Om Parkash Gupta vs The State

Surindcr Singh, J.—With the aid of this u/s 82, Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner Om Parkash Gupta of Patiala implores this Court to quash the proceedings and the complaint filed against him under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (referred to hence forth as the Act) which is pending in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patiala. A specific prayer for the quashing of the order dated May 10, 1976 by which the petitioner was charged for an offence u/s 16(1)(a)(i) read with section 7 of the Act, is also made.

The allegation as contained in the complaint is, that the Food Inspector inspected the premises of Modi Spinning and weaving Mills, Patiala, on June 24, 1974, and found the petitioner (who is stated to be the Manager of the Mill) having in his possession about 23F Quintals of Cotton Seed Oil for sale, lying in a tack. The Food Inspector purchased 375 ml. of this oil on payment. The oil was coverted in three equal parts into three bottles which were duly stoppered and sealed. As usual one part of the sample was handed over to the petitioner, the second part was transmitted to the Public Analyst for analysis and the third part was retained by the Food Inspector. The report of the Public Analyst indicated some variation regarding the ingredients of the oil, inasmuch as some mineral oil (quantity not mentioned) was noticed and the unsaponifiable matter was found to be 2.5 percent against a maximum prescribed standard of 1.5 percent. The petitioner was therefore, proceeded against under the Act.

The Food Inspector, during the course of his examination, made a categorical statement that he bad purchased only 375 ml. of Cotton Seed Oil from the petitioner for the purpose of converting it into three parts of the sample. At the time when the question of framing of charge was under consideration, an argument was advanced before the trial Court that the mandatory provisions of Rule 22 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules had not been complied with, in that there was nothing to show that the quantity of the oil sent to the Public Analyst was 125 grams or mow as provided in Entry No. 6 pertaining to edible oils. It appears that the trial Court envolved a method to solve this mystery by sending for the part of the sample which was lying in possession of the Food Inspector and mearsuring its contents. By so doing, it was found that the net weight of the oil in the said sample bottle was 135 grams. The petitioner, however, dissatisfied with this procedure prayed that the contents of the sample be measured in terms of millilitres so as to have an idea about the correctness of assertion that 375 ml. of oil had been taken in possession. The trial Court refused to accede to this simple prayer, vide order dated May 6, 1976 (Copy Annexure VII), Thereafter, the petitioner made another prayer that the contents of the sample in his own possession may also be weighed, but once again the trial Court vide order dated May 7, 1976 (Copy Annexure VIII) declined to do so. Ultimately, by means of order dated May 10, 1976, the trial Court framed a charge against the petitioner.

The guilty have to be punished, but this can be done only under the process of law by observing the mandatory formalities and procedure, as prescribed by the relevant statute. The sacrosanctity attached to the maxim "Everyone is presumed to be innocent till he is proved to be guilty". Is not merely for the benefit of the accused but is more for the observance of the Court. A fair trial presupposes that a person accused of an offence is to be afforded all reasonable opportunity to defend himself, not necessarily with a view to prove his absolute innocence but even for the purpose of bringing on record the dubiety of the prosecution allegations as the law confers upon him a right to claim the benefit of all doubts in the matter. The second cardinal principle, in the same context is, that the Court is not called upon to derive adverse conclusion with predisposed notions about the guilt of the accused. A perural of the various orders pissed by the trial Court,, to which reference has been made above, and particularly the order dated May 10, 1971, indicates that the learned Magistrate lost light of both their principles.

In Rajaldas Gurunamal Pamanani Vs. The State of Maharashtra, their Lordships expressed a firm view that the non-compliance of the provisions of Rule requiring a particular quantity of a sample of food to he sent for purposes of analysis, was not a mere infraction of the Rules but would also cause injustice. It was further held that the quantities mentioned in the Rule were required for a correct analysis and shortage in this quantity was not permitted by the statute. There cannot be a better case for the application of this dictum than the one in hand.

It is not disputed that the requirement of the Rule, so far as the Cotton Seed Oil is concerned, is that a minimum quantity of 125 grams of oil should be sent for analysis. The petitioner was well within his right to show that the quantity of oil sent to the Public Analyst was less than the minimum prescribed under the Rules. The procedure adopted by the trial Court in weighing the contents of the part of the sample lying with the Food Inspector could not be utilised for coming to a finding that 125 grams of Cotton Seed Oil bad been actually sent to the Public Analyst for examination. The trial Court observed in its order dated May 10, 1976. "From statement of the Food Inspector that the sample purchased was divided into three equal parts and the circumstances of the weight of contents of one of the sample bottles having been found to be 135 grams, it can be presumed that the actual weight of the oil purchased from the accused was 135 x 3-405 grams." There is no warrant for such a presumption when the Food Inspector bad clearly stated that he had taken into possession only 375 ml. of oil in all It is quite well-known that the specific gravity of Cotton Seed Oil would he less than that of water. In fact, a reference to the Booklet "Specification for Cotton Seed Oil" issued by the Indian Standards Institution (Second Revision) indicates that the requirement for Cotton Seed Oil in respect of specific gravity is 0.910 to 0.920. This is naturally in relation to the specific gravity of water, which is taken as 1. From this point of view, the 375 ml. of oil purchased from the petitioner would work out to much lesser number in terms of milligrams and even if all the three parts of the sample are presumed to be equal in quantity (for which there is no definite material), each of the samples would, in any case, contain less than 125 milligrams of oil. This would directly attract violation of Rule 22 Item 6.

At one stage, for the satisfaction of this Court on the point as to whether the required quantity of oil had been sent to the Public Analyst or not, it was found expedient to summon the Public Analyst himself and this was done. Dr. Hargobind Singh, Public Analyst Punjab, appeared in this Court, and deposed that there is no mention in the record pertaining to this case, as to how much quantity of Cotton Seed Oil had been received in the sample for purposes of analysis. In face of this statement and in the absence of any other material produced by the prosecution to show that the requisite quant of oil had been sent for analysis, the petitioner was clearly entitled the benefit available to him under the law.

In regard to the invoking of powers u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is indeed well settled that the inherent jurisdiction of this Court would be utilised with reluctance so as to interfere with the proceedings at an interlocutory stage, but at the same time, it must be kept in mind that this Court can and should exercise these powers to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, on the circumstances noticed above, the facts as alleged by the prosecution, even if accepted at their face value, cannot sustain conviction on account of a patent illegality. It would be not only futile but improper to allow these proceedings to continue for an indefinite period It is, therefore, ordered that the proceedings pending against the petitioner u/s 16(1)(a)(i) read with section 7 of the Act, in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patiala are quashed.