High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 04 MP CK 2568

Nidhi Gopal vs Manoj Kumar Kushwaha

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 7 April 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Rajendra Kumar Vani, J
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Appeal No. 1797 of 2026

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Judgment

36 paragraphs · 3,715 words

With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is heard finally.

2.

This appeal has been filed under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by the victim/complainant against judgment dated 08.02.2019 passed by the learned Special Judge (Atrocities) Satna in Criminal Appeal No.70 of 2018 whereby the learned Court has reversed the judgment dated 19.04.2018 passed by Judicial Magistrate first Class, Satna in Criminal Case No.1737 of 2013, whereby the learned Court below convicted the respondent under Section 138 of N.I. Act and awarded sentence of six months' simple imprisonment and fine of Rs.29,98,700/-. Vide impugned judgment learned Appellate Court set aside the judgment dated 19.04.2018 and acquitted the respondent from the aforesaid Section.

3.

The brief facts of the case are that the appellant/complainant instituted a complaint before the learned Judicial Magistrate alleging that both the appellant/complainant and respondent/accused were engaged in the business of purchase and sale of land. It was alleged that the respondent/accused, having gained the confidence of the appellant/complainant, induced him to invest in the said business and in furtherance thereof, demanded a sum of Rs.20,00,000/-. Pursuant to such inducement, the appellant/complainant is stated to have advanced a total sum of Rs.20,00,000/- to the respondent/accused in two or three installments during March–April, 2012. The respondent/accused allegedly assured repayment and a written agreement was also executed between the parties stipulating that the profit amount would be returned within one year. It is further the case of the appellant/complainant that when, in October–November, 2012, he demanded return of the principal amount and profit, the respondent/accused issued cheque No.340615, dated 09.11.2012 for a sum of Rs.5,00,000/-. Upon presentation, the said cheque was dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, the appellant/complainant issued a notice dated 25.12.2012. Subsequently, upon being approached, the respondent/accused requested the appellant/complainant not to initiate legal proceedings on account of prior relations. However, upon persistent demand by the appellant/complainant, the respondent/accused issued four additional cheques bearing cheque No.340616 dated 14.01.2013 for Rs5,00,000/-, cheque No.340617, dated 25.03.2013 for Rs.5,00,000/-, cheque No.340618, dated 25.03.2013 for Rs.5,00,000/- and cheque No.340619, dated 25.03.2013 for Rs.5,00,000/-. The said cheques, when presented by the appellant/complainant through his banker, Punjab National Bank, Satna, were returned unpaid by the drawee bank i.e. Vijaya Bank, Satna, with the endorsement “Stop Payment by Drawer.” Consequently, the appellant/complainant issued notices dated 06.04.2013 and 08.04.2013 through counsel. The notice sent by registered post was returned on 13.04.2013 with the endorsement “addressee not found at home.” The appellant/complainant also caused publication of notice in the daily newspaper “Nav Bharat” dated 09.05.2013 alleging that the accused had issued the cheques with a dishonest intention, despite knowledge of insufficient funds and with the object of defrauding the appellant/complainant, a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was filed.

4.

The learned trial Court, upon taking cognizance, summoned the respondent/accused and proceeded with the trial. In support of his case, the complainant adduced documentary evidence including the cheques in question (Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-4), written statement of the accused (Ex.P-5), bank deposit slips (Ex. P-6 to Ex.P-9), bank return memos (Ex.P-10 to Ex.P-13), statutory notices (Ex.P-14 and Ex.P-17), postal receipts (Ex.P-15), returned envelope (Ex.P-16), acknowledgment (Ex.P-18) and publication of notice in the newspaper (Ex.P-19). The complainant Nidhi Gopal Gupta also examined himself as a witness. In defence, the respondent/accused examined himself as DW-1 and further examined Subir Sinha, Branch Manager, Vijaya Bank as DW-2. The defence of the respondent/accused, in substance, was that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated; that five cheques had been lost and that the appellant/complainant has misused four of such cheques to institute the present false complaint.

5.

The learned trial Court, upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, recorded a finding that the appellant/complainant had successfully established his case beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly, convicted and sentenced the respondent/accused.

6.

Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused preferred an appeal. The learned appellate Court setting aside the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court allowed the appeal and eventually acquitted the accused of the offence under Section 138 of NI Act. Hence, the present appeal.

7.

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant/complainant submits that the learned Appellate Court has erroneously acquitted the respondent by setting aside the judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial Court on the ground that the source of income of the appellant/complainant was not established. It is contended that the appellant/complainant has categorically deposed before the learned trial Court that he is engaged in the business of dealing in property and, therefore, had sufficient means to advance the amount to the respondent/accused. It is further submitted that the ingredients of the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act stand duly established by the appellant/complainant. In view of the aforesaid submissions, it is prayed that the impugned judgment of the learned Appellate Court be set aside and the judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial Court be restored.

8.

Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent/accused has submitted that the learned Appellate Court has rightly concluded that the financial capacity of the complainant to advance the alleged amount has not been proved. It is contended that the complainant and his wife had filed nomination forms for the Ward Member election, which have been exhibited as Ex. D-1 and Ex. D-4 and the same reflect that the income and property of the appellant/complainant are limited. It is further submitted that they are registered as AAY beneficiaries, which pertains to persons falling below the poverty line and such fact has also been admitted by the appellant/complainant in his cross-examination in paragraphs 18 to

22.

In view of the aforesaid circumstances, it is submitted that the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Appellate Court is well-reasoned and does not warrant any interference by this Court, thus, prays for rejection of this appeal.

9.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

10.

It is trite law that once the execution of the cheque is proved, the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act come into play; however, it is equally well settled that such presumptions are rebuttable in nature. Upon rebuttal by cogent and reliable evidence, the onus shifts back upon the appellant/complainant to establish his case beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, although the cheques (Ex. P/1 to Ex. P/4) are alleged to have been executed by the respondent/accused, the same are stated to have been issued pursuant to an agreement (Ex.P/5). Thus, the foundational document is Ex. P/5, which was required to be proved satisfactorily by the appellant/complainant particularly in light of the evidence adduced by the respondent/accused in rebuttal of the statutory presumption. The evidence led on behalf of the respondent/accused along with documents Ex.D/1 and Ex.D/8, reveals that the appellant/complainant and his wife had contested elections for the post of Ward Members in Municipal Corporation and had filed nomination forms in that regard. The nomination form submitted by the appellant/complainant is Ex.D/4, while those submitted by his wife are Ex.D/5, Ex.D/6 and Ex.D/7. Ex.D/8 is a copy of the AAY register, indicating they belong to below the poverty line.

11.

From Ex.D/4, it is evident that in the year 2009, the appellant/complainant had declared cash in hand of Rs.1,00,000/-, Rs.30,000/- in his State Bank of India account, and Rs.20,000/- in his HDFC Bank account. His wife had Rs.25,000/- cash in hand and Rs.15,000/- in her bank account. The dependent daughter had no amount, while the dependent father had Rs.50,000/- cash in hand and the mother had Rs.15,000/- in cash. Notably, the said documents and the accompanying affidavit do not disclose any loan advanced to the respondent/accused. It is also reflected that the appellant/complainant was not in possession of any vehicle at the relevant time. Furthermore, the appellant/complainant (PW-1) has admitted in his cross-examination that he did not own any agricultural land. Similarly, as per Ex.D/5, Ex.D/6, and Ex.D/7 pertaining to the 2014 election, the complainant’s wife had Rs.50,000/- in cash, while the appellant/complainant himself had Rs.1,00,000/- in cash and the dependents had no monetary holdings. The amount in their joint bank account was Rs.2,000/- and Rs.1,000/- was lying in an OBC Bank account. These documents also do not reflect any loan having been advanced to the respondent/accused or to any other person. It is further evident that the complainant’s wife possessed ornaments valued at Rs.1,65,000/-, and the appellant/complainant had gold weighing approximately 4 tolas valued at Rs.1,00,000/-. Consequently, the total assets of the complainant’s wife were valued at Rs.2,92,000/-, while those of the appellant/complainant were valued at Rs.2,86,360/-. It is also undisputed that they did not own any agricultural or other immovable property. In view of the aforesaid evidence and material on record, the financial capacity of the appellant/complainant to advance the alleged loan amount appears to be doubtful.

12.

It is noteworthy that the appellant/complainant (PW-1) while denying the suggestion that he lacked the financial capacity to advance a sum of Rs.20,00,000/- to the respondent/accused, has categorically admitted that he has never paid income tax. Although he stated that he might have filed an income tax return on one occasion, no such copy of the return has been produced or filed in the present case. Further, neither the complaint, affidavit, nor any other document discloses the source from which an amount of Rs.20,00,000/- could have been arranged. Though the appellant/complainant has vaguely asserted that the said amount was collected from a small business and other sources, no particulars or supporting evidence have been furnished in this regard. Moreover, in paragraph 22 of his statement, he has stated that he was engaged in the business of sale and purchase of land; however, no documentary evidence has been placed on record to substantiate the same. He has also admitted that a BPL (Below Poverty Line) card stands issued in the name of his father, wherein his own name, as well as those of his wife and children are recorded, which has been exhibited as Ex.P/21.

13.

In view of the aforesaid admissions and the documents placed on record on behalf of the respondent/accused, the statutory presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act stands duly rebutted. The said documents being in the nature of application and affidavit submitted before the Election Authority, carry a high degree of credibility and their genuineness cannot be doubted.

13.

It is pertinent to note that the appellant/complainant (PW-1) has at various stages, disclosed that a sum of Rs.20,00,000/- was advanced to the respondent/accused on different occasions; however, such particulars find no mention in the complaint. On the contrary, in paragraph-2 of the complaint, it is merely stated that during the period from March to April, 2012 a sum of Rs.20,00,000/- was paid to the respondent/accused in 2–3 installments without specifying the exact dates or the quantum of each installment. It is also not clarified whether the amount was paid in 'two' or 'three' parts. In the absence of specific pleadings in the complaint, such subsequent statements lack evidentiary value and are not admissible. As observed earlier, since Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/4 are based upon the agreement (Ex.P/5) and it was incumbent upon the appellant/complainant to duly and satisfactorily prove the said agreement. However, the attesting witnesses to Ex.P/5 have not been examined nor has any other witnesses such as the scriber or the person who purchased the stamp have been produced by the complainant in support of the documents. It is further noteworthy that Ex.D/5 does not bear the signature of the appellant/complainant and the respondent/accused has denied the signatures appearing on the said documents. In such circumstances, it was incumbent upon the appellant/complainant to examine the attesting witnesses to prove the execution of the document. Additionally or alternatively the appellant/complainant ought to have proved the signatures of the respondent/accused by obtaining an opinion from a handwriting expert and placing the same on record in evidence.

14.

The evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent/accused clearly demonstrates that the appellant/complainant lacked the financial capacity to advance a sum of Rs.20,00,000/- to the respondent/accused. In such circumstances, it was incumbent upon the appellant/complainant to satisfactorily establish his financial capacity before the learned trial Court. However, during the course of his cross-examination, the appellant/complainant has admitted that he has not filed any documentary evidence to substantiate his claim of being engaged in property dealings or carrying on business as a property broker. Even as per the averments made in the complaint, the alleged amount was advanced for carrying on the business of property brokerage in partnership; nevertheless, no partnership deed or any document evidencing such partnership has been produced on record. In view of the aforesaid deficiencies, the appellant/complainant has utterly failed to establish his financial capacity to lend a sum of Rs.20,00,000/- to the respondent/accused at the relevant point of time.

15.

The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Krishna Janardhan Bhat vs. Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54 the relevant paragraphs 33 and 34 is reproduce verbatim as under:-

"33.

In Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Company v. Amin Chand Payrelal [(1999) 3 SCC 35] interpreting Section 118(a) of the Act, this Court opined:

"12.

Upon consideration of various judgments as noted hereinabove, the position of law which emerges is that once execution of the promissory note is admitted, the presumption under Section 118(a) would arise that it is supported by a consideration. Such a presumption is rebuttable. The defendant can prove the non-existence of a consideration by raising a probable defence. If the defendant is proved to have discharged the initial onus of proof showing that the existence of consideration was improbable or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to the plaintiff who will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would disentitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the negotiable instrument. The burden upon the defendant of proving the non- existence of the consideration can be either direct or by bringing on record the preponderance of probabilities by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. In such an event, the plaintiff is entitled under law to rely upon all the evidence led in the case including that of the plaintiff as well. In case, where the defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of proof by showing the non-existence of the consideration, the plaintiff would invariably be held entitled to the benefit of presumption arising under Section 118(a) in his favour. The court may not insist upon the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration by leading direct evidence as the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated and even if led, is to be seen with a doubt." [Emphasis supplied]

34.

Furthermore, whereas prosecution must prove the guilt of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof so as to prove a defence on the part of an accused is preponderance of probabilities. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on records by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies."

16.

The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of John K. Abraham vs. Simon C. Abraham, [(2014) 2 SCC 237 in paragraph-9 has observed as under:-

"9.

It has to be stated that in order to draw the presumption under Section 118 read along with 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the burden was heavily upon the complainant to have shown that he had required funds for having advanced the money to the accused; that the issuance of the cheque in support of the said payment advanced was true and that the accused was bound to make the payment as had been agreed while issuing the cheque in favour of the complainant."

17.

In case of K. Subramani vs. K. Damodara Naidu, (2015) 1 SCC 99 the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 3 and 9 has observed as under: -

"3.

In the trial the complainant examined himself as PW1 and examined CWs1 and 2 on his side and marked documents Exts. P-1 to P-23. The accused examined himself as DW 1 and marked documents Exts. D-1 to D-5. The trial court held that the complainant had no source of income to lend a sum of Rs.14 lakhs to the accused and he failed to prove that there is legally recoverable debt payable by the accused to him and that in discharge of said liability he issued the cheque and accordingly acquitted the accused for the alleged offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act.

9.

In the present case the complainant and the accused were working as Lecturers in a Government college at the relevant time and the alleged loan of Rs.14 lakhs is claimed to have been paid by cash and it is disputed. Both of them were governed by the Government Servants’ Conduct Rules which prescribes the mode of lending and borrowing. There is nothing on record to show that the prescribed mode was followed. The source claimed by the complainant is savings from his salary and an amount of Rs.5 lakhs derived by him from sale of site No.45 belonging to him. Neither in the complaint nor in the chief-examination of the complainant, there is any averment with regard to the sale price of site No.45. The concerned sale deed was also not produced. Though the complainant was an income-tax assessee he had admitted in his evidence that he had not shown the sale of site No.45 in his income-tax return. On the contrary the complainant has admitted in his evidence that in the year 1997 he had obtained a loan of Rs.1,49,205/- from L.I.C. It is pertinent to note that the alleged loan of Rs.14 lakhs is claimed to have been disbursed in the year 1997 to the accused. Further the complainant did not produce bank statement to substantiate his claim. The trial court took into account the testimony of the wife of the complaint in another criminal case arising under Section 138 of the N.I. Act in which she has stated that the present appellant/accused had not taken any loan from her husband. On a consideration of entire oral and documentary evidence the trial court came to the conclusion that the complainant had no source of income to lend a sum of Rs.14 lakhs to the accused and he failed to prove that there is legally recoverable debt payable by the accused to him."

18.

It is trite law that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. The standard of proof so as to prove a defence on the part of the accused is based on preponderance of probability. Inference of preponderance of probability can be drawn not only from the material brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relied.

19.

In the case of State of Gujarat v. Jayrajbhai Punjabhai Varu, (2016) 14 SCC 151 the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that prosecution has to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. It is also the rule of justice in criminal law that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other towards his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. In case of Nikhil Chandra Mondal v. State of W.B., (2023) 6 SCC 605 Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that it is a settled principle of law that however strong a suspicion may be, it cannot take place of a proof beyond reasonable doubt. Unless finding of the trial Court is found to be perverse or illegal/impossible, it is not permissible for the appellate Court to interfere with the same.

20.

Recently in case of Mallappa & others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 544, the Hon'ble Apex Court has again summarized the principles while deciding the appeal against acquittal which are as follows :-

"42.

Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarised as :

(i)

Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive — inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary;

(ii)

Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;

(iii)

If the court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed;

(iv)

If the view of the trial court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;

(v)

If the appellate court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a reappreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the trial court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;

(vi)

In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the trial court."...

2 1 . Ex consequenti, in light of the foregoing discussion and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid decisions and upon a careful reappraisal of the entire evidence available on record, this Court finds that the findings recorded by the learned Appellate Court in the impugned judgment do not suffer from any perversity, illegality or material irregularity. The learned Appellate Court has, upon proper and cogent appreciation of the evidence, rightly arrived at the conclusion of acquitting the respondent/accused. No ground is made out warranting interference with the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Appellate Court. Accordingly, the appeal, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed and the judgment of acquittal of the respondent/accused is affirmed.