legislation, cannot lead a Tribunal trained in law to forget all basic principles of establishing liability and establishing the quantum of compensation payable. The Tribunal, in this case, has chosen to merely go by the oral evidence of the widow when without any difficulty the claimants could have got the employer company to produce the relevant documents to show the income that was being derived by the deceased from his employment. Of course, in this case, the above two aspects become relevant only if we find the insurance company liable. If we find that only the owner of the vehicle, the employer of the deceased was liable, there will be no occasion to further consider these aspects since the owner has acquiesced in the award passed by the Tribunal against it.

10.

Chapter XI of the Act bears a heading, "Insurance of Motor Vehicles against third party risks". The definition of "third party" is an inclusive one since Section 145(g) only indicates that "third party" includes the Government. It is Section 146 that makes it obligatory for an insurance to be taken out before a motor vehicle could be used on the road. The heading of that Section itself is "Necessity for insurance against third party risk". No doubt, the marginal heading may not be conclusive. It is Section 147 that sets out the requirement of policies and limits of liability. It is provided therein that in order to comply with the requirements of Chapter XI of the Act, a policy of insurance must be a policy which is issued by an authorised insurer; or which insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in subsection (2) against any liability which may be incurred by the owner in respect of the death of or bodily injury or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. With effect from 14.11.1994, injury to the owner of goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle was also added. The policy had to cover death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. Then, as per the proviso, the policy shall not be required to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment, other than a liability arising under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, an employee engaged in driving the vehicle, or who is a conductor, if it is a public service vehicle or an employee being carried in a goods vehicle or to cover any contractual liability. Subsection (2) only sets down the limits of the policy. As we understand Section 147 (1) of the Act, an insurance policy thereunder need not cover the liability in respect of death or injury arising out of and in the course of the employment of an employee of the person insured by the policy, unless it be a liability arising under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of a driver, also the conductor, in the case of a public service vehicle, and the one carried in the vehicle as owner of the goods or his representative, if it is a goods vehicle. It is provided that the policy also shall not be required to cover any contractual liability. Uninfluenced by authorities, we find no difficulty in understanding this provision as one providing that the policy must insure an owner against any liability to a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place, and against death or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. The proviso clarifies that the policy shall not be required to cover an employee of the insured in respect of bodily injury or death arising out of and in the course of his employment. Then, an exception is provided to the last forgoing to the effect that the policy must cover a liability arising under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of the death or bodily injury to an employee who is engaged in driving the vehicle or who serves as a conductor in a public service vehicle or an employee who travels in the vehicle of the employer carrying goods if it is a goods carriage. Section 149(1), which casts an obligation on an insurer to satisfy an award, also speaks only of award in respect of such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (h) of subsection (1) of Section 147, (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy). This provision cannot therefore be used to enlarge the liability if it does not exist in terms of Section 147 of the Act.

11.

The object of the insistence on insurance under Chapter XI of the Act thus seems to be to compulsorily cover the liability relating to their person or properties of third parties and in respect of employees of the insured employer, the liability that may arise under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of the driver, the conductor and the one carried in a goods vehicle carrying goods. On this plain understanding of Section 147, we find it difficulty to hold that the insurance company, in the case on hand, was liable to indemnify the owner, the employer Company, the insured, in respect of the death of one of its employees, who according to the claim, was not the driver. Be it noted that the liability is not one arising under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 and it is doubtful, on the case put forward by the claimant, whether the deceased could be understood as a workman coming within the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923. Therefore, on a plain reading of Section 147 of the Act, it appears to be clear that the insurance company is not liable to indemnify the insured in the case on hand.

12.

The argument that the proviso does not keep out employees from coverage though the claims under the Workmen''s Compensation Act are specified, cannot be accepted on the plain language of the proviso. The proviso enacts an exemption and carves out an exception to that exemption. The suggested interpretation would result in ignoring the effect of the language employed by the proviso, exempting the owner from covering his employees under insurance except in cases where the liability in respect of them is, one arising under the Workmen''s Compensation Act. Obviously, as determined by that Tribunal."

12.8 In the case of Smitaben Wd/o. Bhogilal Jagjivandas Gadhia (Supra), the Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the similar issue and the similar conditions / clauses in the policy i.e. clauses 2 & 3 and the issue with respect to liability of the insurance company to pay the compensation for the death or bodily injury of an employee of the insured travelling in the vehicle arising out of and in the course of the employment. After considering section 147 of the Act, 1988 and the terms and conditions of the policy more particularly clauses 2 & 3, the Division Bench of this Court in paras 11 to 15 has observed and held as under:

"11. Having thus heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the documents on record, few facts emerge from the record as undisputed. Deceased Bhogilal was an employee of the State Government. He had travelled in the Government vehicle for his official work to Valsad. After completing his work while returning from Valsad, the vehicle in which he was travelling met with an accident. The vehicle was being driven by the driver of the Government. Short question, therefore, which calls for our consideration in view of such factual background is whether the Insurance Company was liable to satisfy the claim of the heirs of the deceased.

12.

From the record, it also emerges that the insurance policy was a limited liability policy and covered only the statutory risk. The insured had not paid any additional premium to cover any additional risk. Clause 1 of the terms of the policy pertained to liability to third parties and provided that subject to the limited liability as laid down in the Motor Vehicles Act, the Insurance Company will indemnify the insured in the event of accident caused by or arising out of the use of the Motor Vehicle. The policy also contained such general clauses of exceptions. Clauses 2 and 3 which are relevant for our purpose are as under:

"2. The Company shall not be liable in respect of any claim arising out of any contractual liability.

3.

Except so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act the Company shall not be liable in respect of death arising out of and in the course of employment of a person who is indemnified under this policy or bodily injury sustained by such person arising out of and in the course of such employment."

Combined reading of the terms of the policy would reveal that the same was made to cover only statutory liability contained under the Motor Vehicles Act and no further. In particular, it provided that the Insurance Company shall not be liable in respect of death arising out of and in the course of employment of a person in the employment of the insured.

13.

Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act pertains to requirements of policies and limits of liability. Subsection (1) thereof which is relevant for our purpose reads as under:

"147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability. (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which (a) is issued by a person who is an authorized insurer; and

(b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in subsection (2)-

(i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;

(ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;

Provided that a policy shall not be required-

i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee-

a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or

(b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or

(c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or

(ii) to cover any contractual liability.

Explanation. - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident, if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place.

Proviso to subsection (1) of section 147 in clear terms provides that the policy shall not be required to cover liability in respect of death arising out of and in the course of employment of the employee of a person insured by the policy. In the present case, the deceased was travelling in the vehicle insured by the policy of the Insurance Company as employee of the owner. When the accident took place, therefore, in our view, the Insurance Company was not liable to satisfy the claim awarded by the Tribunal for the death of such a person.

14.

The issue is no longer res integra and is squarely covered by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (vjn) Meena Variyal & ors., 2007 ACJ 1284. Facts in the said case were very similar to those involved in the present appeal. The vehicle was owned and insured by the Company. The deceased died when the vehicle met with an accident in which he was travelling. It is unclear whether the deceased himself was driving the vehicle or the vehicle was being driven by driver Mahmood Hasan at the time of the accident. The Apex Court considered the legal situation in both the eventualities. The Court was of the opinion that if the deceased himself was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident, the situation would be that on such count itself, heirs of the deceased may not be entitled to claim any compensation. The Apex Court also considered the alternative situation that if it was found that the deceased was a mere passenger and the vehicle was being driven by Mahmood Hasan, the driver. In that background, the Apex Court considered the policy and the provisions contained in section 147 of the Act and came to the following conclusion:

"10. Chapter XI of the Act bears a heading, "Insurance of Motor Vehicles against third party risks". The definition of "third party" is an inclusive one since Section 145(g) only indicates that "third party" includes the Government. It is Section 146 that makes it obligatory for an insurance to be taken out before a motor vehicle could be used on the road. The heading of that Section itself is "Necessity for insurance against third party risk". No doubt, the marginal heading may not be conclusive. It is Section 147 that sets out the requirement of policies and limits of liability. It is provided therein that in order to comply with the requirements of Chapter XI of the Act, a policy of insurance must be a policy which is issued by an authorised insurer; or which insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in subsection (2) against any liability which may be incurred by the owner in respect of the death of or bodily injury or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. With effect from 14.11.1994, injury to the owner of goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle was also added. The policy had to cover death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. Then, as per the proviso, the policy shall not be required to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment, other than a liability arising under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, an employee engaged in driving the vehicle, or who is a conductor, if it is a public service vehicle or an employee being carried in a goods vehicle or to cover any contractual liability. Subsection (2) only sets down the limits of the policy. As we understand Section 147 (1) of the Act, an insurance policy thereunder need not cover the liability in respect of death or injury arising out of and in the course of the employment of an employee of the person insured by the policy, unless it be a liability arising under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of a driver, also the conductor, in the case of a public service vehicle, and the one carried in the vehicle as owner of the goods or his representative, if it is a goods vehicle. It is provided that the policy also shall not be required to cover any contractual liability. Uninfluenced by authorities, we find no difficulty in understanding this provision as one providing that the policy must insure an owner against any liability to a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place, and against death or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of vehicle in a public place. The proviso clarifies that the policy shall not be required to cover an employee of the insured in respect of bodily injury or death arising out of and in the course of his employment. Then, an exception is provided to the last forgoing to the effect that the policy must cover a liability arising under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of the death or bodily injury to an employee who is engaged in driving the vehicle or who serves as a conductor in a public service vehicle or an employee who travels in the vehicle of the employer carrying goods if it is a goods carriage. Section 149(1), which casts an obligation on an insurer to satisfy an award, also speaks only of award in respect of such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (h) of subsection (1) of Section 147, (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy). This provision cannot therefore be used to enlarge the liability if it does not exist in terms of Section 147 of the Act.

11.

The object of the insistence on insurance under Chapter XI of the Act thus seems to be to compulsorily cover the liability relating to their person or properties of third parties and in respect of employees of the insured employer, the liability that may arise under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of the driver, the conductor and the one carried in a goods vehicle carrying goods. On this plain understanding of Section 147, we find it difficult to hold that the insurance company, in the case on hand, was liable to indemnify the owner, the employer Company, the insured, in respect of the death of one of its employees, who according to the claim, was not the driver. Be it noted that the liability is not one arising under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 and it is doubtful, on the case put forward by the claimant, whether the deceased could be understood as a workman coming within the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923. Therefore, on a plain reading of Section 147 of the Act, it appears to be clear that the insurance company is not liable to indemnify the insured in the case on hand."

15.

In view of the above conclusive pronouncement of the Apex Court on the very issue which we are considering in the present appeal, we have no hesitation in reversing the award of the Claims Tribunal to the limited extent so far as it fastened liability on the appellant Insurance Company to satisfy the award. To this limited extent, the impugned award of the Tribunal is required to be and is hereby set aside."

13.

Identical question came to be considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gitaben Mukeshbhai Pathak (Supra) and after considering the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Meena Variyal (Supra) and Smitaben Wd/o. Bhogilal Jagjivandas Gadhia (Supra), the Division Bench has held that the insurance company is not liable to pay the compensation for the death / injury of / sustained by the employee of the insured / owner of the vehicle travelling in a vehicle during the course of his employment.

13.1 In the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra) (which has been heavily relied upon on behalf of the original claimants) it appears that the Hon''ble Supreme Court considered an "Act policy" on a different footing from the "comprehensive / package policy" and thereafter has observed and held that a comprehensive / package policy would cover the liability of the insurer for payment of compensation for the occupant in a car. However, it is required to be noted that as such the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the said decision has not overruled the view taken by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Meena Variyal (Supra) and/or even in the Bhagyalakshmi & Ors. (Supra). In the aforesaid decision the Hon''ble Supreme Court even considered the circular of IRDA with respect to the risk covered for the occupants travelling in a private car or a pillion rider.

However, it is required to be noted that in the said decision the Hon''ble Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the similar clauses like clauses 2 & 3 of the insurance policy and the exclusion of the risk of the death / injury of an employee of the insured/owner of the vehicle travelling in a vehicle during the course of his employment.

13.2 Similarly, even the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Surendra Nath Loomba (Supra), which has been relied upon by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original claimants would not be of any assistance.

13.3 Similarly, the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Yash Pal Luthra (Supra) and decision of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in the case of Shanti Bopanna (Supra), which were decided after considering the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Balakrishnan & Anr. (Supra) also would not be of any assistance to the claimants and/or the same shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand.

13.4 Considering Section 147 of the Act, 1988, terms and conditions of the insurance policy more particularly clauses 2 & 3 reproduced herein above and considering the facts that no additional premium have been paid for the employees travelling in the vehicle and the policy being ''Act Policy'' and even if it is considered to be ''Comprehensive Policy'', as observed herein above, in view of the aforesaid provisions and the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Meean Variyal (Supra) and the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gitaben Mukeshbhai Pathak (Supra) and Smitaben Wd/o. Bhogilal Jagjivandas Gadhia (Supra) in which the Division Bench did consider Section 147 of the Act, 1988 and the similar / same terms and conditions of the insurance policy and the exclusion clauses mentioned in clauses 2 & 3, we are of the opinion that the insurance company cannot be held liable to pay the compensation for the death/injury of the employee of the insured/owner of the vehicle travelling in the vehicle during the course of his employment. Consequently, we have no hesitation in reversing the impugned judgment and award/s of the learned Tribunal to the limited extent so far as it fastens liability upon the appellant/s / insurance companies to satisfy the award. However, it is clarified that if at all under the concerned insurance policy where the personal risk is covered, on payment of premium per person, the original claimants shall be entitled to the same to the aforesaid extent from the concerned insurance company.

14.

For the reasons recorded hereinabove and considering the relevant clauses in the insurance policy, the learned Tribunal has materially erred in holding the respective insurance companies liable to pay the compensation.

15.

Now, so far as the amount of quantum of compensation in First Appeal No.989/2011 is concerned, the learned Tribunal has materially erred in not considering the future rise in income while awarding future rise of income. It is required to be noted that at the time of accident the deceased was serving as a Senior Manager in Torrent Pharmaceuticals and was getting Rs. 6200/per month. Therefore, considering the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarlva Verma (Supra) and as the deceased at the time of accident was aged 37 years, 50% of the aforesaid is required to be added towards future rise in income and while considering the prospective income and deducting ⅓rd towards personal expenses of the deceased and applying multiplier of 15, original claimants shall be entitled to Rs. 11,16,000/towards future loss of income. The original claimants shall also be entitled to Rs. 25,000/under the conventional head and funeral expenses. Thus, the original claimants shall be entitled to total amount of Rs. 11,41,000/towards compensation under different heads. To the aforesaid extent the impugned judgment and award passed by the learned Tribunal in MACP No.810/1992 is required to be modified and the First Appeal No.989/2011 is required to be partly allowed to the aforesaid extent.

16.

So far as First Appeal No.5195/2008 which can be said Cross Appeal in First Appeal No.2108/2008 is concerned, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the learned Tribunal has committed any error in awarding Rs. 8,20,000/under different heads towards compensation for the death of deceased Jaigopal Dave. We see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and award passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Fast Track Court No.3, at Nadiad, District Kheda in MACP No.1502/2001 insofar as the quantum of amount of compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal is concerned.

17.

Cross Objection No.6/2003 also deserves to be dismissed as there is no substance and the amount awarded by the learned Tribunal can be said to be just compensation.

18.

In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, First Appeal Nos.3309/1996, 2109/2006 to 2110/2006, 764/2002 to 766/2002, 4833/2007, 1027/2006 and First Appeal Nos.2108/2008 to 2110/2008 are hereby allowed. Impugned judgment and award passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in respective claim petitions holding the respective appellants - insurance company/s liable to pay the compensation are hereby quashed and set aside.

18.1 First Appeal No.989/2011 preferred by the original claimants of MACP No.810/1992 is partly allowed and it is held that the original claimants shall be entitled to Rs. 11,41,000/with 9% interest thereon from the date of claim petition till realization from the original opponent Nos.1 and 2 only (not from original opponent No.3 - United India Insurance Co. Ltd.).

18.2 In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, First Appeal No.5195/2008 and Cross Objection No.6/2003 are hereby dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.

It goes without saying that whatever the amount the respective insurance companies have deposited pursuant to the impugned judgment and awards passed by the learned Tribunal in respective claim petitions, on the First Appeals being allowed and the respective judgment and awards qua them being set aside, they shall be entitled to get back the same either from the original claimants or from the concerned employer, however after deducting any amount due and payable to them under the cover of their personal insurance as observed hereinabove. Registry is directed to return the Record & Proceedings of the respective cases to the concerned Tribunal forthwith as early as possible.