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Judgment
R.G. Vaidyanatha, J.—This is an appeal against the judgement dated 6th October, 1986 in M.A.C. application No. 118 of 1982 on the file of M.A.C.T., Thane. Respondents have filed cross - objections. Respondents and their Counsel absent. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellant.
The respondents who are the parents of Rain Khilari, filed a claim petition in the Court below. Their case is that their son Ram Khilari aged about 19 years was going on a bicycle on 7.12.1981. The truck driven by the first respondent bearing MRQ 221 came on that road being driven in rash and negligent manner and as a result of the impact the Ram Khilari fell down from the bicycle and sustained serious injuries and died as a result of the same. The parents have filed claim petition claiming compensation of Rs. 50,000/- in the Court below for the death of their son.
Originally only respondents of 1 and 2 were made parties to the proceedings. They have filed a written statement denying the involvement of the vehicle No. MRQ 221 in the accident. Appellants 1 and 2 denied their liability for paying compensation. They also took objection that the second appellant is not the owner of the vehicle. They also denied that the accident was due to any rash and negligent driving on the part of the first appellant.
The learned trial Court framed the following issues : Issues
Do the applicants establish negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle No. MRQ-221 in driving the same on 7.12.81 ?
Is the death of Ram khilari Ratanlal Walmiki is the result of such negligence ?
Arc the applicants entitled to compensation of Rs. 50.000/- If not to what extern1?
interest and costs in what manner to be assessed and saddled?
It appears after the evidence was recorded on an application filed by the claimants, Union of India was made respondent in the Court below. Then after recording evidence and hearing the arguments, the learned trial court allowed the claim petition partly by granting compensation of Rs. 36,000/- together with interest at 9%. Being aggrieved by the judgement of the trial court, the appellants have come up with the present appeal.
The learned Counsel for the appellant has questioned the correctness and legality of the impugned judgement. It was argued that Union of India was necessary party and was impleaded at a very late stage and no opportunity was given to Union of India by issuing notice for filing written statement or to adduce evidence. Then on merits it was argued that the vehicle driven by the first appellant was not involved in the accident at all and therefore, appellants are not liable for the suit claim. Then on merits it was contended that the rash and negligent driving on the part of the first appellant is not proved and the compensation awarded is excessive. As already stated, we do not have the benefit of the argument on behalf of the respondents since they and their Counsel have remained absent.
As far as the question of impleading Union of India as a party to the proceedings, there cannot be any dispute at all. Since Union of India is the owner of the vehicle, it should have been impleaded at the earliest stage. However, the driver and the Area Superintendent of the Central Government Goods Depot were impleaded as party respondents. The vehicle belongs to the Railway Department. It may be that formally Union of India should have been impleaded.
The learned Counsel for the appellant invited my attention to a case of the apex Court in The State of Kamataka v. GMSR, Madras AIR 1976 SC 2138. In that case preliminary issue was framed about the maintainability of the suit for not impleading Union of India as party to the suit. Both the trial Court and the High Court held that the suit is not maintainable in view of specific provision of Sections 79 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court also held that the Union of India is a necessary party and the suit is not maintainable without the same being made as a party.
In my view, we cannot apply the provision of CPC or other substantive laws to a proceeding under the Motor Vehicles Act; it is well settled that strict rules of evidence and strict rules of procedure and strict rules of pleadings are not applicable to proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act. The inquiry in claim case is summary in nature and it cannot be treated as a regular civil suit. Therefore, the observations of the apex court cannot be applied to a summary inquiry in claim case u/s 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act.
Even granting for a moment that the defect was fatal for not impleading Union of India as party, the defect has been cured at a later stage. An application was filed on behalf of the respondents to make Union of India as party respondent, that application was allowed. The petition was amended and
Union of India was added as respondent No. 3. It may be, a separate notice was not sent to Union of India and this may be because, the learned Government Pleader who was appearing for the Railway Department must have taken notice on behalf of the Union of India. Any how. Union of India has now come up in appeal, I do not find that Union of India has any better defence than appellants I and 2 in disputing the identity of the vehicle involved in the accident or about the rash and negligent nature of the accident. Since I have heard the learned Counsel Shri Navin Parikh appearing for the appellants including the Union of India on merits, I find that no prejudice is caused to Union of India in not being able to file written statement in the Court below. Though, initially there was some defect in the petition, it has been subsequently cured and Union of India has been made a party and therefore, the above decision of the apex court is not applicable to the facts of the present case.
As far as the question whether the vehicle MRQ 221 was involved in the accident and whether the accident was due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle, we have to see whether the claimants have proved their case.
We have the direct evidence of an eyewitness P.W. 3 Gajanan Patil. He has sworn before the Court that on that day, the deceased was going on a cycle ahead of him and he was also going on a cycle. At that time, a trailer MRQ 221 came from the backside and had overtook him and then went and dashed against the cycle of the deceased, As a result of the impact, the cyclist fell down and the vehicle of trailer ran over the leg of the injured. P.W. 3 Cut her states that since the vehicle was going away, he chased the vehicle which entered the compound of Surendra Company, he went inside and questioned the driver of the Vehicle. He has identified the driver as the first appellant, though the driver initially was reluctant to admit the question, later he came with him to the police station. He has also stated that the trailer came in a fast speed when the accident look place. Nothing is brought out in the cross-examination to discredit his evidence. His presence at the spot was not disputed at all. In fact, the first appellant was examined as D.W. 1 and though he denied causing the accident, he admitted that P.W. 3 had come to the compound of Surendra Company and questioned him about the accident. He has denied the suggestion that his truck dashed against the cyclist.
We have the evidence of P.W. 2-Shantaram Vichare P.S.I. of Phule Chowk Police Station, Kalyan. He has spoken about the investigation done by him about the accident and about the filing of charge sheet against the first appellant in the criminal Court.
The fact that the first appellant was acquitted in criminal case is not relevant for our present purpose. The degree of proof required in a criminal case is of a higher order than the degree of proof in a civil case. In a criminal case, the Court can decide nature and manner of accident on broad probabilities and circumstances of the case.
The learned trial Court who recorded the evidence has found that the vehicle in question was involved in the accident and the accident was due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the first appellant. After reappreciating the evidence in the light of the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant. I do not find any reason to take a different view.
As far as the quantum of compensation is concerned, for the death of a young boy of 19 years, the learned trial Court has awarded only Rs. 36,000/ - as compensation; by any stretch of imagination it cannot be said that the amount awarded is excessive.
P.W.I. Ratanlal Walmiki is the unfortunate father of the deceased''s son. He had only two sons of whom, one had died earlier and the other died as a result of this accident. He has also stated that his deceased son was working as a labourer as a sweeper and earning Rs. 450/- per month. Having regard to the earnings of the son and his young age, the amount of Rs. 36,000/- awarded by the trial Court is by no means excessive so as to call for interference by this Court.
So far as cross-objections are concerned, no arguments are addressed before me. Hence I hold that the respondents have not made out any case for interference with the impugned order and to enhance the compensation.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed and cross-objections also dismissed. In the circumstances of the case and particularly since the respondents and their counsel were absent, there will be no order as to costs.