Official Receiver of Ramnad at Madura vs Income Tax Officer

Leach, C.J.—The petitioner is the Official Receiver of Ramnad and in that capacity represents the estate of one P.P.V. CT. Chidambaram

Chettiar. For the year 1941-1942 the petitioner was assessed to Income Tax on the income of the estate. The petitioner challenged the

correctness of the assessment and appealed, first to the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and then to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal,

Madras, in each case, unsuccessfully. The order of the Appellate Tribunal dismissing his appeal was received by the petitioner on 12th May 1944.

He was of the opinion that the question involved was one which justified a reference to the High Court u/s 66(1), Income Tax Act, but before

taking steps in this direction he desired to have the sanction of the Subordinate Judge of Devakottai. Sanction was obtained and the petition was

presented at the office of the Appellate Tribunal in Madras on 11th July 1944, the last day of the period of limitation. Section 6(1) provides a

period of 60 days for such an application.

Rule 14 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules requires an appeal to be presented in person or by a representative to the Registrar at Bombay or to

some person authorized in that behalf by the Registrar, but adds that an appeal which is received in the office of the Registrar by post within the

prescribed period of limitation shall be deemed to have been validly presented. Rule 14 is in Part 4 of the Rules. Rule 45 says that subject to the

provisions of Part 6, the provisions of Parts 3 and 4 shall apply to the presentation, notices and hearing of an application for reference as if it were

an appeal. There is no provision in the Rules for the presentation of an appeal or an application for reference to the Tribunal itself. In these

circumstances the Madras office of the Appellate Tribunal refused to receive the application presented on 11th July 1944 with the result that the

petitioner posted it to the Registrar at Bombay where it was received out of time. The Tribunal refused to make the reference because the period

of limitation had expired and it had no power to extend the period. The petitioner has now applied to this Court u/s 66(3) for an order directing the

Appellate Tribunal to treat the application as having been made in time.

Sub-section (3) of Section 66 states that if on an application being made Under Sub-section (1) the Appellate Tribunal rejects it on the ground

that it is time barred, the assessee or the Commissioner, as the case may be, may, within two months from the date on which he is served with

notice of the rejection, apply to the High Court, and the High Court, if it is not satisfied of the correctness of the Appellate Tribunal''s decision may

require the Appellate Tribunal to treat the application as made within the time allowed Under Sub-section (1). Therefore the Court can only act

Under Sub-section (3), if it is not satisfied of the correctness of the Appellate Tribunal''s decision. If it is satisfied that the decision is correct, no

order can be passed. Undoubtedly the order of the Appellate Tribunal was correct. Rule 14 is mandatory and the application for a reference by

the Appellate Tribunal could only be filed in accordance with the rule. The position may be a hard one for the petitioner, but the rules must be

interpreted according to the, language used therein. The petitioner would appear to have, had ample time in which to make the application, but

whether he had or not makes no difference to the position.

The application is dismissed. We make no order as to costs.