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Judgment
Rakesh Kainthla, J
The present petition has been filed on behalf of the informant and the accused for quashing the FIR. The petition is signed by the informant/victim and she had filed an affidavit in support of the petition. It has been asserted that the matter has been compromised between the parties. Therefore, the informant does not want to pursue the case against the accused; hence, it has been prayed that the FIR be quashed based on the compromise.
Heard.
As per the petition, the informant had filed the FIR and set the criminal law in motion. The police conducted the investigation and filed the charge sheet before the competent court based on the FIR lodged by the informant. In these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the informant can be aggrieved from the registration of the FIR and the continuation of the proceedings initiated by her. It was held in Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 653 that ordinarily an aggrieved party who is affected by an order has a right to seek redress by questioning the legality, validity or correctness of the order unless such party is a minor and insane person or suffering from any other disability. It was observed:-
“7. Ordinarily, the aggrieved party which is affected by any order has the right to seek redress by questioning the legality, validity or correctness of the order, unless such party is a minor, an insane person or is suffering from any other disability which the law recognises as sufficient to permit another person, e.g. next friend, to move the Court on his behalf. If a guardian or a next friend initiates proceedings for and on behalf of such a disabled aggrieved party, it is in effect proceedings initiated by the party aggrieved and not by a total stranger who has no direct personal stake in the outcome thereof….”
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, Advocate General of Maharashtra, (1970) 2 SCC 484 that a person aggrieved is a person who has suffered some detriment pecuniary or otherwise to cause him some prejudice. It was observed at page 503:
“9. Generally speaking, a person can be said to be aggrieved by an order which is to his detriment, pecuniary or otherwise or causes him some prejudice in some form or other. A person who is not a party to litigation has no right to appeal merely because the judgment or order contains some adverse remarks against him. But it has been held in a number of cases that a person who is not a party to a suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate court and such leave would not be refused where the judgment would be binding on him under Explanation 6 to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We find ourselves unable to take the view that because a person has been given notice of some proceedings wherein he is given a right to appear and make his submissions, he should without more have a right of appeal from an order rejecting his contentions or submissions. An appeal is a creature of statute and if a statute expressly gives a person a right to appeal, the matter rests there.
Innumerable statutes both in England and in India give the right of appeal to “a person aggrieved” by an order made and the provisions of such statutes have to be construed in each case to find out whether the person preferring an appeal falls within that expression. As was observed in Robinson v. Curey [7 QBD 465] the words “person aggrieved” are “ordinary English words which are to have the ordinary meaning put upon them.
According to Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn., Vol. 25), p. 293, footnote “h”:
“the expression is nowhere defined and must be construed by reference to the context of the enactment in which it appears and all the circumstances”.
Attempts have however from time to time been made to define the expression in various cases. In Ex parte Sidebotham In re Sidebotham [14 Ch D 458 at 465] it was observed by James, L.J.:
“But the words ‘person aggrieved’ do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A ‘person aggrieved’ must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something.”
The above definition of James, L.J., was described by Esher, M.R., in Ex parte Official Receiver In re Reed, Bowen & Co. [19 QBD 174 at 178] as not “an exhaustive definition”. His Lordship added:
“It is an affirmative definition of a person who may appeal, and at all events, it includes a person who has asked for a decision for which he had a right to ask, and has been wrongfully refused.”
Queen v. Keepers of the Peace and Justices of the County of London [25 QBD 357, 361] was a case of an appeal by an informant against the judgment of a justice of the peace upon the hearing of an information or complaint by the vestry of the parish against a person for unlawfully and wilfully obstructing the free passage of a certain highway. The relevant section provided:
“If any person shall think himself aggrieved by ... any order, conviction, judgment, or determination made, or by any matter or thing done by any justice or other person in pursuance of this Act ... such person may appeal to quarter sessions.”
In holding that an informant had no right of appeal Lord Coleridge, C.J., said:
“ ‘Is a person who cannot succeed in getting a conviction against another a person aggrieved’? He may be annoyed at finding that what he thought was a breach of law is not a breach of law; but is he ‘aggrieved’ because someone is held not to have done wrong? It is difficult to see that the section meant anything of that kind.”
In Rex v. London Quarter Sessions Ex parte Westminister Corporation [1951 (2) KB 508] a borough council whose cancellation of the registration of a street trader had been reversed by a Magistrate on appeal by the trader concerned under Section 25 of the London County Council (General Powers) Act, 1947, was held not to be a person aggrieved by an order of a Court of summary jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 64 of the Act. The argument advanced on behalf of the corporation was that it had a public administrative duty to perform in the regulation of the streets and having been interfered with in the execution of that duty by the decision of the Magistrate, they were persons aggrieved by his order. One of the grounds for refusal of the application by Lord Goddard, C.J., was that the order made did not directly affect the borough council in such a way as to make them “a person aggrieved” within the meaning of the section. According to the learned Chief Justice what the statute did was “to substitute the opinion of the Magistrate for the opinion of a borough council”. It was said that the Court of summary jurisdiction had to take into account the same matters as the borough council had to take into account, and if the court thinks that the cancellation of the licence is not justified, it can restore the licence to the street trader. If the Court of summary jurisdiction refuses to grant a licence, then the street trader is a person aggrieved, because his livelihood is affected, or an order is made directly affecting him.
The case of Sevenoaks Urban District Council v. Twynam [1929 (2) KB 440 at 444] was relied upon by counsel appearing for the Advocate-General of Maharashtra to support his argument that even a person who had no proprietary or pecuniary interest in the subject-matter of the litigation might be a person aggrieved so as to give him a right to appeal. The statute in this case was however worded very differently from the statutes which came up for consideration in the cases noted earlier. Section 68(1) of the Public Health Act, 1925, laid down that:
“Where for the purpose of relieving or preventing congestion of traffic it appears to the local authority to be necessary to provide within their district suitable parking places for vehicles.”
Then that authority may, subject to certain conditions, provide those parking places and might acquire land suitable for use as a parking place. The proviso to the section however laid down that no such order shall authorise the use of any part of a street so as unreasonably to prevent access to any premises adjoining the street, or the use of the street by any person entitled to the use thereof, or so as to be a nuisance, or be made in respect of any part of a street without the consent of the authority or person responsible for the maintenance of the street. Sub-section (2) of the section provided that where a local authority proposes to acquire land for the purpose of using it as a parking place they are to give notice of the proposal specifying the land and notify the date within which any objection is to be sent to them and the notice is to state that a right of appeal was conferred by the section. Sub-section (3) provided that before carrying into effect any proposal of which notice was required to be given the local authority shall consider any objection which was sent to them in writing. There was no limit there as to the kind of person making the objection or the kind of objection which might be raised. The respondent, a ratepayer, duly gave notice under sub-section (3) on various grounds but he did not allege the infringement of any personal legal right and he objected in his capacity as a rate-payer and as a member of the public on grounds common to them all. The urban council considered the objection and informed him of their decision to proceed with the scheme. The respondent appealed to petty sessions which allowed his objection. The appellant appealed to quarter sessions and took the preliminary objection that the respondent was not a person aggrieved because he had alleged no infringement of any legal right personal to him.
Referring to the dicta of James, L.J., Esher, M.R. and Lopes, L.J., in the above cases Lord Hewart, C.J., observed:
“I think this respondent did ask for a decision for which he had a right to ask. He did give notice of an objection of which he was entitled to give notice, ... but the person making the objection is not to have an appeal unless he satisfies two conditions: (1) that he is the author of the objection, and (2) that he is aggrieved by the refusal in the sense that he has a special and individual right infringed. It seems to me that upon the fair construction of this sub-section, which is by no means a common kind of statutory provision, what is meant is that a person may make an objection and is entitled to a decision upon it, and if the decision is adverse to him, he may, if he thinks fit and subject to the usual consequences, appeal from it to a petty sessional court, and so appealing, may, in consequence of other statutory provisions, appeal, if need be, to the Court of quarter sessions.
According to Avory, J.:
“There is no limit there [in sub-section (3)] of the kind of person or the kind of objection which may be made. It proceeds that after so considering the objection, they are to give notice of their decision to the person by whom the objection was made, and any person who is aggrieved by such decision may appeal. I cannot help thinking that on the plain words of that statute it was intended to give a right of appeal to any person who has made an objection to the proposal and has received notices that that objection has been overruled.”
In Ealing Corporation v. Jones [1959 (1) QB 384 at 390] Lord Parker, C.J., remarked that it was easier to say what will not constitute a person aggrieved than it was to say what “person aggrieved” included. He observed that a person was not aggrieved when being a public body it had been frustrated in the performance of one of its public duties. He amplified this by saying that:
“If costs have been awarded in a case against a local authority, it is clear on the authorities that the local authority would be an aggrieved person. Equally, if the result of the decision has been to put some legal burden on the public body concerned, that has been held to make it a person aggrieved.”
According to Donovan, J., in the same case:
“The word ‘aggrieved’ connotes some legal grievance, for example, a deprivation of something, an adverse effect on the title to something, and so on, and I cannot see that this is so here. The local planning authority has simply been told that it cannot enforce the discontinuance of the present use of this land by the appellant by means of an enforcement notice under Section 23.”
It was held in Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar, (1975) 2 SCC 702 that only a person affected by something which deprives him of something can approach the Court. It was observed at page 711:
Where a right of appeal to courts against an administrative or judicial decision is created by statute, the right is invariably confined to a person aggrieved or a person who claims to be aggrieved. The meaning of the words “a person aggrieved” may vary according to the context of the statute. One of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one “a person aggrieved”. Again, a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The meaning of the words “a person aggrieved” is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. A more liberal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality.
A similar view was taken in Shobha Suresh Jumani v.Appellate Tribunal, Forfeited Property, (2001) 5 SCC 755: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1334: (2001) 249 ITR 405: 2001 SCC OnLine SC 750 wherein it was observed at page 758:
“5. First, we would reiterate that the words “any aggrieved person” are found in several statutes. However, the meaning of the expression “aggrieved” may vary according to the context of the enactment in which it appears and all the circumstances. In Sidebotham, Re, ex p Sidebotham [(1880) 14 Ch D 458 : (1874-80) All ER Rep 588 (CA)] (Ch D at p. 465) it was observed by James, L.J.:
“But the words ‘person aggrieved’ do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A ‘person aggrieved’ must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something.”
The said passage was referred to and relied upon by this Court in Thammanna v. K. Veera Reddy [(1980) 4 SCC 62] and Northern Plastics Ltd. v. Hindustan Photo Films Mfg. Co. Ltd. [(1997) 4 SCC 452]
Orissa High Court held in Sulochana Devi vs. District Magistrate (13.11.1992 - ORIHC): MANU/OR/0156/1992 that only a person whose legal right is invaded can approach the Court under Section 482 of CrPC. It was observed:
9….Who has locus standi to do so? The concept of locus standi has undergone a sea change. It is needless to emphasise that the requirement of locus standi of a party to a litigation is mandatory: because the legal capacity of the party to any litigation whether in private or public action in relation to any specific remedy sought for has to be primarily ascertained at the threshold. The traditional syntax of law in regard to locus standi for a specific judicial redress, sought by an individual person, or determinate class or identifiable group of persons, is available only to that person or class or group of persons who has or have suffered a legal injury by reasons of violation of his or their legal right or a right legally protected, the invasion of which gives rise to actionability within the categories of law. In a private action, the litigation is bipolar; two opposed parties are looked in a confrontational controversy which pertains to the determination of the legal consequences of past events unlike in public action. The character of such litigation is essentially that of vindicating private rights, proceedings being brought by the persons in whom the right personally inheres or their legally constituted representatives who are thus obviously most competent to commence the litigation.
In contrast, the strict rule of locus standi applicable to private litigation is relaxed as a broad rule is evolved which gives the right of locus standi to any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in instituting an action for redressal of public wrong or public injury, but who is not a mere busy body or a meddlesome interloper; since the dominant object of Public Interest Litigation (in short, 'PIL')is to ensure observance of the provisions of the Constitution or the law which can be best achieved to advance the cause of community or disadvantaged groups and individuals or public interest by permitting any person, having no personal gain or private motivation or any other oblique consideration, but acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in maintaining an action for judicial redress for public injury to put the judicial machinery any citizen could bring such an action in respect of a public delict. This has been expressed by the apex Court in several cases including the Janata Dal's case (supra).
Even if there are a million questions of law to be deeply gone into and examined in a criminal case registered against the specified accused person(s), it is for him/them to raise all such questions and challenge the proceeding initiated at an appropriate time before the proper forum and not for third parties either individually or under the garb of Public Interest Litigation. Ordinarily, the aggrieved party which is affected by any order has the right to seek redress by questioning the legality, validity or correctness of the order, unless such party is a minor, an insane person or is suffering from any other disability which law recognises as sufficient to permit another person e.g. next friend, to move the Court in his behalf Similar view was expressed in the Janta Dal's case(supra), and Simarjit Singh Mann v. Union of India and Anr. : 1992 II SLR 231
It has not been proved as to how any legal right or right legally protected has been invaded so as to give a cause of action for the petitioner to move this Court for interference. It is not disputed that the property in respect of which action has been taken belongs to Om Prakash. It is the assertion of the petitioner that being his wife she has an interest in the property. That even if correct per se does not clothe the petitioner locus standi to seek exercise of power Under Section 482, Cr.P.C.”
In the present case, the informant set the criminal law in motion and she cannot be aggrieved from the continuation of the proceedings and does not have any locus standi to file a petition for quashing the FIR.
It was submitted that the informant has compromised the matter and she has an interest to see that the matter does not proceed further. This submission cannot be accepted. Once the criminal law is set in motion, the State takes over because it has an interest to protect the society. The informant is left with a limited role thereafter. He can compromise the matters specified in Section 320 of CrPC (Section 359 of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Samhita, 2023) and not other offences. The High Court can quash the FIR based on compromise in suitable cases where the public interest is not involved.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the power of the Court to quash the FIR based on the compromise in Narender Singh versus State of Punjab, 2014 (6) SCC 466 and laid down the following principles:-
In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:
29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, the offences alleged to have been committed under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationships or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crimes against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or if the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of the injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, the nature of weapons used, etc. Medical reports in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case, it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case, it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on a complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, the timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of this reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the chargesheet has not been filed. Likewise, in those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at the infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after a prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in the acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.” (Emphasis supplied)
This question was again considered in Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 1: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1189 and the following principles were summarized:
The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:
16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in proposition 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.” (Emphasis supplied)
Similar principles were laid down in State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 320 and it was observed:
“15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:
15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;
15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;
15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender;
15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crimes against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or if the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of the injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, the nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation the chargesheet is filed/the charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;
15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the
antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.” (Emphasis supplied)
It was laid down in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 769 that heinous and serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity etc. cannot be quashed based on the compromise and only offences which are predominantly civil in nature can be compromised. It was observed:
The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominately civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from a commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”
It is apparent from these judgments that the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC is not only non-compoundable but cannot be quashed based on the compromise in the exercise of the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
Therefore, it is not permissible to quash the FIR for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC based on the compromise.
Consequently, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed.
The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the present petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
The present petition stands disposed of and so are the pending miscellaneous applications, if any.