Om Prakash Grover vs Canara Bank

Ranjit Singh, J

This case seems to be one of the old vintage cases. Proceedings in this case are in progress since the year 1993 and shockingly these have-not been finalized till date. We are now in the year 2014. Unfortunate aspect is that this case may have to go back again to the Tribunal for which the blame would not rest onto parties concerned.

Though in this appeal an order dated 25.1.2011 passed by DRT-III, Delhi is impugned on a number of grounds, but what would straightaway strike is the delay in pronouncing the judgment after hearing arguments and after reserving the same for pronouncement. Since no other issue is being dealt with while disposing of this appeal, detailed mention to the facts may not be needed. Still, it would be appropriate to make a brief narration of facts so as to appreciate the issue of delayed delivery of judgment by the Tribunal below.

Canara Bank sanctioned a Packing Credit Limit for a sum of Rs. 10 lacs with post sale credit limit and packing credit sub-limit to the tune of Rs. 2 lacs to respondents 2 and 3 in the year 1987. Smt. Jeeti Mumick created equitable mortgage of property No. 14/11, West Patel Naqar, New Delhi on 23.6.1987 to secure the credit facilities. The property of Smt. Jeeti Mumick was substituted with the property bearing No. 23/21, AB, Tilak Nagar, New Delhi of the appellant on 15.7.1988 On 29.11.1988, renewal / enhancement of the credit facilities was sought from Rs. 10 lacs to Rs. 15 lacs. Ad-hoc basis packing credit sub-limit to the tune of Rs. 2 lacs and OD/DOB cash incentive credit limit to the tune of Rs. 1.50 lacs was also permitted. Respondents 2 and 3 confirmed acknowledgement of their liability towards the respondent Canara Bank on 6.9.1990 to be Rs. 17,97,797.80 in the packing credit account and Rs. 79,353.50 in duty draw back and cash incentive limit account.

It is alleged that respondent No. 3, Mr. H.S. Bakshi, the proprietor of M/s Cear Shoes dishonestly removed and disposed of entire stock of goods and machinery. Grievance is that the respondent Canara Bank failed to protect its hypothecated stock or to take any action against respondent No. 3 in any manner.

On 29.8.1993, respondent No. 1 bank sent a legal notice to the respondents requiring them to repay the alleged outstanding dues. In 1993 itself, Suit No. 2134/1993 was instituted before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi. In the year 1995, the suit was transferred from the High Court to DRT, Delhi. The appellant appeared and filed written statement denying the liability. It may be noticed here that this case thereafter remained pending before the Tribunal from 1995 to 2011 when final order was passed on 25.1.2011 holding that the appellant and others liable for a sum of Rs. 44,55,953.40. Sixteen years is a long period to adjudicate the lis.

The claim of the appellant is that he never stood guarantor for the credit facility availed of by respondent Nos. 2 and 3. He would further submit that the title deeds of the property of the appellant were illegally retained by the bank and the appellant can be made liable only for a sum of Rs. 10 lacs. Some other submissions were also made. The Tribunal, however, did not accept the pleas raised by the appellant and vide impugned order dated 25.1.2011 allowed the claim against respondents 2 and 3 (defendants 1 and 2) ex parte and against the appellant and another defendant on contest.

This appeal is pending before this Tribunal since 2011. When this appeal came up for hearing on 4.2.2014, the counsel for the appellant pointed out that the order in this case was reserved for pronouncement by the Tribunal on 30.4.2009 after hearing arguments and the judgment was pronounced on 25.1.2011, i.e., after expiry of one year and nine months. Though initially the counsel for the respondent pleaded that there is no such plea raised in the appeal, but did not disputed the factual position. The counsel for respondent therefore was required to address arguments on the aspect, of delay in delivering the judgment as this is a legal issue which arises on the basis of record available in these proceedings. The counsel for the respondent, however, could not make any meaningful submission either to rebut this factual position, and so also" against the legal position which is settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

Keeping a case pending for one year and nine months after hearing arguments and then pronouncing the same obviously would be a situation which certainly gives rise to lot of apprehensions and in itself is enough to cast doubt on the judgment as such. Apart from anything else, the Court or Tribunal is likely to forget the line of submissions advanced before it with the passage of time, especially, when the time gap between the date of reserving the order and passing the judgment is so long, which, in the present case, is nearly two years. Though the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes or other procedural law may not have laid down any time-limit for pronouncement of the judgment after hearing arguments, but a speedy delivery of the judgment is a characteristic of a justice dispensation system. Any procedure or course of action which does not ensure reasonably quick adjudication has to be termed as nothing but unjust. The delayed delivery of judgment after hearing arguments and reserving the same for pronouncement thereafter would also be contrary to the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, an act of Court shall prejudice none.

This issue of delayed pronouncement of judgment has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well. In the case of R.C. Sharma vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1976 SUPREME COURT 2037. Here the judgment was pronounced after eight months of hearing of arguments. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that an unreasonable delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgment unless explained by exceptional or extraordinary circumstances is highly undesirable even when written arguments are submitted. As observed by the Hon'ble Court it is not unlikely that some points which the litigants considers important may have escaped the attention of 'the Court or Tribunal with the passage of time. Importantly, it is noticed by the court that what is more important is that the litigant must have complete confidence in the results of litigation. This confidence tends to be shaken if there is excessive delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgments. Justice, as is often observed, must not only be done but must manifestly appear to be done.

Later, this issue of delayed delivery of judgment after hearing arguments, again, has been dealt by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anil Rai vs. State of Bihar, AIR 2001 SUPREME COURT 3173. It is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that any procedure or course of action which does not ensure a reasonably quick adjudication has to be termed as unjust. After noticing that the procedural code did not provide any time-limit for pronouncement of the order, but, still, pronouncement of judgment being part of the justice dispensation system, has to be delivered without any delay. The Hon'ble Court went on to observe that in a country like ours where people consider the Judges only second to God, efforts be made to strengthen that belief of the common man. Delay in disposal of the cases facilitates the people to raise eyebrows, sometime genuinely which, if not checked, may shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system. The Court has further held that judiciary itself has to assert for preserving its stature, respect and regards for the attainment of the Rule of Law. For the fault of a few, the glorious and glittering name of the judiciary cannot be permitted to be made ugly.

In this case, the Supreme Court went onto lay down guidelines regarding pronouncement of judgment, one of which was that if the judgment is not pronounced within a period of six months then any of the parties of the said lis is held entitled to move an application before the Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to withdraw the said case and to make it over to any other Bench for fresh arguments. This judgment, therefore, leave us with enough guidance even as regard to the outer limit beyond which the situation becomes incurable.

Testing the facts in the present case, it cannot be denied that there has been inordinate unexplained delay on the part of the Tribunal in pronouncing the judgment after having heard the arguments and reserving the same for pronouncement of the order. I have perused the record where zimni orders passed in the case are available. Surprisingly, some of the orders would show that the case was fixed for final arguments as far back as in the year 2002. May be, it was only an application under section 340 CrPC. There are a number of zimni orders where the O.A. has simply been adjourned by noting that argument heard and fixed for disposal of the application. Thereafter, it is recorded that the orders were not ready and the case was being adjourned. In between the case appears to have got delayed as there was no Presiding Officer. Still, the delay in this case in disposing of the O.A., in my view, is enormous. From the year 2007 onward the Presiding Officer, DRT-III was available and the process of adjournment and completing the pleadings continued on various dates spanning over few years. In an order passed in July 2008 it is recorded that the Tribunal had been unable to serve copies of its order passed on 'the previous date. Finally, this case was reserved for orders. On that day, it is found recorded that the appellant Mr. Om Prakash Grover had insisted for passing the pronouncement of judgment and order in the claim case of the bank on the basis of the material available in the record maintained in connection with such claim case. The case was accordingly adjourned for verdict to 8.5.2009.

There is another order recorded on 2.12.2010 that the judgment would be delivered after the exhaust of the list. Still the same could be pronounced only on 25.1.2011. This delay is inexplicable and in itself is enough to show that the cause of justice may have suffered because of this delay. Right to speedy justice is not only a fundamental right but even operation of the legal system would not promote justice if speedy justice is not ensured. It is an obligation of all concerned with justice delivery system. The confidence of the people in the judicial system has to be maintained at all costs. The only option is to set aside this order so as to afford chance to the parties to raise their pleas or the arguments before the Tribunal below. This course will cure the dent, if any, in the justice delivery system, and remove any apprehension arising in the minds of litigant and public at large. It is neither alleged nor made out from the record that this delay was for any other reason which may tend to shake the confidence of the public in the justice dispensation system. But, still, to keep the glorious name of Courts and Tribunals intact, it would appropriate to set this infirmity right by setting aside the judgment and remanding the case back to the Tribunal for a fresh hearing. It is so ordered.

Before parting with this order, I would wish to place on record my anguish on this unexplainable delay in delivery the judgment after hearing arguments. The delay is noticed and seen in this case not only in delivering the judgment but in trying this case. Such a situation has to be avoided at any cost and I can express hope that the Tribunals keep this aspect in mind while dealing with the cases. No doubt that the Tribunals may be over-worked, but, still, this can not be a valid cause for denying speedy justice. Speedy dispensation of justice is essential part of justice delivery system.

Since this case has already been so inordinately delayed, would make it clear to the Tribunal which has now to deal with it to hear and decide the case from the stage of arguments with real speed. The parties will not be permitted to raise any additional pleas, evidence or raise any other issue which has so far not been raised by either side. The Tribunal now will only hear their arguments and thereafter decide the case in accordance with law.

The appeal is accordingly allowed in the above terms. Let the parties appear before the Tribunal below on 30.4.2014.