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Judgment
Ramanujulu Naidu, J.—Sri T. Bali Reddy, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that the impugned order is wholly without jurisdiction as, under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act 1982, as it stood prior to its amendment, enquiry into any alleged act of land grabbing could only be done by the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area concerned, in the absence of a "Special Court" constituted for the purpose. In other words, he contends that the District Judge of the concerned area having been constituted as persons designate, the impugned order passed by the Additional District Judge is without jurisdiction.
Sri P.L.N. Sarma, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, submits that, though reference is made to the expression "the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area concerned", the District Judge acts as a Court with all the incidents attached to a Court, and that u/s 11(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, he can make-over the case in question to the Additional District Judge. Reliance is also placed upon some of the observations made in Public Prosecutor v. L Ramayya (1974-2, APLJ, 305 - Full Bench).
The question-raised in the Revision Petition is not only one of general importance but has far-reaching consequences. An authoritative pronouncement of a Division Bench of this Court on the question is, therefore, desirable.
ORDER
Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J.—This civil revision petition arises out of an order passed under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to an "the Act") and is referred to a Division Bench by a learned single Judge of this Court on the ground that the question raised is not only of general importance but has far-reaching consequences and an authoritative pronouncement of a Division Bench would be desirable.
The facts which gave rise to this civil revision petition may briefly be stated as follows:- The respondents herein filed land grabbing O.P.No. 335 of 1983 in the Court of the District Judge, Krishna, Machilipatnam, stating inter alia that the petition A-Schedule lands were purchased by Mahaboob Ali Baig Saheb, a resident of Vijayawada, from Chimta Purnachandra Rao of Gudivada, under a registered sale-deed dated 7-11-1940. The said lands were sold to Abdul Karim Saheb, a resident of Nambur, Guntur District, under a registered sale-deed dated 11-1-1943. This is however specified in the petition B-Schedule. After the death of Abdul Karim Saheb, his legal heirs partitioned the B-Schedule lands under a registered partition deed dated 21-9-1968. The 1st petitioner in the above O.P. is the eldest son of the said Abdul Karim Saheb and he got an extent of Ac. 2-50 Cents which is described in the petition C-Schedule. It is stated that from the date of the partition he has been is possession and enjoyment of the said land by raising crops and paying cist to the Government. He was also issued Patta Certificate. From out of the said land the 1st petitioner gifted the lands specified in Schedules D to J to his children and grand-children who are petitioners 3 to 9, under registered gift deeds. The 2nd petitioner is the alienee of the land from the 1st petitioner, which is described in the K-Schedule. A part of the land was also acquired by the Government and an award was passed in favour of the petitioner. All the petition schedule lands were leased out to one Saluku Satyanarayana. It is stated that on 19-4-1981 some persons trespassed into the land of the 2nd petitioner and raised huts illegally and squatted on the land. The matter was reported to the Collector, Krishna, by application dated 21-4-1981 with copies to different authorities. An application u/s 145, Cr.P.C. was also filed before the Taluk Magistrate (Executive), Vijayawada. By order dated 25-5-1981 in M.C.61 of 1981 the Magistrate held that the respondents trespassed into the Patta land of the 2nd petitioner, and directed to remove the dwelling huts, and the huts were removed on 2-6-1981. Again on 15-8-1981 Burre Mariamma and others formed into an unlawful assembly and trespassed into the petition schedule lands and raised huts knowing fully well that the petitioners got vacated earlier illegal occu- pants through process of law. On 16-8-1981 the 3rd petitioner submitted a report to the 1 Town Police Station, Law and Order, Vijayawada. The police removed the huts and filed a charge-sheet against Burre Mariamma and others under Sections 143 and 447, I.P.C. in CC.No. 282 of 1981 on the file of the 4th Addl. Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Vijayawada. However on 23-8-82 the case was dismissed. Taking advantage of the dismissal of the case, the respondents trespassed into the petition schedule lands on 4-3-1983 and raised unauthorised huts. The petitioners submitted an application to the Taluk Magistrate (Executive), Vijayawada on 9-3-1983 which was numbered as M.C No. 60 of 1983, praying for removal of the huts. The learned Magistrate advised during enquiry that the petitioners should compromise the matter with the respondents, otherwise he had no option but to dismiss the petition. The respondents formed into a bogus society, New Joji Nagar Labour Society and got it registered as 128/1983 in the office of the Registrar, Krishna, on 16-6-1983 with the unterior purpose of grabbing the petition schedule lands. They are creating false claims by fabricating false documents. The 1st respondent is the President and the 2nd respondent is the Secretary of the society. They erected huts on the schedule lands and unauthorisedly installed water boring in the petition-schedule lands. The respondent-society, its members and successors in interest have trespassed into the petition-schedule lands illegally. They have no right and their activities are unlawful and they are carrying their unlawful activities in the petition-schedule lands in violation of law as land grabbers. They have no manner of right to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the petition schedule lands. On these facts the petitioners approached the Tribunal constituted under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, viz., the Court of the District Judge, Krishna, Machilipatnam, praying that the respondent-society and its members and successors in interest and their huts be removed and the petition-schedule lands be restored to the petitioners and the respondent-society and its members and successors in interest be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
The 1st respondent is New Joji Labour Society represented by its President and the 2nd respondent is the very same society represented by its Secretary. They filed a counter denying the title and possession of the petitioners. It is stated that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the petition and that the petition is also bad for non-joinder and misjoinder of parties. It is also stated that the act of making the alleged gift-deeds by the 1st petitioner in favour of petitioners 3 to 9 is an after-thought and that it does not bind the respondents. It is further stated that filing of declaration forms before the Urban Land Ceiling Authority and the orders declaring the 1st petitioner as a non-surplus holder only show that the family of the 1st petitioner is a joint family and the lands are agricultural lands. The purchase of the land by the 2nd petitioner and his possession is also denied. The lease of the land in favour of Satyanarayana is alleged to be incorrect. With regard to the M.C proceedings it is stated that the order passed by the Executive Magistrate was without notice to one of the respondents therein and that the respon- dents herein were not parties, so that order does not bind them. It is stated that the allegation of removing of huts of Mariyamma and others on 16-8-1981 shows the power used by the petitioners against the persons in occupation of the land, but the report does not contain the name of the Secretary of the society. The real facts are not stated. The possession of Mariyamma and others is admitted in C.C.No. 282 of 1981. The society was established on 16-3-1983; the bye-laws of the society speak about the idealogy of the society; as such the alleged raising of huts on the petition schedule land by the society does not arise. The respondent-society was not a party to M.C.No. 60 of 1983 also. It is denied that the Executives Magistrate advised the petitioners to compromise the matter. Under these circumstances it is prayed that the O.P. may be dismissed.
The learned District Judge, Krishna, Machilipatnam, made over the case to the Court of the 1st Additional District Judge, Machilipatnam.
The 1st petitioner was examined as P.W.1. The petitioners filed documents Exs.A-1 to A-73. On behalf of the respondents R.W.1, the President of the 1st respondent-society was examined. No document was marked by the respondents. The Court marked Exs.C-1 to C-14.
After considering the evidence on record and the contentions of the parties, the learned Additional District Judge, Krishna, by order dated 27-10-1986 held that the Court of Additional District Judge had jurisdiction to try the petition under the Act. He has further held that the land was grabbed by the respondent-society with the active instigation of Burre Mariyamma and Arjuna Rao and that the petitioners have proved the title to and possession of the land and declared the petitioners as the owners of the petition schedule lands, i.e., C-Schedule to K-Schedule lands, and that they are in lawful possession of A-Schedule land and the respondents and its members are land grabbers, and ordered that they be evicted from the petition-schedule lands immediately and the petition-schedule lands be restored to the petitioners. Against this order the present civil revision petition is filed by the 1st respondent in the Original Petition.
Sri T. Bali Reddy, the learned counsel for the revision-petitioners, urged the following contentions:
1) Under the Act only the Special Court has jurisdiction to entertain a claim and decide the same; the Additional District Judge has no jurisdiction to try the Original Petition and pass the order under revision which is wholly without jurisdiction, and
2) The order of eviction passed by the Additional District Judge, Machilipatnam is inexecutable as the alleged encroachers are not named and the order is passed only against the society.
Sri T. Veerabhadraiah, the learned counsel for the respondents herein, raised a preliminary objection, viz., that the civil revision petition u/s 115 C.P.C. is not maintainable. His further contentions are:
1) that the Court of the First Additional District Judge has jurisdiction to try the case as the District Judge is not persona designata under the Act, therefore, the order cannot be said to be without jurisdiction; and
2) that the President and the Secretary of the society have been instrumental in encroaching upon the land and causing erection of huts thereon and they formed the society with the help of their supporters, therefore, the order of eviction was rightly passed against the society and it binds all the encroachers and land grabbers.
In view of the above contentions, the following two questions arise for consideration:-
1) Whether the District Judge is a persona designata under the Act, and whether the order under revision suffers from error of jurisdiction.
2) Whether the order of eviction passed by the Additional District Judge, Machilipatnam against the petitioner-society is binding on the alleged encroachers who are not parties to the proceedings?
Before dealing with the above two questions, we may dispose of the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents regarding the maintainability of the revision petition u/s 115 C.P.C. Sri Bali Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the civil revision petition may be treated as one under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and that the petitioners would pay the difference of Court-fee. Therefore, on this technical ground we are not inclined to dismiss the petition. However, the petitioners are directed to pay the difference of Court-fee of Rs. 90/- within two weeks from today.
We shall first take up the first question. If the District Judge is persona designata under the Act, it follows that the order passed by the Additional District Judge, Machilipatnam, would be without jurisdiction. But if the District Judge is not persona designata, then admittedly he has power to make over the case to the Additional District Judge, as such the order under revision cannot be said to suffer from any error of jurisdiction. Here it would be useful to refer to the provisions of the Act as they stood prior to the amendment of the Act.
The preamble to the Act states that there have been organised attempts on the part of certain lawless persons operating individually and in groups, to grab either by force or by deceit or otherwise, lands (whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any other private persons) who are known as "land grabbers" and they are forming bogus co-operative housing societies or setting up fictitious claims and indulging in large scale and unprecedented and fraudulent sales of lands belonging to the Government, local authority, religious or charitable institutions or endowments including a wakf, or private persons, through unscrupulous real estate dealers or otherwise in favour of certain sections of the people resulting in large accumulation of unaccounted wealth and quick money to land grabbers; and having regard to the resources and influence of the persons by whom the large scale on which, and the manner in which, the unlawful activity of land grabbing was, has been, or is being organised and carried on in violation of law by them, as land grabbers in the State of Andhra Pradesh, particularly in its urban areas, the Legislature thought it fit and expedient to arrest and curb immediately any such unlawful activity of land grabbing which was also adversely affecting public order. Therefore, the legislature of the State of Andhra Pradesh passed the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, to prohibit the activity of land grabbing in the State which replaces Ordinance 9 of 1982 promulgated on June 29, 1982. The Act received the assent of the President on 4th September, 1982 and it was published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette on 6th September, 1982. The Act was amended twice-first by Act 16 of 1987 and second time by Act 6 of 1988. In this case we are concerned with the unamended Act. A resume of the provisions of the Act, before amendment may be useful here. Section 2 is the definition section. Section 3 declares land grabbing unlawful and any activity connected with or arising out of the land grabbing an offence punishable under the Act. Section 4 prohibits land grabbing and provides punishment for violation of the provisions of Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 4 with imprisonment for a term not less than six months which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to Rs. 5,000/-. Section 5 provides penalties for other offences, in connection with land grabbing. Section 6 deals with offences by companies. Section 7 provides for constitution of Special Courts and the matters connected therewith. Section 8 prescribes the procedure and the powers of the Special Courts. Section 9 says that the competent authority shall give effect to the orders of the Special Court under the Act. Section 10 alters the rule of evidence jn the proceedings under the Act and provides that the burden of proving that any land in respect of which the provisions of the Act are applied is not a land grabbed, shall be on the person alleged to have grabbed the land. Sections 11 and 12 deal with the power to try offences and the sanction for, prosecution of the offence under the Act. Section 13 says that any person acting under the Act shall be deemed to be a public servant and Section 14 protects the persons acting in good-faith from a suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings. Section 15 gives overriding effect to the provisions of the Act over other Acts. Section 16 confers rule-making power on the Government. Section 17 declares that any transaction relating to alienation of a land grabbed or a part thereof by way of sale, lease, gift, exchange, settlement, surrender, usufructuary mortgage or otherwise, or any partition effected or a trust created in respect of such land, which has taken place on or after the commencement of the Act, shall be null and void, except to the extent ordered by the Special Court. Section 18 repeals the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Ordinance, 1982. Since Section 8 deals with the powers and procedure of the Special Courts it would be useful to extract the same here:-
"8. Procedure and powers of the Special Courts:- (1) The Special Court may, either suo motu, or on application made by any person, officer or authority, take cognizance of and try every case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing, or with respect to the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, and pass such orders (including orders) by way of interim directions) as it deems fit:
Provided that if, in the opinion of the Special Court, any application filed before it is prima facie frivolous or vexatious, it shall reject the same without any further enquiry.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1980) (hereinafter in this section referred to as the ''said Code'') or in the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972, (Act 9 of 1972) any case in respect of an alleged act of land grabbing, or the determination of questions of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed under this Act, shall be triable only in a Special Court constituted for the area in which the land grabbed is situate; and the decision of the Special Court shall be final.
(3) A Special Court shall, in the trial of cases before it, follow the procedure prescribed by the said Code for the trial of cases involving the determination of questions of title and ownership or lawful possession before a Civil Court.
(4) Every case under Sub-section (1) shall be disposed of finally by the Special Court, as far as possible, within a period of six months from the date of institution of the case before it.
(5) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the said Code, including the provisions as to grant of interim relief or passing of orders with respect to the eviction and possession of lands grabbed, shall apply to the proceedings before a Special Court and for the purposes of the said provisions, the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Civil Court and shall have all the powers of a Civil Court.
(6) Every finding of the Special Court with regard to any alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact of land grabbing and of the persons who committed such land grabbing, and every judgment of the Special Court with regard to the determination of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons having interest in such land, whether or not, such persons are parties before the Special Court.
(7) It shall be lawful for the Special Court to pass an order in any case decided by it, awarding compensation in terms of money for wrongful possession, which shall not be less than an amount equivalent to the market value of the land grabbed as on the date of the order, payable by the land grabber to the owner of the land grabbed land. The amount of compensation so awarded shall be recovered as an arrear of land revenue in case the Government are the owner, or as a decree of a Civil Court, in any other case:
Provided that the Special Court shall, before passing an order under this Sub-section, give to the land grabber an opportunity of making his representation or of adducing evidence/if any, in this regard, and consider every such representation and evidence.
8) Any case, pending before any Court or other authority immediately before the constitution of a Special Court, as would have been within the jurisdiction of such Special Court, shall stand transferred to the Special Court having jurisdiction, as if the cause of action on which such suit or proceeding is based had arisen after the constitution of the Special Court."
From a reading of the above section it is clear that the Special Court has power to take cognizance of and try every case arising out of any alleged act of Sand grabbing, or with respect to the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed, whether before or after the commencement of the Act, and pass such orders (including interim orders) as it deems fit. The power can be exercised either suo motu or on an application made by any person or officer or authority, under Sub-section (1). The power is however a discretionary power as the Special Court has discretion to reject an application under Sub-section (1), if it is of the opinion that such application is prima facie frivolous or vexatious. The power extends to passing an order awarding damages in terms of money for wrongful possession, which shall not be less than an amount equivalent to the market value of the land grabbed as on the date of the order, which shall be payable by the land grabber to the owner of the land grabbed. Before passing an order granting compensation, the Special Court has to give an opportunity of making his representation or of adducing evidence, if any, in regard to the awarding of compensation and has to consider the representation and the evidence produced by the land grabber, (See Sub-section (7) of Section 8). Sub-section (2) which commences with a non-obstante clause says that any case in respect of an alleged act of land grabbing or determination of question of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed under the Act, shall be triable only in a Special Court constituted for the area in which the land grabbed is situate, notwithstanding anything in the CPC or the A.P. Civil Courts Act; the decision of the Special Court is declared to be final. It may be noted here that exclusion of the provisions of the CPC and the A.P. Civil Courts Act is only for the purpose of conferment of jurisdiction on the Special Court in regard to the matters enumerated in Sub-section (2) of Section 8, for Sub-sections (3) and (5) provide that in any trial of rases before the Special Court, it shall follow the procedure prescribed by the CPC for trial of cases involving the determination of question of title and ownership to or lawful possession of the land before a Civil Court and that except to the extent provided under the Act the provisions of the CPC including the provisions as to the grant of interim relief or passing of order with respect to eviction and possession of the lands grabbed, shall apply to the proceedings before a Special Court and for the purpose of the said provisions the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Civil Court and shall have all the powers of a Civil Court. Sub-section (6) incorporates the rule of evidence by declaring that every finding of the Special Court with regard to any alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact of land grabbing and of the persons who committed such land grabbing and further provides that any judgment of the Special Court with regard to the determination of the title and ownership to, and lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons having interest in such land, whether or not, such persons are parties before the Special Court.
Sub-section (8) directs that any case pending before any Court or authority immediately before the Constitution of a Special Court, as would have been within the jurisdiction of the Special Court, shall stand transferred to the Special Court having jurisdiction as if the cause of action on which such suit or proceeding is based had arisen after the constitution of the Special Court.
''Special Courr'' is defined in Section 2(i) which reads as fallows:-
"2. (i) "Special Court" means a Special Court constituted u/s 7, and where no such Special Court is in existence, the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area concerned."
From the definition of "Special Court" extracted above, it is clear that the Special Court means (a) a Special Court constituted u/s 7, and where no such special court is in existence, (b) the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area concerned. Admittedly during the material period no Special Court was constituted u/s 7. Therefore, the Special Court under the Act would be the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area in which the land in question is situated. The question then arises whether the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area is persona designata for purposes of Special Court under the Act.
"Persona designata" means ''a person pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character'' (Vide Law Dictionary by P.G. Osborn). The expression "persona designata" is no longer res integra. It has fallen for consideration of the Courts in a number of cases. In Ramachandra Rao v. Slate of Madras, AIR 1962 A.P. 58. (Now A.P.) Kumarayya, J. (as he'' then was), considered the question whether determination of compensation by the Addl. District Judge is in the eye of law a determination by a District Judge within the meaning of Section 16 of the Telegraph Act The contention before the learned Judge was that reference to "District Judge" in Section 16 was made as persona designata, so the District Judge could not delegate his authority to the Additional District Judge. In that case an application filed before the District Judge for determination of compensation u/s 16 was made over to the Additional District Judge in exercise of power u/s 3-A of the Madras Civil Courts Act. The learned Judge, after considering various authorities, stated the position as under:
"Surely if he be a judicial officer as in this case and is intended by the statute to act not otherwise than in a judicial capacity or court of civil jurisdiction, he cannot come within the expression "persona designata" so that he may, irrespective of his continuance in office, perform the duty."
In our view, the learned Judge has correctly summed up the position. After considering the definition of "District Judge" in the General Clauses Act, 1897, the learned Judge held that reference to "District Judge" in the Telegraph Act is virtually to the District Court and the Madras Civil Courts Act would Stave its operation unless there is a specific provision to the contrary; and therefore negatived the contention that the determination of compensation by the Additional District Judge was without jurisdiction. This judgment was followed in A. Rajamma Vs. A. Krishnama Naidu, .
In Public Prosecutor v. L. Ramayya, 1974 (2) A.P.L.J. 305 (F.B.) the question which fell for consideration of a Full Bench of our High Court was whether the District and Sessions Judge who was acting as Judicial Authority u/s 6C of the Essential Commodities Act is persona designata, or whether he is an �inferior Criminal Court against whose order a revision was maintainable u/s 435 or Section 439, Cr.p.C. Section 6C of the Essential Commodities Act provides that any person aggrieved by an order of confiscation made under Sec,6-A may within one month from the date of communication to him of such order, appeal to any Judicial Authority appointed by the State Government concerned. The Government of Andhra Pradesh appointed District and Sessions Judge of each district as the Judicial Authority to whom an appeal might be made. The Full Bench after discussing exhaustively the definition of the expression "persona designata" in Law Dictionary of P.G. Osborn and number of decisions, laid down the following distinguishing features:-
1) Where, by statute, matters are referred to the determination of a Court with no further provision, the necessary implication is that the Court will determine the matters as a Court. Its Jurisdiction is enlarged with all the incidents of such jurisdiction.
2) Where a person is indicated not by name but by official designation, the question always arises whether, the intention was to single him out as a persona designata, i.e., as an individual the designation being merely his further description. The question whether such a person is a persona designata or not depends upon the intention to be gathered from the words used, nature of the functions to be performed and object and purpose to be achieved.
3) When a reference is made to an officer presiding over a Court and not the court itself, it does not necessarily follow that such a person is intended to act as a "persona designata" and not as a Court because if; is quite an ordinary practice for a reference to be made to the Officer presiding over the Court even when the intention is to refer to the Court. The mention of the officer presiding over the court instead of the Court does not by itself imply that toe is intended to act as a persona designata and not as a Court.
4) When a statute confers authority on a judicial officer one should be slow in saying that the legislature confers such authority on the said officer as a persona designata.
5) Where a judicial officer who presides over a Court is appointed to perform a function under any statute and he is intended by the statute to act not otherwise than in a judicial capacity, in the absence of any other indication to the contrary, he cannot come within the expression "persona designata" and he acts as a Court only.
6) When a judicial authority like an officer who presides over a court, is appointed to perform a function, that is to judge and decide in accordance with law and nothing has been mentioned about the finality or otherwise of the decisions made by that authority, it is an indication that the authority is to act as a court in which case only it is not necessary to mention whether they are final or not as all the incidents of exercising jurisdiction as a court would necessarily follow.
7) Whether the authority functions as a persona designata or as a court does not necessarily depend on the question whether it is acting against the decisions of designated persons or Tribunals or not. Statutes are full of instances where appeals or revisions to Courts are provided even as against the decision of designated persons and tribunals.
In a recent judgment in S. Srinivas Rao v. High Court of A.P., 1988 (2) ALT 586 a Division Bench of this Court had to consider the question whether the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, the appellate authority under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, is a persona designata and whether on transfer of appeals from the file of the Chief Judge, Small Causes Court, to the file of the Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, the Additional Chief Judge has jurisdiction to dispose of the appeals. Jayachandra Reddy, speaking for the Court observed thus:
"Section 5 of A.P. (Telangana Area) Small Causes Courts Act confers power on the Judges and Addl. Judges. But what all Section 5 lays down is that an Additional Judge of a Court of Small Causes shall discharge such functions as may be assigned to him by the Judge of that Court. The expression "Judge" means the "Chief Judge". It is only in that context the expression "Chief Judge" is used in Section 20 of the Act. Therefore, it cannot be said that the "appellate authority" u/s 20 of the Act, viz., the Chief Judge, is referred as to mean that he should act as a "persona designata". In other words, when a reference is made in Section 20 of the Act to the "appellate authority" as the "Chief judge" it only means the Judge of the Small Causes Court and is not mentioned as "Persona Designata". We may once again mention that the expression "Chief Judge" in Section 20 of the Act is only to describe or identify and this becomes clear when we examine Section 20 of the Act in the light of Sections 4 and 5 of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Small Causes Courts Act. Therefore, u/s 5 the Judge who could otherwise also be called the Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court can assign or transfer the appeals on his file to the Addl. Chief Judges for disposal. Section 20 of the Act even if interpreted strictly can only mean that all those appeals have to be filed before the Chief Judge, i.e., the Judge of the Small Causes Court and the Chief Judge can exercise powers u/s 5 and transfer them to the Addl. Chief Judges of the Small Causes Courts, who for identity and distinction sake are being called as "Addl. Chief Judges".
Sri Bali Reddy contended that having regard to the definition of "District Judge" as contained in the General Clauses Act and the definition of "Special Court" u/s 2(j) of the Act, the reference to "District Judge" is as persona designate but not as "District Judge". He also referred to the amended definition of "Special Court" in support of his contention that the reference to ''Di.-4.rict Judge'' in the unamended definition can only be as persona designata. The expression "District Judge" is not defined in the Act. However, "District Judge" is defined in Section 3(17) of the General Clauses Act as follows:-
"3. (17) "District judge" shall mean the Judge of a Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, but shall not include a High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction."
The term ''District Judge'' is defined to mean the Judge of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. "Special Court", as stated above, means the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area concerned. If this definition of "District Judge" is read into the definition of "Special Court", it would only mean Judge of principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction of a particular District. Keeping the principles stated by the Full Bench in Public Prosecutor v. L. Ramayya, (3 supra), in mind, we shall determine whether the "District Judge" discharging his functions as "Special Court", acts as a persona designata. Under the Act the Special Court discharges judicial functions nay, the same functions as the civil court discharges for trial of cases involving determination of questions of title and ownership or lawful possession. The procedure prescribed under the CPC applies to the proceedings before the Special Court. The Special Court has also the power to pass interim orders like the Civil Court. We have, therefore, no doubt that the District Judge while acting as Special Court does not act as persona designata, but merely acts as Presiding Officer of the District Court Once it is held that the District Judge as a Special Court acts as District Judge, it follows that the District Judge has power to assign work to the Additional District Judge.
Section 11(2) of the A.P. Civil Courts Act provides that; an Addl. District Judge shall perform all or any of the functions of the District judge under the A.P. Civil Courts Act or any other law for the time being in force (which includes functions as Special Court under the Act), which the District Judge may assign to him and in the exercise of performance of those functions he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge. Therefore, it follows that the functions of the District Judge as ''Special Court'' under the Act maybe assigned to the Addl. District Judge and in performance of his functions, the Additional District Judge has the same powers as the District Judge. Consequently he can try and dispose of cases or proceedings arising u/s 8 of the Act, which are made over to him by the District Judge. For these reasons, we are unable to accept the contention thai the order under revision passed by the Additional District Judge, Machilipatnam is without jurisdiction.
The second question is whether the order of eviction passed by the Additional District Judge, Machilipatnam, is a valid order as the alleged encroachers are not parties to the proceedings. From a perusal of the counter filed before the Special Court it is dear that no plea is taken that the members of the society or the office bearers of the society are not in possession of the land in question, or that those who arc in possession are not impleaded as parties. From the aims and objects of the Act it is evident that the activity of land grabbing which is sought to be prohibited by the Act is not only by the individual, but also by the societies whether incorporated or not The individuals who encroach and remain on the land are not constant but variables. They change from time to time. So, it is very difficult for any person or authority to implead them eo nomine. It is for this reason Sub-section (6) of Section 8 of the Act provides that finding of the Special Court with regard to any alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact of land grabbing and of the persons who committed such land grabbing and every judgment of the Special Court with regard to the determination of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons having interest in such, land, whether or not, such persons are parties before the Special Court, From the judgment under revision it is clear that the President and the Secretary of the society have been instrumental in grabbing the lands in question and those who are in possession of the land grabbed by the society and its members. Therefore, the judgment is binding on all those who have occupied the land grabbed. In view of this position, the contention that the judgment under revision is not executable against those who are in possession of the land grabbed, is untenable.
For the above reasons, we do not find any merit in the civil revision petition. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.