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Judgment
Neerja K. Kalson, J.
CRM-28546-2018
This is an application filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 193 days in filing the revision petition.
For the reasons stated in the application, the same is allowed and the delay of 193 days in filing the revision petition is condoned.
CRM-28545-2018
This is an application for granting permission to file revision petition being legal heirs/regal representatives of late Sh. Gian Singh (original complainant), who had expired on 23.12.2012.
For the reasons mentioned in the application, the same is allowed. The applicants are permitted to file/pursue present petition being legal heirs of late Gian Singh (complainant).
CRR-2700-2018
The present criminal revision is directed against the judgment dated 27.09.2017 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, whereby the appeal preferred by respondent No. 1 against his conviction was allowed and he was acquitted of the charges framed against him. Consequently, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 03.03.2014 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana, were set aside.
The prosecution case, in brief, is that Gian Singh submitted a complaint dated 30.06.2000 before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ludhiana, alleging that his son, Surinder Singh, had entered into an Agreement To Sell dated 30.09.1999 with respondent No. 1, Harcharan Singh, in respect of a plot measuring 500 square yards situated at Village Gill-II, District Ludhiana. According to the complainant, the entire sale consideration had been paid and possession of the property had been delivered. On the same day, respondent No. 1 executed a General Power of Attorney, bearing Vasika No. 31-B, in favour of Gian Singh. Subsequently, a sale deed bearing Vasika No. 2990 dated 28.03.2000 was executed in favour of Narinder Singh, Surinder Singh and Kulwinder Singh. The grievance of the complainant was that respondent No. 1 had cancelled the General Power of Attorney on 05.11.1999 without furnishing any prior notice or intimation. On the basis of the complaint, FIR No. 386 dated 13.12.2000 was registered under Sections 406, 420 and 120-B IPC at Police Station Sadar, Ludhiana.
Upon completion of investigation, the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was presented before the learned trial Court. A charge under Section 420 IPC was framed against respondent No. 1, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
To substantiate its case, the prosecution examined five witnesses, namely PW-1 Karamjit Singh, PW-2 ASI Baldev Singh, PW-3 Rajinder Kumar, PW-4 Surinder Singh and PW-5 Naresh Chander, whereafter the prosecution evidence was closed.
The statement of respondent No. 1 was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein the incriminating circumstances appearing against him were put to him. He denied the allegations and pleaded false implication. No evidence was adduced in defence.
Upon appreciation of the evidence, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana, vide judgment dated 03.03.2014, convicted respondent No. 1 under Section 418 IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs 5,000, with a default stipulation.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order of sentence, respondent No. 1 preferred Criminal Appeal No. 74 of 2014 before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ludhiana. The appeal was allowed vide judgment dated 27.09.2017, whereby the conviction and sentence were set aside and respondent No. 1 was acquitted. It is this judgment of acquittal which has been assailed in the present revision petition by the legal representatives of the original complainant.
Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the learned First Appellate Court failed to appreciate the prosecution evidence in its proper perspective and that the findings recorded in the impugned judgment are founded upon an erroneous appreciation of the material available on record. It is submitted that the appellate judgment suffers from material illegality and irregularity warranting interference by this Court.
Elaborating the submissions, learned counsel contends that the Agreement To Sell dated 30.09.1999 contained recitals regarding the execution of the General Power of Attorney and receipt of the sale consideration. It is, therefore, urged that the learned First Appellate Court erred in entertaining doubts regarding the transaction despite the documentary material placed on record.
It is further contended that the refusal of respondent No. 1 to furnish specimen signatures warranted an adverse inference against him. Learned counsel also pointed out that the observation made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge that complainant Gian Singh survived until 2013 was factually incorrect, as the registered death certificate proves that he expired on 23.12.2012, and that his non-appearance in the witness box ought not to have been construed to the detriment of the prosecution.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully examined the material available on record.
It is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. against an order of acquittal is narrow, supervisory, and exceptional in scope. The Revisional Court does not reappreciate oral or documentary evidence or substitute its subjective evaluation for that of the First Appellate Court. Revisional interference with a judgment of acquittal is permissible only in extraordinary situations where the decision displays a glaring procedural defect, patent perversity, or complete misreading of material evidence occasioning a failure of justice. Furthermore, while examining a revision preferred against an order of acquittal, the statutory limitation engrafted under Section 401(3) Cr.P.C. strictly circumscribes this Court’s jurisdiction, precluding the direct restoration of a conviction and confining the permissible relief, in cases of patent perversity, strictly to a remand or retrial. This statutory limitation and the exact remit of the revisional court have been authoritatively expounded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vishnu Kumar Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., 2026 INSC 770, wherein it was observed in paragraph 58 as under:
"58.A plain reading of Section 401(3) would indicate that nothing contained in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorise the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Significantly, the limitation imposed by sub-section (3) is directed only against the ultimate relief that may be granted in revision and not against the scope of examination that may be undertaken by the revisional court. Thus, while the High Court is prohibited from directly recording a conviction in revision, it is not precluded from scrutinising the evidence in detail to determine whether the acquittal or conviction is legally sustainable. If such scrutiny discloses manifest illegality or perversity, the revisional court may set aside the impugned order and pass such orders as are permissible in law, including ordering a retrial or remanding the matter, while remaining within the statutory limitation contained in Section 401(3)."
The golden thread running through the web of criminal jurisprudence dictates that where two reasonable conclusions are possible on the evidence on record, the view which is favourable to the accused must be preferred, and the presumption of innocence is reinforced and strengthened upon an acquittal. Applying this salutary principle to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C., an order of acquittal cannot be unsettled merely because an alternative perspective on the oral and documentary evidence might also be conceivable, so long as the conclusion arrived at is plausible and reasonable. Where the findings recorded in favour of the accused rest upon a proper appreciation of material contradictions, interpolations, and unexplained lacunae in the prosecution case, such a view pointing to innocence cannot be characterised as perverse, and this Court in its supervisory jurisdiction will refrain from substituting its own view to disturb the acquittal.
The distinction between a mere breach of contractual obligation and the offence of cheating was elucidated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V.Y. Jose and another v. State of Gujarat and another, (2009) 3 SCC 78, wherein it was held that fraudulent or dishonest intention must exist at the inception of the transaction and cannot be presumed merely from a subsequent failure to honour a contractual obligation. The Court further clarified that the availability of a civil remedy does not, by itself, exclude criminal liability where the essential ingredients of the offence are otherwise established. In the context of Section 418 IPC, it must additionally be established that the accused cheated with the knowledge that wrongful loss was likely to ensue to a person whose interest in the transaction he was bound, either by law or by legal contract, to protect. The mere existence of such an obligation, without proof of the requisite deception and dishonest intention, would not suffice to attract criminal liability under the provision. Thus, the determinative consideration is whether the requisite dishonest intention accompanied the original inducement, and not merely whether the subsequent conduct of a contracting party resulted in a breach of contractual obligations.
It is in the backdrop of the aforesaid legal position that the findings returned by the learned First Appellate Court fall for consideration.
The transaction giving rise to the present proceedings centres upon the agreement to sell dated 30.09.1999 concerning the plot measuring 500 square yards at Village Gill-II, District Ludhiana. According to the prosecution, respondent No. 1 had received the entire sale consideration, delivered possession and executed a General Power of Attorney on the same day. The subsequent revocation of that authority, without prior intimation, formed the foundation of the allegation of cheating. The controversy, therefore, was not confined to the factum of revocation, but extended to whether the circumstances attending the transaction disclosed the requisite dishonest intention and satisfied the statutory ingredients of the offence.
The learned trial Court, while recording the conviction under Section 418 IPC, placed reliance upon the agreement to sell and the General Power of Attorney, and treated the cancellation of the latter without notice as constituting a breach of the obligation owed to the complainant. The learned First Appellate Court, however, examined the evidentiary foundation of the transaction and assigned reasons for entertaining doubt regarding the prosecution case. It noticed, inter alia, the absence of particulars concerning the sale consideration, the alterations appearing in the agreement to sell, the references to earlier transactions and the deficiencies in the investigation. The learned First Appellate Court also noticed that, while the execution of the General Power of Attorney was admitted by respondent No. 1, the agreement to sell was disputed. These circumstances were considered cumulatively by the learned First Appellate Court in concluding that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt.
A fortiori, as pertinently highlighted by the learned First Appellate Court, if the entire sale consideration had, indeed, been liquidated and possession delivered on 30.09.1999, and the parties were present before the registering authority, there was no plausible explanation as to what necessitated entering into an agreement to sell coupled with a General Power of Attorney rather than executing and registering an outright deed of conveyance. It was the complainant-buyer who could have insisted upon the execution and registration of a regular sale deed on that very date. The learned First Appellate Court found the prosecution explanation wanting in this regard and considered the circumstance alongside the other deficiencies noticed in the evidence. The inference so drawn formed part of its cumulative assessment and cannot be characterised as perverse merely because another inference might also be conceivable.
The principal grievance arising from the revocation of the General Power of Attorney must be viewed in the light of the distinction between civil consequences flowing from a contractual transaction and criminal liability founded upon deception. The revocation of an authority may give rise to civil consequences; however, the availability of a civil remedy neither automatically establishes nor excludes the commission of cheating. What remains essential is the existence of the requisite dishonest intention and the other statutory ingredients. The appellate Court’s conclusion must, therefore, be examined with reference to the reasons assigned in the impugned judgment, rather than upon any assumption that the civil character of the transaction, by itself, forecloses criminal liability.
The question which consequently arises is whether the reasons assigned by the learned First Appellate Court disclose any manifest illegality, perversity or material irregularity warranting the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The answer must be found in the sustainability of the appellate Court’s reasoning, without embarking upon a fresh adjudication of the competing evidentiary inferences.
The petitioners have sought to question the appellate Court’s findings principally on the strength of the agreement to sell, the execution of the General Power of Attorney and the refusal of respondent No. 1 to furnish specimen signatures. However, the learned First Appellate Court did not proceed in disregard of the documentary transaction; rather, it examined the circumstances surrounding its execution and the evidentiary deficiencies which, in its assessment, rendered the prosecution case doubtful. The petitioners' reliance upon the aforesaid circumstances, including the refusal to furnish specimen signatures, does not establish that the appellate Court’s reasoning is founded upon a complete misreading or exclusion of material evidence. The mere possibility of drawing a different inference from the material on record is insufficient to unsettle the acquittal.
As regards the discrepancy concerning the year of death of the original complainant, Gian Singh, the petitioners have pointed out that he expired on 23.12.2012, whereas the learned First Appellate Court referred to the year 2013. Although, the discrepancy is apparent yet, it has not been shown that the said error materially affected the foundation of the judgment of acquittal or occasioned a miscarriage of justice. The same, therefore, does not furnish an independent ground for revisional interference.
Viewed in its entirety, the impugned judgment reflects a reasoned consideration of the circumstances which weighed with the learned First Appellate Court in reversing the conviction. The deficiencies noticed by that Court were not treated in isolation but were evaluated cumulatively in the context of the prosecution's obligation to establish the statutory ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. Whether another conclusion could have been reached on the same material is not determinative. What is material is that the petitioners have failed to demonstrate any manifest illegality, perversity or material irregularity resulting in miscarriage of justice. In the absence of such infirmity, the judgment of acquittal does not warrant interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
