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Judgment
,,,,,,,,
Nevinnomyssky Azot, The appellant has filed an application for condonation of delay in filing this Anti-Dumping Appeal that has been filed under",,,,,,,,
section 9C of the Customs Tariff Act 1975, Tariff Act. Subsection (1) of section 9C of the Tariff Act provides that an appeal against the order of",,,,,,,,
determination regarding the existence, degree and effect of any subsidy or dumping in relation to import of any article shall lie to the Tribunal. Sub-",,,,,,,,
section (2) provides that every appeal under this section shall be filed within 90 days of the date of order under appeal, but the Appellate Tribunal may",,,,,,,,
entertain any appeal after the expiry of the said period of 90 days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the",,,,,,,,
appeal in time.,,,,,,,,
This appeal was filed in the office on December 01, 2020 with the following principle reliefs:",,,,,,,,
“a) Hold that the Respondent No. 1 (The Designated Authority) incorrectly did not include the appellant in the duty table and did not,,,,,,,,
recommend ‘NIL’ rate of duty thereof and declare the impugned corrigendum dated April 25, 2018 issued by Respondent No, 1 as",,,,,,,,
issued contrary to the applicable law and well-established principles of natural justice and fairness;,,,,,,,,
b) Issue an order or direction to call for, examine the records in relation to and quash the impugned corrigendum dated April 25, 2018",,,,,,,,
issued by Respondent No. 1 to the extent it affects the Appellant; and,,,,,,,,
c) Issue an order or directions, directing the Respondent No. 2 (The Union of India) to issue customs notification giving effect to or acting",,,,,,,,
upon the first corrigendum dated December 19, 2017 issued by Respondent No. 1.â€",,,,,,,,
To appreciate the aforesaid reliefs claimed in the appeal, it would be necessary to state certain relevant facts. It is on the basis of the",,,,,,,,
recommendations made in the final findings by the Designated Authority that the Central Government issued a Customs Notification dated September,,,,,,,,
12, 2017 imposing antidumping duties and so far as the appellant is concerned, it was subjected to a residual rate of duty. In the first corrigendum",,,,,,,,
dated December 19, 2017 issued by Designated Authority, the duty for the appellant was specified as ‘NIL’, but this corrigendum was",,,,,,,,
withdrawn by the second corrigendum dated April 25, 2018 issued by the Designated Authority. The second corrigendum was notified by the Central",,,,,,,,
Government by a Notification dated May 25, 2018 but this was not in connection with the duty specified for the appellant.",,,,,,,,
It would be seen from the aforesaid reliefs that have been claimed by the appellant in the appeal that no reliefs have been claimed for setting aside,,,,,,,,
the Customs Notification dated September 12, 2017 issued by the Central Government or the final findings dated August 1, 2017 issued by the",,,,,,,,
Designated Authority. The reliefs that have been sought are for quashing the second corrigendum dated April 25, 2018 and for issuance of a Customs",,,,,,,,
Notification to give effect to the first corrigendum dated December 19, 2017.",,,,,,,,
Thus, if the period of limitation is counted from September 12, 2017, which is the date when the Central Government issued the Customs",,,,,,,,
Notification imposing antidumping duty, there would be a delay of about three years in filing the appeal since the appeal has to be filed, as",,,,,,,,
contemplated under section 9C of the Tariff Act, within 90 days of the date of the order and the appeal was actually filed on December 1, 2020.",,,,,,,,
However, if the limitation is to be calculated in terms of the third relief claimed by the appellant which is for acting on the first corrigendum dated",,,,,,,,
December 19, 2017, then there would be a delay of about two years and nine months. If the limitation is to be calculated from the second relief,",,,,,,,,
namely for quashing the second corrigendum dated April 25, 2018, then the delay would be of about two years and five months.",,,,,,,,
To explain the delay, the appellant has stated the following facts in the delay condonation application:",,,,,,,,
“4. ******* Meanwhile the recommended anti-dumping duty in the final findings was given effect to by the Respondent No. 2 vide,,,,,,,,
Notification No. 44/2017-Customs (ADD) dt. 12.09.2017. Pursuant to the representations made to the Respondent No. 1, first corrigendum",,,,,,,,
notification dt. 19.12.2017 was issued by the Respondent No. 1 including the Applicant in the duty table and providing “NIL rate of anti-,,,,,,,,
dumping duty.,,,,,,,,
However, the Respondent No. 2 did not give effect to the first corrigendum notification dt. 19. 12.2017; and on 25.04.2018, the",,,,,,,,
Respondent No. 1 issued the impugned (second) corrigendum notification withdrawing the first corrigendum notification dated 19.12.2017,",,,,,,,,
amongst other amendments to the final findings, without providing any reason. This impugned corrigendum was given effect to vide",,,,,,,,
Notification No. 29/2018-Customs (ADD) dt. 25.04.2018 (should be 25.05.2018)i ssued by the Respondent No. 2. Thus, the Applicant",,,,,,,,
continued being subjected to the residual rate of antidumping duty.,,,,,,,,
That pursuant to the issuance of customs notification giving effect to the send corrigendum notification, the Applicant’s parent group,",,,,,,,,
Euro Chem Group AG on 26.06.2018 approached the Trade Representative of Russian Federation in India to obtain comments from the,,,,,,,,
Respondent No. 1, with respect to the reasons for withdrawal of the first corrigendum notification dt. 19.12.2017 which provided the relief",,,,,,,,
sought by the Applicant. The Respondent No. 1 replied to the letter from the Trade Representative of Russian Federation in India on,,,,,,,,
10.07.2018, However, it did not address the concern regarding such withdrawal. Instead, the Respondent No. 1 simply mentioned that the",,,,,,,,
same has been addressed in the final findings dt. 01.08.2017. The last dated of filing an appeal before this Hon’ble Tribunal under,,,,,,,,
Section 9C of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 was 23.08.2020. (should, be 23.08.2018 if the limitation is calculated from the date of issue of",,,,,,,,
second corrigendum on 25.5.2018.),,,,,,,,
As the reply from the Respondent No. 1 was received not long before the expiry of the statutory time period of filing the appeal pursuant,,,,,,,,
to which the Applicant internally assessed its options, the same had resulted in the lapse of the statutory period for filing an appeal under",,,,,,,,
Section 9C of the Act.,,,,,,,,
That after a year of refusal of Euro Chem Group AG’s request to provide single dumping margin to the Applicant and NAK Azot and,,,,,,,,
several internal deliberations, the fact that the Applicant maintains its plans to export the PUC to India; the Applicant pursued this issue",,,,,,,,
again with the Respondent No. 1 vide its letter dt. 07.11.2019 (filed on 11.11.2019) which highlighted that the non-issuance of a single,,,,,,,,
dumping margin for NAK Azot and Nevinka- the Applicant, is inconsistent with the India’s obligations provided under the WTO",,,,,,,,
Agreement on Anti-Dumping (“ADAâ€), the Indian Anti-dumping laws, the Respondent No.1’s Manual of Operating practices for",,,,,,,,
Trade Remedy Investigations as well as the established past practices.,,,,,,,,
The Applicant filed another letter with the Respondent No. 1 dt. 20.01.2020. a reminder letter dt. 28.02.2020 and two reminder emails dt.,,,,,,,,
24.04.2020 and 10.07.2020 seeking a response to the request filed by the Applicant through its parent group on 11.11.2019. However, the",,,,,,,,
no response has been received from the Respondent No. 1 till date.,,,,,,,,
S.No,"Tariff
Item","Description of
goods","Country
of origin","Country of
exports",Producer,Exporter,"Duty
amount",Unit
(1),(2),(3),(4),(5),(6),(7),(8),(9)
1.,"31023
0 00","“Ammonium
nitrateâ€
whether prilled,
granular, or in
other solid
form, with or
without
additives or
coating, and
having bulk
density in
excess of 0.83
g/cc",Russia,Switzerland,"Novomos
kovskaya
(NakAzot)","Euro
Chem
Trading
GMBH
Through
Rawfert
Offshore
Sal",NIL,"US
Dollar/
Metric
Ton
1.,3102,"Ammonium
Nitrate
Having
density
above 0.83
g/cc*",Russia,Switzerland,"Novomosko
vsky Azot
JSC
Nevinnomys
sky Azot,
JSC","Euro
Chem
Trading
GMBH
through
Rawfert
Offshore
Sal,
Lebanon
Euro
Chem
Trading
GMBH",NIL,"US
Dollar/
Metric
Ton
the appellant was also impleaded as a respondent. All these appeals were dismissed by the Tribunal and the Special Leave to Appeal (Civil,,,,,,,,
Appeal No. 19899 of 2018) filed to assail the order passed by the Tribunal was also dismissed by the Supreme Court; and,,,,,,,,
(iii) No satisfactory explanation has been offered by the appellant for the inordinate delay in filing the appeal.,,,,,,,,
Shri Ameet Singh, learned counsel appearing for the Designated Authority also submitted that the appellant has failed to furnish any satisfactory",,,,,,,,
explanation for the inordinate delay in filing the appeal. Learned counsel submitted that the appellant was well aware of the remedies available to it for,,,,,,,,
challenging the Customs Notification dated September 12, 2017 and the final findings dated August 01, 2017 of the Designated Authority but still it",,,,,,,,
waited for over three years to file this appeal.,,,,,,,,
Shri Sunil Kumar, learned Authorized Representative appearing for the Department also urged that the Delay Condonation Application should be",,,,,,,,
dismissed as it has been filed with inordinate delay. Reliance has been placed upon a decision of Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v/s Managing,,,,,,,,
Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Ors. (2013) 12 SCC 649,,,,,,,,
The submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and the learned Authorized Representative of the Department have been considered.,,,,,,,,
The appellant is actually aggrieved by the Customs Notification dated September 12, 2017 as the appellant was subjected to a residual rate of duty",,,,,,,,
even though according to the appellant it should have been subjected to ‘NIL’ rate of antidumping duty like its related producer. The appellant,,,,,,,,
clearly had a remedy available under section 9C of the Tariff Act of filing an appeal within a period of 90 days from the date of the Customs,,,,,,,,
Notification. The appellant did not file the appeal within the aforesaid period of 90 days even though four appeals were filed before the Tribunal by,,,,,,,,
different parties against the aforesaid final findings and the Customs Notification. It needs to be noted that the appellant was impleaded as a,,,,,,,,
Respondent in the appeals. All the four appeals were ultimately dismissed by the Tribunal on March 16, 2018 and the Special Leave to Appeal was",,,,,,,,
dismissed by the Supreme Court.,,,,,,,,
The appellant has concealed essential material facts in this application filed for condonation of delay in as much as no statement has been made,,,,,,,,
that four appeals were filed by other interested parties before the Tribunal to challenge the Customs Notification dated September 12, 2017 issued by",,,,,,,,
the Central Government imposing anti-dumping duty on the basis of the recommendation dated August 01, 2017 made by the Designated Authority,",,,,,,,,
particularly when the appellant was impleaded as a Respondent in the said appeals. This fact alone disentitles the appellant to seek any discretion in a,,,,,,,,
matter where there is a delay of about three years in filing the appeal. The fact regarding filing of four appeals was brought to the notice of the Bench,,,,,,,,
only by the learned counsel appearing for the Domestic Industry.,,,,,,,,
The appellant did pursue the matter with the Designated Authority and a corrigendum dated December 19, 2017 was issued by the Designated",,,,,,,,
Authority modifying the duty table in the final findings by specifying individual rate for the appellant, namely ‘NIL’ rate of duty which was the",,,,,,,,
rate of duty specified for the related producer.,,,,,,,,
It is doubtful whether the Designated Authority could have modified the duty for the appellant specified in its final findings, because it was not a",,,,,,,,
typographical mistake as a categorical finding had been recorded by the Designated Authority in the final findings that the request made by the,,,,,,,,
appellant for determination of individual dumping margin could not be accepted for the reason that it had not exported the product under consideration,,,,,,,,
during the period of investigation as a result of which the export price could not be assessed. The Designated Authority also held that it was not,,,,,,,,
desirable to consider the request of the appellant that the same dumping margin should be specified as was assessed for the related producer. Even,,,,,,,,
otherwise, the Central Government did not issue a Customs Notification in the Official Gazette accepting the recommendations of the Designated",,,,,,,,
Authority. Thus, for all the practical purposes, the first corrigendum issued by the Designated Authority did not result in any benefit to the appellant,",,,,,,,,
and it should have continued to pay the residual duty that was notified in the Customs Notification dated September 09, 2017 issued by the Central",,,,,,,,
Government.,,,,,,,,
The appellant, however, still kept quiet and did not, at the appropriate time, take recourse to proceedings contemplated in law for either setting",,,,,,,,
aside the Customs Notification dated September 12, 2017 or for implementation of the recommendation made by the Designated Authority in the first",,,,,,,,
corrigendum by issuance of a Customs Notification by the Central Government. It is only in this appeal filed on December 1, 2020 that a prayer has",,,,,,,,
now been made that the Central Government may issue such a Customs Notification.,,,,,,,,
The Designated Authority ultimately, withdrew the first corrigendum dated December 19, 2017 by a subsequent corrigendum dated April 25, 2018.",,,,,,,,
On behalf of the appellant a representation was thereafter made to the Designated Authority for specifying an individual rate for the appellant but,,,,,,,,
the Designated Authority made it clear to the appellant, by a letter dated July 10, 2018, that such a request cannot be accepted for the reason that this",,,,,,,,
issue had already been addressed by the Designated Authority in the final findings.,,,,,,,,
Though, as stated above, the cause of action actually arose when the Central Government issued the Customs Notification dated September 12,",,,,,,,,
2017 specifying the duty on the basis of the final findings recommended by the Designated Authority and even if it is assumed that the appellant,,,,,,,,
believed that its grievance would be addressed by the Central Government when the first corrigendum dated December 19, 2017 was issued by the",,,,,,,,
Designated Authority, but still the appellant could not have waited endlessly and should have immediately taken recourse to legal proceeding when the",,,,,,,,
recommendations made by the Designated Authority in the first corrigendum were not considered by the Central Government nor any Customs,,,,,,,,
Notification was issued by the Central Government for accepting such a recommendation made by the Designated Authority.,,,,,,,,
However, the appellant did not approach the Tribunal or took recourse to any other proceedings and continued to make several representations,",,,,,,,,
even though the Designated Authority had specifically informed the appellant that it would not consider the issue raised on behalf of the appellant,,,,,,,,
since it had been decided in the final findings of the Designated Authority. These representations, therefore, cannot enure to the benefit of the",,,,,,,,
appellant for explaining this long delay in filing the appeal on December 01, 2020.",,,,,,,,
Learned Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon a decision of this Tribunal in Greenply Industries Ltd., which is also in connection with",,,,,,,,
anti-dumping appeal. The Bench noted that though the grounds mentioned for explaining the delay were not substantial, but considering the larger issue",,,,,,,,
on the merits of the case, if any, the delay was condoned. This cannot mean that in all cases where merit is to be considered, the delay should be",,,,,,,,
condoned. Each case has to be examined on its own facts. In fact the Bench itself was conscious of this fact and treated the views to have been,,,,,,,,
expressed by it ‘as a special case’.,,,,,,,,
Learned counsel for the Domestic Industry has, however, placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Balwant Singh. While examining",,,,,,,,
the provisions of order 22 rule 9(2) and (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in a case when there was a delay of 778 days in filing an application,,,,,,,,
for bringing on record the legal representative of the deceased appellant, the Supreme Court observed:-",,,,,,,,
We may state that even if the term `sufficient cause' has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of",,,,,,,,
reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the,,,,,,,,
concept of `reasonableness' as it is understood in its general connotation.,,,,,,,,
The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles,,,,,,,,
should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right, has",,,,,,,,
accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own,,,,,,,,
conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of",,,,,,,,
negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If",,,,,,,,
a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a",,,,,,,,
valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.,,,,,,,,
The application filed by the applicants lack in details. Even the averments made are not correct and ex-facie lack bona fide. The,,,,,,,,
explanation has to be reasonable or plausible, so as to persuade the Court to believe that the explanation rendered is not only true, but is",,,,,,,,
worthy of exercising judicial discretion in favour of the applicant. If it does not specify any of the enunciated ingredients of judicial,,,,,,,,
pronouncements, then the application should be dismissed. On the other hand, if the application is bona fide and based upon true and",,,,,,,,
plausible explanations, as well as reflect normal behaviour of a common prudent person on the part of the applicant, the Court would",,,,,,,,
normally tilt the judicial discretion in favour of such an applicant. Liberal construction cannot be equated with doing injustice to the other,,,,,,,,
party.,,,,,,,,
xxxxxxxx,,,,,,,,
The expression `sufficient cause' implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word `sufficient' means adequate enough, as",,,,,,,,
much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plentitude which, when done,",,,,,,,,
suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of,,,,,,,,
practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the Court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat",,,,,,,,
the delay as an excusable one. These provisions give the Courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful manner, while",,,,,,,,
assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law does not stand frustrated.,,,,,,,,
Above are the principles which should control the exercise of judicial discretion vested in the Court under these provisions. The,,,,,,,,
explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which,,,,,,,,
has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons",,,,,,,,
for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The,,,,,,,,
statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of,,,,,,,,
limitation for bringing the legal representatives on record, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay.",,,,,,,,
The larger benches as well as equi-benches of this Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to,,,,,,,,
condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of",,,,,,,,
right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be,,,,,,,,
inclined to condone the delay in the filing of such applications.â€,,,,,,,,
(emphasis supplied),,,,,,,,
It would also be necessary to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramlal v.Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361 The observation are,,,,,,,,
as follows:-,,,,,,,,
“7. In construing Section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the,,,,,,,,
period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree as binding,,,,,,,,
between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the",,,,,,,,
law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should",,,,,,,,
not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown,,,,,,,,
discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order,,,,,,,,
that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras,,,,,,,,
High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan, ILR 13 Mad 269.",,,,,,,,
It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay",,,,,,,,
in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction,,,,,,,,
vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be,,,,,,,,
dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the,,,,,,,,
delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party,,,,,,,,
or its bona fides may fall for consideration;â€,,,,,,,,
(emphasis supplied),,,,,,,,
In Esha Bhattacharjee, which decision has been relied upon by the learned Authorized Representative of the Department, reference has been",,,,,,,,
made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Balwant Singh. The Supreme court culled out the following principles:-,,,,,,,,
“From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:,,,,,,,,
i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, nonpedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay,",,,,,,,,
for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.,,,,,,,,
ii) The terms “sufficient cause†should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that",,,,,,,,
these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.,,,,,,,,
iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.,,,,,,,,
iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be",,,,,,,,
taken note of.,,,,,,,,
v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.,,,,,,,,
vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are,,,,,,,,
required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.,,,,,,,,
vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free,,,,,,,,
play.,,,,,,,,
viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is",,,,,,,,
attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a",,,,,,,,
liberal delineation.,,,,,,,,
ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is",,,,,,,,
so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said,,,,,,,,
principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.,,,,,,,,
x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose",,,,,,,,
the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.,,,,,,,,
xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of",,,,,,,,
law of limitation.,,,,,,,,
xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which,,,,,,,,
is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.,,,,,,,,
xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.â€,,,,,,,,
(emphasis supplied),,,,,,,,
The following principles follow from the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court:-,,,,,,,,
(i) The law of limitation is a substantive law and once a valuable right has accrued to a party as a result of the failure of the other party to,,,,,,,,
explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away this right on the mere asking of the",,,,,,,,
applicant, particularly when the delay is directly as a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party;",,,,,,,,
(ii) The explanation has to be reasonable or plausible so as to persuade the Court to believe that the explanation rendered is not only true,,,,,,,,
but is worthy of exercising judicial discretion in favour of the applicant;,,,,,,,,
(iii) If the explanation is bona fide and also reflects the normal behaviour of a common prudent person, the judicial discretion would tilt in",,,,,,,,
the favour of such an applicant;,,,,,,,,
(iv) The explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay;,,,,,,,,
(v) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal, the technical consideration should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis; and",,,,,,,,
(vi) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration.",,,,,,,,
The factual position has been narrated above. It clearly demonstrates that the appellant, for no justifiable reason, did not challenge the Customs",,,,,,,,
Notification dated September 12, 2017 within the time stipulated in section 9C of the Tariff Act nor did the appellant take immediate steps for",,,,,,,,
implementation for the first corrigendum issued by the Designated Authority on December 19, 2017. This does not reflect the normal behaviour of a",,,,,,,,
person having all the resources to take recourse to legal proceedings. In fact, Euro Chem group, which is the parent group of the appellant, in",,,,,,,,
beginning of 2018 had threatened going to Court for elimination of the anti-dumping duty, but still for a long period of two years, the appellant kept",,,,,,,,
quiet. The appellant has been thoroughly negligent and there is no good reason as to why the delay should be condoned on the mere asking the,,,,,,,,
appellant. It needs to be noted that even after having been informed by the Designated Authority that the representation filed on behalf of the,,,,,,,,
appellant for specifying ‘Nil’ rate of duty could be accepted for the reason that the final findings had dealt with the issue, the appellant",,,,,,,,
repeatedly filed representations. These representations were for the same relief which had been denied to the appellant by the Designated Authority,,,,,,,,
and, therefore, the said explanation offered for the delay cannot be accepted. Above all, the appellant concealed material relevant facts from the",,,,,,,,
Tribunal since the appellant has not stated that four Anti-Dumping Appeals had been filed to assail the Customs Notification. The appellant was,,,,,,,,
impleaded as a respondent and these appeals had been dismissed by the Tribunal and the Special Leave to Appeal filed before the Supreme Court,,,,,,,,
was also dismissed.,,,,,,,,
The facts stated above leave no manner of doubt that the appellant has not been able to satisfy the Tribunal that the appellant was prevented by,,,,,,,,
sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. The Delay Condonation Application, therefore, deserves to be rejected and is rejected.",,,,,,,,
As the delay condonation application has been rejected, the appeal stands dismissed.",,,,,,,,
(Order pronounced on February 17, 2021)",,,,,,,,