Narain Dass vs State of Haryana

R.L. Anand, J.

The impugned judgments have been read with the assistance rendered by the counsel of the parties. I do not see any legal infirmity in the impugned judgments so far as the conviction part is concerned.

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in the alternative urged that the petitioner may be visited with leniency in the matter of sentence as he was a minor on the date of the commission of offence and in this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon certificate Ex. D.2 and the statement of Nihal Singh DW.2 which were relied upon in the trial court. In this regard I would like to reproduce the discussion of the learned trial Court which is as follows :

"On the other hand, the learned GFI urged that the accused was not less than 18 years of age at the time of taking of sample. He drew my attention towards charge framed against the accused dated 15.4.1983 in which the accused stated his age 19 years. He urged that from this angle, the accused cannot be said less than 18 years of age on the date of commission of offence. He also urged that the age of the accused is to be considered on the date of his conviction and not on the date of the commission of the offence. After going through the record as per school leaving certificate Ex.D.2 and statement of DW.2 the accused on difference comes out to be only 28 days less than 18 years of age on the date of taking of sample i.e. 23.1.1982. The accused failed to produce any birth entry from the register of chowkidar or from the Municipal Committee or hospital regarding proof of his age. In the charge framed on 15.4.1983 by Sh. U.B. Khanduja, the then learned SDJM, Kaithal, the accused told his age 19 years. From that angle, the accused was more than 18 years of age on the date when the sample was taken. The age of 19 years was told by the accused himself. Considering all these circumstances including the physical appearance of the accused, the accused cannot be said to be less than 18 years of age on the date of commission of offence."

The above discussion would show that if the school leaving certificate Ex.D.2 is relied upon, the petitioner was less than 18 years on the date of commission of offence i.e. 23.1.1982.

No doubt, the cases under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act should be seen with strictness yet keeping in view the fact that the petitioner is suffering agony of protracted trial since 1982 and that he was less than 18 years on the date of commission of offence, the ends of justice would suffice if the petitioner is ordered to be released on probation.

In this view of the matter, the petition is partly allowed and the sentence imposed upon the petitioner is hereby modified and he is ordered to be released on probation under Section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act provided he furnishes a bail bond in the sum of Rs. 5,000/ with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of CJM, Kaithal undertaking that during the period do probation he shall not commit any offence and shall maintain peace and be of good behaviour. He shall appear before the CJM as and when called upon the receive the sentence on the commission of breach of terms of the bond. The petitioner, is, however, directed to pay a sum of Rs. 5,000/ to the State towards the costs of litigation. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Rs. 1,000/ has already been paid by the petitioner as fine and this amount may be adjusted towards litigation expenses. If the petitioner has already paid Rs. 1,000/ towards fine and if the CJM, Kaithal, is satisfied regarding that payment, the petitioner shall deposit a sum of Rs. 4,000/ failing which he shall deposit Rs. 5,000/ by way of costs of litigation.

With the above modification in sentence, this petition stands disposed of. Necessary payment be made and bail bond be executed within one month from the date of the passing of this order. A copy of this order be sent to the CJM, Kaithal, through District and Sessions Judge, concerned.