Neelakantha S. Sankannaver vs State of Karnataka

K.T. Thomas and R.P. Sethi, JJ.—The Appellant has filed this appeal as of right. He is in jail. We appointed Mr. S. C. Patel, advocate as an amicus curiae in the matter. He argued for the Appellant. We heard learned amicus curiae and Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde, learned Counsel for the State of Karnataka.

Appellant is alleged to have killed his 16 year old wife by throttling her on the night of October 4, 1990. He was acquitted by the trial court due to want of evidence but the High Court, on appeal by the State reversed the order of acquittal and convicted him u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to imprisonment for life.

Appellant was convicted by the trial court of the offence u/s 309, I.P.C. (attempt to commit suicide) but instead of sentencing him, the trial court released him under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. That conviction was declared by the High Court to be illegal, as the law then stood, was based on the decision of this Court in P. Rathinam/Nagbhusan Patnaik Vs. Union of India and another, Subsequently, the said decision was overruled by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Smt. Gian Kaur Vs. State of Punjab, .

The main circumstance which the High Court relied on is the medical evidence which showed that deceased, Savakka, could have been throttled to death. That would only show that the death of the deceased was a homicide. But unfortunately, there is no other circumstance to show that Appellant was the murderer. Even the father of the deceased turned hostile when he was examined as P.W. 1. The father of the Appellant was examined as P.W. 2. He deposed that the deceased was found hanging herself. Of course, P.W. 2 said that the deceased and the Appellant were sleeping in the same room on the crucial night.

Barring the above evidence, there is nothing except the circumstance that the Appellant attempted to commit suicide.

The question is whether the evidence of P.W. 2, that on the crucial night Appellant and the deceased were sleeping together, could be given absolute credence in the light of his other testimony that he found the deceased hanging herself. It is true, the Court can separate the chaff from the corn and believe what is true and reject what is untrue. But in a case like this, when the trial court declined to place reliance on the testimony of P.W. 2 on the said aspect, we are unable to say that the trial court had gone unreasonably wrong on that aspect. If the said statement of P.W. 2 is not absolutely trustworthy, then there is practically total dearth of circumstance to connect the Appellant with the crime.

Even the circumstance that the Appellant attempted to commit suicide is not a decisive link because on coming to know that his young wife was dead, he could have thought of ending his own life in a weak moment.

In this appeal filed as of right, as between an order of acquittal passed by the trial court and the order of conviction passed by the High Court in reversal thereof, we have to see whether the trial court went so unreasonably wrong in passing the verdict of acquittal. We are unable to hold that the conclusion reached by the trial court is so unreasonable.

For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the impugned order as well as the sentence passed on the Appellant and we restore the order of acquittal passed by the trial court. We direct the jail authorities to set the Appellant at liberty forthwith unless he is required in any other case.

Appeal is disposed of in the above terms.