AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
M.N. Rao, J.—The Collector and District Magistrate, Prakasham District, Ongole, the second respondent, by an order dated 4-9-1994 in Rc.No. CC/54/94 directed the detention of one Nalluri Brahmam, the brother-in-law of the petitioner herein, under Sub-section (2)(a) of Section 3 read with Section 3(1)(a) of the Prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, (for short ''the Act'') "with a view to preventing him (the detenu) from further acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supply of commodity (rice) essential to the community". In the order of detention, it is mentioned that the detenu - Nalluri Brahmam - the owner of Navodaya Rice Mill, Jandrapet Prakasham District "has been indulging in acts prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities i.e., public distribution system (for short ''P.D.S.'') rice which is essential to the community by diverting and selling the said rice and thus contravening Clauses 3(1) and 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation of Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 and CLAUSE 3(1) of Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities Dealers (Licensing and Distribution) Order, 1982 r/w Sections 7 and 8 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955". On the same day, i.e., 4-9-1994, the detenu was taken into custody and lodged in the District Jail, Nellore.
The detenu is the owner of Navodaya Rice Mill situated in Jandrapet holding Rice Milling Industry Licence No. 1193/S/Trading dated 2-11-1991, which was renewed upto 31-3-1995. He is also one of the four partners of Navodaya Rice Mill holding Form-B licence issued under the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities Dealers (Licensing and Distribution) Order, 1982, which was renewed upto 31-3-1995. The Managing Partner of the firm is one Y. Veeranjaneyulu and the firm is permitted to carry on business at premises bearing Door No. 87/A-27, Jandrapet i.e., in the premises of Navodaya Rice Mill itself.
In the grounds of detention, it is stated that the Sub-Inspector of Police, Vigilance Cell, along with mediators, laid in wait on 12-8-1994 at the rice mill and they witnessed a lorry bearing No. AAK 5801 loaded with rice begs entering the premises of the rice mill. At that time, the detenu was present in the rice mill. Two persons - Gelli Punna Rao and Motumarri Nageswara Rao - said to be brokers, got down from the lorry and after a brief discussion, started unloading the rice bags from the lorry with the aid of coolies. By that time, the Sub-Inspector of Police, along with the mediators, arrived and on seeing them, Motumarri Nageswara Rao, one of the brokers, the lorry driver and some of the coolies ran away. The other broker, Gelli Punna Rao, when attempted to run away, was prevented by the Sub-Inspector and the other police personnel. On enquiry, the detenu failed to produce any documents pertaining to the rice being unloaded. The detenu, Gelli Punna Rao, the broker, and one of the coolies - Yadala Suryanarayana - furnished the following information to the Sub-Inspector-.
"The detenu has been purchasing rice meant for public distribution system from fair price shop dealers through the two brokers Punna Rao and Nageswara Rao for Rs. 510 per quintal, polishing the same at his rice mill and selling the polished rice at higher price in the market. As per usual practice, the two brokers contacted two fair price shop dealers of Pandillapalli village - U. Venkataswamy and G. Venkateswarlu - and purchased 87 bags of PDS rice from Venkataswamy and 63 bags from Venkateswarlu at the rate of Rs. 450/- per quintal. The purchase was effected at the Mandal Level Stock point, Chirala. After taking delivery of the rice, both the fair price shop dealers handed over the stock to the lorry bearing No. AAK 5081 and the two brokers brought the lorry straight to the rice mill from the Mandal Level Stock point as per usual practice. The route officer, Nakkala Koteswara Rao, who was supposed to accompany the lorry from the Mandal Level Stock point to the fair price shops did not accompany the lorry."
By the time the vigilance personnel surprised the rice mill, nine bags of PDS rice were already unloaded and the rest -141 bags - were still in the lorry. Each of the 150 bags contained stencil marks, acknowledgement numbers of the Food Corporation of India and machine stitchings. The Sub-Inspector, therefore, arrested Nalluri Brahmam, the detenu, and the broker, G. Punna Rao (who was also subsequently detained), seized the PDS rice of 150 bags and also the lorry bearing No. AAK 5801. A case was registered in Crime No. 49/94 for violation of conditions 3(i)(ii)(iii), 7(1), 8(1) and Clause (3) of Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities Dealers (Licensing and Distribution) Order, 1982 and Clause (4) of Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation of Distribution by Card System) Order, 1973 r/w Sections 7 and 8 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.
As a follow-up action, the Sub-Inspector inspected the two fair price shops of Pandillapalli village and seized certain quantities of kerosene and a small quantity of 5 kgs. rice from the fair price shops. The Stock Register of U. Venkataswamy''s fair price shop disclosed that no essential commodities were received during the month of August, 1994. No records were found in the shop of the other dealer, G. Venkateswarlu.
After considering the entire material placed before him, the District Collector, the second respondent, passed the order of detention, which is impugned in this writ petition. The Advisory Board met on 24-10-1994 and expressed the opinion that there was sufficient cause for the detention of Nalluri Brahammam. The Government by G.O. Rt. No. 5860 dated 31-10-1994 confirmed the order of detention and fixed the period of detention as six months.
Sri M.V. Ramana Reddy, learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has advanced two contentions in support of his plea that the impugned order is liable to be struck down: (i) The report of the Advisory Board was submitted to the State Government after the expiry of the mandatory period of seven weeks prescribed under Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act; and (ii) on the basis of a solitary incident, the detention was ordered ignoring the fact that by the date of detention, the detenu was already an under-trial prisoner and he had no freedom of action, the order is, therefore, vitiated because of non-application of mind by the detaining authority.
Re. (1):
Section 3(1) of the Act confers power on the Central and State Governments and other officers specified therein to direct detention of any person with respect to whom, if satisfaction is reached that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community, it is necessary to order such detention. District Magistrates and Commissioners of Police, by Sub-section (2), also can pass orders of detention. Sub-section (3) lays down that when any order is made either by a District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police, he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government, to which he is subordinate, together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the matter and no such order shall remain in force for more than 12 days after it is made unless in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government. Section 10 says that in every case where a detention has been made, the appropriats Government shall, within three weeks from the date of detention, place before the Advisory Board, constituted u/s 9, the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected and in case where the order has been made either by a District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police, the report of such officer under Sub-section (3) of Sec.9 also should be placed before the Advisory Board.
Sub-section (1) of Section 11 reads:
"The Advisory Board shall, after considering the materials placed before it and after calling for such further information as it may deem necessary from the appropriate Government or from any person called for the purpose through the appropriate Government or from the person concerned, and if, in any particular case, it considers it essential so to do or if the person concerned desires to be heard, after hearing him in person, submit its report to the appropriate Government within seven weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned."
The contention advanced for the petitioner is that the a fore said mandatory requirement was breached. The seven weeks'' time expired on 23-10-1994 but the report of the Advisory Board was submitted to the State Government only on 24-10-1994, after the expiry of the prescribed time.
The order of detention was made on 4-9-1994 and excluding that date, the seven weeks'' period expired on 23-10-1994, which happened to be a Sunday. The date 4-9-1994 has to be excluded in view of the specific language employed in Section 11(1) that the report has to be submitted to the appropriate Government "within seven weeks from the date of the detention of the person concerned". Whenever the word ''from'' occurs in any enactment made by Union Parliament, the date on which the order is made has to be excluded by virtue of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. So excluded, the seven weeks''s time, as already stated, expired on 23-10-1994, which happened to be a Sunday. The Advisory Board, headed by a retired High Court Judge and consisting of two other retired High Court Judges, met on 24-10-1994 at 2-00 p.m., and considered five cases of detentions including the case of the present detenu. In the counter-affidavit filed by the District Collector, the second respondent, in paragraph 1, it is stated that he was filing the affidavit on behalf of the State Government also, the first respondent, "after obtaining instructions wherever necessary ". "As 23-10-1994 happened to be a Sunday and holiday, the Advisory Board reviewed the case on 24-10-1994 and submitted its report on the same day. I submit that this does not vitiate the order".
It is urged very strenuously by Sri Ramana Reddy, for the petitioner, that the Advisory Board meeting on 24-10-1994 itself is illegal because by then the seven weeks'' period had expired. It would have been a different matter had the Advisory Board met before the Sunday (23-10-1994) and submitted the report on Monday, which was a working day. In the computation of period relating to a case of deprivation of personal liberty, the General Clauses Act has no application; the language of Section 11(1) must be strictly interpreted and even if there is any doubt, the benefit should go to the detenu, says the learned counsel.
We are unable to accept this contention. The computation of time as laid down in Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applies to all Central Acts and Regulations and this is made explicit by Sub-section (2). Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads:
"10. Computation of time - (1) Where, by any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the Court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the Court or office is open:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or proceeding to which the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877) applies.
(2) This section applies also to all Central Acts and Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887."
The prescribed period, by Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act, for submission of the report by the Advisory Board to the State Government is seven weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned. It is not in dispute that the last day of the seven weeks'' period happened to be a Sunday and the Secretariat was closed on that day. By virtue of Section 10(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the duty of submission of the report shall be deemed to have been performed on the next day i.e., Monday - 24-10-1994.
In H.H. Raja Harinder Singh Vs. S. Karnail Singh, , Venkatarama Ayyar, J., interpreting Section 10 of the General Clauses Act held:
"Broadly stated, the object of the section is to enable a person to do what he could have done on a holiday, on the next working day. Where, therefore, a period is prescribed for the performance of an act in a Court or office, and that period expires on a holiday, then according to the section, the act should be considered to have been done within that period, if it is done on the next day on which the Court or office is open. For that section to apply, therefore, all that is requisite is that there should be a period prescribed and that period should expire on a holiday."
There was no statutorily ordained duty on the part of the Advisory Board to meet on 23-10-1994, which happened to be a Sunday. Its only obligation was to submit the report within seven weeks from the date of detention and that duty was performed by the Advisory Board by submitting the report on 24-10-1994, the next working day after the expiry of seven weeks time.
In order to ascertain the correct facts, we have asked Sri Ravinder Rao, the learned Assistant Government Pleader who represented the learned Advocate-General, to produce the records before us. The records produced by him show that five opinions were recorded by the Advisory Board on 24-10-1994 when it met at 2-00 p.m. The opinion relating to the present detenu - Nalluri Brahmam - was one of the five. On all the five opinions, we find the initials of an officer of the Secretariat with the date 24-10-1994. An additional counter-affidavit sworn to by Sri P. Suryanarayana, Deputy Secretary to Government, Law & Order, General Administration Department, was filed today to clarify the matter further. The additional counter-affidavit of the Deputy Secretary says that at the time of the hearing by the Advisory Board, a Section Officer represented the Government. After considering all the five cases, the Advisory Board gave opinions directing release of two of the detenus and the Section Officer who attended the meeting of the Advisory Board received the sealed cover from the Advisory Board containing the five opinions. After the Section Officer handedover the original opinions in all the five cases, immediately he initialled the same in proof of their receipt. Since the office was closed by that time, he instructed the Section Officer to take necessary action on the basis of the opinions on the following day and accordingly on 25-10-1994, entries were made in the tappal number book maintained in the section. We have also perused the tappal number book Vol.2 under the date 25-10-1994. The present case is entered against serial No. 2839. The inward serial numbers of all the five cases dealt by the Advisory Board are 2838 to 2942 and all these are mentioned under the date 25-10-1994.
The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that when the entires were made in the tappal book under the date 25-10-1994, it must be construed that the report of the Advisory Board was submitted on 25-10-1994 but not on 24-10-1994, on which date it tendered its opinion. We do not agree. The additional counter-affidavit filed by the Deputy Secretary clearly explains the circumstances under which the receipt of the opinions of the Advisory Board was entered in the tappal book under the date 25-10-1994. As the Advisory Board met on24-10-1994at2.00p.m.,to consider five cases, including the case of the detenu in question, it is reasonable to believe that the Board must have taken three to four hours to examine in detail all the five cases and by the time the opinions could reach the Secretariat, it was late in the evening. After office hours, it is common knowledge, the concerned lower level officials maintaining the registers would not be present. The entries in the tappal book, therefore, could not be made on 24-10-1994 with respect to the orders received after the office hours. The initials of the Deputy Secretary, Sri Suryanarayana, on all the five opinions corroborate his averments in the additional counter-affidavit as to the circumstances under which the five opinions were received in the Secretariat after the office hours on 24-10-1994. We, therefore, hold that the opinion relating to the detenu in question was received within the prescribed time u/s 11(1) of the Act by the State Government.
The District Collector, the detaining authority, while sending the record with an enclosed letter to the State Government for the purpose of passing an order approving the detention u/s 3 of the Act has categorically mentioned the details of the records he was submitting. The entire record was made available to the Advisory Board and we have verified this by looking into the records. Sri Ramana Reddy''s argument is that u/s 10 of the Act, it was incumbent upon the detaining authority to send a report to the State Government and that report should be placed before the Advisory Board but in this case, no such report has been sent, and, therefore, the order of detention is vitiated. We do not find any merit in this contention. The report contemplated u/s 10 of the Act is the report which is required to be submitted by the detaining authority to the State Government under Sub-section (3) of Section 3. The report in question is only a covering letter containing the details of the records submitted to the Government and when the entire record was placed before the Advisory Board by the State Government, we do not find any force in the contention that Section 10 was breached. Conceivably, there may be cases in which, some times, the detaining authorities submit reports to the State Government concerning the local situations which had necessitated passing of preventive detention orders and if any such report was there, it was incumbent on the part of the State Government, u/s 10, to place the same before the Advisory Board. When the report contains only the materials submitted by the detaining authority, there is no possibility to infer that there should be another report by the detaining authority to the State Government with regard to the passing of detention orders. When factually there was no such report, the question of submitting a non-existant report by the Government to the Advisory Board would not arise.
Re. (2)
The question to be considered next is whether the impugned order of detention is vitiated since it was passed when the detenu was an under trial prisoner and the act alleged against him was only a solitary instance.
In Rameshwar Shaw Vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan and Another, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court speaking through Gajendragadhkar, J., (as he then was) observed:
"It is also true that in deciding the question as to whether it is necessary to detain a person, the authority has to be satisfied that if the said person is not detained, he may act in a prejudicial manner, and his conclusion can be reasonably reached by the authority generally in the light of the evidence about the past prejudicial activities of the said person. When evidence is placed before the authority in respect of such past conduct of the person, the authority has to examine the said evidence and decide whether it is necessary to detain the said person in order to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner ...... where an authority is acting bona fide and considering the question as to whether a person should be detained, he would naturally expect that evidence on which the said conclusion is ultimately going to rest must be evidence of his past conductor entecedent history which reasonably and rationally justifies the conclusion that if the said person is not detained, he may indulge in prejudicial activities."
In Ramesh Yadav Vs. District Magistrate, Etah and Others, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court ruled that if the detaining authority was apprehensive that in case the detenu was released on bail", he would again carry on his criminal activities in the area, the bail application should be opposed and incase bail was granted, it should be challenged in a higher forum. It was observed:
"Merely on the ground that an accused in detention as an undertrial prisoner was likely to get bail, an order of detention under the National Security Act should not ordinarily be passed."
Preventive detention orders made in respect of persons who have already been in jail depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case was high-lighted by the Supreme Court in Shashi Aggarwal Vs. State of U.P. and Others, It was held:
"There must be material apparently disclosed to the detaining authority in each case that the person against whom an order of preventive detention is being made is already under custody and yet for compelling reasons, his preventive detention is necessary."
This was further explained in Vijay Kumar Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , Dutt, J., in a separate but concurring judgment, expressed the view:
"There must be material for such compelling reasons and the material or compelling reasons must appear from the grounds of detention that will be communicated to the detenu. In other words, two facts must appear from the grounds of detention, namely, (1) awareness of the detaining authority of the fact that the detenu is already in detention, and (2) there must be compelling reasons justifying such detention, despite the fact that the detenu is already under detention."
The expression "compelling reasons" in the context of making an order of detention was explained by S.C. Agrawal, J., speaking for a three judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat and another Vs. Union of India and others, .
"......there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody, he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities."
The rule in Rameswar''s case (2 supra) was not understood as laying down an inflexible principle that when a person was already in jail, no order of preventive detention could be passed against him as he had no freedom of action. Depending upon the fact situation, it is open to the detaining authority exercising discretion on the basis of the material available to pass an order of preventive detention even if the person detained has already been in jail custody. In N. Meera Rani Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and Another, a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court adverting to a similar question and after reviewing the case-law on the point including Rameshwar''s case (2 supra), observed:
"Subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention and the decision must depend on the facts of the particular case; preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order etc., ordinarily it is not needed when the detenu is already in custody; the detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while making the order, but, even so, if the detaining authorityis reasonably satisfied on cogent material that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, the detention order can be validly made even in anticipation to operate on his release. This appears to us to be the correct legal position."
After reviewing a catena of cases on this aspect, the following conclusions were reached by a two-member Bench of the Supreme Court in Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik Vs. Union of India and others, :
"(1) A detention order can validly be passed even in the case of a person who is already in custody. In such a case, it must appear from the grounds that the authority was aware that the detenu was already in custody.
(2) When such awareness is there, then it should further appear from the grounds that there was enough material necessitating the detention of the person in custody. This aspect depends upon verious considerations and facts and circumstances of each case. If there is a possibility of his being released and on being so released, he is likely to indulge in prejudicial activity then that would be one such compelling necessity to pass the detention order. The order cannot be quashed on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and that if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition, the same can be questioned before a higher Court.
(3) If the detenu has moved for bail, then the application and the order thereon refusing bail even if not placed before the detaining authority it does not amount to suppression of relevant material. The question of non-application of mind and satisfaction being impaired does not arise as long as the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu was in actual custody.
(4) Accordingly the non-supply of the copies of bail application or the order refusing bail to the detenu cannot affect the detenu''s right of being afforded a reasonable opportunity guaranteed under Article 22(5) when it is clear that the authority has not relied or referred to the same.
(5) When the detaining authority has merely referred to them in the narration of events and has not relied upon them, failure to suply bail application and order refusing bail will not cause any prejudice to the detenu in making an effective representation. Only when the detaining authority has not only referred to but also relied upon them in arriving at the necessary satisfaction then failure to supply these documents, may, in certain cases depending upon the facts and circumstances amount to violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. Whether in a given case the detaining authority has casually or passingly referred to these documents or also relied upon them depends upon the facts and the grounds, which aspect can be examined by the Court.
(6) In a case where detenu is released on bail and is at liberty at the time of passing the order of detention, then the detaining authority has to necessarily rely upon the mas that would be a vital ground for ordering detention. In such a case, the bail application and the order granting bail should necessarily be placed before the authority and the copies should also be supplied to the detenu."
In the light of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court referred to above, we have to consider the question whether the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu was already in jail, that he was likely to be released from jail custody and after release, he is likely to indulge in prejudicial acts.
In the grounds of detention, the detaining authority has clearly stated that the detenu has been purchasing P.D.S. rice from the fair price shop dealers and systematically committing offences of this type and is likely to indulge in similar activities in future. Adverting to the fact that the detenu is a remand prisoner, the detaining authority (the District Magistrate) observed:
"Presently you are a remand prisoner. The application filed on your behalf for grant of bail is pending in the District & Sessions Court, Ongole. There is a possibility of your being released on bail in near future. On such release, the possibility of your indulging in similar prejudicial activity cannot be ruled out. In order to preventyou from further indulging in such prejudicial activity, it is necessary to detain you preventively.
Launching of prosecution against you would not have the desired effect of preventing you from further acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community as its culmination takes considerably long time."
Judging from the nature of the systematic and pre-planned act committed by the detenu, the satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority, in our opinion, cannot be faulted. Systematically according to a well planned design, the detenu has been buying P.D.S. rice meant for distribution among the poorer sections of the society, polishing the same in his rice mill and selling at higher prices. Because he was caught in that process on one occasion, no inference could be drawn that it was a stray and solitary act. The mediators'' report which is Annexure-I to the grounds of detention says that at the time of the seizure of the stocks, when the detenu was asked, he stated: "the lorry came to the mill with P.D.S. rice and the rice bags are being unloaded inside the mill". He further stated that "they used to pruchase P.D.S. rice from the fair price shop dealer through the brokers - Gelli Punna Rao and Nageswara Rao - at cheaper rates, getting the rice to the mills on lorries and after repolishing there, they used to sell the same at higher rates. As usual, today i.e., on 12-8-1994, he has purchased 150 bags of P.D.S. rice through the mediation of Motumarri Negeswara Rao and Gelli Punra Rao at the rate of Rs. 525/- per quintal and that the said brokers, Nageswara Rao and Punna Rao brought the P.D.S. rice in a lorry to the rice mill today i.e., on 12-8-1994 at 5.00 p.m., and while unloadingthe P.D.S. rice bags from the lorry inside the mill, Vigilance Police came and caught them". Gelli Punna Rao, one of the brokers, who was arrested along with the detenu in question and in respect of whom subsequently an order of preventive detention was passed, stated before the mediators that:
"......he along with Motumarri Nageswara Rao of Perala jointly used to purchase P.D.S. rice from the Fair Price shop dealers of Chirala and Vetapalem marvdals at cheaper rates and used to sell the P.D.S rice loads through lorries to the rice mills at higher rates........since the rice mill owner and the Mg. Partner of the mill agreed to purchase the P.D.S. rice at the rate of Rs. 510/- per quintal, they have brought th P.D.S. rice load in the lorry ATK 5801 directly from the MLS point Chirala to Navodaya Rice mill, Jandrapeta and no Route Officer or any other Revenue Officials accompanied the PDS rice lorry."
From thenature of the act alleged against the detenu, for which sufficient material was available on record based upon which the requisite satisfaction of the detaining authority was arrived at, it is clear that it is a part of series of acts well planned and premeditated. We hold that the order of detention is based on a "reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct judged in the light of the surrounding circumstances", and so it cannot be interfered with, Mrs Saraswathi Seshagiri Vs. State of Kerala and Another, .
In order to disable a person from committing further prejudicial acts, one solitary act is sufficient if the detaining authority is satisfied that the offender has a tendency to violate the laws, See: Smt. Hemlata Kantilal Shah Vs. State of Maharashtra and another, ; M. Mohd Sulthan v. Jt. Secy, to Govt. of India, AIR 1990 SC 2222. A Division Bench of this Court, to which one of us (M.N. Rao, J.) was a party Ipheld an order of detention based upon a single act of the offender, See: N. Balaiah Vs. Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, .
The detaining authority, very rightly in our view, drew the inference that there is a possibility of the detenu being released on bail in the near future and that on such release, he might indulge in similar prejudicial acts. The very next day after the detention order was served upon the detenu, he was released on bail by the learned Sessions Judge on 5-9-1994. Rarely Courts decline to release on bail offenders prosecuted under the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act having regard to the fact that the maximum sentence is two years and the trial should be held in a summary way. (vide Section 12-AA of the Essential Commodities Act). The defaming authority after applying his mind carefully to the fact situation, passed the order of detention in question. We, therefore, do not find any legal infirmity afflicting the same.
For these reasons, the writ petition fails and accordingly it is dismissed.