National Highways Authority Of India & Ors. vs Purna Chandra Kahili & Anr.

Per M. S. Sonak, C.J.

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

Rule. The Rule is made returnable immediately at the request of and with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties.

The petitioner, National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), assails the judgment and order dated 06.02.2025 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna, Circuit Bench at Ranchi (Tribunal), which allowed O.A. No. 051/00446/2024 instituted by the respondent herein.

By the impugned judgment and order, the Tribunal quashed the Memorandum dated 27.06.2024 by which the 1^st respondent was reverted from the post of Deputy General Manager (Technical) to the post of Technical Assistant and directed his restoration to the post of Deputy General Manager (Technical), with all consequential benefits, including promotion and salary, with effect from 27.06.2024.

By order dated 06.08.2025, the Coordinate Bench of this Court declined the motion for an urgent hearing and further declined to stay the operation of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.02.2025 in O.A. No. 051/00446/2024.

The appellants challenged the order dated 06.08.2025 by preferring an S.L.P. against the said order. The Hon’ble Supreme Court disposed of the SLP by passing the following order on 19.08.2026:

Pursuant to the above-mentioned direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the matter was taken up out of turn, on an urgent basis, to ensure compliance with the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

The above-referred challenge arises in the context of the following facts and circumstances: -

Mr Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel for the petitioner-NHAI, submitted that the Tribunal has committed an error apparent on the face of record in holding that this Court’s judgment and order dated 08.09.2022 had already concluded that the essential educational qualifications of a degree prescribed under Column -7 in the Schedule to the 1996 Regulations would not apply in the case of promotion to the post of Manager Technical) because Column-7 & 8 had to be read and construed independently.

Mr Sinha submitted that this Court, in terms, left this issue open, and the Tribunal, based on a misreading and misconstruction, held itself bound by observations that do not even appear in this Court’s judgment and order dated 08.09.2022. He submitted that, for this error apparent on the face of the record, the Tribunal’s impugned judgment and order deserve to be set aside.

Mr Indrajit Sinha submitted that the positions of the Manager (Technical) and Deputy General Manager (Technical) were high-ranking posts in the technical section. He submitted that on a holistic and correct interpretation of the 1996 Regulations, it was apparent that the possession of a degree in civil engineering was an essential qualification for these posts. He submitted that the advertisement of August 2011 had specified that this was an essential qualification. Even the 1^st respondent applied on the premise that he fulfilled this essential qualification.

Mr Sinha therefore submitted that neither the 1^st respondent nor the CAT was justified in holding that a degree in civil engineering was not an essential qualification after the 1^st respondent’s degree from the JRN Rajasthan Vidyapeeth was recalled and cancelled under the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and directions were issued to divest candidates like the 1^st respondent of the benefits obtained by them based upon such degrees. He submitted that such approbation and reprobation cannot be allowed and the CAT has failed to appreciate these crucial aspects; the impugned judgment and order warrants interference.

Mr Indrajit Sinha submitted that the August 2011 advertisement was essentially an invitation to apply for appointment as Manager (Technical) on deputation, not for transfer on deputation. Relying on Ashok Kumar Ratilal Patel v. Union of India, reported in (2012) 7 SCC 757, Mr Indrajit Sinha contended that the essential qualifications prescribed in the advertisement would apply uniformly to in-house and out-house candidates. He submitted that applying differential qualifications would infringe Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Mr Indrajit Sinha submitted that the 1996 Regulations nowhere provide for filling up the post of Manager (Technical) by promotion. He submitted that even if the 1^st respondent’s case to the contrary is accepted, then the feeder category would be the post of Assistant Manager (Technical). He submitted that even this alleged feeder-category post requires a degree in civil engineering as an essential qualification. Therefore, he submitted that an absurd situation would arise if, for a feeder-category post, a degree in civil engineering was essential, but such a degree was construed as non-essential for the next higher post of Manager (Technical). He submitted that the interpretation which led to such absurd and startling results should not be approved by this Court.

Mr Indrajit Sinha submitted that no amount of experience can substitute for the essential qualifications prescribed under the Rules. The Tribunal’s view to the contrary, therefore, was flawed, as errors were apparent on the face of the record, and was further contrary to the law laid down in the State of M.P. v. Dharam Bir, (1998) 6 SCC 165.

Mr Indrajit Sinha submitted that the appellant had no option but to withdraw the benefits secured by the 1^st respondent based on the engineering degree which was recalled and treated as cancelled under the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He submitted that the impugned judgment and order virtually requires the appellant to act in defiance of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Orissa Lift Irrigation Corpn. Ltd. (Supra). He submitted that this is yet another ground warranting interference with the impugned judgment and order made by the Tribunal.

Finally, Mr Indrajit Sinha submitted that the posts of Manager (Technical) and Deputy General Manager (Technical) were senior technical posts. He submitted that, even if any ambiguity existed in the 1996 Regulations, it had to be resolved by holding that a degree in civil engineering was an essential qualification, and not otherwise. He submitted that allowing a person to hold such a senior post without even a basic degree in civil engineering would severely compromise public faith and endanger public safety in the engineering projects undertaken by NHAI on a routine basis.

For all these reasons, Mr Indrajit Sinha submitted that the Tribunal’s impugned judgment and order may be quashed and set aside.

Mr Ajit Kumar, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the 1^st respondent, defended the Tribunal’s impugned judgment and order based on the reasoning reflected therein. He submitted that since this Court was not sitting in appeal over the Tribunal’s judgment and order, in the absence of any error apparent on the face of record or perversity, this Court ought not to interfere with the Tribunal’s impugned judgment and order.

Mr Ajit Kumar, after taking us to the 1996 Regulations, first submitted that Regulation 5, when read with Column 6, 7 & 8 of the Schedule, makes it evident that the post of Manager (Technical) was also a post capable of being filled by promotion. He submitted that nothing in the 1996 Regulations indicates that a degree in Engineering was an essential qualification even for filling the post by promotion, as the Tribunal correctly held in the impugned judgment and order. He submitted that since the Tribunal’s view was a correct one or, in any event, the most plausible one, this Court ought not to interfere with the Tribunal’s well-reasoned judgment and order.

Mr Ajit Kumar submitted that Regulation-5, read with Columns 6, 7 & 8 of the Schedule to the 1996 Regulations, was unambiguous. Therefore, he submitted that there was no good reason to depart from the Rule of literal interpretation as was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of CCI v. SAIL, (2010) 10 SCC 744, Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92, CCE v. Universal Ferro & Allied Chemicals Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 332, Lifestyle Equities C.V. & Anr v. Amazon Technologies Inc, 2025 INSC 1190, and Gopal Krishan v. Daulat Ram, (2025) 2 SCC 804.

Mr Ajit Kumar also submitted that the word “or” in Column-8 of the Schedule to the 1996 Regulations must be read as “or” and not be read as “and” in the facts and circumstances of the present case. He submitted that the use of the word “or” in Column 8 clearly distinguishes the eligibility criteria with respect to the different modes of recruitment for the post of Manager (Technical). He relied on LIC v. D.J. Bahadur, (1981) 1 SCC 315, to support his contention.

Mr Ajit Kumar also submitted that the 1996 Regulations provide for three modes of recruitment to the post of Manager (Technical). He submitted that, for all three modes, the criteria and eligibility conditions cannot be the same. He submitted that the eligibility conditions in Columns 6 and 7 applied only to direct recruitment and not to promotions, deputation or transfer. He pointed out that several alternatives were provided in Column 8 and were separated by the expression “or”. On that basis, Mr Ajit Kumar submitted that the Tribunal’s impugned judgment and order was correct and warranted no interference.

Mr Ajit Kumar submitted that the 1^st respondent had already obtained a diploma in engineering besides working for several years in the technical section of NHAI. He submitted that after all these years, it was too much to contend that the 1^st respondent did not possess the essential requirement even for promotion to the post of Manager (Technical) or Deputy General Manager (Technical) with the NHAI.

Mr Ajit Kumar submitted that NHAI constituted a committee to determine whether a degree in civil engineering was a necessary qualification for appointment to the post of Manager (Technical) or Deputy General Manager (Technical). One member agreed with the 1^st respondent’s contention, but the other two members did not properly examine whether a degree in civil engineering was indeed necessary. Accordingly, he submitted that the impugned reversion was without proper consideration and interpretation of the 1996 Regulations and other relevant factors. Accordingly, he submitted that the Tribunal correctly interfered with the reversion order, and that the Tribunal’s impugned judgment and order require no interference.

Mr Ajit Kumar submitted that wherever the qualification degree in civil engineering was deemed essential, the 1996 Regulations have said so in clear and unambiguous terms. However, insofar as promotion is concerned, the 1996 Regulations state no such requirement. Therefore, by any mode of interpretation or construction, such a requirement would not be read into the 1996 Regulations for promotion to the post of Manager (Technical). He submitted that such a construction would be contrary to all the settled principles of statute.

Mr Ajit Kumar finally submitted that the Regulations were amended in 2022 and that the Tribunal properly considered the impact of such amendments in its impugned judgment and order. He submitted that the appellant's arguments overlook the impact of the 2022 amendments and therefore ought not to be accepted.

Finally, Mr Ajit Kumar submitted that if the appellant’s interpretations were to be accepted, then that would leave a Technical Assistant with no promotional avenues. Such an interpretation would be contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K.G.S. Bhatt, (1989) 4 SCC 635, and in O.Z. Hussain (Dr) (Ms) v. Union of India, 1990 Supp SCC 688.

For these reasons, Mr Ajit Kumar submitted that this petition should be dismissed.

The rival contentions now fall for our determination.

Much of the controversy in this matter centres on the interpretation of Regulations 4 and 5, and of columns 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the schedules, insofar as they relate to appointment to the post of Manager (Technical) with the NHAI. We have no doubt considered these provisions in juxtaposition with the others in the 1996 Regulations.

Therefore, it is only appropriate that we transcribe the above-referred provisions, insofar as they concern appointment to the post of Manager (Technical): -

On a prima facie construction of the above rules, the Coordinate Bench of this Court, in its judgment and order dated 08.09.2022 in W.P(S) No. 1269 of 2022, instituted by the 1^st Respondent in the earlier round of litigation, observed that 1996 Regulations were capable of at least two interpretations and therefore, by resorting to empty formality theory or the useless formality theory, the principles of natural justice could not have been dispensed with by the NHAI, before ordering the 1^st Respondent’s reversion.

The Coordinate Bench of this Court, in its judgment and order dated 08.09.2022, therefore set aside the reversion order but remanded the matter to the 1^st Respondent to issue a show-cause notice and then dispose of it after considering the cause that the 1^st Respondent might show in the matter. The Coordinate Bench specifically observed that it was “consciously refraining from expressing any final opinion on the interpretation of Column 8 in Schedule to 1996 Regulations relating to the promotion to the post of Manager (Technical) with the NHAI”.

The above position is quite clear on perusal of paragraphs 32 and 33 of the Coordinate Bench’s judgment and order dated 08.09.2022, which are now transcribed below for the convenience of reference: -

Despite these clear and categorical observations, the Tribunal, in its impugned judgment and order, held that the Coordinate Bench’s judgment and order dated 08.09.2022 held that a degree in Civil Engineering was not an essential qualification for promotion to the post of Manager (Technical). This was not the position taken by the Coordinate Bench in its judgment and order dated 08.09.2022.

The Coordinate Bench, while consciously refraining from expressing any opinion on the interpretation of the 1996 Regulations, merely observed that those Regulations were capable of at least two interpretations. Even this observation was made to reject the NHAI’s contention that observance of the principles of natural justice would have made no difference in this matter and would have amounted to a useless formality.

Thus, based upon the complete misreading and misconstruction of the Coordinate Bench’s judgment and order dated 08.09.2022, the Tribunal was not justified in concluding that the 1996 Regulation clearly held that there was no requirement of a degree of Civil Engineering for promotion to the post of Manager (Technical) and Deputy General Manager (Technical) for the regular employees. The Tribunal, by grossly misreading the Coordinate Bench’s judgment and order dated 08.09.2022, or by reading something that finds no place in the judgment, or by confusing a contention with a conclusion, held itself bound by a finding never rendered. This constitutes an error apparent on the face of record, and the Tribunal’s impugned judgment and order deserve to be quashed and set aside on this ground.

The record shows that the 2011 Advertisement was issued by the NHAI to invite applications from officers under the Central/State Government Department/Autonomous Body/Public Sector Undertakings for ‘appointment on deputation basis’ to the post of Manager (Technical). The advertisement clearly stated that, in case of any discrepancies in the eligibility/experience criteria, the recruitment rules under the NHAI Regulations shall prevail. The advertisement also prescribes the eligibility conditions, and one essential qualification was a degree in Civil Engineering from a reputed Institution of Technology or a recognised University.

The 2011 Advertisement also provided for an application format for the post of Manager (Technical) on deputation. Clause 11 of this format requires the applicant to state whether educational and other qualifications required for the post were satisfied. Further, if any qualification was treated equivalent to the one prescribed in the rules, the applicant was required to state the authority for the same.

The advertisement also prescribes “other conditions (Deputation)”. Clause 5 of the other conditions, based upon which the 1^st Respondent applied under the 2011 advertisement, reads as follows:

The above-referred Clause 5, which was the window under which the 1^st Respondent applied for the post of Manager (Technical), the 1^st Respondent had to establish that the post of Manager (Technical) was indeed a post capable of being filled by promotion and further, the 1^st Respondent fulfilled the eligibility condition prescribed for promotion, as on the last date for receipt of application.

Apart from Column 5 of the 1996 Regulations, which, incidentally, in respect of almost all the posts provides that they could be filled by deputation/transfer/promotion/direct recruitment, there is nothing to indicate that the post of Manager (Technical) was indeed a post capable of being filled by promotion. The 1^st respondent applied pursuant to the 2011 advertisement on the premise that he possessed a valid engineering degree.

In applying in the prescribed format, the 1st respondent even declared that he possessed the essential qualification of a degree in engineering. However, after the Hon’ble Supreme Court recalled and cancelled his degree, the 1^st respondent began contending that the post of Manager (Tech) could be filled only through promotion because column 5 of the 1996 Regulations referred to this mode, among others.

If such approbation and reprobation by the 1^st respondent is overlooked on a demurrer, and even if column 5 of the Schedule to the 1996 Regulations is construed most liberally or broadly, there is nothing in column 8 to indicate that the post of the Manager (Technical) was even capable of being filled in by promotion or the grade or feeder category from which such post should be filled in by promotion. Therefore, if the 1^st Respondent’s insistence upon the literal interpretation rule is to be followed, then we must say that the 1996 Regulations do not even contemplate filling up the post of Manager (Technical) by way of promotion.

However, even if we were to only focus on column 5, which, along with all other modes, also refers to promotion, practically in respect of all the posts in the Schedule, still, the question would remain as to what would be the feeder category or the grade from which the promotions are to be made for the post of Manager (Technical).

Mr Ajit Kumar and the Tribunal have relied upon column 8 of the Schedule to the 1996 Regulations and contended that since ‘or’ must be read disjunctively, it is sufficient if the candidates fulfil even one of the alternate eligibility requirements prescribed in column 8 and further, there was no necessity of even referring to essential education qualifications prescribed in column 7.

Though it is difficult to accept Mr Ajit Kumar’s or the Tribunal’s reasoning, column 8, with which we are concerned, refers to at least three alternatives: -

Admittedly, column 8, on which Mr Ajit Kumar and the Tribunal relied so heavily, makes no reference whatsoever to ‘promotion’ or the ‘grades’ from which promotions are to be made to the post of Manager (Technical). Therefore, the Tribunal was not justified in referring to column 8 for determining the feeder cadre or the grades, if any, from which promotions could be made to the post of Manager (Technical). The so-called three alternatives relate to the grades or categories from which the appointments are to be made on deputation/transfer and have no nexus with promotion.

In any event, the 1^st Respondent was admittedly not a candidate on the panel of Under Secretary in the Government of India possessing the educational qualification stipulated in column 7. Further, the 1^st Respondent was also not a candidate holding an analogous post in a Central/State Government Department/Autonomous Body/Public Sector Undertaking. Now, with respect, holding that, because the 1^st Respondent might have had three years of regular service in the scale of Rs. 2200-4000 or six years in the scale of Rs. 2000-3500, the 1^st Respondent would be eligible to be considered for the post of Manager (Technical) would be too absurd a proposition.

Because, by applying the literal interpretation rule so forcefully pressed on behalf of the 1^st Respondent, any employee of the NHAI with regular service in the scale of Rs 2200-4000 or six years in the scale of Rs 2000-3500 would have to be considered, irrespective of whether or not such employee had any nexus with the Technical Section of the NHAI or having no qualification of engineering whatsoever. On a literal interpretation, even NHAI employees recruited with qualifications in subjects having absolutely no nexus with engineering would then claim eligibility merely because they may have had three years regular service in the scale of Rs. 2200-4000 or six years in the scale of Rs. 2000-3500. Such tortious interpretation of the regulation would result in an absurd consequence, which cannot be countenanced.

At least prima facie, the expression following the third ‘or ’, i.e. ‘with three years regular service in the scale of Rs 2200-4000 or six years in the scale of Rs 2000-3500’, applies only to the second alternative, which refers to the deputation/transfer from candidates holding analogous posts in a Central / State Government Department / Autonomous Body / Public Sector Undertakings or if they are not holding analogous posts, then, with three / six years regular service in the prescribed grades.

From the context, it is quite clear that, first, the categories in column 8 have nothing to do with filling the post of Manager (Technical) through promotion, and second, the regulation never intended to dispense with the requirement of a degree in Civil Engineering from a reputed Institution of Technology or a recognised University.

Therefore, the Tribunal’s contrary finding is vitiated by perversity. The Tribunal's finding that the Coordinate Bench of this Court, in its judgment and order dated 08.09.2022, held that a degree is not an essential qualification for promotees is also vitiated by perversity, because the Coordinate Bench never said so in its judgment and order dated 08.09.2022. For both these reasons, the Tribunal’s impugned judgment and order deserve to be set aside.

The Tribunal also suggests, or in any event it was argued on behalf of the 1^st Respondent, that even though the 1^st Respondent may not have possessed a valid degree in Civil Engineering, nevertheless, the 1^st Respondent had substantial experience in the Technical Section and such experience must be regarded as a substitute for the absence of qualification. The Tribunal is somewhat ambiguous on this issue, but Mr Ajit Kumar contended that it was not open for the NHAI to ignore the 1^st Respondent’s experience in the Technical Section after he obtained a diploma in engineering.

However, upon due consideration of this contention and reasoning, we are unable to subscribe to it either on principle or on the precedent in State of M.P. and Another versus Dharam Bir (Supra).

In principle, the eligibility conditions set out in an advertisement or in the rules cannot be diluted by holding that the absence of the prescribed educational qualifications can be made good by relying on experience. The 1996 regulations do not, either expressly or impliedly, permit such a construction. The advertisement under which the 1^st respondent applied for and secured the post also does not permit such a construction.

The rules, regulations and even the advertisement are sacrosanct, in the sense that any deviation from their express terms, if at all permissible, cannot be made without amending the rules or the advertisement. Otherwise, the principle of equal opportunity enshrined in Article 16 would be rendered a casualty. Besides, the argument similar to that now raised by Mr Ajit Kumar was rejected by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Dharam Bir (Supra).

In State of M.P. v. Dharam Bir (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court was concerned with the position of Principal, Class I, and the contention was that the requirement of possessing a degree or Diploma in Engineering from a recognised university or Board, along with five years’ experience of working in any Technical Institute or in any reputed business concern, applied only to direct recruits but not to promotees, was rejected. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the requirement of possessing a degree or Diploma in Engineering applies to both direct recruits and promotees.

Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court rejected the contention that, though the incumbent did not possess a degree or diploma in Engineering, since he had worked as Principal for a long time and had acquired sufficient experience in that post, he ought not to be reverted to Vice Principal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the above-referred plea was without merit.

Further, the argument based on a ‘human approach’ was rejected on the ground that courts or tribunals have no power to override the mandatory provisions of the rules on the basis of a sympathetic consideration that a person, though not possessing an essential qualification, should be allowed to continue in the post merely on the basis of his experience. The Court observed that such an order would amount to altering or amending the statutory provisions made by the Government under Article 309 of the Constitution.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the experience gained by the respondent from working in the post in question for over a decade cannot be equated with the educational qualifications required of a candidate as a condition for eligibility for promotion to higher posts. If the Government, in exercise of its executive powers, has created certain posts, it is for it to prescribe the mode of appointment, or the qualifications candidates must possess before appointment to those posts.

The Hon’ble Court further noted that the educational qualification of a degree or diploma in Engineering has a direct nexus with the nature of the post, i.e., Principal of a Technical Institute. The Court noted that the Principal may also have occasions to take classes and teach students. A person who does not hold either a degree or a diploma in Engineering cannot possibly teach the students of an industrial training institute the technicalities of the subject of Engineering and its various branches.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that a compounder cannot, merely based on experience, claim a post made exclusively for persons with an MBBS or other higher degrees in Medicine or Surgery. The Court held that allowing such a plea would relax the rule relating to educational qualifications. Such power of relaxation cannot be usurped by a Court or Tribunal.

The argument based on literal interpretation, or on the circumstances in which ‘or’ must be read as ‘or’ rather than as ‘and’, is hardly relevant. This is because column 8, which refers to the expression ‘or’ at least three times, nowhere states that the alternate qualifications are for promotees. Rather, column 8 deals only with appointments to be made by deputation/transfer. Therefore, though the proposition relied upon by Mr Ajit Kumar admits of no doubt, it would not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

Even Mr Indrajit’s contention that ‘or’ should be read as ‘and’ need not be decided in this matter, given the phraseology in column 8 and the fact that this column does not prescribe any feeder grade or the grade from which promotions are to be effected for the post of Manager (Technical).

The argument based upon the 2022 Regulations or the 2022 Amendments to the existing Regulations also cannot be accepted. Admittedly, the 2022 Regulations/Amendments are not even remotely attracted in the present case. Merely because some creases may have been ironed out in the 2022 Amendments, there is no reason to hold that under the Regulations before such amendments, the essential qualifications of having a Degree in Civil Engineering did not even apply for promotion to the post of Manager (Technical). This assumes that the post of Manager (Technical) could be filled by promotion from Technical Assistants who were not even in the feeder grade or in the next lower post of Assistant Manager (Technical).

Granting relief to the 1^st respondent would imply defiance of the express directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Orissa Lift Irrigation Corpn. Ltd. (supra), because, in this case, the benefit of promotion obtained by the 1^st respondent was based on his B. Tech Degree from the JRN Rajasthan Vidyapeeth through a distance education course.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court not only recalled and cancelled such degrees but also directed that all benefits, such as promotion, obtained by the candidates based on such degrees would stand recalled. Any inaction by the appellant in failing to give effect to the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s directions and in failing to recall the promotions secured by the 1^st respondent would amount to disobedience of the express directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Accordingly, this is yet another reason why the Tribunal was not justified in quashing the order reverting the 1^st respondent from the post of Deputy General Manager (Technical) to that of Technical Assistant.

In this matter, we are conscious of the limits of judicial review. However, this is a case of complete misreading and misconstruction of the Coordinate Bench’s judgment and order dated 08.09.2022 and the 1996 Regulations. If the Tribunal’s view is allowed to prevail, it would amount not only to allowing the 1^st Respondent to approbate and reprobate, but also to defying the directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case of Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited (Supra).

This is a case of errors apparent on the face of record in the Tribunal’s impugned judgment and order. In such circumstances, following the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, [AIR 2015 SC 545] and Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Science and Another versus Bikartan Das and Others [(2023) 16 SCC 462], this Court would be obliged to interfere.

Neither the 1996 Regulations nor the advertisement demonstrated any feeder category or grade from which promotions were contemplated to the post of Manager (Technical). Normally, the immediate lower post, i.e. Assistant Manager (Technical), would be the feeder grade if the post of Manager (Technical) was intended to be filled by promotion. For the post of Assistant Manager (Technical), a degree in Civil Engineering is prescribed as an essential qualification.

Therefore, if we were now to accept the Tribunal’s reasoning in the impugned judgment and order, a degree in Civil Engineering would be an essential qualification for appointment to the post of Assistant Manager (Technical) but not for the post of Manager (Technical). In any event, if an Assistant Manager (Technical) already possessing a degree in Civil Engineering were the feeder grade, it may not have been necessary to provide for the same qualification again if the post of Manager (Technical) could be filled by promotion. Since that is clearly not the case, we are unable to uphold the Tribunal’s reasoning. This reasoning rests on an obvious misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provisions and is based on reasons that are clearly wrong in law.

The decisions in KGS Bhatt (Supra) and O. Z. Hussain (Supra) will not apply to the facts of the present case. Firstly, the Respondents never challenged the regulations on the ground that no promotional avenues existed from the post of Technical Assistant. Secondly, even if we were to assume that a promotional channel was available, it could never have been from a Group-C post directly to a Group-A post, even if the 1^st Respondent had possessed a basic degree in Civil Engineering.

The 1^st Respondent, based upon the gross misinterpretation of regulation and a Civil Engineering Degree obtained by him from an unrecognised University or a Civil Engineering Degree which was later recalled and cancelled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court itself, having secured some position, cannot resist the directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court for withdrawal of such benefits. The Hon’ble Supreme Court granted only limited protection against recovery of the financial benefits received.

The NHAI is not recovering any financial benefits, but it was not only justified but duty-bound to comply with the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s specific directions to withdraw the benefits obtained by candidates based on engineering degrees that were liable to be recalled and cancelled.

For all the above reasons, we allow this petition, quash and set aside the Tribunal’s impugned judgment and order dated 06.02.2025 and restore the Memorandum dated 27.06.2024 reverting the 1^st respondent from the post of Deputy General Manager (Technical) to the post of Technical Assistant.

The Rule is made absolute in the above terms without any order for costs. IAs, if pending, will not survive and are disposed of.