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Judgment
(Per FIRDOSH P. POONIWALLA J)
The present Writ Petition has been filed seeking the following final reliefs :
“a. That this Honourable Court be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the Respondent No. 1 to grant promotion/upgradation/progression to Petitioner from Job Group B to C in 2002, from Job Group C to D in 2007, and from Job Group D to E in 2012 alongwith the corresponding and consequential high payscales, perks, allowances and benefits, and any future promotions/upgradations/progressions that the Petitioner may be eligible to receive.
b. That this Honourable Court be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the Respondent No. 1 to disclose the promotion/upgradation/progression policy or policies in operation at the Respondent No. 1 during the period from 1997 till the date of filing of this petition.”
Respondent No.1 has raised a preliminary objection as to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the present Writ Petition. This Judgement deals only with the said preliminary objection raised by Respondent No.1
SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT NO. 1
Mr. Anand Pai, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No.1, submitted that the present Petition is filed in this Court in 2017, although the Petitioner was, at that time, posted in the Kochi Refinery of Respondent No.1.
Mr. Pai drew attention to paragraph 70 of the Petition, which states that the Petitioner resides in Mumbai, and submitted that the same forms the basis of filing the present Petition, and that the same is incorrect. Mr. Pai further submitted that the present Petition proceeds on the basis that the whole cause of action arose in Mumbai.
In this context, Mr. Pai submitted that, after his transfer to Kochi in 2014, until his retirement in 2021, the Petitioner continued to work at Kochi. His service-related emoluments were paid at Kochi, and he was in fact subjected to disciplinary enquiry at Kochi. Mr. Pai submitted that paragraphs 56 to 62 of the Petition are in respect of happenings at the Kochi Refinery. Further, Mr. Pai submitted that the aspect of promotion, from 2014, arose in Kochi, and must be agitated at the Kerala High Court and not in this Court. Mr. Pai further submitted that there was no demand in Kochi from 2014 to 2021 for the benefits, and the Petitioner retired and was paid all retiral dues. Mr. Pai submitted that, thus, no part of the cause of action arose in Mumbai, and the situs of employment is Kochi.
In support of his submissions, Mr. Pai relied upon the following judgements:
V.G. Jagdishan vs. Indofos Industries Limited, (2022) 6 SCC 167;
J. Balaji vs. The Hindu, New Delhi, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 5352; and
PETITIONER’S SUBMISSIONS
Mr. Mihir Desai, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, submitted that the territorial jurisdiction of this Court is expressly attracted by Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. Article 226(2) provides that the power of a High Court under Article 226 may be exercised where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, notwithstanding that the seat of the authority or residence of the person against whom the writ is sought may be outside such territory.
Mr. Desai submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Limited vs. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 254, has authoritatively held that the expression "cause of action" in Article 226(2) has the same essential meaning as ordinarily understood in law, namely, the bundle of material facts which the Petitioner is required to establish in order to obtain the relief sought. Mr. Desai submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in the said Judgement that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, the same is sufficient to confer jurisdiction, provided such fraction constitutes an integral or material part of the cause of action.
Mr. Desai submitted that the Petition specifically concerns decisions pertaining to the Petitioner's promotion and service career, which were taken by the Human Resource Department of Respondent No. 1 at Mumbai. Mr. Desai submitted that the said facts are directly and substantially connected with the lis between the parties, and therefore, constitute an integral part of the cause of action.
Further, Mr. Desai submitted that, in this Petition, the Petitioner has sought a Writ of Mandamus directing Respondent No. 1 to grant promotion/upgradation/ progression to the Petitioner from Job Group B to C in 2002, from Job Group C to D in 2007 and from Job Group D to E in 2012, alongwith the corresponding and consequential high payscales, perks, allowances and benefits. Mr. Desai submitted that it is the case of the Petitioner that the Petitioner was entitled to all these promotions when the Petitioner was serving in Mumbai. Therefore, definitely a part of the cause of action, if not the entire cause of action, arises in Mumbai. In support of his submissions, apart from the aforesaid Judgement in Kusum Ingots (supra), Mr. Desai relied upon the Judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in:
Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711;
Alchemist Limited vs. State Bank of Sikkim, (2007) 11 SCC 335; and
State of Goa vs. Summit Online Trade Solutions Private Limited, (2023) 7 SCC 791.
In conclusion, Mr. Desai submitted that this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain, try, and dispose of this Petition, and therefore, the preliminary objection raised by Respondent No. 1 ought to be rejected.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
In order to consider the preliminary objection raised by Respondent No. 1, it is important to consider the provisions of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. Articles 226(1) and (2) of the Constitution of India read as under:
“226.(1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.
(2)The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.”
By virtue of the provisions of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, a High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action wholly or in part arises, would have jurisdiction to entertain a Writ Petition.
In Kusum Ingots (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, keeping in view the expressions used in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Page 6 of 19 Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter. Paragraphs 6, 7, 10, and 29 of the Judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots (supra) are relevant and are set out hereunder:
“6.Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean that every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. Its importance is beyond any doubt. For every action, there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily.
7.Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India reads thus: "226. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories."
10.Keeping in view the expressions used in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter.
29.In view of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, now if a part of cause of action arises outside the jurisdiction of the High Court, it would have jurisdiction to issue a writ. The decision in Khajoor Singh has, thus, no application.”
In Oil and Natural Gas Commission (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a Writ Petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the Petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the Petition. Paragraph 6 of the Judgement in Oil and Natural Gas Commission (supra) is relevant and is set out hereunder:
“6.It is well settled that the expression "cause of action" means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. In Chand Kour v. Partab Singh' Lord Watson said:
“...the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.” Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend upon whether the averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.”
In Alchemist (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the legislative history of Article 226 makes it clear that after 1963 (when Article 226 was amended to include Article 226(1A), which was later renumbered as Article 226(2)), the cause of action is relevant and germane, and a Writ Petition may be instituted in a Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which the cause of action, in whole or in part, arises. Paragraphs 15 to 18 and 37 of the Judgement in Alchemist (supra) are relevant and are set out hereunder:
“15.The effect of the above decisions was that no High Court other than the High Court of Punjab (before the establishment of the High Court of Delhi) had jurisdiction to issue any direction, order or writ to the Union of India, because the seat of the Government of India was located in New Delhi. Cause of action was a concept totally irrelevant and alien for conferring jurisdiction on the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution. An attempt to import such concept was repelled by this Court. In the circumstances, Article 226 was amended by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 and after Clause (1), new Clause (1-A) was inserted which read as under:
"226.(1-A) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories."
16.It may be stated that by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, Clause (1-A) was renumbered as Clause (2). The underlying object of amendment was expressed in the following words: "Under the existing Article 226 of the Constitution, the only High Court which has jurisdiction with respect to the Central Government is the Punjab High Court. This involves considerable hardship to litigants from distant places. It is, therefore, proposed to amend Article 226 so that when any relief is sought against any Government, authority or person for any action taken, the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises may also have jurisdiction to issue appropriate directions, orders or writ." (emphasis supplied)
The effect of the amendment was that the accrual of cause of action was made an additional ground to confer jurisdiction on a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
17.As Joint Committee observed:
"This clause would enable the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The Committee feels that the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises in part only should also be vested with such jurisdiction."
18.The legislative history of the constitutional provisions, therefore, makes it clear that after 1963, cause of action is relevant and germane and a writ petition can be instituted in a High Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which cause of action in whole or in part arises.
37.From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the ratio laid down in a catena of decisions by this Court, it is clear that for the purpose of deciding whether facts averred by the appellant-petitioner would or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the court, the court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a "part of cause of action", nothing less than that.”
In State of Goa (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the constitutional mandate of Article 226(2) is that the cause of action referred to therein must at least arise in part within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction when writ powers conferred by Article 226(1) are proposed to be exercised, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person is not within those territories. Paragraphs 14, 15 and 17 of the Judgement in State of Goa (supra) are relevant and read as under :
“14.While dealing with an objection as to lack of territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition on the ground that the cause of action has not arisen within its jurisdiction, a High Court essentially has to arrive at a conclusion on the basis of the averments made in the petition memo treating the contents as true and correct. That is the fundamental principle. Bearing this in mind, we have looked into the petition memo of WP (C) No. 38 of 2017 and searched in vain to trace how at least part of the cause of action has been pleaded by the petitioning company, to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court.
15.This is a case where clause (2) of Article 226 has been invoked by the High Court to clothe it with the jurisdiction to entertain and try the writ petitions. The constitutional mandate of clause (2) is that the "cause of action", referred to therein, must at least arise in part within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction when writ powers conferred by clause (1) are proposed to be exercised, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person is not within those territories.
17.Determination of the question as to whether the facts pleaded constitute a part of the cause of action, sufficient to attract clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, would necessarily involve an exercise by the High Court to ascertain that the facts, as pleaded, constitute a material, essential or integral part of the cause of action. In so determining, it is the substance of the matter that is relevant. It, therefore, follows that the party invoking the writ jurisdiction has to disclose that the integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action do constitute a cause empowering the High Court to decide the dispute and that, at least, a part of the cause of action to move the High Court arose within its jurisdiction. Such pleaded facts must have a nexus with the subject-matter of challenge based on which the prayer can be granted. Those facts which are not relevant or germane for grant of the prayer would not give rise to a cause of action conferring jurisdiction on the court. These are the guiding tests.”
Applying the law laid down by the aforesaid Judgements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to the facts of the present case, it is clear from the averments in the Petition and the relief sought in prayer (a) of the Petition that the Petitioner is seeking grant of promotion/upgradation/ progression to the Petitioner in 2002, 2007 and 2012 when the Petitioner was situated in Mumbai. Since the reliefs are sought by the Petitioner in respect of the period during which he was employed in Mumbai, the cause of action, or at least a part thereof, would definitely arise in Mumbai.
Further, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Desai, the Petition specifically concerns decisions pertaining to the Petitioner's promotion, which would be taken by the Human Resource Department of Respondent No. 1 at Mumbai. For this reason also, the cause of action would arise in Mumbai. Further, it is also pertinent to note that Respondent No. 1 has its registered office at Mumbai.
For all the aforesaid reasons, a material, essential, and integral part of the cause of action in the present Petition has arisen in Mumbai. In these circumstances, by virtue of the provisions of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, this Court would have jurisdiction to entertain, try, and dispose of this Petition.
The fact that the Petitioner was transferred to Kochi in 2014, and retired in Kochi, does not change the position, and does not deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to entertain the present Petition as the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
This leaves us to deal with the Judgements relied upon by Mr. Pai in support of his submissions.
The first Judgement relied upon by Mr. Pai is the Judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in V.G. Jagdishan (supra). Paragraphs 4, 7 , 10 and 11 of the said Judgement are relevant and are set out hereunder :
“4.It was the case on behalf of the workman that as the demand notice was served at Head Office at Delhi, it can be said that the dispute has arisen giving rise to substantial cause of action at Delhi. Therefore, it was the case on behalf of the workman that the Labour Court at Delhi has territorial jurisdiction to try the case.
7.Ms V. Mohana, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant herein --workman has vehemently submitted that in the present case it cannot be said that there is a total lack of jurisdiction in the Labour Court, Delhi. It is submitted that as the Head Office, where the demand notice was sent was at Delhi and the demand notice was served from Delhi where the workman was staying after the termination, it can be said that a part cause of action has arisen in Delhi. It is submitted that when a part of the cause of action has arisen in Delhi, the court at Delhi would have territorial jurisdiction. Reliance is placed on the decisions of this Court in Nandram v. Garware Polyster Ltd., Bikash Bhushan Ghosh v. Novartis India Ltd. and Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd. v. Ande Lingaiah.
7.1.It is further submitted by Ms V. Mohana, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant that in the present case, the Labour Court had decided the preliminary issue and held that the Labour Court, Delhi has no territorial jurisdiction to decide the case. It is submitted that the Labour Court ought to have given its decision on all issues. Reliance is placed upon the decision of this Court in D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Admn. It is submitted that as held by this Hon'ble Court, tribunals should dispose of all the issues, whether preliminary or otherwise, at the same time.
7.2.Making the above submissions and relying upon above decisions of this Court, it is prayed to quash and set aside the order(s) passed by the Labour Court, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court and direct the Labour Court, Delhi to decide and dispose of the case at the earliest.
10.From the findings recorded by the Labour Court, Delhi and the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, it is not much in dispute that the workman was employed as a driver at Ghaziabad office. He was working at Ghaziabad. His services were retrenched at Ghaziabad. All throughout during the employment, the workman stayed and worked at Ghaziabad. Only after the retrenchment/termination the workman shifted to Delhi from where he served a demand notice at Head Office of the Management situated at Delhi. Merely because the workman after termination/retrenchment shifted to Delhi and sent a demand notice from Delhi and the Head Office of the Management was at Delhi, it cannot be said that a part cause of action has arisen at Delhi. Considering the facts that the workman was employed at Ghaziabad; was working at Ghaziabad and his services were terminated at Ghaziabad, the facts being undisputed, only the Ghaziabad Court would have territorial jurisdiction to decide the case.
11.As such the issue involved in the present case is no longer res integra in view of the decision of this Court in Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Kalyan Banerjee. In Eastern Coalfields the workman was employed in Mugma area in the district of Dhanbad, Jharkhand. His services were terminated at Mugma. However, the workman filed a writ petition before the Calcutta High Court. On a preliminary objection taken the Calcutta High Court helds that since the workman was serving at Mugma area under the General Manager of the area which is the State of Jharkhand, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction. Affirming the aforesaid decision, this Court held that the entire cause of action arose in Mugma area within the State of Jharkhand and only because the head office of the company was situated in the State of West Bengal, the same by itself will not confer any jurisdiction upon the Calcutta High Court particularly when the head office had nothing to do with the order of punishment passed against the workman. In the present case also, the workman was employed at Ghaziabad; he was working at Ghaziabad and his services were also terminated at Ghaziabad by the office at Ghaziabad where he was employed.”
On a reading of the Judgement in V.G. Jagdishan (supra) considering the fact that the workman was employed at Ghaziabad, was working at Ghaziabad and his service were terminated at Ghaziabad, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that only the Ghaziabad Court would have territorial jurisdiction to decide the challenge to his termination. These facts are very different from the present case where the Petitioner has claimed promotion at the time when he was employed in Mumbai and therefore we have held that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain, try and dispose of this Petition.
The next Judgement relied upon by Mr. Pai is the Judgement of the Delhi High Court in J. Balaji (supra). Paragraphs 4, 7, 9 and 12 of the said Judgement were relied upon by Mr. Pai and are set out hereunder :
“4.Appellant challenged the aforesaid termination order by filing a claim petition under Section 24 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 (ID Act). By Award dated 27th August, 2019 passed in LCA No. 07/2016 (Old DID No. 53/15), the learned Labour Court dismissed the claim petition of the appellant herein holding that Delhi Courts had lost their territorial jurisdiction since the situs of employment of the appellant had shifted from Delhi to Chennai as the appellant had joined the office at Chennal upon his transfer. Thus, learned Labour Court held as follows:-
"Issue no. 2. Whether the claimant/petition was employed as a Correspondent in respondent's organization at Chennai, if so, whether this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the present petition?
It is an admitted case as emerged from the evidence on record that workman started his job with the management at Vishakhapatnam and lastly he was working at Chennai.
As had been held in catenea of judgments as relied upon by Id. AR for management, it has become manifestly clear that it is the situs of place of employment of workman which determines the question of territorial jurisdiction of a Labour Court for deciding a labour dispute raised by a workman and the place of his initial appointment or the place of his promotion would be of no help to him in conferring the territorial jurisdiction upon a Court which otherwise does not have the same.
This view of mine is further fortified by the following citations relied upon by the management:
1.Lohia Starlinger Limited v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2006 V AD (Delhi) 732;
2.Braham Prakash v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2007) 143 DLT 311;
3.Harsaran Singh v. Managing Director, Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd., (2009) 163 DLT 794;
In the light of the aforesaid citations, I have no hesitation in holding that once the workman was transferred to Chennai and had also joined there, then the situs of his employment shifted from Delhi to Chennai and as such, the Delhi Courts had lost their territorial jurisdiction which would now vest in the Labour Courts at Tamil Nadu. Therefore, Delhi Courts had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present claim. As such, the issue is answered in negative and decided in favour of management and against the workman."
7.It is further contended that the ID Act has no provision related to territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, claim filed under ID Act cannot be fettered by the rules of territorial jurisdiction as applicable to civil suits.
9.On the other hand learned counsel for respondents justified the Award passed by the learned Labour Court as well as the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. Learned counsel for respondents relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of V.G. Jagdishan v. Indofos Industries Ltd., (2022) 6 SCC 167 in order to contend that Delhi Courts did not have territorial jurisdiction in the present case.
12.After his transfer from Delhi to Chennai vide order dated 3rd February, 2014, appellant sent an email dated 12th February, 2014 seeking an extension of time till 6th March, 2014 to join duty at Chennai, which was acceded to by respondents. Thereafter, appellant made a second request for an extension of time to join at Chennai till 9th June, 2014 vide his email dated 4th March, 2014. However, his leave was approved upto 23rd March, 2014. Subsequently, pursuant to further requests by appellant, respondents extended the time to join the transfer posting at Chennai on or before 15th April, 2014. Appellant once again wrote on 14th April, 2014 seeking further extension of leave. By communication dated 19th April 2014, appellant was informed that he had been relieved from Delhi Office and his services stood transferred to Chennai from 15th April, 2014, and that he ought to apply for leave to the Chief of Tamil Nadu Bureau who was the competent authority. Thereafter, appellant wrote to the Chief of Tamil Nadu Bureau seeking leave for six weeks on 21st April, 2014. The Chief of Tamil Nadu Bureau sent email communication to appellant on 26th April, 2014, granting him leave and giving him one final opportunity to join Chennai before 2nd May, 2014. Ultimately, appellant joined duty at Chennai on 2nd May, 2014.”
In the case of J. Balaji (supra), the Petitioner was challenging his termination. The Court held that the Petitioner had joined duty at Chennai, his service was terminated from Chennai and the Order of termination was issued from Chennai. The Court held that, in these circumstances, it is clear that the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Courts at Chennai, and merely because the Appellant was posted in Delhi, prior to his posting at Chennai, would not confer jurisdiction on the Delhi High Court when the cause of action qua the proceedings did not arise in Delhi. Once again, the facts in the case of J. Balaji (supra) are clearly distinguishable. In J. Balaji (supra) the challenge was to the termination of the employee. The employee was posted at Chennai, his service was terminated from Chennai and the order of termination was issued from Chennai. In these circumstances, the Court held that the Courts at Chennai had territorial jurisdiction. In the present case, as stated hereinbefore, the Petitioner is seeking promotion during the period of his employment when he was in Mumbai, therefore the cause of action has arisen in Mumbai and this Court has jurisdiction to entertain, try and dispose of this Petition.
ORDER
In the aforesaid circumstances and for the aforesaid reasons, the following Order is passed :
Respondent No’s.1 preliminary objection on jurisdiction is rejected.
It is held that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain, try and dispose of the present Writ Petition.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
Place the Writ Petition for directions on 25th November, 2026.