Nitin Yadav and Others vs State of Haryana and Another

Amol Rattan Singh, J.—This petition, invoking Section 482 Cr.P.C., seeks quashing of the order of the learned JMIC, Ambala, dated 27.07.2010, by which the learned Magistrate ordered registration of an FIR against the petitioners and directed the SHO of the Police Station concerned to investigate the matter. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners, being residents of Meerut in Uttar Pradesh, were living beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the learned JMIC and, as such, without complying with the mandate contained in Section 202 Cr.P.C., i.e. of first inquiring into the matter, he could not have straight away ordered the registration of an FIR. A perusal of the order under challenge shows that, while doing so, the learned Magistrate had cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in Madhu Bala Vs. Suresh Kumar and others, , & thereafter directed the registration of an FIR. A perusal of the said judgment, as also of a more recent judgment of the Apex Court in Srinivas Gundluri and Others Vs. SEPCO Electric Power Construction Corporation and Others, , reveals that the JMIC was very much within his jurisdiction to have ordered registration of the FIR and directing investigation, in view of Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

After discussing the entire law on the issue, their Lordships held in Srinivasis case, that the stage of holding an inquiry u/s 202 is completely different to the stage when an FIR is directed to be registered as per Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. in Srinivas'' case (supra) also, the Magistrate had directed registration of an FIR and investigation of the case. Thus, there is no material difference in the nature of the order passed in that case and the present one and as such, the ratio of the law laid down would obviously apply to the present case also.

It was held that Chapter XV of the Code, comprising Section 200 to Section 203, operates in a field different from Section 156(3). If a Magistrate decides to take cognizance of a complaint, in terms of Section 200 Cr.P.C., he is then bound to follow the procedure laid down as contained in Chapter XV, including the mandate contained in Section 202. However, if he simply directs investigation in terms of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., it is pre-cognizance stage, simply on the information of a complainant alleging a cognizable offence to have been made out. In the present case, the learned JMIC adopted the latter course. Hence, keeping in view the law as enunciated in Srinivas'' case (supra), I find no infirmity in the order of the learned JMIC and, as such, this petition is dismissed. Obviously, the law would take its own course, in terms of the order passed by the Magistrate.