Nitya Ranjan Mallick vs Punjab National Bank And Another

Heard the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant as well as the learned Advocate representing the Punjab National Bank, respondent before the writ Court.

The petitioner while working as a Clerk-cum-Cashier was proceeded against on the basis of the charge memo dated 30.01.1996. The substance of the allegation levelled against the petitioner was that he withdrew the funds which were credited to the customers’ accounts and thereby siphoned/misappropriated the bank’s funds. There are allegations that to facilitate such siphoning off the bank’s funds, he has made withdrawal using withdrawal slips by forging signatures of the account holders and to cover up his lapses, he also removed the original ledger sheets of the concerned ledgers after making fake credit entries.

After issuance of the charge memo, a proceeding was conducted over several dates which culminated in dismissal of the petitioner from service by an order dated 25.03.1999, passed by the disciplinary authority. It is the petitioner’s case that thereafter, he filed an appeal on 08.05.1999, i.e. within the prescribed period for filing appeal (60 days).

The petitioner was also proceeded against in respect of the same charges in a criminal case. The First Information Report in respect of the same charges was lodged on 15.02.1995. The offences alleged in the FIR were under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the then Indian Penal Code. The criminal trial thereafter continued for more than a decade. An acquittal, however, was recorded in the trial on 25.02.2010. Nearly 8 months after the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal trial, he submitted his grounds of appeal in support of the appeal which was filed on 08.05.1999. Having submitted his grounds for an appeal, he approached the writ Court by filing a writ petition being WPA No. 13950 of 2012 complaining that an appeal was pending. The writ Court by an order dated 14.08.2023 requested the appellate authority to pass a reasoned order on the pending appeal, which order was passed on 16.02.2024. The appeal was dismissed.

Under the circumstances, the present writ petition was filed for the following reliefs:

The writ Court did not accept the petitioner’s contentions and the writ petition bearing WPO No. 684 of 2024 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by the judgment dated 20.05.2026. The same is the subject matter of the present intra court appeal.

Before this Court, it is submitted that the learned Advocate representing the writ petitioner/appellant made submission before the writ Court relying upon a bipartite settlement dated 10.04.2002. It was submitted that in the event of an acquittal being recorded in respect of a workman under the terms of settlement, the workman was required to be paid his full pay and allowances and be treated as on duty for the entire period of currency of the criminal trial. The learned Single Judge has glossed over such submission and no finding in respect thereof was returned.

The learned Senior Advocate appearing for the writ petitioner/appellant has drawn attention of this Court to the specific clause in the bipartite settlement, i.e. Clause 3 (c) which reads:

It is therefore submitted that the bank had no option but to continue the petitioner in service and treat the entire period as on duty.

The learned Advocate for the respondent bank on the other hand submits that the relevant clause, on which reliance is placed by the learned Senior Advocate for the appellant, is not limited in its operation to such a consequence as is canvassed by the learned Advocate representing the writ petitioner/appellant. This is one of the options available to the bank under the clause relied upon. The petitioner or any employee does not have any indefeasible right that the employer must resort only to this discretion amongst various discretions arising out of the same bipartite settlement dated 10.04.2002. In the present case, the petitioner’s dismissal from service precedes his acquittal in the criminal trial, by about 12 years.

Under the circumstances, once the employee was dismissed, after a proceeding conducted in compliance with the principle of natural justice and observing the procedural prescription, there was no scope for the petitioner to contend, more than a decade thereafter, relying upon his acquittal in the criminal trial, that he be treated in service and given full pay back-wages in purported implementation of Clause 3(c) of the bipartite settlement dated 10.04.2002.

We have considered rival submissions. The case made out by the appellant before us is limited to a consequence of Clause 3(c) of the settlement, which according to him, is reinstatement of the writ petitioner with full back-wages treating him as on duty.

We find from the provisions, which we extracted above, that the same deals with the disciplinary action against a workman and procedure in respect of the same.

A plain reading of Clause 3(c) reveals the intent of the provision.

It gives the management a discretion that in the event, the management decided that a person is not to be proceeded against otherwise under Clauses 11 and 12 of the same bipartite settlement, such workman/person was required to be put back in service and in such circumstance the workman would be deemed to have been on duty during the period of suspension. If the authorities were to decide to reinstate a person after his acquittal, then the further consequences contemplated under the provision is grant of full pay and allowances minus the subsistence allowance which was already drawn and other privileges for the period of suspension. While granting such benefit, the nature of acquittal was also relevant.

Clause 3(c) in the very opening sentence gives another option to the management to proceed against a workman under Clauses 11 and 12 of the same bipartite settlement, despite the fact that such workman was acquitted in the criminal trial.

Clauses 11 and 12 of the bipartite settlement prescribes/lays down the procedure for conducting a departmental proceeding against such an employee. The prescription therefore ensures compliance with the principle of natural justice which is inherent in the procedure description. From reading of Clause 3(c), we find that despite an acquittal being recorded, the management had more than one option and the option was not limited to reinstatement with full back-wages and benefit.

Petitioner’s dismissal was recorded after a full-fledged departmental proceeding nearly 12 years prior to the petitioner’s acquittal.

We further find that the terms of settlement have to be read as a whole and cannot be confined to a line taken from a specific provision relied upon by a workman to claim a relief. The interpretation of Clause 3(c) of the settlement canvassed before us, as if it is the only option with the bank, does not find favour with this Court.

Under these circumstances, we do not find any force or substance in the submission advanced by the learned Senior Advocate. The judgment of the learned Single Judge in such circumstances does not require any interference in the present intra court appeal.

The appeal is dismissed.

I agree.