Naresh Chandra and Others vs Meerut Development Authority and Another

M. Katju, J.—Heard learned Counsel for the parties. This is the third round of litigation in the matter.

The Petitioner No. 1''s father challenged notifications ''of the year 1980'' under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the land in dispute but the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the said notifications as stated in para 3 of the writ petition.

The Supreme Court gave liberty to the acquiring authority to pass award within two years. The award was given within that time, and Writ Petition No. 6198 of 1988 against that award has been dismissed on 3.8.1998 by this Court vide Annexure-4 to the petition.

A perusal of the judgment dated 3.8.1998, Annexure-4 to the petition shows that it was held therein that so far as the land acquisition proceedings are concerned, the matter is concluded. However, so far as the question of possession of the constructed portion is concerned, the Petitioners may make a representation before the Meerut Development Authority, Meerut and the State Government praying for release of the land. The Petitioners made representation vide Annexure-8 but the same has been rejected by the orders dated 22.4.2003/21.5.2003, Annexure-9 to the petition.

We have carefully perused the impugned order and find no illegality in the same. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that in the impugned order it is mentioned that the development authority took possession, which is not correct. Be that as it may, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order in exercise of our discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Respondents are not bound to exempt the land over which there are constructions. That is their discretion, and it is an administrative decision. As held in Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India, , this Court has a very limited scope of interference in administrative decisions. Whether to grant exemption or not requires consideration of various factors by the concerned authority. Sometimes grant of exemption may disrupt the entire scheme. At any event, it is not for this Court to interfere in such administrative matters.

It may be mentioned that the definition of land in Section 3(a) of the Land Acquisition Act states:

(a) the expression ''land'' includes benefits to arise out of land and, things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to any thing attached to the earth.

As held in Bai Malimabu and Others Vs. State of Gujarat and Others, and Kashi Nath and Ors. v. State of U.P. 1993 (1) AWC 273: 1993 ALJ 154 , the word ''land'' in Section 3(a) includes the superstructures on the land. This view has been reiterated in Manveer Singh and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , and in Writ Petitiion No. 24627 of 2003 dismissed on 2.7.2003, Horam Singh v. State of U.P.Thus, the constructions on the land in dispute are certainly ''land'' within the meaning of Section 3(a).

The matter has been dragging on since 1980, and it is not proper for this Court to interfere again and again. There is no force in this petition. The writ petition is dismissed.