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Judgment
(Per Pramod Kumar Srivastava,J.)
Heard learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Aatreya Tripathi, learned AGA for the State and Sri Maneesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the complainant.
This criminal appeal, preferred under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred in short as ‘Cr.P.C.’), arises from the judgment and order dated 22.02.2005 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-I, Faizabad, in Sessions Trial No. 210 of 1994, State v. Nazar Abbas, arising out of Case Crime No. 33 of 1994, Police Station Jalalpur, District Faizabad. By that judgment the appellant has been convicted under Sections 302 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred in short as ‘IPC’) and sentenced to imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.5,000/- under Section 302 IPC (with additional rigorous imprisonment for six months in default of payment of fine), and to rigorous imprisonment for one year under Section 324 IPC.
By the same judgment the learned trial court acquitted the appellant in Sessions Trial No. 211 of 1994, State v. Nazar Abbas, arising out of Case Crime No. 35 of 1994 under Section 4/25 of the Arms Act, Police Station Jalalpur. That trial had been consolidated with Sessions Trial No. 210 of 1994, the latter being treated as the leading case, by an order dated 02.07.1994. The State has not challenged the acquittal of the appellant under Section 4/25 of the Arms Act.
The prosecution case, as set out in the written report (Ex. Ka-3) given by P.W.-2 Dilshad Hussain at Police Station Jalalpur on 18.02.1994, is as follows. At about 5:35 p.m. on 18.02.1994, the complainant was standing in front of the main gate of the school-madarsa “Panjatani” in his Mohalla Jafrabad, talking with Gulfam Haider (PW-4) and one Nazar Abbas alias Thakur and Chandi Prasad Yadav, a milk vendor while awaiting the return of his brothers Hasan Abbas and Ali Abbas, who had gone to their brick kiln, because it was nearly time to break the fast. In the meantime, one Lallan Verma, brought a tractor-trolley laden with bricks and parked it in front of the house of the appellant-Nazar Abbas @ Nagaru, and came over to exchange greetings with the complainant’s group.
When Hasan Abbas and Ali Abbas returned on a motorcycle and asked appellant to move the tractor as it was obstructing the passage, the appellant, abusing them, said that the tractor would not move until his bricks were unloaded, and then began to strike Hasan Abbas with a knife that he had on him. When Ali Abbas intervened, appellant also inflicted knife injuries upon him. The complainant and the others ran towards the spot at the commotion and saw the appellant running away southwards at great speed. Hasan Abbas died on the spot. Ali Abbas was taken for treatment by Ahmad Hussain and others.
On this report Case Crime No. 33 of 1994 under Sections 302/307 IPC was registered at Police Station Jalalpur at 18:40 hours on 18.02.1994. The chik FIR (Ex. Ka-1) was prepared by P.W.-1 Constable Paras Nath, then posted as Head Moharrir, who made the corresponding entry at report no. 39 of the General Diary, the carbon copy of which is Ex. Ka-2.
The investigation was commenced by P.W.-9 Kailash Nath Singh, then Station House Officer, Police Station Jalalpur. On 18.02.1994 he copied the chik FIR and the General Diary entry and recorded the statement of the complainant and the statements of P.W.-4 Gulfam Haider, Nazar Abbas alias Thakur and Lallan Verma. By his own account, he first reached the spot at about 7:00 p.m., about twenty minutes after the complainant had reached the police station. Blood-stained earth and plain earth were taken from near the spot under a memo dated 18.02.1994 (Ex. Ka-12), attested by Ram Narayan Yadav and Aftab Hussain. The site plan (Ex. Ka-9) was prepared by P.W.-9.
On 19.02.1994, between 7:30 a.m. and 9:15 a.m., P.W.-9 held the inquest (Ex. Ka-8) in the courtyard of the madarsa, where the body lay on a cot covered with a sheet. The panch witnesses were Jafar Husain, Mehdi Hasan, Inam Husain, Mohammad Yaseen and Kamar Hayat. They were unanimous that the death was caused by knife injuries inflicted by the appellant. The body of the deceased, duly sealed, was sent for post-mortem with Constables Virendra Kumar Yadav and Virendra Kumar Rai (P.W.-7), together with the connected papers (Ex. Ka-10 to Ex. Ka-17).
On 19.02.1994, P.W.-9, accompanied by Head Constable Kamlakant Yadav and Constables Brijesh Kumar Yadav and Vishram Yadav, apprehended the appellant near Ram Prasad Singh’s kiln in village Faridpur on informer’s tip. At about 2:45 p.m., the appellant attempted to flee but was caught after a chase of about 150 paces. Two passers-by, Sabbar Husain and Javed Mehdi, confirmed his identity. A bloodstained Rampuri knife was recovered from his right trouser pocket, and a bloodstained blue shirt was seized (Ex. Ka-7 and Ex. Ka-10). The recovery memo recorded his admission that he had used the knife to attack Hasan Abbas and Ali Abbas the previous evening. The knife was sealed at the spot, and Case Crime No. 35 of 1994 under Section 4/25 of the Arms Act was registered at 17:30 hours on the basis of the recovery memo (chik FIR Ex. Ka-6), prepared by P.W.-8, Head Constable Shivji Mishra.
P.W.-9 recorded the statement of Chandi Prasad on 20.02.1994 and the statement of P.W.-3 Ali Abbas on 22.02.1994, and perused the medical report of Ali Abbas. The appellant was examined at the district jail hospital on 21.02.1994 at 9:40 a.m. by Dr. S.S. Tiwari (DW-1), who recorded eighteen injuries (Ex. Kha-1) on him.
On the transfer of P.W.-9, the investigation was continued by P.W.-6 Sabhajeet Pal, who perused the earlier case diary, obtained the original inquest report and post-mortem report, and sent the knife, the shirt and the earth samples to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Lucknow. On completion of the investigation, he submitted the charge-sheet (Ex. Ka-5) under Sections 302/307 IPC. The Arms Act case was investigated by Sub-Inspector Sadiq Ali (since deceased), who prepared the site plan of the place of recovery (Ex. Ka-19) and submitted the charge-sheet (Ex. Ka-20) dated 11.03.1994. Both chargesheets were proved by P.W.-11 Constable Ved Prakash Mishra through the handwriting and signatures of the investigating officer.
The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Faizabad (“CJM”), took cognizance of the offences upon the filing of the charge-sheets. After finding that the offences alleged against the appellant were exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the CJM complied with the provisions of Section 207 of the Code by furnishing copies of the police report, charge-sheet, case diary, and accompanying documents to the appellant. Thereafter, both cases were formally committed to the Court of Session, Faizabad, for trial vide committal orders dated 23.05.1994. Upon transfer to the trial court, the cases were registered as Sessions Trial No. 210/1994 and Sessions Trial No. 211/1994.
The trial court framed charges against the appellant on 02.07.1994 in Sessions Trial No. 210/1994 under sections 302 and 324 I.P.C. and in Sessions Trial No. 211/1994 under section 4/25 Arms Act. The charges were read over and explained to the appellant in Hindi, who pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. By order of the learned Sessions Judge dated 2.7.1994, Sessions Trial No. 211/1994 was clubbed/consolidated with Sessions Trial No. 210/1994, with Sessions Trial No. 210/1994 being treated as the leading case.
To substantiate its case, the prosecution examined a total of 11 witnesses P.W.-1 Constable Paras Nath, P.W.-2 Dilshad Hussain (complainant), P.W.-3 Ali Abbas, P.W.-4 Gulfam Haidar, P.W.-5 Dr. S. Kumar, P.W.-6 Sabha Jeet Pal, P.W.-7 Constable Virendra Kumar Rai, P.W.-8 Head Constable Shiv Ji Mishra, P.W.-9 SHO Kailash Nath Singh, P.W.-10 Dr. Hari Om Srivastava, P.W.-11 Constable Ved Prakash Mishra. The defence examined DW-1 Dr. S.S. Tiwari (Ex. Kha-1).
P.W.-1 Constable Paras Nath proved that on the basis of the complainant’s written report he prepared the chik FIR at 18:40 hours on 18.02.1994 and made the GD entry at report no. 39 with a carbon copy (Ex. Ka-2).
P.W.-2, Dilshad Hussain, the complainant, reiterated the contents of his report and deposed that when his brothers asked the appellant to remove the tractor, the appellant refused to do so until the bricks had been unloaded. An exchange of words followed, during which the appellant took out a knife and attacked Hasan Abbas. When Ali Abbas intervened to save Hasan Abbas, the appellant also struck him with the knife. The appellant fled upon the arrival of other persons, while Hasan Abbas was declared dead at the spot. P.W.-2 further stated that he tied a gamchha around Hasan Abbas’s wound and had himself written the report. In his cross-examination, P.W.-2 stated that there was no prior enmity between the parties. He explained that his house was about 100 paces from the place of occurrence and that, at the relevant time, he was standing near the school gate, approximately 30–35 paces from the tractor. The tractor driver was standing 20–25 paces to its north, and the tractor’s position obstructed the passage of a motorcycle. He stated that the entire occurrence lasted about five to ten minutes. There were, however, some variations in his account regarding how he came to witness the incident. In his deposition dated 29.06.1999, P.W.-2 stated that he was looking at his brother while talking to him and ran towards the spot upon hearing his brother’s shout, where he found Hasan Abbas already lying on the ground. He also stated that he had witnessed the entire incident. In his subsequent deposition dated 01.07.1999, he stated that he ran towards the spot upon seeing the incident rather than upon hearing a noise. Nevertheless, he maintained that his report correctly recorded that the persons accompanying him had rushed to the spot on hearing the noise and had seen the appellant fleeing. He denied the suggestions that he and Ali Abbas were not present at the place of occurrence, that Ali Abbas’s presence and injuries had been fabricated, or that Hasan Abbas had attacked the appellant with a knife which the appellant had snatched and used against him.
P.W.-3, Ali Abbas, the injured witness, deposed that he and Hasan Abbas were returning from their kiln on a motorcycle, driven by Hasan, when they found a tractor-trolley loaded with bricks standing in front of the appellant’s house and obstructing their passage. When Hasan Abbas asked the appellant to move it, the appellant replied that it would be moved only after the bricks had been unloaded and abused them. Thereafter, the appellant struck Hasan with a knife three or four times from the front, causing him to fall. The appellant then attacked him with the knife, following which he fell into a drain. The appellant fled towards the south, while villagers took him to the local hospital, from where he was referred to Faizabad and subsequently examined and admitted to the district hospital. In his cross-examination, he stated that he operated the kiln and had left home at 8 a.m. He maintained that he and Hasan intended to return home to break their fast and had no intention of quarreling, and that they had not taken another route as it was longer. He stated that P.W.-2 Dilshad was standing near the school, about 30–35 paces away, and came to the spot upon hearing his shout. He clarified that he shouted when Hasan Abbas was attacked by the appellant and he himself was injured only after Hasan had fallen after which the appellant chased him for about 20 paces before striking him. He stated that he had sustained two injuries and denied having attacked the appellant, dragged him, or broken his spectacles. He also denied the suggestions that he was absent from the place of occurrence or that his injuries had been fabricated.
P.W.-4, Gulfam Haider, a weaver, deposed that he was standing near the school with P.W.-2 Dilshad and Nazar Abbas, son of Zafar, when Chandi Prasad Yadav joined them and Lallan Verma brought the tractor-trolley. He stated that Ali Abbas and Hasan Abbas arrived on a motorcycle and asked the appellant to move the trolley, whereupon the appellant abused them, took out a knife and began assaulting Hasan. On hearing Ali Abbas’s shout, the group rushed to the spot and saw the appellant striking Hasan with the knife and, when Ali attempted to save him the appellant attacked Ali as well. He further stated that P.W.-2 Dilshad tied a gamchha around Hasan’s wound and that Hasan died at the spot. In his cross-examination, P.W.-4 stated that he worked at a place 60–65 paces from the spot and resided 30– 35 paces away. He had worked until 4 p.m. that day and clarified that P.W.-2 Dilshad had not called him, rather, he had met the group on the way and remained with P.W.-2 Dilshad for about fifteen minutes before the occurrence. He denied having any close friendship with Dilshad, stating that they exchanged only customary greetings as neighbours. He further stated that he, P.W.-2 Dilshad and Nazar Abbas, son of Zafar, chased the appellant for about 60–70 paces, and that the appellant had neither sustained any injury nor had his spectacles broken. His statement was recorded by the police at the school about two hours after the occurrence.
PW-5 Dr. M. Kumar conducted the post-mortem of deceased Hassan Abbas on 19.02.1994 at about 3 p.m. and detailed the ante-mortem injuries found on the body of the deceased Hasan Abbas. The following ante-mortem injuries were recorded on the dead body:
“1.Incised wound: 3 x 1.5 cm, bone deep on the front of the left side of the chest, 5.5 cm inside the left nipple in the 3rd intercostal space.
2.Incised wound: 1 x 0.5 cm, bone deep on the back of the right hand.
3.Incised wound: 3 x 1.5 cm, bone deep on the right side of the chest, 9 cm below the scapula at the 7 o'clock position.
4.Incised wound: Size dimensions noted as bone deep on the back/left side of the chest, 15 cm below.
5.Abrasion: 2.5 cm on the right hip (kulli).
6.Abrasion: 5 x 0.5 cm on the back of the right forearm, 3.5 cm above the wrist.
Internal Findings & Cause of Death: Internal examination revealed that injury no. 4 had punctured the pleura and damaged the left lung, with about 1 liter of blood accumulated in the chest cavity. Injury no. 1 had punctured the pericardium (heart membrane) and damaged the left part of the heart, with about 200 ml of blood present in the cavity. The doctor opined that death was caused due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of ante-mortem injuries no. 1 and 4 (injuries to the heart and lung), and that the time since death was about one day.”
P.W.-6, Sabhajeet Pal, who succeeded P.W.-9 as the Investigating Officer, stated that he had not inspected the place of occurrence and could not recall whether it was situated near the appellant’s house or the complainant’s house. He further admitted that he had not opened the sealed knife to ascertain whether it was blood-stained, relying instead on the earlier memo.
P.W.-7, Constable Virendra Kumar Rai, deposed that he carried the sealed dead body along with the relevant papers to the hospital at Akbarpur on a tractor. The post-mortem was conducted at about 3 p.m., and he deposited the sealed clothes and the report at the police station that evening.
P.W.-8, Head Constable Shiv Ji Mishra, proved the chik FIR (Ex. Ka-6) registered in Case Crime No. 35 of 1994. He stated that the knife was not before the Court on 26.03.2003 and that the General Diary records were destroyed after five years. He denied the suggestion that the Arms Act case had been falsely registered to lend support to the murder case.
P.W.-9, Kailash Nath Singh, the Investigating Officer, proved the steps taken during the investigation. In his cross-examination, he stated that he could not specify the distance between the deceased’s house and the place of occurrence and admitted that the deceased’s house was not shown in the site plan. He stated that the police station was about 1.25 km from the spot and that a motorcycle could pass through the lane even when a tractor was standing there. He also confirmed having seen a stack of bricks in front of the appellant’s house. Regarding the appellant’s arrest, P.W.-9 stated on 15.12.2003 that he had apprehended the appellant himself, but on 17.12.2003 stated that three persons had chased and apprehended him and that he had not done so himself. He further stated that around ten to fifteen persons were present at the time of arrest, including the two witnesses to the arrest memo. According to him, the appellant sustained an injury at the time of arrest and had no prior injury on his body. He claimed that a copy of the arrest memo was given to the appellant, who tore it up, although this fact was not recorded in the memo. He also stated that the cloth in which the knife had been sealed had become illegible and admitted that he had not seized Rs 25,000 or the savings certificates allegedly lying at the appellant’s house. P.W.-9 further deposed that he visited the appellant’s house at about 10 p.m. on 18.02.1994, where he found only women. He did not search the premises, as he had received information that the appellant was not at home.
P.W.-10 Dr. Hari Om Srivastava proved the injury report of Ali Abbas (Ex. Ka-18) and detailed the cut wounds found on the injured. The following injuries were found on his person:
“1.Incised wound: 2.5 x 1.5 cm up to muscle depth, present on the front of the left shoulder (2 cm above the sterno-clavicular joint / anterior fold of the axilla), with fresh profuse bleeding flowing downwards and tailing on the lower side. (Kept under observation, referred to surgeon in operation theatre).
2.Incised wound: 1 x 0.5 cm up to skin depth, present on top of the left shoulder, transversely placed with anterior tailing.
Medical Opinion: The doctor stated that these injuries could have been caused by a sharp-edged weapon (such as a knife) and were fresh at the time of examination.”
P.W.-11 Constable Ved Prakash Mishra formally proved the documents and reports (site plan Ex. Ka-19 and charge-sheet Ex. Ka-20) prepared by the deceased S.I. Sadiq Ali in connection with the Arms Act case.
In his statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code, the appellant denied the prosecution allegations and evidence as false and pleaded private defence. He claimed that Hasan Abbas and Ali Abbas had abused and assaulted him and that, when he attempted to flee, Hasan chased him with a knife. Apprehending danger to his life, he allegedly snatched the knife from Hasan in self-defence, during which injuries were sustained. He further claimed that he had himself suffered injuries due to the beating by Hasan and Ali Abbas. According to him, as he was alone at his house that day, the police took him to the police station the same evening, falsely showed the recovery of a knife and subsequently charge-sheeted him.
In support of his defense, the accused examined one witness. D.W.-1 Dr. S.S. Tiwari, Medical Officer at the District Jail Hospital, who examined the injuries of the appellant on 21.02.1994 at 9:40 A.M., noting 18 simple contusions and abrasions caused by a blunt object, and proved the injury report (Ex. Kha-1). In examination-in-chief, he said that these injuries could be of 18.02.1994 at 5:35 (p.m.). In cross-examination, he said that two days mean about 48 hours and that the injuries could be of 9:40 a.m. on 19.02.1994; and that the margin on either side could be six hours. He did not know when the appellant had been admitted to the jail.
Upon analyzing the evidence, medical reports, and rival legal submissions, the trial court held that under Sections 302 and 324 I.P.C., the charges were held to be fully proved beyond reasonable doubt based on consistent eyewitness accounts, prompt FIR registration, supporting medical evidence, and recovery of the weapon. The appellant’s plea of private defense was rejected as untenable. Consequently, the appellant was convicted under Section 302 and 324 IPC. However, under Section 4/25 Arms Act, the trial court held that the prosecution failed to satisfactorily prove the recovery of the knife beyond reasonable doubt, giving the benefit of the doubt to the accused. Consequently, the accused was acquitted of the charge under Section 4/25 of the Arms Act.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES:
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the alleged incident happened on sudden provocation. The deceased Hasan Abbas was having the knife and inflicted blows upon the appellant but to protect himself the appellant snatched the knife from the deceased and used the same on the deceased and the injured in exercise of right of private defence. He further submits that the appellant had suffered number of injuries in the alleged incident but prosecution could not explain those injuries making the origin and genesis doubtful and falsifying the prosecution narrative. He also contends that as per prosecution case the appellant was alone. It is not possible for the appellant to have inflicted the blow upon the deceased and the injured. He also submits that there is no pre-existing quarrel or enmity between the parties. He further submits that in case of alleged recovery of the weapon (knife) appellant has been acquitted for the charges levied against him. On the above grounds, he submits that the finding and observations of the trial court are perverse and are liable to be set aside and the present appeal merits to be allowed.
Learned AGA submits that there is no delay in FIR. The appellant had inflicted knife blow to the deceased and injured intentionally to kill them resultantly deceased succumbed to his injuries. He further submits that the appellant has concocted the story of right to private defence. He further contends that the injuries of the appellant were not caused at the time of incident as PW-9 Kailash Nath Singh had admitted that injuries were sustained by the appellant during his arrest. Therefore, there is no case of right of private defence. This is a case without provocation where the appellant knows the result of his overt act.
Learned counsel for the complainant argues that the nature and site of injuries indicates the knowledge and intention of the appellant to cause death of the deceased. He further submits that the alleged incident happened on 18.02.1994 while the accused was arrested on 19.02.1994 and he was medically examined on 21.02.1994 and DW-1 Dr. S.S. Tiwari opined that the injuries were 2 days old which indicates that the alleged injury was not caused on the date of incident but subsequent thereto at the time of arrest on 19.02.1994 which is corroborated by the statement of PW-9 Kailash Nath Singh. He further submits that the learned trial court, after considering facts and circumstances in their entirety, convicted and sentenced the appellant which is in consonance with law and does not require the interference of this court.
ANALYSIS:
Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the paper book, trial court record and the impugned judgment, the question that arises for our consideration is whether the findings recorded by the learned trial court are correct and sustainable in the light of the evidence on record.
At the outset, the Court must determine whether the death of Hasan Abbas was homicidal and whether the injuries sustained by Ali Abbas were consistent with the prosecution’s case. The medical evidence, particularly the post-mortem report and the testimony of the doctor who conducted the examination, is material to this determination. The post-mortem report (Ex. Ka-4), proved by P.W.-5, establishes that Hasan Abbas, aged about 21 years, died due to hemorrhage and shock resulting from incised wounds. Injury Nos. 1 and 4 were penetrating wounds on the left side of the chest, which pierced the pericardium and left lung and damaged the left side of the heart. Approximately one litre of blood had accumulated in the left chest cavity. The doctor opined that death had occurred at about 5:30 to 5:45 p.m. on 18.02.1994, which is consistent with the prosecution’s account of the time of occurrence. The nature and location of these injuries, particularly the damage to vital organs, leave no room for doubt that Hasan Abbas died a homicidal death. The doctor also opined that the incised wounds could have been caused by a knife. The inquest report (Ex. Ka-8), prepared on the morning of 19.02.1994, records the condition of the body, the clothing worn by the deceased and the injuries noticed on his hand, chest and back. Although the inquest report refers to injuries on the left palm and wrist, whereas the post-mortem report records injuries on the right hand and forearm, this discrepancy, by itself, does not displace the detailed medical findings. An inquest report is primarily intended to ascertain the apparent cause of death and need not contain an exhaustive or medically precise description of every injury. The post-mortem findings, therefore, provide the more detailed medical account of the injuries and establish that the death was homicidal. Moreover, appellant does not dispute that the deceased Hasan Abbas was killed with a knife rather in his defence he seeks the right of private defence for inflicting the injuries sustained by Hasan Abbas.
As regards P.W.-3 Ali Abbas, the injured witness, his injury report (Ex. Ka-18), proved by P.W.-10, Dr. Hari Om Srivastava, records two incised wounds on his left shoulder. The injuries were fresh and bleeding when he was examined at 10 p.m. on 18.02.1994, approximately four and a half hours after the occurrence. The doctor opined that the injuries had been caused by a sharp-edged weapon, such as a knife, and were not dangerous to life. The suggestion that these injuries were self-inflicted or fabricated is not borne out by the evidence. Indeed, the defence put to P.W.-2 Dilshad Hussain, was that Ali Abbas was not present at the spot and that his injuries had been procured, whereas the appellant himself claimed that Ali Abbas, along with deceased Hasan Abbas, had assaulted him. These inconsistent suggestions do not lend support to the allegation of fabrication. The medical evidence establishes that Ali Abbas had sustained two genuine incised wounds caused by a sharp-edged weapon within a few hours before his examination. His injuries, though simple in nature, lend corroboration to his presence at the place of occurrence and to his account of having been assaulted. The testimony of an injured witness carries special evidentiary weight, since the injuries ordinarily provide assurance of his presence at the scene, unless material contradictions or other compelling circumstances warrant rejecting his evidence.
As regards the contention that the FIR was lodged after an unexplained delay, the record shows that the occurrence took place at about 5:35 p.m., whereas the FIR was registered at 6:40 p.m., within approximately one hour and five minutes. The police station was about 1.25 kilometres from the place of occurrence, as borne out by the FIR and the testimony of P.W.-9, the Investigating Officer. The circumstances surrounding the occurrence also provide a reasonable explanation for the time taken in lodging the report. The complainant had lost his brother in the incident, while another brother had sustained injuries requiring medical attention. In such circumstances, the complainant cannot reasonably be expected to have proceeded to the police station immediately, without attending to the immediate aftermath of the occurrence. The delay must be assessed in the context of the facts and the conduct reasonably expected of those involved, rather than by applying a rigid standard of promptness. Significantly, the FIR names the appellant, identifies the persons involved, describes the sequence of events and attributes the occurrence to the dispute over the tractor-trolley obstructing the passage, a circumstance which is also acknowledged in the defence version. Nothing in the material placed before us suggests that the interval was used to deliberate upon or fabricate the prosecution case. Considered in its entirety, we are of the view that the FIR was lodged within a reasonable time, and the interval of about one hour and five minutes does not render the prosecution version suspicious.
Another contention that has been raised by the appellant is that the prosecution has not reliably proved, through its ocular evidence, that the appellant inflicted those injuries as all the witnesses of fact are interested or chance witnesses whose evidence requires careful scrutiny. The approach to ocular evidence is settled. Witnesses may be wholly reliable, wholly unreliable, or neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the last case, the court looks for corroboration in material particulars (Refer Para 18 of Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, (1957) 1 SCC 700). It is a trite law that such evidence is not to be rejected because the witness is related to the deceased, rather it is to be weighed with care. The evidence of an injured witness stands on a special footing, his presence at the scene is assured by his injuries, and his account is not lightly to be discarded. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P., (2010) 10 SCC 259 has elucidated this principle as follows:-
“30.The law on the point can be summarized to the effect that the testimony of the injured witness is accorded a special status in law. This is as a consequence of the fact that the injury to the witness is an in-built guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and because the witness will not want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to falsely implicate a third party for the commission of the offence. Thus, the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein.”
The presence of P.W.-3 Ali Abbas, the injured witness, at the place of occurrence is established by the injuries recorded in Ex. Ka-18, proved by P.W.-10 Dr. Hari Om Srivastava, which were found to be fresh and consistent with the time of the incident. His testimony in examination-in-chief and cross-examination remains consistent on the essential features of the occurrence. He stated that he and deceased Hasan Abbas were returning on a motorcycle when their passage was obstructed by the tractor-trolley and that, when Hasan Abbas asked the appellant to move it, the appellant abused him and attacked him with a knife and that the appellant thereafter assaulted Ali Abbas as well. This account finds corroboration in the testimony of P.W.-2 Dilshad Hussain, and P.W.-4 Gulfam Haider, on the material particulars, as also in the medical evidence, which records four incised wounds on Hasan Abbas and two on Ali Abbas. The appellant has assailed the credibility of P.W.-3 Ali Abbas on two principal grounds. First, it is urged that his account is unnatural, for the appellant, after stabbing Hasan Abbas, allegedly chased Ali Abbas for about twenty paces and assaulted him while others present nearby made no attempt to intervene. This contention, according to us, does not merit acceptance. The site plan places the group at point A, approximately 33 paces from point D, where the occurrence took place. The assault unfolded within a short span of time, and there is nothing on record to suggest that the persons present were armed or had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and prevent the attack. In any event, human reactions to a sudden and violent occurrence cannot be measured against a fixed standard of expected conduct. The mere fact that the other persons did not intervene cannot, by itself, render the testimony of P.W.-3 Ali Abbas improbable or unreliable. Second, the appellant contends that P.W.-3 Ali Abbas fell into a drain out of fear and could not, therefore, have witnessed the occurrence. We are of the view that this argument of the appellant overlooks the sequence of events described by the witness. P.W.-3 Ali Abbas stated that he saw the appellant attack deceased Hasan Abbas and raised an alarm before the appellant turned towards him. It was only after he was himself struck that he fell into the drain. His subsequent fall does not impair his ability to have witnessed the preceding assault on deceased Hasan Abbas, and nor has any material contradiction been brought out to discredit his account of the incident up to that point. Viewed as a whole, the objections raised by the appellant concern the reactions of the witnesses and the circumstances in which P.W.-3 Ali Abbas was assaulted, rather than any material inconsistency in his account of the occurrence. His presence is independently supported by the medical evidence, and his testimony finds material corroboration in the accounts of P.W.-2 Dilshad Hussain and P.W.-4 Gulfam Haider. In the absence of any compelling circumstance casting doubt on its veracity, the testimony of P.W.-3 Ali Abbas cannot be discarded on the grounds urged by the appellant.
One aspect of the testimony of P.W.-3 Ali Abbas calls for closer scrutiny. He stated that the appellant struck deceased Hasan Abbas three or four times from the front. The post-mortem report, however, records four incised wounds: one on the front of the left side of the chest, one on the back of the right hand, and two on the back of the chest, on the right and left sides respectively. The location of the latter two injuries does not readily accord with an account of an assault in which all the blows were delivered from the front. The trial court, while discussing the medical evidence, appears to have treated Injury Nos. 1, 3 and 4 as injuries to the chest without adequately distinguishing between the wound on the front of the chest and those situated on its back. This aspect ought to have been considered while evaluating the precise manner in which the assault occurred. The discrepancy, however, must be assessed in its proper context. The medical evidence does not, merely by recording wounds on the back, conclusively rule out P.W.-3 Ali Abbas’s account that the appellant attacked deceased Hasan Abbas with a knife. It remains possible that Hasan Abbas turned or moved during the assault, or that the two were engaged in a physical struggle as the blows were inflicted. These are possible explanations, rather than established facts, and the evidence does not permit a definitive conclusion as to the precise movement of either person. The settled position is that ocular testimony must be assessed independently, and medical evidence assumes greater significance where it renders the eyewitness’s account improbable or wholly incompatible with the injuries found.
The complainant P.W.-2 Dilshad Hussain’s account of the surrounding events is natural and is confirmed by the defence in material respects where he states that a tractor-trolley of bricks stood in front of the appellant’s door when the brothers-Hassan Abbas and Ali Abbas arrived on a motorcycle and the quarrel about the removal of the tractor began after which Hasan Abbas was killed there. The dispute over the obstruction caused by the tractor-trolley, therefore, is not in serious controversy. The position is different, however, insofar as P.W.-2 claims to have witnessed the actual assault. His own account contains material variations on this aspect. In the FIR, he stated that the group rushed towards the place of occurrence on hearing the commotion and saw the appellant fleeing after assaulting the brothers. In his deposition dated 29.06.1999, he stated that he ran upon hearing his brother-Ali Abbas’s shout and found deceased Hasan Abbas already fallen. On 01.07.1999, he stated that he had run upon seeing the incident, while maintaining that his report, which indicated otherwise, was correct. Significantly, P.W.-3 Ali Abbas, also stated that P.W.-2 was not present during the quarrel and came to the spot only after he raised an alarm. The learned trial court accepted P.W.-2 as an eyewitness, rejecting the challenge to his presence on the ground that the defence had not established his absence from the spot. In our view, this approach does not adequately address the material variations in P.W.-2’s own account of how he came to the scene. The question is not whether he was present in the vicinity or reached the spot immediately after the assault, but whether he actually witnessed the stabbing. His presence near the school and his arrival at the scene are not, by themselves, sufficient to establish that he saw the assault. Accordingly, while P.W.-2’s testimony can safely be relied upon to establish the circumstances preceding the occurrence, the condition of the brothers immediately thereafter and the lodging of the FIR, his evidence does not inspire sufficient confidence to be treated as that of an eyewitness to the actual assault. We therefore do not rely upon his testimony to establish the act of stabbing, which must instead be assessed on the strength of the remaining evidence, particularly the testimony of the injured witness, P.W.-3 Ali Abbas, and the other corroborative material on record.
The appellant’s challenge to the testimony of P.W.-4 Gulfam Haider, on the ground that he was a chance witness, also does not merit acceptance. In this regard, reliance has been placed on Ravi Mandal v. State of Uttarakhand, (2024) 20 SCC 620, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the testimony of a chance witness requires cautious scrutiny and that his presence at the place of occurrence must be satisfactorily explained. The facts of the present case, however, are materially different. P.W.-4 stated that he resided in Jafrabad, that his place of work was about 60–65 paces from the place of occurrence, and that he had finished work at 4 p.m. on the day of the incident. He met P.W.-2 Dilshad on his way and remained with him for about fifteen minutes before the occurrence. He also clarified that he shared no close friendship with P.W.-2 Dilshad and merely exchanged customary greetings with him as a neighbour. His presence in the locality at that time and place was, therefore, natural and satisfactorily explained. He cannot be treated as a chance witness whose presence at the scene was doubtful merely because he happened to be there when the occurrence took place. P.W.-4’s testimony, however, must be appreciated in light of his own account of what he witnessed. He stated that, upon hearing the shout, he and the others rushed towards the spot and saw the appellant assaulting deceased Hasan Abbas and thereafter P.W.-3 Ali Abbas. His evidence, therefore, does not establish that he witnessed the first blow inflicted upon Hasan Abbas. On this aspect, his testimony corroborates P.W.-3 Ali Abbas, regarding the continuation of the assault and the appellant’s subsequent flight. We accordingly accept the evidence of P.W.-4 to that limited extent.
The FIR account and the investigation record names Lallan Verma, the tractor driver, Chandi Prasad Yadav, the milk vendor, and Nazar Abbas alias Thakur, son of Mohammad Zafar, as persons present when the tractor-trolley was parked and the conversation preceding the occurrence took place. P.W.-9 Kailash Nath Singh, the Investigating Officer, confirmed that he had recorded their statements. However, none of these persons was examined by the prosecution nor were the witnesses to the inquest or to the memo concerning the seizure of blood-stained earth examined. Even the learned trial court did not address this omission. Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“Evidence Act”) does not require the prosecution to examine any particular number of witnesses. The quality of the evidence, rather than its quantity, is material. Likewise, an adverse inference under Section 114, Illustration (g) of the Evidence Act, is not automatic merely because a witness named in the FIR or during investigation has not been examined. The question is whether material evidence has been withheld without adequate explanation. In the present case, the non-examination of Lallan Verma assumes particular significance. He was admittedly present when the tractor-trolley was parked and, according to P.W.-2 Dilshad Hussain, was standing about 20–25 paces to its north. He was therefore, a material witness who could have shed light on how the dispute arose and the circumstances in which the assault began. His non-examination remains unexplained and warrants caution in appreciating the prosecution evidence. Nevertheless, this omission, by itself, does not falsify the testimony of the injured witness, P.W.-3 Ali Abbas, whose account is cogent and finds corroboration in the medical evidence. Accordingly, notwithstanding the omission to examine the aforesaid witnesses, the testimony of P.W.-3 Ali Abbas supported by the medical evidence and corroborated by P.W.-4 Gulfam Haider, regarding the continuation of the assault and the appellant’s flight, establishes that the appellant inflicted knife injuries upon deceased Hasan Abbas, which resulted in his death, and also injured P.W.-3 Ali Abbas during the dispute concerning the tractor-trolley. The omission does, however, remain a relevant circumstance in assessing the precise manner in which the occurrence unfolded and the appellant’s plea of private defence, which must be considered separately.
The appellant further contends that, although P.W.-6 Sabhajeet Pal, stated that the knife, the shirt and the earth were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, neither the laboratory report nor any report of a serologist was exhibited. P.W.-8 Head Constable Shiv Ji Mishra, stated that a report had been received and handed over to the Investigating Officer. It is also pointed out that no fingerprint evidence was produced. Further, while P.W.-8 stated on 26.03.2003 that the knife was not before the Court, P.W.-9 Kailash Nath Singh, subsequently identified it as Material Ex. 1 on 15.12.2003. These circumstances, according to appellant, cast doubt on the evidentiary value of the alleged recovery. Significantly, the learned trial court did not base the conviction under Sections 302 and 324 IPC on the recovery of the knife, rather, in Sessions Trial No. 211/1994, the appellant was acquitted on account of the recovery not having been proved. This Court, too, excludes the alleged recovery from consideration. Consequently, no reliance can be placed on the recovery memo (Ex. Ka-7), including the assertion recorded therein that the appellant admitted having used the knife on the preceding evening. Such an admission, allegedly made to a police officer while the appellant was in custody, is inadmissible under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act nor can it be brought within the exception under Section 27, since the knife was allegedly found on the appellant’s person at the time of his arrest and was not discovered in consequence of any information supplied by him. In Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67, the Privy Council clarified that Section 27 of the Evidence Act permits proof only of that part of the information received from an accused in custody which relates distinctly to a fact discovered in consequence thereof, and it does not render admissible a confession concerning the past use of an object where no such discovery has resulted from the information.
The question, therefore, is whether the absence of a forensic report linking the knife or the other seized articles to the occurrence undermines the finding that the appellant inflicted the injuries upon deceased-Hasan Abbas and P.W.-3 Ali Abbas. In the facts of the present case, we are of the view that it does not, though the omission on the part of the investigating agency deserves notice. The forensic examination of a weapon or clothing may provide scientific corroboration by establishing the presence and, where possible, the origin of bloodstains. Its absence, however, does not invariably defeat the prosecution case. Where the testimony of an eyewitness is reliable and is corroborated by medical evidence, the failure to recover or scientifically link the weapon to the crime is not, by itself, fatal. In the present case, the appellant was named in the FIR, and his identity was not in dispute. The occurrence took place in front of his house, and the dispute concerning the tractor-trolley is substantially consistent with his own version. More importantly, the appellant's plea of private defence itself proceeds on the assertion that he snatched and used the knife against deceased Hasan Abbas. The central question, therefore, is not whether the recovered knife was scientifically linked to the occurrence, but whether the prosecution has established through reliable evidence that the appellant inflicted the fatal and other injuries. As discussed above, the testimony of the injured witness P.W.-3 Ali Abbas is supported by the medical evidence and receives corroboration from P.W.-4 Gulfam Haider regarding the continuation of the assault. The appellant's contention that the recovery cannot be relied upon without proof that the blood on the knife matched that of the deceased is correct to the extent that no such scientific link has been established. However, the prosecution case does not depend upon the recovery, which has already been excluded from consideration. The absence of forensic evidence consequently does not displace the direct evidence otherwise available on record. At the same time, the investigating agency's failure to place the laboratory report on record, despite having sent the seized articles for examination, remains an unexplained lapse. The Court cannot presume what the report would have disclosed, nor can the omission be treated as affirmative corroboration of the prosecution case. Its effect must be assessed alongside the entire evidence, and not in isolation. On the facts of this case, the lapse does not discredit the otherwise reliable ocular and medical evidence establishing the appellant's role in causing the injuries. The separate question whether the circumstances in which those injuries were inflicted attract the offence of murder or fall within the appellant's plea of private defence must, however, be considered independently.
The appellant further contends that his acquittal under the Arms Act demonstrates that the alleged recovery of the knife was fabricated and, consequently, undermines the testimony of P.W.-3 Ali Abbas. This submission cannot be accepted. First, the learned trial court did not record a finding that the recovery was fabricated. It held that the charge under the Arms Act had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, having regard to the absence of independent witnesses, the non-examination of the police party and the unexplained delay in recording the information concerning the seizure of the weapon. A failure to establish the charge of unlawful possession does not, by itself, establish that the recovery was fabricated or render otherwise independent evidence of the assault unreliable. Secondly, the charge under the Arms Act related to the alleged possession of the knife on 19.02.1994 at about 2:45 p.m., at a place different from that of the occurrence on 18.02.1994. The ingredients of the two sets of offences are distinct. The failure to prove unlawful possession of the weapon at the time and place alleged does not necessarily entail failure to prove that the appellant used a knife during the preceding day's assault. Thirdly, none of the eyewitnesses testified to the alleged recovery, nor was the knife recovered on 19.02.1994 identified by them as the weapon used in the assault. The prosecution case concerning the actual occurrence must, therefore, be assessed independently of the disputed recovery. Fourthly, the prosecution evidence cannot be treated as an indivisible whole, to be either accepted or rejected in its entirety. The Court may accept a part of the evidence that inspires confidence while excluding another part that remains unproved. In the present case, the recovery has already been excluded from consideration, and the finding regarding the assault rests on the testimony of P.W.-3 Ali Abbas, corroborated by the medical evidence and, to the extent discussed above, by P.W.-4 Gulfam Haider. The acquittal in Sessions Trial No. 211/1994 under the Arms Act has attained finality and is not disturbed. That acquittal, however, does not by itself invalidate the independent evidence establishing the appellant's role in the assault.
The learned counsel for the appellant further contends that, being alone, the appellant could not have inflicted knife injuries upon both deceased Hasan Abbas and P.W.-3 Ali Abbas. This submission does not find support in the evidence. The prosecution case is that the appellant was armed with a knife, whereas the two brothers were unarmed. Hasan Abbas sustained four incised wounds, while P.W.-3 Ali Abbas, sustained two. According to P.W.-3, the appellant attacked him only after Hasan had fallen and he had raised an alarm. He further stated that, upon being struck, he fell into a drain, while the other persons present were some distance away and did not intervene. There is nothing inherently improbable in an assailant armed with a knife inflicting injuries upon two persons in quick succession, particularly when the assaults occur one after the other. The fact that the appellant was confronted by two persons does not, by itself, render the account of P.W.-3 improbable, nor does the failure of others to intervene necessarily cast doubt on his testimony, having regard to the suddenness of the occurrence and the presence of a knife. Accordingly, this contention does not discredit the testimony of P.W.-3 or create a reasonable doubt as to the appellant’s ability to inflict the injuries described. We find that the evidence supports the conclusion that the appellant assaulted both brothers.
The above argument cannot, moreover, be reconciled with the appellant’s own plea. His case is that he took the knife from deceased Hasan Abbas and used it. If this plea is considered, it by itself accepts that the appellant, with the knife in his hand, caused the injuries on both brothers. More so, it cannot be said in the same breath that the appellant could not have done so. The injuries on the appellant, considered next, show only that he was struck, they do not show that he was overpowered or prevented by the deceased Hassan Abbas and P.W.-3 Ali Abbas from using the knife.
The learned counsel for the appellant relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar, (1976) 4 SCC 394, to contend that the prosecution’s failure to explain the injuries sustained by the appellant renders its case doubtful and supports the plea of private defence. In that decision, the Supreme Court in Para 12 held that the non-explanation of injuries sustained by an accused during the same occurrence may, in appropriate circumstances, indicate that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis of the incident or has not presented its true version. The Court also clarified, however, that the principle is not absolute and that its application depends upon the nature of the injuries and the reliability of the prosecution evidence. In the present case, the appellant’s injury report records eighteen simple injuries caused by a hard and blunt object. However, the medical evidence does not reliably establish that these injuries were sustained during the occurrence on 18.02.1994. As discussed above, D.W.-1 Dr. S.S. Tiwari, gave differing estimates regarding their age, while P.W.-9, the Investigating Officer, stated that the appellant sustained injuries at the time of his arrest on 19.02.1994. The prosecution witnesses also denied that the appellant had been beaten or dragged during the occurrence. The principle laid down in Lakshmi Singh (supra) does not require the Court to presume that injuries found on an accused were sustained during the occurrence. The necessary factual connection must first be established. In the absence of reliable evidence linking the appellant’s injuries to the incident, the prosecution’s failure to explain their cause does not, by itself, render its case doubtful. Further, the appellant’s plea of private defence must be assessed in the light of the entire evidence. The mere existence of injuries on his person does not establish that the deceased Hassan Abbas or P.W.-3 Ali Abbas initiated a physical assault or that the appellant acted in the exercise of a right of private defence. Having regard to the evidence discussed above, we find no basis to accept the appellant’s contention or to conclude that the prosecution has suppressed the true genesis of the occurrence.
D.W.-1 Dr. S.S. Tiwari, examined the appellant on 21.02.1994 at 9:40 a.m. and recorded eighteen injuries, all simple in nature and caused by a hard and blunt object in the injury report (Ex. Kha-1). The examination took place approximately 64 hours after the occurrence, which allegedly took place at 5:35 p.m. on 18.02.1994. In his examination-in-chief, the doctor stated that the injuries could have been sustained at the time of the occurrence. However, in cross-examination, he explained that an estimate of “two days” meant approximately 48 hours, and that the injuries could have been sustained at around 9:40 a.m. on 19.02.1994, allowing a margin of six hours either way. The learned trial court accepted the latter estimate, which places the possible time of the injuries between approximately 3:40 a.m. and 3:40 p.m. on 19.02.1994. This period does not coincide with the time of the occurrence and includes the time of the appellant’s arrest, recorded as 2:45 p.m. on the same day. P.W.-9, Kailash Nath Singh, the Investigating Officer, stated that the appellant sustained injuries at the time of his arrest and had no injuries on his body beforehand. The learned A.G.A. and counsel for the complainant rely on this evidence to oppose the plea of private defence. We find no sufficient ground to disturb the trial court’s assessment. The statement made by D.W.-1 in his examination-in-chief was only that the injuries could have been sustained at the time of the occurrence. His explanation in cross-examination was more specific as to their possible age, and no other medical opinion was produced to contradict it. The defence led no further evidence to establish that the eighteen injuries had been sustained during the occurrence on 18.02.1994, nor does the appellant’s statement under Section 313 of the Code, in which he attributed his injuries to an assault by Hasan Abbas and Ali Abbas, establish the connection between those injuries and the occurrence. The prosecution witnesses denied that the appellant had been beaten, dragged or had his spectacles broken, while P.W.-4 Gulfam Haider, specifically stated that the appellant had no injuries. The medical evidence, viewed alongside the testimony of the Investigating Officer, does not make the appellant’s account more probable. It is true that injuries sustained by an accused during the same occurrence may be a material circumstance in considering a plea of private defence. However, the mere existence of injuries does not, by itself, establish that they were sustained during the occurrence or that the accused was acting in self-defence. The assessment must turn on the nature and timing of the injuries and the evidence as a whole. In the present case, the evidence does not sufficiently connect the appellant’s injuries with the incident of 18.02.1994. We therefore find no basis to infer, from the injury report alone, that the appellant sustained those injuries in the course of the occurrence or that his plea of private defence is thereby rendered probable.
At this stage it would be apposite to mention that the court is conscious of the following. The arrest memo (Ex. Ka-7) records that the appellant ran, was chased about 150 paces and was caught; it records no injury. No medical examination of the appellant at the time of arrest or on production before the Magistrate is on the record. Eighteen contusions and abrasions are a considerable number to ascribe to an arrest of that kind, and the prosecution has not explained how they came to be caused. These are shortcomings in the investigation. They do not, however, establish that the injuries were caused in the occurrence, which is the fact the appellant had to make probable; at most they leave open how and when, after the occurrence, the injuries were caused, a question that this Court need not resolve.
In any event, even if it be assumed in favour of the appellant that the injuries were sustained in the occurrence, the result does not change. The injuries are all simple, caused by a hard blunt object, and are contusions and abrasions, the larger ones on the thighs, legs and buttocks; there is no incised, stab or other penetrating wound, none on the chest or abdomen, and on the head only a contusion around the left eye. They are not of a kind that makes the account of the occurrence of the prosecution case doubtful, given by an injured eyewitness and corroborated by the medical evidence, and they do not warrant the inference that the genesis has been suppressed.
The appellant has also raised the plea of private defence. Sections 96 to 106 IPC recognise the right of private defence of the body and property, while Section 100 permits the voluntary causing of death in exercise of that right only in specified circumstances, including where the assault reasonably gives rise to an apprehension of death or grievous hurt. The right is, however, subject to Section 99, which prohibits the infliction of more harm than is necessary for the purpose of defence. The principles governing this right stand settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2010) 2 SCC 333 in Para 58. The right of private defence is preventive, not punitive. Its exercise depends upon a reasonable apprehension of danger and does not require the accused to wait until an injury is actually inflicted. Equally, the accused is not required to establish the plea beyond reasonable doubt. Under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, the burden may be discharged on a preponderance of probabilities, by relying upon the prosecution evidence, the defence evidence or the circumstances of the case. The evidence must be assessed realistically, without weighing the situation of the accused with undue precision. In the present case, the appellant relies upon his statement under Section 313 of the Code and the testimony of D.W.-1 Dr. S.S. Tiwari, in support of the plea. These materials must be examined alongside the evidence concerning the commencement of the quarrel, the sequence of the assault, the injuries sustained by the deceased and P.W.-3 Ali Abbas, and the circumstances in which the appellant himself sustained injuries. The question is whether the evidence, taken as a whole, makes it probable that the appellant acted to protect himself against an imminent threat of death or grievous hurt, and whether the force used was within the limits prescribed by law.
Measured against these principles, the appellant’s plea of private defence cannot be accepted. First, the eighteen injuries recorded on the appellant were all simple in nature and caused by a hard and blunt object. There was no incised wound or cut, and no injury to the chest or abdomen; the only injury to the head was a contusion around the left eye. As discussed above, the evidence does not establish that these injuries were sustained during the occurrence. In any event, their nature does not, in the circumstances of this case, establish a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt. Secondly, the appellant’s assertion that deceased Hasan Abbas attacked him with a knife, which he then snatched in self-defence, finds no support in the evidence. None of the witnesses stated that either brother was armed, nor was any weapon reported to have been found at the spot. The prosecution witnesses consistently stated that it was the appellant who took out the knife and attacked Hasan Abbas. Although the absence of cuts on the hands or arms of the appellant is not conclusive, it does not lend support to his account of having disarmed a knife-wielding assailant. Thirdly, the nature and extent of the injuries inflicted are inconsistent with the exercise of a right of private defence on the facts established. The appellant inflicted four incised wounds upon Hasan Abbas, including deep wounds to the chest, and thereafter inflicted two incised wounds upon P.W.-3 Ali Abbas. Nothing in the evidence establishes an imminent threat that could reasonably have required the use of a knife in this manner. The limits prescribed by Section 99 IPC cannot be disregarded where the circumstances giving rise to the right of private defence have not been established in the first place. Fourthly, the appellant’s version does not explain the assault upon P.W.-3 Ali Abbas. According to P.W.-3 Ali Abbas raised an alarm after Hasan Abbas was struck, whereupon the appellant turned towards him, pursued him for about twenty paces and inflicted knife injuries upon him. Such conduct, particularly after Hasan Abbas had fallen, is inconsistent with an act undertaken merely to ward off an imminent attack. The right of private defence is preventive and ceases when the apprehension of danger has passed; it cannot justify pursuing and injuring a person in the absence of a continuing threat. Fifthly, the defence adopted inconsistent positions while cross-examining the prosecution witnesses. On the one hand, it was suggested that P.W.-3 Ali Abbas was not present at the occurrence and that his injuries had been fabricated. On the other, the appellant claimed that P.W.-3 Ali Abbas, along with deceased Hasan Abbas, had attacked him. These versions are difficult to reconcile. While an accused may raise alternative pleas, the evidence must still make the plea of private defence reasonably probable. In the present case, neither version finds sufficient support in the evidence on record. The plea of private defence cannot rest on the mere existence of injuries on the appellant or on a version unsupported by the surrounding circumstances. Having regard to the origin of the quarrel, the evidence concerning the commencement of the assault, the nature and location of the injuries inflicted upon deceased Hasan Abbas, and the subsequent attack upon P.W.-3 Ali Abbas, we find that the appellant has failed to establish, even on a preponderance of probabilities, that he acted in the exercise of a right of private defence. The contention is accordingly rejected.
Thus, the plea of private defence is not made out. The conclusion of the learned trial court on the plea is upheld.
Another contention raised by the appellant is that the offence at best is culpable homicide not amounting to murder, by Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Section 300 IPC is reproduced hereinbelow for reference:
“300.Murder.—Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or— 2ndly.—If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or— 3rdly.—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or — 4thly.—If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
Exception 1.—When culpable homicide is not murder.—
Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.
The above exception is subject to the following provisos:—
First.—That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.
Secondly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.
Thirdly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.
Explanation.—Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.
Exception 2.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.
Exception 3.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused.
Exception 4. — Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
Explanation. — It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.
Exception 5.—Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.”
The Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC applies where culpable homicide is committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The explanation makes it immaterial which party offered the provocation or committed the first assault. The question is whether the circumstances established by the evidence satisfy these requirements. Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC, which concerns grave and sudden provocation, is also relevant to the submission insofar as it attributes the assault to the heat of the moment. However, neither exception is attracted merely because the incident arose from a sudden quarrel. The requirements of the applicable exception must be assessed against the evidence concerning the commencement of the altercation, the nature of the assault and the conduct of the parties. On the evidence accepted above, the occurrence began when the brothers asked the appellant to move the tractor-trolley, which was obstructing their passage. The appellant refused and abused them, leading to an exchange of words. There is no reliable evidence that either brother assaulted the appellant or threatened him with a weapon before he drew the knife. P.W.-3 Ali Abbas, stated that deceased Hasan Abbas was attacked while the dispute was still verbal and that the appellant turned towards him only after Hasan had fallen. The injuries allegedly sustained by the appellant have not been shown to have been caused during this occurrence. P.W.-9 Kailash Nath Singh, the Investigating Officer, attributed them to the time of arrest, and the medical evidence does not establish otherwise. The essential requirement of a sudden fight involving a mutual exchange of blows is, therefore, not satisfied. The circumstances also do not establish grave and sudden provocation of the kind contemplated by Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC. The brothers’ request to move a tractor-trolley that obstructed their passage, followed by a verbal exchange, does not, on the evidence available, disclose conduct capable of depriving the appellant of his self-control. The evidence further indicates that the appellant himself used abusive language before resorting to violence. Exception 1 is, therefore, not attracted. Even assuming that the quarrel was sudden and that the appellant acted in the heat of passion, the remaining requirements of Exception 4 are not satisfied in the present case. The appellant used a knife against deceased Hasan Abbas, who is not shown to have been armed, and inflicted four incised wounds, including penetrating injuries to the chest that damaged the heart and lung. After Hasan Abbas fell, the appellant pursued P.W.-3 Ali Abbas and inflicted two further knife injuries upon him. This sequence demonstrates that the appellant did not merely deliver a single blow in the course of a sudden scuffle but continued the assault the second person who attempted to intervene. The use of a knife against unarmed persons, the targeting of vital parts of deceased Hasan Abbas’s body and the subsequent attack on P.W.-3 Ali Abbas are circumstances indicating that the appellant took undue advantage and acted in a cruel manner. The law does not permit Exception 4 to be invoked merely because the occurrence arose from a sudden quarrel, rather all its ingredients must be established. The absence of previous enmity between the parties does not, by itself, reduce the offence from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. While the absence of premeditation is a relevant consideration, it is not conclusive. The nature of the weapon, the parts of the body targeted, the severity of the injuries and the manner in which the assault continued must also be considered. The fact that the immediate cause of the occurrence was a dispute over the tractor-trolley does not, therefore, operate in the appellant’s favour so as to bring the case within Exception 4.
The intention with which an accused inflicted the injuries must be inferred from the nature of the weapon used, the part of the body targeted, the force employed, the number of blows inflicted and the circumstances in which the assault took place (Refer Para 34, 38 and 39 of State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, (1976) 4 SCC 382). In the present case, the appellant used a knife and inflicted four incised wounds upon Hasan Abbas. These included a wound on the front of the left side of the chest, over a vital organ, and two wounds on the back of the chest. All four injuries were described as bone-deep. The wound on the front of the chest pierced the pericardium and damaged the left side of the heart, while the wound on the left side of the back penetrated the pleura and left lung. Approximately one litre of blood had accumulated in the left chest cavity. The nature, depth and location of these injuries, particularly the penetration of the chest and damage to the heart and lung, demonstrate the force with which the knife was used and the gravity of the assault. The appellant did not merely cause a superficial injury; he intentionally inflicted multiple deep incised wounds, including injuries to vital parts of the body. Applying the principles laid down from Para 13 to 20 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 37, the relevant inquiry is whether the particular bodily injury was intentionally inflicted and whether that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The prosecution need not separately establish an intention to cause death if the requirements of Section 300 Thirdly IPC are otherwise satisfied. In view of the medical evidence and the circumstances of the assault, we find that the fatal injury was not accidental or unintended. The appellant intentionally inflicted the injury, and its nature and location establish that it was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. We accordingly accept the submission of the learned A.G.A. and learned counsel for the complainant that the nature and seat of the injuries establish the requisite intention under Section 300 Thirdly IPC.
The injuries sustained by P.W.-3, Ali Abbas, stand on a separate footing. The injury report (Ex. Ka-18), proved by P.W.-10 Dr. Hari Om Srivastava, records two simple incised wounds on the left shoulder, caused by a sharp-edged weapon such as a knife. The testimony of P.W.-3 establishes that these injuries were inflicted by the appellant during the same occurrence. For the reasons already discussed, the plea of private defence is not made out. The conviction under Section 324 IPC is therefore upheld. The sentence of one year’s rigorous imprisonment is well within the limit of three years prescribed and is not excessive.
For the reasons given, this Court reaches the following conclusions:
The death of deceased Hasan Abbas was homicidal, and P.W.-3 Ali Abbas, sustained incised wounds caused by a knife.
The prosecution has established through the testimony of P.W.-3 Ali Abbas, an injured witness, corroborated by the medical evidence and, insofar as the continuation of the assault is concerned, by P.W.-4 Gulfam Haider, that the appellant inflicted the injuries upon P.W.-3 Ali Abbas.
The absence of forensic evidence linking the recovered knife to the occurrence and the appellant’s acquittal in Sessions Trial No. 211/1994 under the Arms Act do not undermine the prosecution case, which stands independently on the ocular and medical evidence.
The appellant has failed to establish that the eighteen injuries recorded on his person were sustained during the occurrence. The medical evidence and the testimony of P.W.-9 Kailash Nath Singh the Investigating Officer, support the trial court’s assessment on this aspect. In the present case, the plea of private defence is not supported by the evidence as a whole and is accordingly rejected.
The requirements of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC are not satisfied. The evidence does not establish a sudden fight involving a mutual exchange of blows, and the nature and sequence of the knife assault demonstrate that the appellant took undue advantage. The offence is, therefore, murder punishable under Section 302 IPC, and no ground is made out for altering the conviction to one under Section 304 IPC.
The conviction of the appellant under Section 324 IPC for causing injuries to P.W.-3, Ali Abbas, is also upheld. The sentences imposed by the learned trial court under Sections 302 and 324 IPC do not warrant interference.
On the aspect of sentencing, Section 302 IPC prescribes death or imprisonment for life, and the offender is also liable to fine. The learned trial court, holding that the case was not one of the rarest of rare, imposed imprisonment for life. Once the conviction under Section 302 IPC is upheld, no lesser term of imprisonment is open to this Court.
The fine of ₹5,000/- with additional rigorous imprisonment for six months in default, is within the discretion of the court and is not excessive. The sentence under Section 324 IPC is concurrent. Thus, no interference with the sentences is warranted.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The conviction of the appellant, Nazar Abbas @ Nazaroo, under Sections 302 and 324 IPC, and the sentences of imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.5,000/- (with additional rigorous imprisonment for six months in default of payment) under Section 302 IPC and of rigorous imprisonment for one year under Section 324 IPC, to run concurrently, are affirmed.
The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds are cancelled and his sureties are discharged. He shall surrender before the learned trial court to serve the remainder of his sentence, failing which the learned trial court shall take steps to secure his custody in accordance with law.
The appellant shall be entitled to set-off under Section 428 Cr.P.C. for the period of detention undergone by him during investigation, inquiry and trial and the period of incarceration undergone after conviction shall be counted towards the sentence.
The acquittal of the appellant in Sessions Trial No. 211 of 1994 under Section 4/25 of the Arms Act is not disturbed.
A copy of this judgment, together with the lower court record, be sent to the learned trial court forthwith for compliance, and a copy be communicated to the Superintendent of the concerned jail.
