Nand Lal Chandel and Others vs Mathru

T.R. Honda, J.—Whether the decision of a revenue officer rendered in proceedings u/s 62 of the H.P. Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter called the Act) with respect to the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties would operate as res judicata in a subsequent civil suit between the same parties involving such relationship�, is the sole question that arises for consideration in this appeal which is at the instance of the defendant.

The suit giving rise to this appeal was filed by the Respondent-plaintiff Mathru, hereinafter called the Plaintiff, for possession of certain parcle of agricultural land. The Plaintiff�s suit was based on her title. Her simple allegations Were that the Defendant had some time before the institution of the suit entered into forcible possession of the suit land and being a trespasser was, therefore, liable for eviction therefrom.

The Defendant while admitting the title of the Plaintiff in respect of the suit land resisted the suit on various pleas. His main plea was that he was in possession of the suit land as a lawful tenant under the plaintiff. Inter-alia he pleaded that on an earlier occasion he was forcibly dispossessed from this land by the Plaintiff when he had applied to the revenue officer (Asstt. Collector) u/s 62 of the Act to seek restoration of his possession. In those proceedings the revenue officer had passed an order on 30-6-1964 directing the Plaintiff to put the Defendant into possession and in execution of that order of the revenue officer, the possession was restored to the defendant. The Plaintiff never challenged that order of the revenue officer either by filing an appeal or otherwise though such a remedy was open to her. That order of the revenue officer, according to the defendant, had become final and now operated as res judicata for the purposes of the present suit in so far as it involved the question of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties.

The pleadings of the parties gave rise to as many as 8 issues which were struck by the Court below. We are here concerned with issue No. 5 only which is in the following language:

Whether the decision of revenue Court operates res-judicata ? OPD

The trial Court returned its findings on this issue in favour of the Defendant and without recording its findings on any of the remaining issues, dismissed the suit of the Plaintiff as barred by res-judicata.

On appeal, the learned District Judge reversed the findings of the trial Court on the above mentioned issue and vide its judgment under appeal, remanded the case to the trial Court with the directions to dispose it of on merits after giving its findings on the other issues which remained undecided.

The present appeal is filed by the Defendant against the aforesaid order of remand.

The contention raised on behalf of the Appellant-Defendant by his learned Counsel Shri Kedarishwar is simple and is like this: Section 62 read with Section 110 of the Act entitles a tenant dispossessed from the land under his tenancy to apply to the revenue officer for restoration of his possession and these provisions further confer jurisdiction on the revenue officer to make an order to that effect if, on inquiry, he is satisfied about the claim of the tenant. This jurisdiction vested in the revenue officer is exclusive and no other Court is competent to decide such a matter. An order passed by the revenue officer u/s 62 of the Act would therefore, according to the contention of the learned Counsel, be called an order passed by a Tribunal of competent jurisdiction and such an order unless setaside or reversed in appeal or otherwise, would be binding inter-se parties and would operate as res-judicata in any subsequent litigation between the same parties including a civil suit. In support of this contention the learned Counsel relies upon the general principles of res-judicata based on public policy and which have received judicial recognition over the years.

The learned Counsel for the Respondent on the other hand, while conceding that a plea of res-judicata can be success fully raised on general principles as advocated by Shri Kedarishwar, argues that on the facts of this case the order recorded by the revenue officer would not be called an order passed by a Court muchless an order passed by a Court of com petent jurisdiction and hence such an order cannot operate as res-judicata between the parties for the purposes of the present suit.

Now, it is not disputed that the plea of res-judicata raised on behalf of the Appellant on the strength of the order of the revenue officer made u/s 62 of the Act cannot be supported by the technical rule embodied in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. At the same time there is no dispute with regard to the legal proposition that apart from the provisions found in Section 11 of the Code, such a plea can be successfully raised on the general principles of res-judicata which are founded on considerations of public policy. The rationale behind this public policy is that finality must be attached to the binding decisions of courts of competent jurisdiction so that individulas are not vexed twice over with the same litigation. These general principles would, however, be attracted only where it is shown that the decision rendered in the former litigation was rendered between the same parties and by a Court of competent jurisdiction, though it may not be necessary that the earlier Court had the jurisdiction to hear the latter suit also.

The crucial question that, therefore, arises in this case is whether the revenue officer who made the order in the previous litigation u/s 62 of the Act was a Court and had the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the question involved in the present suit, namely, whether relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties.

This question in my view must be answered in the negative. There is a clear distinction between a �Revenue Officer� and a �Revenue Court� which is explicit in the Act itself. In terms of Section 2(14) of the Act, �Revenue Officer� or �Revenue Court�, in any provision of the Act means a Revenue Officer or Revenue Court having authority under the Act to discharge the functions of a Revenue Officer or Revenue Court, as the case may be, under that provision. Under the Act certain functions are assigned to the Revenue Officer while Ors. are assigned to the Revenue Court which by itself suggests that a Revenue officer is different than a Revenue Court. Ordinarily, a Revenue Officer of any grade is the Revenue Court of the same grade, but though the person is the same, when he acts in his executive capacity he is called a �Revenue Officer� and when he acts in his judicial capacity he is called a �Revenue Court�. This distinction is more clear when we turn to the provisions of Sections 110 and 111 of the Act. Section 110 enumerates the applications and proceedings which are required to be disposed of by a �Revenue Officer� in exercise of his jurisdiction as such. The next Section 111 lays down that when a Revenue Officer exercises jurisdiction with respect to any suit as described in sub Section (3) of that section or with respect to an appeal or other proceeding arising out of any such suit, he shall be called a Revenue Court. A Revenue Officer and a Revenue Court, therefore, enjoy their respective jurisdictions in different spheres as provided under Sections 110 and 111 of the Act. The power to entertain an application u/s 62 of the Act vests not in the Revenue Court but in the Revenue Officer. While exercising that power, a Revenue Officer, therefore, exercises his jurisdiction in his executive capacity and not in his judicial capacity. An order recorded by the Revenue Officer in exercise of his jurisdiction u/s 62 of the Act cannot be called an order recorded by a Court.

Looking from Anr. angle, an application u/s 62 of the Act for restoration of possession can be made only by a tenant who has been wrongfully dispossessed from his tenancy or any part thereof. In other words, the Revenue Officer shall have the jurisdiction to entertain an application under this provision only when the same is made by a tenant who has been wrongfully dispossessed from the land under his tenancy. In case a Revenue Officer entertains an application under this provision from a person other than a tenant, he would be doing so without jurisdiction. Neither Section 62 nor any other section deals with the contingency where the rela-. tionship of landlord and tenant is denied on behalf of the Respondent-landowner in proceedings u/s 62. Determination of such a question, therefore, by the Revenue Officer in proceedings u/s 62 of the Act would in my view be without jurisdiction and his finding recorded to that effect would not operate as res-judicata in the subsequent litigation between the same parties.

I am, therefore, of the considered view that the Revenue Officer making an order u/s 62 of the Act is neither a Court nor has he the jurisdiction to determine the question whether relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. An order passed u/s 62 of the Act, therefore, cannot operate as res judicata in any subsequent suit between the same parties on the question whether there existed relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties.

For the foregoing reasons I endorse the view taken by the learned District Judge and dismiss this appeal.

The parties through their counsel have been directed to appear before the trial Court on 2-4-1986. The trial Court shall ensure that the suit is disposed of as expeditiously as possible.