High CourtsDivision Bench(2014) 05 P&H CK 0600

Nawanshahr Truck Owners Union vs State of Punjab and Others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 30 May 2014

HON’BLE JUDGES
Sanjay Kishan Kaul, C.J · Arun Palli, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Writ Petition No. 11477 of 2014 (O&M)

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Judgment

8 paragraphs · 599 words

Sanjay Kishan Kaul, C.J.—In a transportation tender floated by respondents, respondent No. 6 was declared a successful tenderer on 15.4.2014. The grievance of the petitioner was that said respondent did not have the requisite experience of two years which was a necessary qualification and that the documents submitted by it stated to be issued by Warehousing Corporation for 2010-11 and 2011-12 were forged. With this grievance, the petitioner approached this Court in CWP-8548-2014 which was disposed of by us on 6.5.2014 calling upon the respondent-authorities to take necessary decision after verifying whether respondent No. 6 did or did not possess the requisite qualifications. It is in pursuance of this direction of ours that Commissioner, Department of Food & Civil Supplies & Consumer Affairs has passed a detailed order running into 14 pages on 22.5.2014.

2.

The aforesaid order is now once again sought to be assailed before us in the present petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

3.

We may state at the outset while examining a matter of this nature, where a tender is in question, that the tender jurisdiction is created really to ensure that terms and conditions of the tender are not violated or they are not tailor-made to any party keeping in mind the varied economic activities undertaken by the Government authorities. If certain facts have escaped attention, they are directed to be examined. This Court does not sit as an appellate Court or second appellate Court over the Tender Committee as that would make the functioning of any commercial activity almost impossible.

4.

If we examine the impugned order within the aforesaid parameters, which in any case is a second level scrutiny, we find that there is no cause for our intervention. The Commissioner even granted personal hearing and permitted the respective stands to be brought on record. The petitioner sought to contend before him that experience certificate of the respondent No. 6 pertained to works which were actually done by the petitioner while the respondent No. 6 was claiming experience on the basis that one of its partners remained as a President of the petitioner-Union. The plea was that both sides could not claim experience for the same period and the certificate of respondent No. 6 was alleged to be false and forged. The finding of the Commissioner is that having gone through the relevant record, there could be no doubt about the certificate issued in favour of respondent No. 6.

5.

The certificate was issued by the Warehouse Manager. The correctness of the certificate was got verified by the Chairman of the Tender Committee as well as by the District Manager, PUNGRAIN vide their communications dated 1.4.2014 and 5.4.2014 to the higher authorities of the Warehousing Corporation who admitted having issued the certificate. Thus, really speaking, there can be no doubt about the genuineness of the certificate. In fact, the plea sought to be advanced by the petitioner now is that the Warehousing Corporation ought not to have issued certificate to respondent No. 6. There is also a finding made that the fact that a person was the President of the petitioner-Union and in that process acquired experience of transportation business was not a factor which could be ignored. The certificate was issued by the Warehousing Corporation.

6.

It does appear that it is really an intra-union dispute and, thus, the petitioner-Union is seeking to displace respondent No. 6.

7.

We find no reason to interfere with the fact findings arrived at in the impugned order given the limited scope of our scrutiny in such matters.

8.

Dismissed.