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Judgment
O R D E R
The present Original Application has been filed by the applicant, under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following relief(s):-
“8.Relief(s) sought:
(a)Call for the records of the case;
(b)Quash/Set aside Conclusion report dated 07.07.2020 in respect of inquiry report dated 19.06.2020 and 29.06.2020 against the applicant issued by inquiry officer.
(c)Quash/Set aside of the show cause notice bearing no. RJD-1/AI (T)/CS-01/2020/5324 dated 27.07.2020 in respect of charge sheet no. BBMD/AI (T)/CS-01/2020/418 dated 17.03.2020 issued by the Respondent for imposing the punishment "Stoppage of his next due Three increment with cumulative effect".
(d)Quash/Set aside Confirmation/penalty order vide letter dated 14.09.2020 for confirmation of the imposing of the punishment of "Stoppage of his next due three increment with cumulative effect" which was issued through Show cause notice dated 27.07.2020.
(e)Quash/Set the order dated 30.12.2020 passed by the Regional Manager on appeal dated 30.09.2020.
(f)Direct the Respondent to release the full back wages with interest @ 18% per annum to the Applicant.
(g)Direct the Respondent to give all consequential benefits to the Applicant.
(h)Direct the Respondent to pay the cost of the proceedings to the applicant.
(i)Pass any other order or direction which this Hon'ble Tribunal thinks fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.”
Being aggrieved by the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant by the respondents, culminating in the imposition of the penalty of stoppage of his next three annual increments with cumulative effect. The applicant has also challenged the appellate order whereby the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority has been upheld. According to the applicant, the impugned proceedings are arbitrary, illegal and violative of the applicable service rules as well as the principles of natural justice and, therefore, deserve to be quashed.
It is the case of the applicant that the applicant appointed as a Driver in the Delhi Transport Corporation in 2008. The disciplinary proceedings commenced with the issuance of Charge-sheet No. BBMD/AI(T)/CS-01/2020/418 dated 17.03.2020 (Annexure A-5), alleging misconduct on his part. Thereafter, the applicant submitted his detailed reply to the charge-sheet on 23.03.2020 (Annexure A-6), denying the allegations levelled against him and asserting that no misconduct had been committed by him. Thereafter, the respondents appointed an Enquiry Officer and informed the applicant accordingly vide communication dated 21.05.2020 (Annexure A-7).
Pursuant thereto, the Enquiry Officer conducted the departmental enquiry and submitted enquiry reports dated 19.06.2020 and 29.06.2020 (Annexures A-8 and A-9 respectively). On the basis of the said enquiry reports, a Conclusion Report dated 07.07.2020 (Annexure A-1) was prepared, wherein the findings of the enquiry were recorded. According to the applicant, the findings recorded in the enquiry report and the conclusion report are contrary to the material available on record and have been arrived at without proper appreciation of the evidence. It is further the case of the applicant that on the basis of the aforesaid conclusion report, the disciplinary authority issued Show Cause Notice No. RJD-I/AI(T)/CS-01/2020/5324 dated 27.07.2020 (Annexure A-2), proposing the penalty of stoppage of the applicant's next three annual increments with cumulative effect. The applicant submitted his reply to the said show cause notice explaining his stand and requesting the disciplinary authority to drop the proposed action. However, according to the applicant, the disciplinary authority failed to objectively consider his defence and proceeded to pass the Penalty Order dated 14.09.2020 (Annexure A-3), whereby the proposed punishment of stoppage of the next three increments with cumulative effect was imposed upon him.
Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid punishment order, the applicant preferred a statutory appeal before the competent appellate authority on 30.09.2020, challenging the findings of the enquiry as well as the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. However, the appellate authority, without properly appreciating the grounds raised by the applicant, rejected the appeal vide order dated 30.12.2020 (Annexure A-4), thereby affirming the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority.
The applicant has further averred that even prior to the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings, he had submitted several representations and applications before the competent authorities regarding the circumstances leading to the present dispute. In this regard, reliance has been placed upon applications dated 17.06.2019, 22.01.2020 and 24.01.2020 submitted before the Depot Manager (Annexures A-12 to A-14). The applicant has also relied upon a complaint dated 27.01.2020 submitted by Conductor Shri Jitender (Annexure A-15), a warning letter dated 06.03.2020 issued by the Depot Manager (Annexure A-16), and the reply submitted by the applicant thereto (Annexure A-17). According to the applicant, these documents clearly establish the factual background of the dispute and demonstrate that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated without proper appreciation of the true facts.
The applicant has also placed reliance upon a legal notice dated 19.05.2022 and the reply furnished thereto by the respondents dated 10.06.2022 (Annexures A-18 and A-19) in support of his contention that the respondents have failed to redress his grievance despite repeated representations.
It is the specific grievance of the applicant that the respondents have acted in an arbitrary and mechanical manner throughout the disciplinary proceedings. According to him, the enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure, relevant material was ignored, his defence was not properly appreciated, and the disciplinary as well as appellate authorities passed the impugned orders without assigning cogent reasons. The applicant has, therefore, approached this Tribunal seeking quashing of the Conclusion Report dated 07.07.2020, Show Cause Notice dated 27.07.2020, Penalty Order dated 14.09.2020, and the Appellate Order dated 30.12.2020, along with all consequential benefits, including restoration of the increments withheld pursuant to the impugned punishment and all other consequential service benefits.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents opposes the present case of the applicant by filing a detailed counter reply and has prayed for its dismissal. At the outset, she states that the impugned disciplinary proceedings were conducted strictly in accordance with the applicable statutory rules, departmental instructions and the principles of natural justice. It has been contended that the applicant was afforded adequate opportunity at every stage of the disciplinary proceedings to defend himself and, therefore, there has been no procedural irregularity or violation of any statutory provision warranting interference by this Tribunal.
The respondents have further submitted that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated only after certain acts of misconduct on the part of the applicant came to the notice of the competent authority. Accordingly, a memorandum of charge dated 17.03.2020 was issued to the applicant, clearly setting out the allegations levelled against him. The applicant submitted his reply to the charge-sheet, which was duly considered by the disciplinary authority. Since the explanation furnished by the applicant was not found satisfactory, a regular departmental enquiry was ordered in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
Central Administrative Tribunal11. It is further the case of the respondents that an independent Enquiry Officer was appointed to enquire into the charges framed against the applicant. During the course of the enquiry, adequate opportunity was afforded to the applicant to participate in the proceedings, inspect the relevant documents, cross-examine the departmental witnesses and produce evidence in support of his defence. The enquiry was conducted fairly and impartially, and only after appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record did the Enquiry Officer submit his reports dated 19.06.2020 and 29.06.2020.
The respondents have averred that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were based upon the evidence adduced during the enquiry and were neither arbitrary nor perverse. The disciplinary authority independently considered the enquiry reports along with the entire material available on record before recording its conclusions. Thereafter, a show cause notice dated 27.07.2020 proposing the punishment of stoppage of three annual increments with cumulative effect was issued to the applicant, thereby affording him another opportunity to explain his stand before the imposition of penalty.
According to the respondents, the reply submitted by the applicant to the show cause notice was duly examined by the Central Administrative Tribunaldisciplinary authority. However, since the explanation furnished by the applicant failed to satisfactorily explain the misconduct established during the enquiry, the disciplinary authority, after due application of mind, passed the penalty order dated 14.09.2020 imposing the punishment of stoppage of three annual increments with cumulative effect. The respondents have asserted that the penalty imposed is commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct proved against the applicant and does not suffer from any illegality or disproportionality.
The respondents have further submitted that the applicant preferred a departmental appeal against the order of punishment, which was duly examined by the appellate authority. After considering the grounds raised in the appeal, the records of the disciplinary proceedings and the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority, the appellate authority found no reason to interfere with the punishment imposed and accordingly rejected the appeal vide order dated 30.12.2020. It has been contended that the appellate authority has passed a reasoned and speaking order after due consideration of the entire record.
It has also been contended by the respondents that the allegations made by the applicant regarding mala fides, arbitrariness and violation of the principles of natural justice Central Administrative Tribunalare wholly misconceived and devoid of merit. According to the respondents, every procedural safeguard contemplated under the applicable service rules was duly observed and the applicant was granted sufficient opportunity to defend himself throughout the disciplinary proceedings.
The respondents have lastly submitted that the scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters is limited and this Tribunal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, cannot re-appreciate the evidence recorded during the departmental enquiry as an appellate authority. Since the enquiry was conducted in accordance with law, the findings are based on evidence and the punishment imposed is proportionate to the misconduct established against the applicant, no interference is called for. In support her case, she relies upon the Order of this Tribunal in OA No. 4463/2011 decided on 11.12.2012 wherein this Tribunal dismissed the said OA. The respondents have, therefore, prayed that the Original Application, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed with costs.
The matter was heard at length and reserved on 29.07.2026. On that date, the parties were directed to file written submissions. Pursuant thereto, the respondents have filed the same on 0408.2026 and the applicant has not filed any Central Administrative Tribunalwritten submission.
In their written submissions, the respondents reiterates that the applicant, while working as a Driver in the Delhi Transport Corporation, was served with a charge-sheet dated 17.03.2020 alleging insubordination, use of abusive language and threatening behaviour towards his superior officer. The applicant submitted a reply to the charge-sheet; however, the disciplinary authority, being dissatisfied with the explanation, ordered a regular departmental enquiry. During the enquiry, full opportunity was afforded to the applicant to participate in the proceedings, inspect the relevant records, cross-examine the witnesses and defend himself. It is specifically submitted that the applicant was also informed of his right to take the assistance of a co-worker/Labour Welfare Inspector, which he declined. The enquiry, according to the respondents, was conducted strictly in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
It is further submitted that the Enquiry Officer, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence adduced during the enquiry, returned findings holding the charges proved. The disciplinary authority independently examined the enquiry report, issued a show cause notice proposing the penalty, considered the applicant's reply thereto and thereafter imposed the penalty of stoppage of the next three Central Administrative Tribunalannual increments with cumulative effect by a reasoned order. The appellate authority also independently examined the entire record and, finding no infirmity either in the procedure adopted or in the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority, rejected the statutory appeal by a speaking order.
The respondents contend that every stage of the disciplinary proceedings was conducted in accordance with the applicable Regulations and no violation of the principles of natural justice or statutory procedure has been demonstrated by the applicant. It is, therefore, submitted that the challenge raised in the Original Application is devoid of merit and deserves to be rejected.
Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters is extremely limited. It is contended that this Tribunal cannot sit as an appellate authority over the findings recorded in a departmental enquiry or re-appreciate the evidence led before the Enquiry Officer. Interference is permissible only where the enquiry is vitiated on account of violation of the principles of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, procedural illegality, absence of evidence or where the punishment imposed is so disproportionate as to shock the conscience of the Court.
Central Administrative Tribunal22. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the following :-
A. Judgments in support that minor discrepancy/minor variations in a domestic enquiry cannot be used to invalidate the enquiry report:-
State of Haryana and Anorther Vs. Rattan Singh: AIR 1977 SC 1512
Union of India and Ors. V P. Gunasekaran (2015) 2 SCC 610
Union of India and Others Vs. Dalbir Singh, AIR 2021 SC 4504
High Court of Judicature at Bombay Vs. Shashikant S. Patil (2000) 1 SCC 416
State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya AIR 2011 SUPREME COURT 1931
Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary and Another V. State of Maharashtra (2000) 8 SCC 457
Sucha Singh and Another Vs. State of Punjab (2003) 7SCC 643
Shyamal Ghosh Vs. State of West Bengal Central Administrative Tribunal(2012) 7 SCC 646
Sachin Kumar Singhraha V. State of Madhya Pradesh (2019) 8 SCC 371
B. Judgments of Proportionality:
I. Union of India & Another Vs. BC Chaturvedi (1995) 6 SCC 749
II. UP State transport corporation versus Subhash Candra Sharma and Others AIR 2000 SC 1162
III. Jitender Kumar Versus DTC and another: OA No. 4463 of 2011
IV. Mahindera and Mahindra Ltd Vs. NB Narawade 2005 (3 SCC 134)
C. Judgments on non-appointment of PO
Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. Harish Chandra {W.P. (C) 3183/2011}
Union of India Vs. Ram Lakhan Sharma (2018) 7 SCC 670.
It is, therefore, contended that since the enquiry in the present case was conducted strictly in accordance with law, adequate opportunity was afforded to the applicant at every stage, the findings are based upon evidence available on Central Administrative Tribunalrecord and the punishment imposed is commensurate with the misconduct proved, no ground for interference under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, is made out. The respondents accordingly pray that the Original Application be dismissed with costs.
We have considered the rival submissions and perused the record.
At the threshold, it is necessary to bear in mind the limited scope of jurisdiction exercised by this Tribunal while examining an order of punishment imposed in a departmental enquiry under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The Tribunal does not sit in appeal over the findings of the disciplinary authority; it reviews the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision. The locus classicus is Union of India v. B.C. Chaturvedi, (1995) 6 SCC 749, where the Supreme Court held that:
“12.Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Central Administrative TribunalCourt/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.”
The same restraint has recently been reiterated in Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612, in these words:
“23.The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional Courts under Article 226 or Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority which has been earlier examined by this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. T.V. Venugopalan (1994) 6 SCC 302 and later in Government of T.N. v. A. Rajapandian (1995) 1 SCC 216 and further examined by the three Judge Bench of this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749 wherein it has been held as under:— ―13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718] this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.‖
The contours of permissible interference are authoritatively delineated in Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 (paras 12–13). Their Lordships held that in exercise of judicial review:
“In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
(a)the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b)the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;
(c)there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d)the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
(e)the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f)the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g)the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h)the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i)the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13.Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i)reappreciate the evidence;
(ii)interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii)go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv)go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v)interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi)correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii)go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.
14.In one of the earliest decisions in State of A.P v. S. Sree Rama Rao AIR 1963 SC 1723, many of the above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded thus: (AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7)
“7.… The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution as a Central Administrative Tribunalcourt of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
Tested on this anvil, the applicant's challenge resolves itself into four grounds: (i) breach of the prescribed procedure and of natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry; (ii) non-appointment of a Presenting Officer; (iii) that the findings are perverse and contrary to the record; and (iv) that the disciplinary and appellate orders are unreasoned and the penalty is disproportionate. We shall deal with them in turn.
27. On Ground (i)
Central Administrative TribunalConduct of the enquiry and natural justice. The record discloses that a memorandum of charge dated 17.03.2020 (A-5) was served setting out the imputations namely insubordination, use of abusive language and threatening behaviour towards a superior officer to which the the applicant replied on 23.03.2020 (A-6) on this an independent Enquiry Officer was appointed and communicated (A-7). The applicant was afforded the opportunity to inspect the documents, cross-examine the departmental witnesses and lead defence evidence; and he was informed of his right to be assisted by a co-worker/Labour Welfare Inspector, which he declined. It is well settled that a domestic enquiry is not to be tested by the standards of a criminal trial, nor is it governed by the strict rules of the Evidence Act. In State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491 : AIR 1977 SC 1512, the Supreme Court held:
"4.It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act.
…The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good.”
Central Administrative TribunalJudged by that standard, no infraction of the prescribed procedure or of the principles of natural justice is made out on the record. The opportunity contemplated by the rules was extended at every stage, and the decision of the applicant not to avail of the assistance offered to him cannot be converted, ex post facto, into a grievance of denial of a fair hearing hence challenge on basis of ground (i) is rejected.
28. On Ground (ii)
Non-appointment of a Presenting Officer. The applicant contends that the enquiry stands vitiated for want of a Presenting Officer. The law on the point is settled by Union of India v. Ram Lakhan Sharma, (2018) 7 SCC 670, on which the respondents themselves place reliance. Their Lordships held (para 16) that:
"It is not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to appoint a Presenting Officer in each and every inquiry." and, in the summary of conclusions (para 32), that:
"(ii)Non-appointment of a Presenting Officer, by itself will not vitiate the inquiry."
To that extent the ground is unavailable to the applicant, and the view taken by the Delhi High Court in Delhi Transport Corporation v. Harish Chandra, W.P.(C) 3183/2011, cited by the respondents, is to the same effect. It must, however, be noticed that the same judgment sounds a caveat of importance:
"(i)The Inquiry Officer, who is in the position of a Judge shall not act as a Presenting Officer, who is in the position of a prosecutor."
"Where the Inquiry Officer acts as the Presenting Officer, bias can be presumed. At all events, it clearly gives an impression of bias." (para 31)
"(iv)If the Inquiry Officer conducts a regular examination-in-chief by leading the prosecution witnesses through the prosecution case … the Inquiry Officer acts as prosecutor thereby vitiating the inquiry."
The distinction is therefore between the mere absence of a Presenting Officer, which does not vitiate the enquiry, and the Enquiry Officer stepping into the shoes of the prosecutor, which does. On the record as placed before us, the Enquiry Officer functioned as an independent adjudicator and did not lead the departmental evidence in the manner deprecated in Ram Lakhan Sharma; the applicant has not demonstrated, nor pleaded with particulars, that the Enquiry Officer examined the departmental witnesses in chief or otherwise assumed a prosecutorial role, nor any resultant prejudice. [Bench to confirm from the enquiry proceedings/daily order sheets whether a Presenting Officer was in fact appointed and, if not, whether the Enquiry Officer led the witnesses — if he did, this ground would succeed on the authority of Ram Lakhan Sharma.] Subject to that verification, Ground (ii) is rejected.
29. Ground (iii)
Perversity / findings contrary to the record. The applicant urges that the findings in the enquiry report (A-8, Central Administrative TribunalA-9) and the conclusion report dated 07.07.2020 (A-1) are contrary to the material on record and were arrived at without proper appreciation of the evidence. The submission, in substance, invites a re-appreciation of the evidence, which is impermissible. What the Tribunal may examine is whether the findings rest on some legal evidence, or are based on no evidence or are perverse. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584 (para 7), the Court held:
"If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries." and identified the test of perversity thus:
"The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record."
A finding is not perverse merely because a different view is possible; it is perverse only where it rests on no evidence, or where relevant material has been ignored or irrelevant material relied upon — the sense in which "no evidence" and "perversity" are understood in Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 and Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570 [insert verbatim extract from SCC — Roop Singh Negi on findings resting on legal evidence and the enquiry report not being a mere ipse dixit]. In the present case, the charge was spoken to by the complaint of Conductor Shri Jitender dated 27.01.2020 (A-15), the antecedent warning letter dated 06.03.2020 (A-16), and the oral testimony recorded in the enquiry; the Enquiry Officer's conclusions are supported by this material and cannot be characterised as resting on no evidence or as perverse. The findings being founded on legal evidence, this Tribunal, applying B.C. Chaturvedi and Gunasekaran, will not interfere. Ground (iii) is rejected.
30. On Ground (iv)(a)
Want of reasons in the appellate order. The applicant complains that the appellate order dated 30.12.2020 (A-4) is mechanical and unreasoned. An appellate/revisional authority in disciplinary matters is undoubtedly obliged to apply its mind to the grounds of appeal and to record reasons — Ram Chander v. Union of India, (1986) 3 SCC 103 [insert verbatim extract from SCC — appellate authority must consider the grounds and give reasons]. The record, however, shows that the appellate authority considered the grounds of appeal, the record of the disciplinary proceedings and the findings of the disciplinary authority before declining to interfere, and passed a speaking order. The obligation to give reasons Central Administrative Tribunaldoes not require an appellate order to be a prolix restatement of the enquiry; it requires an application of mind, which is borne out here. Ground (iv)(a) is rejected.
31. Ground (iv)(b)
Proportionality of the penalty. The penalty imposed is stoppage of the next three annual increments with cumulative effect. Two points must be kept in view. First, such a penalty, carrying a permanent and recurring effect on the pay, is a major penalty requiring a regular enquiry — Kulwant Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, (1991) Supp (1) SCC 504 [insert verbatim extract from SCC] — a requirement that stands satisfied here, a regular departmental enquiry having in fact been held. Secondly, the quantum of punishment is primarily for the disciplinary authority; this Tribunal will interfere only if the penalty is so disproportionate as to shock the conscience. As Gunasekaran puts it (para 12), the Court shall not "go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience"; and in B.C. Chaturvedi the Supreme Court held that only where the punishment shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal may it mould the relief — either by remitting the matter to the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty, or, in rare and exceptional cases, by itself substituting an appropriate punishment for Central Administrative Tribunalrecorded reasons [insert verbatim extract of B.C. Chaturvedi, para 18, from SCC]. Misconduct consisting of the use of abusive and threatening language towards a superior has consistently been treated as grave, and the softening of penalties in such cases has been deprecated: in Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd v. N.B. Narawade, (2005) 3 SCC 134, the dismissal of a workman for the use of abusive/insulting language against a superior was upheld, the Court holding that even under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act interference is warranted only where the punishment is shockingly disproportionate [insert verbatim extract from SCC]; and in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Subhash Chandra Sharma, (2000) 3 SCC 324 : AIR 2000 SC 1162, the reduction of the removal of a transport driver guilty of drunken and threatening conduct was set aside and the removal restored, as the interference was not justified by any shocking disproportionality [insert verbatim extract from SCC]. Measured against these authorities, a penalty of stoppage of three increments — a penalty markedly less severe than the removal/dismissal upheld in Narawade and Subhash Chandra Sharma — for proven insubordination and abusive, threatening conduct towards a superior, cannot be said to shock the conscience of this Central Administrative TribunalTribunal. Ground (iv)(b) is rejected.
The respondents' remaining authorities. The respondents rely on this Tribunal's order in Jitender Kumar v. DTC, OA No. 4463/2011 (decided 11.12.2012), a co-ordinate Bench decision on closely comparable facts in which the challenge was negatived; and on Union of India v. Dalbir Singh, (2021) SCC OnLine SC 768 : AIR 2021 SC 4504, for the proposition that departmental findings arrived at on the standard of preponderance of probability are not displaced merely because a criminal proceeding may have ended otherwise. Reliance was also placed on High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416, reiterating that the reviewing court is not an appellate authority and does not interfere merely because a different view is possible [insert verbatim extract from SCC], and on a line of criminal authorities — Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457; Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 7 SCC 643; Shyamal Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (2012) 7 SCC 646; and Sachin Kumar Singhraha v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2019) 8 SCC 371 — for the proposition that minor discrepancies or contradictions do not corrode otherwise credible evidence. While the last-Central Administrative Tribunalmentioned decisions arise from criminal trials and are, strictly, authorities on the appreciation of evidence under the higher criminal standard, the underlying proposition that trivial variations do not, by themselves, vitiate a finding is unexceptionable and applies a fortiori to a domestic enquiry governed by the lower standard explained in Rattan Singh. The most recent restatement of the limited scope of review, in State of Jharkhand v. Ranjan Kumar, 2026 INSC 466 (following B.C. Chaturvedi, Sardar Bahadur and Gunasekaran), is to the same effect.
Conclusion For the reasons aforesaid, we find that the enquiry was held by a competent authority in accordance with the prescribed procedure; that the principles of natural justice were observed; that the findings of misconduct rest on legal evidence and are neither based on no evidence nor perverse; that the appellate order is a reasoned order passed after application of mind; and that the penalty of stoppage of three annual increments with cumulative effect is not, in the facts of this case, so disproportionate as to shock the conscience of this Tribunal. No ground for interference within the narrow limits of B.C. Chaturvedi, Central Administrative TribunalP. Gunasekaran and Ajai Kumar Srivastava is made out.
The Original Application is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
