Natha Singh vs Bikkar Singh

Pritpal Singh, J.

This is a second appeal by the defendants Natha Singh and five others against the judgment and decree dated April 5, 1976 of the District Judge, Faridkot, affirming the decision of the trial Court by which a decree for possession of the suit land was passed in favour of the plaintiffsrespondents Bikkar Singh and Baljinder Singh against them.

The undisputed facts are that Gurnam Kaur was owner of the land in dispute situated in village Kameana in District Faridkot. She made a gift of this land in favour of the plaintiffs Bikkar Singh and Baljinder Singh. The land was in possession of the defendantsappellants. A suit for possession was filed by the plaintiffs against the appellants on the plea that the latter were in illegal occupation of the same. The appellants inter alia pleaded that Nachhattar Singh, one of them is tenant of the land and as such he can be ejected only in due course of law in a proper forum. The trial Court, as well as the first appellate Court discounted the plea of the appellants and held that the possession of Nachhattar Singh is not proved to be in the capacity of a tenant. As a net result of this finding the plaintiff''s suit for possession was decreed against the appellants.

The sole point urged by the learned appellants'' counsel is that the Courts below have come to a wrong conclusion that Nachhattar Singh appellant is not proved to be in possession as a tenant. It is submitted that the Khasra Girdawaris of this land contain the entries which indicate that Nachhattar Singh appellant is occupying the land as a tenant. It is, therefore, contended that relying upon the Khasra Girdawari entries Nachhattar Singh may be held to be a tenant of the land in dispute and resultantly the plaintiffs'' suit for possession may be dismissed. I am unable to accept this contention on two grounds. Firstly, it is a pure finding of fact concurrently arrived at by the trial Court and the first appellate Court and as such it is not possible to upset the same in second appeal. Secondly, there is no infirmity in the finding given by the Courts below that no presumption of truth is attached to the entries in the Khasra Girdawaris and, therefore, in the absence of a positive evidence regarding creation of tenancy in favour of Nachhattar Singh it is not possible to hold simply on the basis of the Khasra Girdawari entries that Nachhattar Singh is occupying the land in the capacity of a tenant. It is wellsettled that entries in the Khasra Girdawari can be looked into a piece of evidence in proof of possession of land. Since presumption of truth is not attached to such entries they cannot be considered evidence of title. The learned appellants'' counsel placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Khiali Ram etc. v. Sant Lal, 1972 Cur L.J 402, which, I find, is of no help to his case. The proposition propounded in this judgment is that Khasra Girdawari entries are the record of the acts of a public servant performed in the discharge of his official duties and are, therefore, relevant under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is nowhere held in this judgment that the entries in the Khasra Girdawari are sufficient to prove the existence of landlord and tenant relationship between the parties in the absence of other cogent material which ought to be produced to prove this relationship.

Thus, I find no reason to interfere with the concurrent finding of fact given by the Courts below that possession of Nachhattar Singh is not proved to be in the capacity of a tenant. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed with costs.