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Judgment
Phillips, J.—In this case, the petitioner was released on giving security u/s 55(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under that section, he has
to file his petition in insolvency within 30 days of the order but he did not do so in the present instance and applied for extension of time on the
ground that he had been ill for the latter half of the one month allowed. The Lower Appellate Court has held that the Court had no jurisdiction to
increase the time of 30 days allowed by Section 55. It is now contended that u/s 148 the time may be extend-ed; but u/s 148 the time that can be
extended is a period fixed or granted by the Court. In an order u/s 55(4), there is no question of the period being fixed or granted by the Court, for
the period is fixed by the Code itself and consequently Section 148 would not appear to be applicable.
Reliance is, however, placed on a decision of the Privy Council in Burjore and Bhawani Pershad v. Bhagana (1883) ILR 10 C 557 (PC) in
which it was held that the Lower Court had rightly exercised its jurisdiction in extending the time provided by Section 602 of the old Code, which
corresponds to the present Order 45, Rule 7. In the old Code, there was no provision corresponding to Section 148 and that section, which is an
enabling section, placed certain limitations upon the power to be exercised, the chief limitation being that the period which can be extended is that
which is fixed or granted by the Court, and this would impliedly exclude periods fixed by law. A Bench of this Court held in Vannisami Thevar v.
Periaswami Thevar (1916) 1 MWN 179 that the time prescribed in Order 21, Rule 92 could not be extended by the Court, and a single Judge of
this Court in A.A.A.O. No. 117 of 1922 held that the time u/s 55(4) could not be extended by the Court. I agree with the views expressed in
these two cases and hold that the Court has no power to extend the period of one month allowed u/s 55(4).
Section 151 is also invoked but certaintly the circumstances of this case are not such as to warrant the exercise of such powers. No particular
injustice has been committed, nor has the process of the Court been abused and even if there were power to interfere u/s 151, I certainly should
decline to do so in the present circumstances.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.