Nazir Ahmad vs Ghulam Rasool and others

Bhat, J.—The suit out of which this second appeal arises was brought in the Court of Munsiff Ramban by the respondent against the

appellant for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts. The suit was based on an agreement which is admittedly an unregistered

partnership deed. The trial Court, the Munsiff Ramban, passed a preliminary decree dated 11-5-1965 against which an appeal was preferred

before the District Judge, Bhaderwah. The District Judge, Bhaderwah affirmed the decree of the trial Court by his decree under appeal dated 28-

2-1969.

Only one point was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant in this appeal and that is that the so-called partnership deed was

unregistered and as such the present suit could not lie. The learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on Section 17(1) of the Registration

Act of the State. Section 17(1) mentions documents which shall be registered, in other words the registration of which is compulsory, and under

sub-clause (d) of the said Section, a partnership deed is one of the documents which has to be compulsorily registered. Effect of non-registration

of documents which are required to be registered is mentioned in Section 49 of the Registration Act. Section 49 of the Registration Act reads as

under:-

No document required by Section 17 (or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act) to be registered shall-

(a) affect any immovable property comprised therein, or

(b) confer any power to adopt or,

(c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered.

Mr. Kotwal argued that all documents mentioned in Section 17(1) are to be registered irrespective of the fact what property was to be affected

by the document. A partnership deed was a document which was compulsorily registrable and therefore as the present document was not

registered it would be inadmissible in evidence. If a partnership deed was not intended to be registered under some circumstances or that it should

not be in same cases hit by the provision of Section 49 of the Registration Act there was no purpose in adding these words in the list or documents

compulsorily registrable. For this proposition of law he has asked us to place a harmonious construction on these two sections i.e., Section 17(1)

(d) and Section 49 otherwise according to him the insertion of the words partnership deed in Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act becomes

superfluous. He has invited our attention to: (i) Kamleshwar Singh Vs. Dharamdeo Singh, (ii) M. Agaiah Vs. Mohd. Abdul Kereem, (FB) (iii)

Ghanshyam Das Vs. Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Nagpur, (iv) Kanamathareddi Kanna Reddy Vs. Kanamatha Reddy Venkata

Reddy, and (v) Manicka Gounder Vs. Arunachala Gounder and Others, .

Kamleshwar Singh Vs. Dharamdeo Singh, , lays down that where alternative constructions are open, the Court will adopt that construction by

which the intention of the legislature will be better effectuated or which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute

purports to regulate and that alternative is to be refected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the system.

M. Agaiah Vs. Mohd. Abdul Kereem, , lays down that the provisions of a statute should be so read as to harmonise one with the other and not

read a repugnancy into them. If two enactments appear to be inconsistent, it must be seen that one is a qualification of the other.

Ghanshyam Das Vs. Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Nagpur, , says that a construction which would attribute redundancy to

Legislature shall not be accepted except for compelling reasons.

Manicka Gounder Vs. Arunachala Gounder and Others, , Full Bench observes that a Court should not be prompt to ascribe, and indeed should

not, without necessity or some sound reason, impute to the language of a statute, tautology or superfluity. In other words although surplusage or

even tautology is not an uncommon feature in legislative enactments, the ordinary rule is that a statute is never supposed to use words without a

meaning.

Kanamathareddi Kanna Reddy Vs. Kanamatha Reddy Venkata Reddy, , Full Bench only lays down that the word ""affect"" in both Clauses (a)

and (c) must be assigned the same meaning and the words ""transaction affecting such property"", in Clause (c) must be understood in the

background of Section 17 and not in isolation,

But these authorities do not help the appellant. There can be no dispute with the propositions of law above mentioned so vehemently argued by

the learned counsel for the appellant. But in our opinion these authorities have no application to the facts of the present case. In the first place it is

very well settled that when an enactment is intended to visit certain transactions with penal consequences it should be strictly construed. According

to us only a few documents require to be registered compulsorily under the Registration Act. In the present world where commerce, business,

science and technology are progressing by leaps and bounds, if we interpret the provisions of the Registration Act particularly Section 49 liberally,

there is apprehension that trade and commerce may be paralysed by making inadmissible a bulk of documents upon which such transactions are

based. Therefore while applying the provisions of the Registration Act we should be very careful not to make a document inadmissible in evidence

when a strict interpretation of the provisions of the Act does not make it so. It has been held in ILR (1887) All 108, Full Bench of the Allahabad

High Court in Jiwan Ali Beg v. Basa Mal and others that the strictest construction should be placed on the prohibitory and penal sections of the

Registration Act, which impose serious disqualifications for non-observance of registration.

Similarly in AIR 1936 Sind 79 (FB), it was observed that the strictest construction should be placed upon the prohibitory and penal sections of

the Registration Act which impose serious disqualifications upon the non-observance of the rule of registration and unless a document is clearly

brought within the purview of the Act, non-registration is no bar to its being acted upon or received in evidence, and in case of doubt the benefit of

the doubt should be given to the person who wants the Court to act upon or receive it in evidence.

This should be the approach we should make in interpretating the penal Section 49 of the Registration Act. Before fully analysing the intention

of the Legislature about this section and the intention of the State Legislature in adding the word 'partnership deed' to the list of compulsorily

registrable documents it is better to mention some well-settled canons of the interpretation of statutes. Maxwell in The Interpretation of Statutes 7th

Edition says that the first and most elementary rule of construction is that it is to be assumed that the word and phrases of technical legislation are

used in their technical meaning if they have acquired one, and, otherwise, in their ordinary meaning, and, secondly, that the phrases and sentences

are to be construed according to the rules of grammar, and it is not allowable to depart where the language admits of no other meaning. On page 3

of this book 7th Edition the learned author quotes Jervis, C.J., in Mattison v. Hart (p), who has said ""we ought......to give to an Act of Parliament

the plain, fair, literal meaning of its words, where we do not see from its scope that such meaning would be inconsistent, or would lead to manifold

injustice"". When the language is not only plain but admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise, because the

learned author says, that the rule of construction is to intend the Legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed. It matters not, in such

a case, what the consequence may be. Where by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by

the Legislature, it must be enforced, even though it be absurd or mischievous. The underlying principle is that the meaning and intention of a statute

must be collected from the plain and unambiguous expressions used therein rather than from any notions which may be entertained by the Court as

to what is just or expedient. The number of Indian cases which may be cited in support of this proposition are so numerous that it will be useless to

multiply them. Only a few may be mentioned: (i) AIR 1923 Lah 655, (ii) Radha Mohan Datt, Silk Merchant Vs. Abbas Ali Biswas and Others ,

(iii) AIR 1935 150 (Lahore) , (iv) AIR 1939 47 (Privy Council) , (v) AIR 1940 Sind 97. (vi) AIR 1942 All 391 (FB), (vii) AIR 1914 Lah 398,

(viii) Kosuri Subba Raju Vs. State of Andhra, and (ix) Pt. Ram Parkash Vs. Smt. Savitri Devi, .

In AIR 1939 47 (Privy Council) , it has been held that when the meaning of words is plain, it is not the duty of the Courts to busy themselves

with supposed intentions.

Similarly in AIR 1942 All 394 (FB), it was laid down that when the words used by the Legislature in a statute are clear, it is not permissible for

the Courts to depart from the ordinary and plain meaning of the words used on the mere supposition that the intention of the Legislature was

otherwise than indicated by the plain and ordinary interpretation of the words used.

In Pt. Ram Parkash Vs. Smt. Savitri Devi, , it has been held that a judge should not allow himself to be swayed by his own personal wishes,

desires or predilections, for rights of the parties to a litigation are not regulated by the whim or caprices of the presiding officer but by the law as

applied to the facts of the particular case: If a rule of law prescribed by a statute operates to the prejudice of a person or class of persons,

application must be made to the Legislature and not to the Courts.

Other authorities need not be quoted.

Keeping this salutary rule of interpretation of statutes in view, let us examine the words of both the sections viz., 17(1)(d) and 49 of the

Registration Act. In the rest of India there is a proviso added to Section 49 which reads as under:-

Provided that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882),

to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act.

This proviso has a varied history and different parts of the same have been brought into existence by different amendments, but in this State we

are not concerned with this proviso which is non-existent law. Now Section 49 as indicated earlier makes inadmissible documents which are

compulsorily registrable under Sec. 17(1) of the Registration Act or by the Transfer of Property Act, if they affect or are used as evidence of any

transaction affecting any immovable property or as instruments conferring any power to adopt. It is clear that the scope and ambit of Section 49 of

the Registration Act was simply to safeguard transactions regarding immovable property for from Ordinary canons this property constitutes

valuable property and must not change hands unless the transaction is evidenced by a document and that too a registered document because such

law will eliminate spurious transactions and give sanctity to such documents. If the penalty of non-registration would be extended to transactions

dealing with movable property, life and business would be very difficult, if not impossible.

On a plain reading of Section 49 of the Act, quoted hereinbefore, it would be crystal clear that this Section only forbids the use of unregistered

documents if they in any way affect or are used as evidence of any transaction affecting immovable property or a power to adopt or affect any

such power to adopt. On a pure grammatical construction the words such, do and have to be understood, as having reference to immovable

property or power to adopt, nothing more is envisaged and nothing more can be imported into this penal section.

Cases can be visualized where a partnership deed affects both immovable and movable property. A partnership deed will not be received in

evidence if it affects immovable property otherwise there is no bar to its admission. This is the ambit, the plain intention and plain meaning of the

provisions of Section 49. Moreover as already indicated a partnership deed is compulsorily registrable only in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. If

the intention of the Legislature is to visit with penal consequences any document relating to partnership unless it is registered it is for the Legislature

to enact the law and it will be for the Courts to enforce the same. In our opinion there is no superfluity, there is no redundancy or repugnancy in the

words of Section 17(1)(d) and Section 49. Section 17(1)(d) makes a partnership deed compulsorily registrable but the penal consequences

according to the law will follow only if that partnership deed is sought to be used as affecting immovable property. The argument of Mr. Kotwal

has no force. No other point has been argued by Mr. Kotwal before us. The appeal fails, and is hereby dismissed without any order as to costs.

S.M.F. Ali, C.J.

I agree.