High CourtsSingle Bench(1999) 09 P&H CK 0142

Norata Singh and Others vs Gram Panchayat (Sabha) of Village Narsali and Others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 22 September 1999 · Citation: (2000) 124 PLR 216 : (1999) 4 RCR(Civil) 428

HON’BLE JUDGES
R.L. Anand, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Regular Second Appeal No. 498 of 1980

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Judgment

31 paragraphs · 2,044 words

R.L. Anand, J.—Norata Singh and others have filed the present appeal and it has been directed against the judgment and decree dated 11.9.1979 passed by District Judge, Patiala, who affirmed the judgment and decree dated 1.1.1977 passed by the trial Court which dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-appellants for injunction.

2.

The brief facts of the case are that Norata Singh and others plaintiffs filed a suit for permanent injunction against Gram Panchayat, Nasra, Ranjit Singh, Jewala Singh and M/s Joginder Singh Kalsi and Sons for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from them or from cremating the dead bodies etc., in the land described in the head-note of the plaint. The case set1 up by the plaintiffs before the trial Court was that they are filing the suit in representative capacity and that the land in dispute except Khasra No. 606 is Gair Mumkin Hadda Rori and is reserved for cremation of dead bodies of every community of the village and that Khasra No. 606 is being used as Rasta by all communities. The defendants Nos. 2 to 4 are threatening to take possession without the consent of the residents of the village of the aforesaid property and have illegality collected the bricks at the spot without any right, title or interest. Hence, the suit.

3.

The defendants were summoned, who appeared and contested the suit. They denied the allegations of the plaintiffs and asserted that the Gram Panchayat has every right to reserve any land for Marrian Hadda Rori and that it has already reserved other land vide resolution No. 17 dated 29.9.1970 and Khasra No. 601 has been reserved for other purposes with the consent of the government. The land in disputethas been given to defendants Nos. 2 to 4 on lease and that is why the bricks are lying for construction by defendants Nos. 2 to 4 and the Gram Panchayat was fully competent to give the land under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act'', 1961 and it has been also asserted that the plaintiffs have no right to file the suit because the land in dispute comes under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (hereinafter called ''the Act'') and the Gram Panchayat is fully competent to give the land on lease or use it in any way under the said Act and thus the suit is not competent and the plaintiffs have no cause of action.

4.

From the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues:-

1.

Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to injunction prayed for? OPP.

2.

Whether the defendants Nos. 2 to 4 take the suit land under a valid lease, if so to what effect? OPD

3.

Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD

4.

Whether the defendant No. 1 is not competent to lease the land in suit? OPD

5.

What is the resolution of panchayat passed on 29.9.1970? OPD

6.

Relief.

Later on an additional issue was framed to the following effect:-

Whether this Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit? OPD.

5.

The trial Court after hearing the counsel for the parties, decided the additional issue by way of preliminary one and came to the conclusion that the suit of the plaintiffs is barred by the provisions of Section 13 of the Act and thus dismissed the suit for the reasons given in paras Nos. 10 to 14 of the judgment, which are reproduced as under:-

"10. The stand taken by the Panchayat, however, is that the land in dispute comes under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, and, therefore, the civil Court has no jurisdiction.

11.

Section 13 of the aforesaid Act has been amended and the amended Section is as follows:-

Bar of jurisdiction of civil courts:

No civil Court shall have jurisdiction - 7

(a) to entertain or adjudicate upon any question whether any property or any right to or interest in any property is or is not shamlat deh vested or deejwed to have been vested in Panchayat under this Act; or

(b) to question the legality of any action than the by the Commissioner or the Collector or the Panchayat under the Act; or

(c) in respect of any matter which the Commissioner or the Collector is empowered by or under this Act to determine.

This section, therefore, created a clear bar to the adjudication of the civil Court of any question whether any property is or is not shamlat deh vested in Gram Panchayat under this Act. The point involved in the present suit is exactly whether the property is vested in Gram Panchayat under the Act or not, because the fate of the suit for injunction depends entirely on the determination of that question. In view of the amended section, therefore, the civil suit is clearly barred.

12.

The arguments of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the question regarding the jurisdiction of civil Court has already been decided by my learned predecessor has no force because at that time, the section was not amended and, therefore, that decision was before the amendment of the Act.

13.

It was then contended on behalf of the plaintiff that Section 13 was amended only in 1976, and, therefore, this amendment cannot apply to the pending suits. It is true that normally as ''Statute'' takes effect from the date of its enactment unless there is something to show that the intention of the legislature was to make-it retrospective. In the instant case the intention of the legislature to make the amendment retrospective is clear from the wording of the section itself because it is stated therein clearly that no Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate upon any question. The word adjudication clearly contemplates that even in the present cases the Court cannot adjudicate the point. If the intention of the Legislature only was to make the amendment prospective, the purpose would have been served by the word ''entertained''. I am, therefore, of the considered view that the intention of the Legislature was clearly for giving retrospective effect to the amendment.

14.

In view of the above discussion the suit is clearly barred u/s 13 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, and the issue is decided in favour of the defendant against the plaintiff."

6.

Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the plaintiffs filed the first appeal before the Court of District Judge, Patiala, which for the reasons given in para No. 5 of the impugned judgment affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal after relying upon a judgment Chandgi Ram v. Nihal Singh (1979)81 P.L.R. 299. Para No. 5 of the first Appellate Court can also be quoted in the following manner:

"5. u/s 13 of the Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act (Punjab No. 18 of 1961) Civil Court shall not entertain or adjudicate upon a question as to whether any land or immovable property vests or does not vest in the Gram Panchayat or question the illegality of any action of the Panchayat under the Act. Since the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to adjudicate has been taken away the trial Court rightly held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. Support for this view is available from the observations Chandgi Ram v. Nihal Singh (1979)81 P.L.R. 299."

7.

I have heard Mr. Amarjit Markan, Advocate on behalf of the appellants, Mr. G.S. Punia, Advocate on behalf of the respondents and with their assistance I have gone through the records of this case.

8.

The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that both the Courts have not rightly appreciated the controversy in dispute. Mr. Markan tried to emphasise that the suit of the plaintiffs was simplicitor and they simply prayed that the land in dispute except Khasra No. 606 was Gair Mumkin Hadda Rori and was reserved for the cremation of the dead bodies of the very community of the village while Khasra No. 606 was being used as Rasta by all the communities and that Gram Panchayat had no jurisdiction to lease the land to respondents No. 2 to 4 and in these circumstances the suit of the plaintiffs virtually was to restrict respondents Nos. 2 to 4 not to use the suit land including Khasra No. 606 as the village community had the right to use the same for common purposes.

9.

On the contrary, Mr. Punia argued that the suit of the plaintiffs is barred u/s 13 of the Act. He submitted that it is the specific case of the defendants that the Gram Panchayat had already reserved other land for common purposes vide its resolution No. 17 and, moreover, Khasra No. 601 has been reserved for the benefit of the village community with the consent of the government. The land in dispute has been given to defendants Nos. 2 to 4 on lease basis. If still the plaintiffs have any right, title or interest, they can approach the Collector for the adjudication of any right u/s 11 of the Act and by virtue of provisions of Section 13 of the Act the jurisdiction of the civil Court has been ousted.

10.

I agree with the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondents. In this regard I will have to examine the provisions of Section 13 of the Act, which lays down that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate upon any question whether any property or any right to or interest in any property is or is not Shamlat Deh vested or deemed to have been vested in a Panchayat under this Act; or to question the legality of any action taken by the Commissioner or the Collector or the Panchayat under this Act; or in respect of any matter which the Commissioner or the Collector is empowered by or under this Act to determine. The reading of the above would show that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been taken away by this Act to entertain or adjudicate any question, whether any property is or is not a Shamlat Deh vested or deemed to have been vested in the Gram Panchayat. Section 2(g) of the Act gives us the definition of ''Shamlat Deh''. Shamlat Deh includes : (1) Land described in the revenue records as Shamlat Deh excluding abadi deh. (1) benefit of village community including streets, lanes playgrounds, schools, drinking wells or ponds within the abadi deh or gorah deh, and; (5)........In this context it will always be useful for me to make a mention of Section 11 of the Act which lays down that any person claiming right, title or interest in any land vested or deemed to have been vested in a Panchayat under this Act, or claiming that any land has not so vested in a Panchayat, may submit to the Collector, within such time as may be prescribed, a statement of his claim in writing and signed and verified in the prescribed manner and the Collector shall, have jurisdiction to decide such claim in such manner as may be prescribed. According to Section 12 every order made by the Collector or the Commissioner shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court by way of appeal or revision or in any original suit, application or execution proceedings. In the light of these statutory provisions, let us now examine the claim of the plaintiffs. The case of the plaintiffs is that the land in dispute has been reserved for the benefit of the village community and that the Gram Panchayat in violation of the object has leased out to the property to defendants Nos. 2 to 4, who had created the obstruction by placing bricks etc. for the purpose of raising some construction. In this background if the plaintiffs want to agitate the issue, they had the right to do so u/s 11 of the Act. Their suit was definitely barred u/s 13 of the Act.

In this view of the matter, I do not see any illegality committed by the Courts below the finding no merit in this appeal hereby dismiss the same with no order as to costs.