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Judgment
P.N. Mookerjee, J.—This is the tenant''s appeal, arising out of a suit for ejectment, arrears of rents and damages. The suit, so far as ejectment is concerned, was dismissed by the trial court, but on appeal, it has been decreed.
The tenant''s defence was of a two-fold character, namely, (1) that the notice to quit was bad; and (ii) that he was entitled to protection under the Rent Control Law.
The first court accepted the defence, founded on the alleged defect in the notice to quit, and, on that ground, it dismissed the plaintiffs'' claim for ejectment, although, at the same time, it found that, at the relevant period, there was no Rent Control Law in operation at Cooch Behar town, in which the present suit property is situate, and that, accordingly, the defendant would not have been entitled to resist the plaintiffs'' claim on any plea under any Rent Control Law.
The lower appellate court reversed the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge on the question of notice and, as it agreed with the learned Subordinate Judge''s view on the question of the defendant''s claim of protection under the Rent Control Law, it decreed the plaintiffs'' suit for ejectment. The present appeal has been filed from this appellate decision by the tenant defendant.
On the question of the notice to quit, the position appears clear. It is true that, by the notice, the defendant was asked to vacate within the 30th of April, but that was followed by another clause, requiring delivery of possession on the 1st of May. Reading the two clauses together, there can be no question of any ambiguity in the notice to quit, or of any defect, so far as the said notice is concerned. I must, therefore, agree with the learned District Judge that the notice to quit, served in this case, was legal, proper and sufficient, and reject the appellant''s argument on this point.
On the other question, namely, as to whether the tenant defendant was entitled to any protection under any Rent Control Law, the position appears to be as follows:
The case comes from Cooch Behar or to be precise, from "the merged territory of Cooch Behar in the State of West Bengal." Prior to the period, when the notice to quit was given, there was in "Cooch Behar" in force in this particular locality the "Cooch Behar Rent Ordinance" which was very similar in terms to the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act of 1948. By the passing, however, of the Cooch Behar Assimilation of State Laws Act, 1950, (West Bengal Act LXIII of 1950), which came into force on and from the 1st of January, 1951, (Vide Notification No. 7497-J., dated 18th December, 1950, published in the Calcutta Gazette, dated 28th December, 1950, Part I, page 2605), all State Laws (including Ordinances) of Cooch Behar ceased to have effect, subject to certain exceptions [Vide section 3(2) and (3) of the Act which are not material here] and all State Laws in force in the State of West Bengal immediately before that day were brought into force in "Cooch Behar" [Vide section 3(1)] and it is not disputed before me that the result of that enactment was that, on and from that day, namely, January 1, 1951, "the Cooch Behar Rent Ordinance" ceased to have any operation in "Cooch Behar" and the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act of 1950, which was in force in the State of West Bengal, immediately before the said date, came into force in "Cooch Behar". In the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act of 1950, however, we find that "it extends to the whole of Calcutta and to all areas which have been or may hereafter be constituted Municipalities under the provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act of 1932", subject to a proviso that "the State Government may, by Notification, extend the Act, or any specified part thereof to any other area specified in the Notification". [Vide section 1(3) of the Act.]
That obviously means that, although the Act would be in force in the State of West Bengal, it would have a limited local extent in the sense that it would primarily be confined to "Calcutta" and "Municipal areas" under the Bengal Municipal Act and, for its application to any other part or area of the State, a Notification under the quoted proviso would be necessary. And, in my opinion, in the absence of anything to the contrary, this limitation would remain attached to the Act when it is brought into force in any outside territory which becomes merged into or is added to the State. That seems to be the reasonable view, as, otherwise, the provisions of the Act, which were not intended to have universal application even in the original or the present state would have automatic effect in every part of the added or merged territory.
It is obvious that the Cooch Behar town, which was within the Cooch Behar Municipality, cannot be brought under the description in the main part of section 1(3), quoted above, and, therefore, for the application of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act of 1950 to Cooch Behar, we have to look to the necessary Notification under the proviso. The first part of the above statement is confirmed by the saving of the Cooch Behar Municipal Act in Schedule I of the Cooch Behar Assimilation of State Laws Act, 1950, and by the express mention of the Bengal Municipal Act of 1932, in Schedule II. as an enactment, not applying to Cooch Behar, and the second part then necessarily follows from the rule of reasonable construction which I have suggested and set out above.
From the above provisions, the position thus clearly emerges that the Cooch Behar town, or the Cooch Behar Municipality was not a Municipality to which the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act of 1950, would apply of its own force, but to which those provisions would have to be extended by an appropriate Notification. Such a Notification actually came, but it came much later, namely, in September, 1951, (Vide Notification No. 12426 L.R., dated September 8, 1951, published in the Calcutta Gazette of the 20th September, 1951, Part I, page 2470, whereby the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act of 1950 was extended to Cooch Behar, that is, the area under the jurisdiction of the Cooch Behar Municipality.)
It thus appears-and this is eventually conceded by Mr. Sen-that during the period 1st January, 1951, to about the end of August of that year, there was no Rent Control Law, prevailing in Cooch Behar and applying to Cooch Behar town or the Cooch Behar Municipality.
The notice to quit in the present case was issued and served sometime in the first part of April, 1951, asking the tenant to quit within 30th April and deliver possession on 1st May, and the present suit was instituted on May 15, 1951. On none of these dates, as seen above,-and no other date is material for my present purpose,-was there any Rent Control Law in force or operation at the place where the disputed premises are situate. The necessary conclusion will, therefore, be that the defendant tenant will not be entitled to claim protection under any Rent Control law, and the plea of his learned Advocate in support of such claim of protection must be rejected.
I, accordingly, hold that the learned District Judge was right in refusing the tenant''s plea of relief under the Rent Control law and his decision must stand.
In the result, this appeal must be dismissed but. having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, particularly the fact that the defendant appellant has been carrying on the business of a Hotel Keeper in the disputed premises for a pretty long time and he has to suffer ejectment almost by accident, due possibly to some inadvertent omission or inexplicable remiss or oversight on the part of the powers that be, I am inclined to give him some reasonable time to vacate the suit premises and I direct that the defendant appellant will have, in the first instance, time till the end of December, 1955, and, if, within this time, he pays down all arrears of rent or mesne profits as the case may be, which may have already accrued or may accrue in the meantime, he will be entitled to remain in the suit premises for a further period of six months.
Subject to the above provision for time, this appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.