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Judgment
M.N. Bhandari, J.—1. By these writ petitions, a challenge is made to the order dated 31st March, 2015, whereby services of the petitioners were terminated under the Rajasthan State Road Transport Workers Standing Orders (in short "Standing Orders").
Learned counsel submits that petitioners were appointed on substantive basis thus their services could not have been terminated without holding inquiry. It is moreso when the order casts stigma on the petitioners. A reference of letter dated 28th June, 2013 in the case of Nand Singh has been given to show nature of appointment. The services of the substantive appointees have been terminated in terms of the Standing Orders applicable to the probationer. The provision of the Standing Orders invoked by the respondents does not specify about termination of probationer but makes a reference about confirmation on completion of period of probation and even exclude payment of compensation in a given case. The definition of the probationer given under the Standing Orders was referred to show that petitioners were substantive appointee thus do not fall in the definition of probationer.
It is lastly submitted that before passing the impugned order, the petitioners were served with the notice dated 24th March, 2015 containing certain allegations of carrying passengers without tickets. No inquiry was conducted thus impugned order has been passed not only in violation of the Standing Orders but principles of natural justice. The petitioners have made a prayer for quashing of the order.
A reference of the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Ram Bahadur Pandey & Anr. Vs. State of Uttarakhand & Ors., reported in , (2015) 2 SC 142, Hari Ram Maurya Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2006) 9 SCC 167 and V.P. Ahuja Vs. State of Punjab & Ors., reported in , (2000) 3 SCC 239 have been given by learned counsel for petitioners. Learned counsel has further relied on the Division Bench judgment of this court in the case of Ramraj Gurjar S/o Shri Suraj Mal Vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Through its Managing Director, Chomu House, Jaipur & Ors., reported in 2008 WLC (Raj.) UC 485 and Single Bench judgment in the case of Jagdish Prasad Rulaniya Vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors., S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4624/2008, decided vide order dated 15th May, 2015. In those cases, termination was held to be illegal as principles of natural justice was violated. The liberty was however given to the department to hold inquiry thus, present writ petitions be covered by the judgments (supra). Hence while quashing the impugned order, liberty can be given to the corporation for a departmental inquiry.
Learned counsel appearing for the Corporation has contested the case. He submits that while making arguments at the admission stage, mis-statement of fact was made by the counsel for petitioners. The petitioners'' appointment was on probation but without producing the order of appointment, it was stated to be a substantive appointment and not on probation. The order of appointment has been enclosed along with reply. The aforesaid shows conduct of the petitioners.
It is further submitted that the petitioners'' services during the period of probation were not found satisfactory. In view of above, Para 8(iii) of the Standing Orders was invoked to deny confirmation as integrity of the petitioners were not unquestionable and otherwise their services were not found to be satisfactory. The petitioners were served with the charge sheet earlier also on many occasions and the petitioner Nand Singh was even punished on two occasions. The petitioners have referred to the recent notice to co-relate their termination. The order of termination does not specify it and at the cost of repeation, if notice dated 24th March, 2015 in the case of Nand Singh is considered, he was served with the charge sheet on five occasions and out of which, punished on two occasions but then order of termination was not passed on service of those charge sheet earlier though it could have been if the respondents would have intended to dispense with the inquiry.
The scrutiny of the service of the petitioners was made by the competent authority and thereupon only order of termination was effected. A reference of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Rajesh Kohli Vs. High Court of Jammu and Kashmir & Anr., reported in , (2010) 12 SCC 783, Kailash Chand Vs. DTC, reported in , 217 (2015) DLT 698, State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Ram Bachan Tripathi, reported in , AIR 2005 SC 3212 and in the case of Rajesh Kumar Srivastava Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in , 2011 (129) FLR 252(Supreme Court) has been given. Therein, similar controversy was considered and decided by the Apex Court. In view of above, impugned order may be maintained.
I have considered the rival submissions made by the parties and perused the record.
The impugned order has been challenged treating it to be punitive in nature. No inquiry was conducted by the respondents thus said to be in violation of principles of natural justice. It is not in dispute that petitioners were appointed on probation and copy of the appointment order has been placed by the respondents along with reply. The order of appointment was not produced by the petitioners. It was made on probation and contrary to it, initial arguments at the time of pressing stay application were made showing petitioners'' appointment to be on substantive basis and not on probation. This shows conduct of the petitioners.
The question now remains as to whether impugned order cast stigma upon the petitioners. The order shows that petitioners'' integrity was not found unquestionable and even not satisfactory thus invoking the Standing Orders, termination was made. Relevant Para 8(iii) of the Standing Orders is quoted hereunder for ready reference:
"8(iii) A probationer shall be confirmed in his appointment at the end of his period of probation if he has successfully passed the prescribed trade test or prescribed departmental examination & if the appointing authority is satisfied that his integrity is unquestionable and he is otherwise fit for confirmation."
The provision aforesaid specifies as to when confirmation of the probationer can be made. It is when authority is satisfied that integrity is unquestionable. The reverse consequence is that if integrity is questionable or an employee is not fit for confirmation then either the period can be extended or may not be continued. The petitioners'' integrity has been found to be questionable apart from service not satisfactory. In my opinion, it does not cast stigma. The termination of the probationers is based on the satisfaction of the authority regarding their services.
It is however true that impugned order of termination has been passed after service of notice making allegations against the petitioners. The impugned order is however not in reference or is based on the said notice. It is also a fact that if notice dated 24th March, 2015 in the case of Nand Singh is seen, the allegations of the similar nature were previously in other five charge sheets also. He was punished on two occasions but discontinuance of the probation was not made as a consequence of service of charge sheet on earlier occasion. The impugned order has been passed when the authority was not satisfied by the services rendered by the petitioners and order cannot be said to be punitive because it is not referring to the charges framed against the petitioners. The facts of this case do not support petitioners to hold impugned order to be punitive in nature. It is not in dispute that if order is punitive in nature or cast stigma, inquiry into the matter is a condition precedent. It depends on the facts of each case.
Learned counsel for petitioners has referred several judgments to support their case. In the case of Ram Bahadur Pandey (supra), the termination was made finding irregularity in his appointment and it was without providing opportunity of hearing thus set aside with liberty to take action in accordance to the rules. In the case of V.P. Ahuja (supra), it was held that service of probationer cannot be terminated erroneously or with punitive orders in violation of principles of natural justice. There Apex Court found that if order casts stigma then termination cannot be without compliance of the principles of natural justice. In the case of Hari Ram Maurya (supra), it was held that if order of termination is punitive, inquiry is mandatory. The same is the position in the case of Ramraj Gurjar S/o Shri Suraj Mal (supra) so as other judgments referred by learned counsel for petitioners. It is settled law that whenever order is punitive or casts stigma, principles of natural justice is to be followed.
The respondents have referred several judgments of Supreme Court where order of termination of probationer was held to be legal despite reference of conduct of the petitioners therein. In the case of Rajesh Kohli (supra), the termination of services was on finding a criminal complaint pending against him while working as an Advocate. The other was complaint of misbehaviour and problem causing in District of posting and so on. The order of termination was held valid for the reasons explained therein. The position of fact is similar in the case of State of U.P. and Ors. Vs. Ram Bachan Tripathi (supra). Therein, merely issuance of show cause notice was not taken to caste stigma if termination is subsequently made as is the case herein. In the case of Kailash Chand (supra), similar issue came up for consideration and decided by Delhi High Court. In the following judgments, the Apex Court did not find termination to be illegal. It is in the case of Mathew P. Thomas Vs. Kerala State Civil Supply Corporation Limited and Ors., reported in , (2003) 3 SCC 263. The relevant para of the said judgment is quoted hereunder for ready reference:
"In the present case, even on earlier occasions when the appellant failed to perform his duties properly during probation period he was warned to improve and continued in the service. If he was to be removed from service on the allegations of misconduct at that time itself the respondents could have removed him from service. This is also a circumstance to indicate that his order of termination was simplicitor. Therefore, having regard to the particular facts and circumstances and in view of what is stated above we have no good reason to disagree with the impugned order."
The Para 32 of the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Pavanendra Narayan Verma Vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences & Anr., reported in , (2002) 1 SCC 520 is quoted thus:
"We are also not prepared to hold that the enquiry held prior to order of termination turned this otherwise innocuous order into one of punishment. An employer is entitled to satisfy itself as to the competence of a probationer to be confirmed in service and for this purpose satisfy itself fairly as to the truth of any allegation that may have been made about the employee. A charge sheet merely details the allegations so that the employee may deal with them effectively. The enquiry report in this case found nothing more against the appellant than an inability to meet the requirements for the post. None of the three factors catalogued above for holding that the termination was in substance punitive exist here."
The Para 7 of the judgment of Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Ram Bachan Tripathi, reported in , AIR 2005 SC 3212 is quoted hereunder:
"Mere description of a background fact cannot be called as stigma. In the termination order it was merely stated that the show-cause notices were issued and there was no response. This can by no stretch of imagination be treated as a stigma as observed by the Tribunal and the High Court."
In the instant case, the authority had exercised powers under Para 8(iii) of the Standing Orders which allow them to confirm a probationer in service on satisfaction of two conditions. While making scrutiny of the case of the petitioners, services were not found satisfactory and integrity to be unquestionable. Those two factors are required to be seen for confirmation and if are found otherwise, can result in either extension of probation period or discontinuance. In the instant case, the respondents took a decision to discontinue the services of the petitioners and for it, impugned order has been passed. The status of the petitioners is only of a probationer as is coming out from the order of appointment and even if definition of probationer given in the Standing Orders is considered. For all the reasons given above, I do not find that impugned order suffers from illegality so as to be interfered.
I am not making comment that within short span of around two years after appointment on probation, the petitioners were found involved in carrying passengers without tickets on many occasions. In the case of Nand Singh, charges were found proved on two occasions but in other matters, inquiry is pending. The aforesaid is not the basis for termination but the court has made reference of the aforesaid fact to show as to what happened within short span of two years of service of the petitioners.
In view of discussion made above, I do not find any ground to cause interference in the impugned order. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed. The stay applications are also dismissed.