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Judgment
Rameshwar Singh Malik, J.—Petitioner-workman impugns the award dated 19.4.2012 (Annexure P-2) passed by the learned Labour Court, whereby the reference was decided against the petitioner. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was engaged as a labourer on daily wages basis for plantation work, by the respondent management on 1.9.1991, Work being of seasonal nature, as and when work used to be available, petitioner was engaged. His services came to be terminated on 31.10.1999. It seems that the petitioner-workman felt satisfied and did not challenge the termination of his service. However, the work man raised industrial dispute after inordinate long delay of about eight years. The dispute was referred to the learned Labour Court for its adjudication. The respondent-management pleaded that petitioner was engaged against a specific project, i.e. Aravali Project, which came to be closed on 31.10.1999. Consequently, services of all the daily wagers came to an end automatically after closure of the said project. Petitioner-workman never completed 240 days of service in a calendar year. Further, it was a clear case of - Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ("the I.D. Act" for short).
After hearing both the parties and going through the evidence brought on record, learned Labour Court came to the conclusion that termination of service of the petitioner was covered u/s 2(oo)(bb) of the I.D. Act, which does not amount to retrenchment. It was further held that since the petitioner-workman has raised the industrial dispute, vide his demand notice dated 19.10.2007 without any reasonable explanation for the inordinate long period of about eight years, his claim was old and stale, because of which, he was not found to be entitled for any relief, thereby passing the impugned award dated 19.4.2012 (Annexure P-2). Hence, this writ petition.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Labour Court failed to appreciate the true facts and circumstances of the case, while passing the impugned award. He further submits that petitioner had rendered the service for more than eight years working in different capacities such as labour mate, Supervisor, Tractor-cum-Jeep driver and Peon. He next contended that the learned Labour Court could have moulded the relief, but case of the petitioner should not have been dismissed only on account of delayed reference. He submits that the present case was not covered under the exceptional clause of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the I.D. Act. Finally, he prays for setting aside the impugned award by allowing the present writ petition.
Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at considerable length, after careful perusal of the record of the case and giving thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present one is not a fit case warranting any interference at the hands of this Court, while exercising its writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. To say so, reasons are more than one, which are being recorded hereinafter.
The present was a specifically pleaded case on behalf of the respondent-management that the petitioner was engaged for a particular project, i.e. Aravali Project, which came to be closed on 31.10.1999. Due to the closure of the project, service of all the daily wagers came to an end. It was neither pleaded nor proved or argued case of the petitioner that he did not work against the above-said specific project, i.e. Aravali Project. It was also not the pleaded case of the petitioner that the work was still available or any of his junior was retained or any fresh appointments were made after the alleged termination of his service. Having said that, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that the learned Labour Court committed no error of law having found the present case covered under the exception clause of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the I.D. Act and the impugned award deserves to be upheld.
It is also a matter of record that the petitioner-workman raised the industrial dispute after about eight long years. No explanation was forthcoming, so as to explain this inordinate long delay in serving his demand notice. Even during the course of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner could not furnish any explanation, whatsoever, for this long delay of eight years.
It is true that no limitation period, as such, is provided under the I.D. Act for raising the industrial dispute but simultaneously it is also the settled proposition of law that old and stale claim cannot be entertained. In this view of the matter, it is unhesitatingly held that the learned Labour Court proceeded on factually correct and legally justified approach, while passing the impugned award, which deserves to be upheld for this reason also.
The view taken by this Court also finds support from the judgments of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Shalimar Works Limited Vs. Their Workmen, , Assistant Executive Engineer, Karnataka v. Shivalinga, (2002) 1 LLJ 457SC , Haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank Vs. Neelam, , Karan Singh Vs. Executive Engineer Haryana State Marketing Board, , U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Ram Singh, 2008 (17) SCC 627, State of Karnataka and Another Vs. Ravi Kumar, and Kuldeep Singh Vs. G.M., Instrument Design Development and Facilities Centre and Another, .
The relevant observations made by the Hon''ble Supreme-Court in Neelam''s case (supra), which can be gainfully following in the present case, read as under:--
BELATED CLAIM:
The Industrial Courts like any other court must be held to have some discretion in the matter of grant of relief. There is no proposition of law that once an order of termination is held to be bad in law, irrespective of any other consideration the Labour Court would be bound to grant relief to the workman. The Industrial Disputes Act does not contain any provision which mandates the Industrial Court to grant relief in every case to the workman. The extent to which a relief can be moulded will inevitably depend upon the facts and circumstances obtaining in each case. In absence of any express provision contained in the statute in this behalf, it is not for the court to lay down a law which will have a universal application.
In Ajaib Singh (supra), the management did not raise any plea of delay. The Court observed that had such plea been raised, the workman would have been in a position to show the circumstances which prevented him in approaching the Court at an earlier stage or even to satisfy the Court that such a plea was not sustainable after the reference was made by the Government. In that case, the Labour Court granted the relief, but the same was denied to the workman only by the High Court. The Court referred to the purport and object of enacting Industrial Disputes Act only with a view to find out as to whether the provisions of the Article 137 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable or not. Although, the Court cannot import a period of limitation when the statute does not prescribe the same, as was observed in Ajaib Singh (supra), but it does not mean that irrespective of facts and circumstances of each case, a stale claim must be entertained by the appropriate Government while making a reference or in a case where such reference is made the workman would be entitled to the relief at, the hands of the Labour Court.
Recapitulating the facts of the present case and respectfully following the law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the cases referred to here-in-above, it is held that the learned Labour Court correctly understood the law enunciated by the Hon''ble Supreme Court. The claim of the petitioner was rightly declined on the twin grounds namely; (i) the case having been found to be covered under the exception clause of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the I.D. Act and (ii) on account of inordinate long delay of about eight years in raising the industrial dispute by the petition ex-workman. Thus the impugned award deserves to be upheld.
No other argument was raised. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this Court is of the considered view that the instant writ petition is misconceived, bereft of merit and without any substance. Thus, it must fail. No case for interference has been made out. Resultantly, the present writ petition stands dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.