National Horticulture Board vs Jitender Kumar Sharma & 2 Ors

Karuna Nand Bajpayee, Presiding Member

This first appeal has been filed under Section 19 of the Act 1986 in challenge to the Order dated 02.12.2022 in Complaint No. 53 of 2019 of the State Commission Rajasthan.

Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and respondents no. 1 & 2 and have perused the record including inter alia the impugned Order dated 02.12.2022 of the State Commission, the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and the memo. of  appeal.

The present appeal has been filed with reported delay of 116 days.  However, the self-admitted delay is 100 days.

As the delay does not appear insignificant, learned counsel appearing for the appellant is being heard first on the delay condonation application in order to decide whether there is any good ground to condone the delay or not.

The submissions made by the learned counsel are no different from the grounds taken in the delay condonation application and they have been virtually repeated once again. Submission is that the impugned Order was passed on 02.12.2022 and the certified copy was obtained on 14.12.2022.  Thereafter legal opinion was obtained and necessary permission from concerned authorities was procured.  Further time also got consumed in approaching concerned senior officer for approval. Thereafter matter was sent to head office and the draft was prepared.  After vetting exercise of draft numerous amendments were suggested and it was re-drafted.  All this process resulted in delay of about 100 days which according to learned counsel deserves condonation.

Normally, the Bench leans favourably towards the defaulting appellant who fails to file the appeal within the limitation period.  It is ordinarily preferred to decide the case on merits rather than to thwart the cause at the very threshold on the ground of limitation.  But while saying so it does not imply that the law of limitation wherever it is provided can either be blissfully ignored or soft paddled at will.  Such kind of approach will entirety frustrate and defeat the very purpose which inspires the enactment on law of limitation.  The statutory law regarding limitation, wherever it is provided has a salutary purpose to serve, and has to be respected and complied with.  In no case can any forum judicial or quasi-judicial can ride roughshod on the solemn provisions regarding the law which provides limitation period.  It goes without saying that when a particular order attains finality it simultaneously gives rise to a right to the other side and unless there is sufficient cause, which may justify the condonation of delay and satisfy the Bench that there were justifiable reasons which explain as to why the appeal was not filed within the stipulated period of time, the Bench cannot act either whimsically or capriciously. The judicial discretion which this Bench exercises in the matters of condonation of delay is not an exercise of some kind of privilege or prerogative, it is a judicial discretion and has to be exercised judiciously.  The availability of sufficient cause has to be seen in perspective of the conspicuous facts and circumstances of each case and the onus of showing such factual basis from which may emanate the convincing grounds to vindicate the delayed filing has to be discharged by the appellant which seek judicial indulgence in this regard.

When this Bench evaluates the grounds that have been pleaded to earn condonation it feels constrained to observe that they scarcely deserve to be called vindicating grounds which may go justify the delayed filing of the appeal. The internal mechanism of the appellant is its own concerned and if before filing the appeal the file keeps shifting from one place to another it must be done with alacrity showing due diligence so that law of limitation may not be breached.  It is not the case where only some small delay of a few days is involved.  The period of delay is a yawning hiatus between the date of the impugned Order and the date of filing which can only be exempted or condoned if convincing explanation is offered which may be called sufficient cause to explain the delayed filing.  However, state of affairs as is reflected from the application seeking condonation is not a very encouraging one and is difficult to be countenanced with.  The grounds shown cannot be called tenable grounds and they speak of nothing but of internal managerial or administrative inefficiency. Being a government organization much more respect towards the law is expected and the appellant is supposed to have requisite knowledge about the law in this regard. The appellant took its own time moving with its own pace and it appears that it hardly bothered for the statutory period provided by the law to file the appeal.

The Bench does not see even a semblance of an explanation which may constitute a good ground to condone the delay. The application for condonation of delay is without worth or substance, sufficient cause to condone the delay is not at all forthcoming. As such the  Bench  has no hesitation in dismissing the application.

Resultantly the appeal stands dismissed on limitation.

The Registry is requested to send a copy each of this Order to all parties in the appeal and to their learned counsel. The stenographer is requested to upload this Order on the website of this Commission immediately.