Narmadabai vs Vijay Uttamchand Bothra and Others

Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties.

The present petition challenges order of the respondent No.4-Tahsildar, passed on 20^th May 2022, in Revenue proceedings No.M.R.C. 81/Yelgaon/43/2019-2020. It also prays for allowing the application of the petitioner filed before the said respondent seeking implementation of order of restoration of possession.

Facts as can be seen from the averments in the petition are as under :

The petitioner herein being a tribal, filed proceedings under Section 36(2) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 seeking setting aside/cancellation of sale-deeds dated 23.10.1992 and 14.09.1994 and for restoration of possession of the Petitioner.

The said proceedings came to be decided on 27.09.1996 by the respondent No.4 - Tahsildar, Buldhana thereby allowing the same and cancelling the said sale-deeds. It was also directed that possession of the suit property be handed over to the petitioner free from encumbrances.

Being aggrieved by the said order of the Tahsildar, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 being purchasers challenged it before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur. However, the appeal was dismissed by the Revenue Tribunal on 24.04.2018. The respondent Nos.1 and 2 filed a writ petition before this Court challenging the order of the Tribunal as also the Tahsildar by filing a Writ Petition No.7340/2018, which (as per the averments in the petition) is pending till date. In the backdrop of these facts, on 19.08.2019 the petitioner herein filed an application before the Tahsildar for implementation of the order dated 27.09.2006. The said application was decided by the Tahsildar thereby rejecting the claim for implementation of the said order, but directing that a mutation entry be done in favour of respondent Nos.5 and 6. It is this order which is impugned in the present petition.

I have heard Mr. A. A. Naik, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sanket R. Charpe, learned Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. D.V. Chauhan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Parth Malviya, Advocate for respondent Nos.5 and 6.

Mr. Naik, Senior Advocate strenuously argued that the Tahsildar gravely erred in indirectly rejecting the claim for implementation and in turn directing that a mutation be done in favour of respondent Nos.5 and 6. It is his submission that under Section 36 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 the Tahsildar acts as a delegate of the Collector and, therefore, he cannot work in a dual capacity so as to direct mutation. He further submits that the direction for mutation was without any inquiry as contemplated under Section 150 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.

Mr. Naik, Senior Advocate would submit that a fraud has been played on the Court, since by deleting the name of the petitioner a compromise decree is obtained behind her back and she has been put to serious inconvenience due to that. He further submits that the impugned order does not take into consideration this fact and proceeds on a premise that the order of the Civil Court recording compromise, being in a later point of time, has to be implemented. He, therefore, submits that the order being non est in law, is liable to be set aside. It is his submission that while acting under the provisions of Section 36 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 the Tahsildar only acts as a delegate of the Collector and, therefore, cannot transgress the boundaries of delegation. The appropriate authority for effecting mutation, even though would be the Tahsildar, while acting as a delegate of the Collector, the Tahsildar cannot on his own direct the mutation of the names of respondent Nos.5 and 6. It is, therefore, his submission that the authority had no jurisdiction for directing mutation, as he only acts as a delegate of the Collector and not as an independent authority. He also submits that the impugned order does not take into consideration the finding of this Court in the earlier round of litigation that the compromise is not binding on the present Petitioner.

By pointing out to me the provisions of Sections 29, 30, and 36 of the Guardians and Wards Act,1890 it is his submission that the appointment of guardian as per the provisions of the said Act is voidable and not void. As far as existence of alternate remedy in the form of appeal is concerned, it is the submission of the learned Senior Advocate that the order of the Tahsildar, being without jurisdiction, would certainly be amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court. He places reliance on judgments in :

On the other hand, Mr. D.V. Chauhan, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos.5 and 6 submits that at the threshold this Court would be aware of the fact that the present petition cannot be an appeal in disguise. He submits that there are various disputed questions of fact which arise in the second appeal and, therefore, this Court would be reluctant to interfere in writ jurisdiction.

He points out to me the history of the litigation, which is as under :

The dispute concerns agricultural land bearing Block/Gat No.444, admeasuring 2 Hectares, 38 R, situated at Yelgaon, Tahsil and District Buldhana.

The grandfather of respondent Nos.5 and 6 applied under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 on 07.10.1988 for declaration as a legal guardian. On 22.02.1989 order was passed in Guardians and Wards Case No.13/1988, which contemplated investment of amounts for the minors with the grandfather acting as a guardian. Accordingly, a guardianship certificate was issued in favour of Ramchandra Balaji Gaikwad as a guardian of present respondent Nos.5 and 6, they being minors at the relevant time. Then, on 12.12.1989, the grandfather, acting as a guardian of respondent Nos.5 and 6, executed a sale-deed in favour of the present petitioner Narmadabai. The said petitioner in turn executed a sale-deed on 23.10.1992 in favour of present respondent Nos.1 and 2. The property thereafter also changed hands, since the said respondent Nos.1 and 2 executed a sale-deed on 14.09.1994 in favour of respondent No. 3.

It was in the conspectus of these facts that the petitioner Narmadabai initiated proceedings seeking cancellation and restoration. The said proceedings were filed on 27.01.2004 and on 27.09.2006 the Tahsildar, vide his order of the even date, cancelled the sale-deeds dated 23.10.1992 and 14.09.1994 and directed restoration of possession to Narmadabai, i.e. the present petitioner. Thereafter, respondent Nos.5 and 6 instituted Regular Civil Suit No.192/2012 challenging the transaction dated 12.12.1989 and claiming possession from respondent Nos.1 to 3. Initially, the plaint in the suit was rejected, but the said rejection was set aside by the District Judge. It is a matter of record that in the said suit, the plaintiffs therein, i.e. the present respondent Nos.5 and 6 have deleted the present petitioner as a party defendant No.4 from the array of defendants. Thereafter, the said suit was compromised between the parties i.e. the respondent Nos.1 and 2 on one hand and respondent Nos.5 and 6 on the other hand. In the meanwhile, the petitioner herein challenged the order of deleting her from the array of defendants of the said civil suit by filing a writ petition before this Court bearing Writ Petition No.663/2018. On 14.08.2019, the said petition was disposed of by this Court, observing that even though it is true that defendant No.4 ought to have been heard before her name was deleted, in the facts of the present case it is found that no useful purpose would be served by now adding the said defendant in the suit. This Court, however, observed that no relief was sought against the said defendant No.4 i.e. the petitioner herein and even the compromise deed did not include her name. Therefore, liberty was granted to the said defendant No.4 to take steps as permissible in law if she is aggrieved by the compromise of the proceedings between the plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 to 3. It was further clarified that since the defendant No.4 is not a party to the compromise the same would not be binding on her. In the meanwhile, on 15.05.2018, the respondent Nos.5 and 6 filed mutation application before the Tahsildar. Thereafter, on 06.10.2017, possession receipt was executed in favour of Respondent Nos.5 and 6 by respondent Nos. 1 to 3. Then, on 24.04.2018, the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur dismissed the appeal filed by the Bothras i.e. respondent Nos.1 and 2 and on 15.05.2018, the present respondents filed a mutation application before the respondent No.4. The respondent Nos.5 and 6 also challenged the order of the Revenue Tribunal in a writ petition bearing Writ Petition No. 7340/2018. In the meanwhile, Writ Petition No. 663/2018 filed by the petitioner came to be decided.

In the backdrop of these facts, on 19.08.2019, the present petitioner filed an application for implementation of the order of the Tahsildar dated 27.09.2006. A compromise decree was passed on 23.08.2019 in R.C.S. No. 192/2012 between respondent Nos.5 and 6 and respondent Nos.1 to 3. Then, another application came to be filed on 14.08.2020 by the respondent Nos.5 and 6 for mutation. It is also a fact on record that the petitioner instituted a Regular Civil Suit on 19.10.2022 bearing R.C.S. No.265/2022 for possession, which is pending till date.

Rival contentions fall for my consideration.

Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner has primarily raised following contentions :

By relying on paragraph 4,5,6,7,8 and 9, it is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that as held by the Supreme Court in the said judgment, the High Courts, bearing in mind the facts of each particular case, have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. Thus, it is the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the said judgment that existence of an alternate remedy is a self-imposed restriction.

In the said judgment it is further held that it is a settled principle of law that availability of an alternate remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the "maintainability" of a writ petition and the rule which requires a party to pursue the alternate remedy provided by a statute is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that "entertainability" and "maintainability" of a writ petition are distinct concepts. A fine but real distinction between the two should not be lost sight of. The objection as to the maintainability goes to the root of the matter, and if such objection were found to be of substance, the Court would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of "entertainability" is entirely within the realm of discretion of the High Court, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition, despite being maintainable, may not be entertained by the High Court for many reasons, or relief could even be refused to the petitioner despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of claimed relief would not further public interest.

Countering this, the learned Senior Advocate for the respondent Nos.5 and 6 submits that a writ petition cannot be an appeal in disguise and the only limited scope of inquiry which can be done by this Court is to see whether the order suffers from any perversity. He submits that certain disputed questions of facts arise in the matter and, therefore, this Court would be loath to interfere in writ jurisdiction. He points me out a fact in his written submissions that subsequently a suit bearing R.C.S. No.265/2022 is filed by the petitioner herein. By pointing me out the relief claimed in the suit, he submits that the present petition is not maintainable.

As can be seen from the suit bearing R.C.S. No.265/2022, the said suit is filed by the present petitioner for possession against the present respondents Nos.5 and 6. The averments in the suit would reveal that the cause of action as stated in the suit is the order which is impugned in the present petition passed by the respondent No.4 on 20^th May, 2022.

Having considered the contentions of the learned Senior Advocates and having gone through the record, it is apparent that the present writ petition is not maintainable since an alternate remedy exists under the law. As enunciated by the Supreme Court in the judgment referred to supra, existence of an alternate remedy is only a rule of practice and not a rule of law. However, for a writ court to entertain the present writ petition, it is obligatory for the petitioner to show that the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; there is a violation of principles of natural justice, or where the order or the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction, and where the vires of the Act is challenged. As stated by the counsel for petitioner, the order of the respondent No.4 is without jurisdiction. But the same is not correct for reasons mentioned hereinunder.

It has been vehemently urged by the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner that the order of the Tahsildar impugned in the petition is wholly without jurisdiction. The basis for making this argument is that there was no application for mutation by respondents Nos.5 and 6 and the only application was for enforcement of the order of the Tahsildar dated 27.09.2006. It is, therefore, urged that the said respondent No.4 ought not to have passed an order directing mutation since the Tahsildar, while deciding the application filed by the petitioner herein, acts as a delegate of the Collector and not in his individual capacity. The argument seems to be sound at the first blush, but the same, on deeper perusal, needs to be rejected since it is factually incorrect.

As can be seen from the record of the matter, an application by respondents Nos.5 and 6 was already pending, which was filed by them on 15.05.2018, much before the petitioner filing an application for implementation of the order on 19.08.2019. It is an admitted position on record that as per Section 150 and other allied provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 it is the Tahsildar who is the competent authority to direct mutation of persons holding valid title/interest in the property.

As far as maintainability of the petition is concerned, I am of the considered opinion that the petition is neither maintainable nor entertainable. As stated by me supra, a civil suit pending for an identical relief in which the cause of action is shown as the order impugned in the petition, the petition, in my view, is also not entertainable due to the subsequent acts.

As has been rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Advocate for respondents Nos.5 and 6 that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment of Roshina T. vs. Abdul Asis K.T. and Others, reported in (2019) 2 SCC 329, held that it is settled by many decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court as also various High Courts that a regular civil suit is the appropriate remedy for settlement of the disputes relating to property rights between private persons. The remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be available except where violation of some statutory duty on the part of a statutory authority is alleged.

Even if it has been argued that there was no jurisdiction vested in the Tahsildar to pass a direction for mutation on an application by the petitioner, I am hardly impressed by this submission since it is one and the same authority. A distinction was sought to be drawn by the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner between the role of the Tahsildar acting under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 and the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974, by relying on a judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No.3828/2023 and more particularly paragraph 8 thereof. In the said judgment, this Court, by relying on an earlier judgment in Roop Chand v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1503, has held that any order passed by an officer authorized under Section 48(7) and 48(8)(2) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code would continue to remain the order passed by the Collector, and therefore, would be amenable in appeal under Section 247 of the Code to the Commissioner by applying Schedule 'E' of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. However, the facts of the said matter were entirely different. In the said matter, the petition questioned an order passed by the Commissioner refusing to entertain the appeal on the ground that the said order had been passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on authorization by the Collector under the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, and therefore, in view of Section 13(4) read with Schedule 'E', the appeal would lie before the Collector. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the proposition as laid down in the said judgment would not be applicable. Furthermore, the counsel for the petitioner could not point out any provision which puts a restriction on the power of respondent No.4 to act in its original jurisdiction while acting as a delegate of Collector. The judgment cited supra nowhere states that the same cannot be done. It only states that when the delegate acts under delegation he only acts for and on behalf of the Collector but does not replace him.

The next ground urged by the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner is regarding the voidness/voidability of the transaction i.e. the sale-deed executed by the grandfather of respondents Nos.5 and 6 in favour of the petitioner. It is his submission that the said transaction i.e. the sale-deed executed by the grandfather of the respondent Nos.5 and 6 on 12.12.1989 was voidable in terms of the provisions of the said Act. He places reliance on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2019) 20 SCC 633 (Murugan and others vs. Kesava Gounder (dead), through legal representatives and others), and more particularly paragraph 14 onwards of the said judgment. By relying on the said judgment, it is his submission that in the cases of alienation by a natural guardian in contravention of Section 8 and 8(2) of the 1956 Act, the Court has always held that it is a voidable sale-deed. Therefore no such ground in the petition.

In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has deciphered the terms "void" and "voidable", and stated that a voidable act is that which is a good act unless avoided. For example, if a suit is filed for a declaration that a document is fraudulent and/or forged and fabricated, it is voidable as the apparent state of affairs is the real state of affairs, and a party who alleges otherwise is obliged to prove it. Taking cue from this judgment, it is the submission of the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner that in the present case, admittedly, no suit has been filed by respondents No.5 and 6 after they attained majority within the period prescribed as per Article 60 of the Limitation Act. It is his submission that the said transaction being voidable and in view of the fact that it was not challenged, cannot be questioned now. He also relies on judgment reported in (2001) 6 SCC 163 (Vishwambhar and others vs. Laxminarayan (dead), through LRs. And another).

Per contra, the learned Senior Advocate for the respondent relies on a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2011) 3 SCC 363 (Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia and others vs. Bombay Environmental Action Group and others) to state that even if an order is void, it requires to be declared by a competent forum, and it is not permissible for any person to ignore the same merely because in his opinion the order is void. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has referred to various judgments in which it is held that whether an order is valid or void cannot be determined by the parties. For setting aside such an order, even if void, the party has to approach the appropriate forum. He also relies on paragraphs 17, 18, and 19 of the said judgment to buttress his submission that the party aggrieved by the transaction cannot decide that the said order is not binding upon it. It is obligatory upon the said party to approach the Court for seeking such a declaration. The order, as opined by the Hon'ble Apex Court, may be void for one person or for one purpose, but it may not be so for another purpose or another person. It is thus clear that even a void order needs to be challenged and its validity or otherwise has to be adjudicated by the competent forum. I entirely agree with the counsel for the respondent Nos.5 and 6.

In this regard, he also submits that the permission granted to the grandfather of respondents Nos.5 and 6 has to be looked at in its entirety. He takes me through the application filed by the said grandfather seeking permission to be appointed as a guardian. After perusing the said application, it is quite clear that the application avers that respondents Nos.5 and 6 (who were minors at the relevant time) are entitled to the insurance amount to the tune of Rs.5,000/- and for other benefits of the Army Group Insurance Directorate, New Delhi. It also states that the applicant i.e. the grandfather of the present respondents Nos.5 and 6 is liable to be declared as a legal guardian of the person and property of the said minor sons Sushil and Ashil (respondents Nos.5 and 6). By taking me through the prayer clause of the said application, the learned Senior Advocate submits that a declaration was sought regarding the grandfather being a legal guardian of the person and property of the minor grandsons Sushil and Ashil alias Arvind. It is his submission that the prayer clause would reveal that no property is specified in the said prayer clause.

He also takes me through the order passed on the said application, which is appended at page 341 of the petition. The said order by the District Judge, Buldhana, passed on 22^nd February 1989, states that the amount to which the minors are entitled should be invested in such a way as to accrue maximum interest, like NSG or NSS or fixed deposit in any nationalized scheduled bank. It further states that the amount shall not be given in cash to the minors till they attain majority.

Taking cue from these admitted facts, it is the submission of the learned Senior Advocate that the context and background in which the application was filed needs to be appreciated. He submits that there is no description of property mentioned in the prayer clause nor it is in the order. It therefore follows that the grandfather of respondents Nos.5 and 6 had no permission while selling the property.

Thus, in my considered opinion, the contention of the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner that the transaction between the grandfather of respondents Nos.5 and 6 and the petitioner being voidable and being not challenged by respondents Nos.5 and 6 has attained finality cannot be countenanced. In my considered opinion, the grandfather of respondents No.5 and 6 was never appointed a guardian with respect to the property involved in the matter. Even if it is assumed that the transaction is void, it has to be challenged and a declaration has to be granted by the competent forum of law regarding the status of the transaction in view of judgments stated supra.

It is further argued by the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, by pointing out the agreement to sell and the sale-deed executed by respondent Nos.1 and 2, and 5 and 6, a fraud has been played upon the Court, and therefore, all transactions are vitiated. He relies upon a judgment reported in (2000) 7 SCC 543 (Gram Panchayat of village Naulakha vs. Ujagar Singh and others), as also Section 44 of the Evidence Act for the said proposition.

Countering this, the learned Senior Advocate for the respondent Nos.5 and 6 states that from the series of events and dates, which are admitted, no fraud has been played on the Court and respondent Nos.5 and 6 were well within their rights to transfer the property in question. In fact the said judgment also does not take the case of the petitioner any further since he has already filed a suit for possession thereby indirectly questioning the compromise decree passed between the respondents inter se. Furthermore, only because the respondent Nos.5 and 6 have entered into agreement and respondent Nos.1 and 2 have executed a sale-deed can't be a pointer to any fraud.

In support of the submission that the judgments which are not inter parties are inadmissible in evidence, the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner relies on a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (1983) 3 SCC 118 (State of Bihar vs. Radha Krishna Singh and others), and more particularly paragraph 125 thereof, wherein the said proposition has been enunciated. There can be no dispute about the said proposition, the same is hardly of any relevance in view of facts in the matter.

Much emphasis has been laid by both the parties on Section 36 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, which reads as under:

Bare perusal of the said section would reveal that the said section provides that the occupancy is transferable and heritable, only subject to certain restrictions as mentioned in the said section. Sub-section (2) of Section 36 provides that occupancy belonging to a tribal shall not be transferred except with the previous sanction of the Collector. Furthermore, sub-section (3) and the proviso to the said sub-section contemplate that where a person belonging to a Scheduled Tribe, in contravention of sub-section (2), transfers possession of his occupancy, the said transferor or any survivor to the said transferor can, within thirty years from 6^th July 2004, apply to the Collector to be placed in possession in accordance with the rules in that behalf.

The proviso to the said sub-section (3) further carves out a provision that if such a transfer is made in contravention of sub-section (2), the Collector is empowered, suo motu or on an application by the tribal made at any time within thirty years from 6^th July 2004, after making such inquiry, declare the transfer to be invalid and direct that the occupancy shall be taken from the possession of such non-tribal or his successor-in-interest and restored to the tribal or his successor-in-interest.

Taking support of this provision, it is the submission of the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner that by virtue of the said section, the Collector is empowered to take possession even from the successor-in-interest of the non-tribal. There cannot be any dispute about this argument, but the timeline also needs to be seen. Even though the section provides for a period of thirty years, admittedly, the initial order cancelling the sale-deeds was passed by the Tahsildar on 27.09.2006 and the said order was put into implementation after thirteen long years, and more particularly on 19.08.2019. No explanation, except for the fact that proceedings challenging the said cancellation were pending is offered or can be seen from the record. It is, however, noteworthy to mention that even assuming such proceedings were pending, there was no stay on implementaiton, and therefore, there was no impediment for the petitioner to seek possession as per order dated 27.09.2006.

In this regard, as has been rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Advocate for the respondents, the entire conduct of the petitioner needs to be seen and minutely scrutinized since she has invoked the extraordinary and supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. In this regard, he places reliance on a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (1998) 3 SCC 573 (K.K. Modi vs. K.N. Modi and others), and more particularly paragraphs 44,45, and 46 thereof, which read as under:

I entirely agree with the contentions raised by the learned Senior Advocate for the respondent Nos.5 and 6, since from the dates and events as mentioned supra, the initiation of proceedings is nothing but an abuse of the process of Court. The petitioner, without any explained reason has waited for thirteen long years and only because the application was made within the prescribed period cannot ipso facto clause the petitioner with a right to implement the order. It therefore follows that the petitioner was very well aware of the status of respondent Nos.5 and 6.

As has been rightly submitted by the learned Senior Advocate for the respondents, if an order of a quasi-judicial authority (who admittedly is not having any judicial expertise) contains a portion based on sound reasoning that can be severed from the part which is not correct, that would not be a reason for this Court to exercise writ jurisdiction. The said proposition of law is well-settled.

After going through the impugned order, it is but obvious that even though it does not mention in express words that the said authority is exercising powers as a Tahsildar for directing mutation, the fact remains that it is one and the same authority. Merely because the said authority allegedly exceeded jurisdiction while acting as a delegate of the Collector under the provisions of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act and assumed the role of the Tahsildar, cannot be a reason to interfere with an otherwise well-reasoned order. It is a matter of fact that the same authority i.e. respondent No.4, was having power to order mutation in accordance with the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. Thus, there is nothing wrong in the order of the Tahsildar directing mutation, especially when the applications for mutation filed by respondent Nos.5 and 6 were already been pending since 15.05.2018 i.e. much before the petitioner filed an application on 19.08.2019 for implementation of the Tahsildar's order dated 27.09.2006.

One more fact that non-suits the petitioner in the present case is a subsequent action of filing a civil suit for identical reliefs as claimed in the application for implementation of the order. After going through the prayer clause, and as I have stated supra, the cause of action of the suit is the order dated 20^th May 2022, whereby the names of respondent Nos.5 and 6 were ordered to be taken in the revenue records. Thus, the petitioner, in my considered opinion, cannot seek two remedies at the same time. On one hand, she has filed the present petition challenging the said order, and on the other hand, she has filed a civil suit for identical relief. This fact is grave enough to indicate that the present litigation is nothing but an abuse of the process of Court, as has been rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Advocate for the respondents.

Furthermore, as can be seen from the averments in the plaint, there is a pleading that the possession of respondent Nos.5 and 6 over the property is in pursuance of the compromise decree executed in R.C.S. No.192/2012, to which the present petitioner was neither a party nor is the same binding upon her. This, in my view, would require evidence where the parties would subject themselves to cross-examination. In that view of the matter, disputed questions of fact do arise, and it is not a case that only questions of law are to be decided, as sought to be canvassed by the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner.

In that view of the matter, I do not find any merit in the petition. I, therefore, pass the following order :