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Judgment
Srinivasan, J.—This is a public interest litigation in which the appointment of the first Respondent as Deputy Superintendent of Police is challenged. The Petitioner is a retired Army Subedar. The facts stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition are as follows: The first Respondent was the Sub-Inspector of Police in Vadipatti, Madurai District. On 1-2-1982, he assaulted the Petitioner and his wife and others and forced them to vacate the house in which they were residing, which belonged to another police officer. There was a public agitation against the first Respondent and the Government ordered enquiry through Revenue Divisional Officer, Usilampatti Division. The Revenue Divisional Officer stated in his report that the 1st Respondent and his men committed serious offences punishable under several Sections of Indian Penal Code. Hence, the Government suspended the first Respondent from service and ordered prosecution against him and his men. A case was filed under Sections 342, 323, 324, 354, 355, 330 and 307, I.P.C. and the same is pending as S.C. No. 169 of 1983 on the file of III Additional Sessions Court, Madurai. The Petitioner has also filed a private complaint against the first Respondent and others under Sections 147, 148, 166, 201, 323, 324, 330, 341, 342, 355, 506, II and 307 read with Section 149 I.P.C. and the case is pending in the Court of Sessions in S.C. No. 21/84. The first Respondent sought to have the proceedings quashed and this Court passed an order in favour of the first Respondent. The same was challenged in the Supreme Court by the Petitioner and the Supreme Court set aside the order of this Court and directed the Sessions Court to dispose of the two proceedings together already pending.
The first Respondent filed W.P. No. 8078/82 for quashing the order of suspension and the same was dismissed. The first Respondent applied for Group I services through the Public Service Commission for appointment as Deputy Superintendent of Police. He was selected by the Public Service Commission and appointed as such by the second Respondent the State of Tamil Nadu. The first Respondent was undergoing training in the Police Officers Training College at Madras. On the day when the first Respondent joined the college, the Principal of the College issued an order stating that he should not be admitted as two sessions cases were pending against him. The first Respondent filed a writ petition in this Court in W.P. No. 6137/85 to quash the order of the Principal of the College and for interim direction that he should be admitted in the college. In the meanwhile, the Government passed an order permitting the first Respondent to join in the training college, and so, the writ petition was dismissed as infructuous.
The appointment of the first Respondent as Deputy Superintendent of Police is against the norms and principles adopted hitherto by the Government of Tamil Nadu and Public Service Commission. Even in the instructions to candidates issued by Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission, Clause 3(iv)(b) states that his character and antecedents to be such as to qualify him for the appointment. The third Respondent intentionally failed and concealed the fact that there were criminal cases pending against the first Respondent consequent to the finding of the Revenue Divisional Officer and that led to the suspension of the first Respondent by the Government. The first Respondent is not fit to hold the public office of a substantive character without being legally qualified therefor. His credentials are not sufficient to permit him to hold the office or to continue in the same. In the circumstances, the Petitioner has prayed for issue of a Writ of Quo warranto calling upon the first Respondent to show to the satisfaction of this Court on what legal authority he was appointed as Deputy Superintendent of Police and sent for training in the Police Training College.
A counter affidavit has been filed by the first Respondent in which he has made certain averments to the effect that the Petitioner had been giving false complaints against him. He has stated a case has been registered against the Petitioner also in Vadipatti Police Station in Crime No. 53/82 under Sections 147, 148, 353, 332 and 307 I.P.C. and the same is now pending as S.C. No. 126/82 in the Court of Sessions at Madurai. The counter proceeds to refer to the two sessions cases pending against the first Respondent. Some objections are taken to the validity of the proceedings initiated by the Revenue Divisional Officer. It is further stated that the order of suspension passed by the government against the first Respondent was subsequently cancelled and he was exonerated in the departmental enquiry. It is further averred that the first Respondent informed the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission and Home Department, Government of Tamil Nadu about the pendency of the criminal proceedings, departmental proceedings, suspension etc. at the time when he applied for the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police. The Public Service Commission was pleased to select him for the direct recruitment of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Category I Class II after due consideration of all the facts and his antecedents. The Government directed him by an order dated 27-5-1985 to report to the police training college. When he joined the college on 27-5-1985, the Principal of the college served him a letter to quit the college on the instructions of the chief officer. The first Respondent approached this Court by way of filing Writ Petition No. 6137 of 1985 and sought interim directions. Notice was issued by this Court. But, before the matter could be taken up for final hearing, the Government permitted the first Respondent to join the college. Hence, the writ petition became unnecessary and it was dismissed as infructuous. The first Respondent has been serving in the police department since 1979 and that he has been falsely implicated in the cases referred to by the Petitioner. The pendency of the criminal proceedings will not act as a bar to the appointment of the first Respondent as Deputy Superintendent of Police, and the authorities have acted only in accordance with the rules. The writ petition is, therefore, unsustainable and has to be dismissed.
The second Respondent has filed a counter affidavit stating that on the basis of the selection made by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission, the Government has appointed the first Respondent as Deputy Superintendent of Police and the appointment was without prejudice to the action to be taken against him on the result of the criminal prosecution pending against him. It is stated in the counter affidavit that the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission having once selected the candidates with the full knowledge of the background of the candidate, the Government decided to issue appointment order to him without prejudice to any further action. The counter affidavit also refers to the fact that the suspension of the first Respondent was already revoked.
The Secretary of the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission has also filed a counter affidavit. Reference is made in that counter affidavit to the application filed by the first Respondent and the disclosure of the relevant facts in the said application. The counter affidavit also refers to Rule 10(a)(iv) of the General Rules of the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Services, which provides for appointment of an officer against whom an enquiry into allegations of corruption or misconduct is pending. It is stated that the appointing authority may appoint him temporarily pending enquiry into the charges against him and that the competent authority shall have discretion to make regular appointment in suitable cases. It is further stated that suspension, is, therefore, not a bar for selecting a candidate for appointment to a post by the Commission. It is further stated that the character and antecedents of the selected candidates have to be satisfied by the appointing authorities themselves after selection and the selection of the first Respondent is well within the principles of law. ft is further stated that the selection of the first Respondent was entirely on the basis of the marks obtained by him in the written test and the oral test. The Commissioner interviewed him and found him suitable in all respects and selected him for appointment to the post.
When the matter was heard, a preliminary objection was raised by the Respondents that the matter should go before the Administrative Tribunal under the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The contention is that this matter is pertaining to the recruitment of a person to a service and even the matter to recruitment for the post is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. My attention was drawn to the definition of ''service matters'' found in Section 3 of the Act and to Section 19 of the Act and it is contended that any person who is aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance.
It has been decided by a Division Bench of this Court in The Chairman, Railway Recruitment Board, Madras-86 v. Ruban Peter 1990 (1) M.L.J. 373 : 1990 1 L.W. 39 (S.N.) that to attract the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, a person "in service" has to move the Tribunal. If the person who seeks redressal of his grievance is not in service, he cannot approach the Tribunal. In sue a case, the jurisdiction of the High Court is not taken away the relevant passage in the judgment is as follows:
The expression ''recruitment and matters concerning recruitment'' occurring in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act on which emphasis had been laid by Learned Counsel for the Appellant to urge that High Court''s jurisdiction has been excluded even in cases which are at the ''pre-recruitment'' stage and that persons who are not ''in service'' can also only approach the tribunals after 1-11-1985, if the grievance of such persons has any co- relation with non-recruitment to services, has to be read in the context in which it appears in the said Section and cannot be divorced from the subsequent expressions in the clause and other provisions of the Act. The use of the expression ''recruitment and matters concerning recruitment'' in our opinion, would imply that the ''in service'' candidates can raise disputes before the tribunal even in respect of matters relating to recruitment but no person who is not ''in service'' can approach the tribunal for redressal of any grievance. Various clauses of Section 3(q) (supra) unmistakably show that the types of disputes referred therein can only be raised by persons ''in service'' as they relate to none else. It is a salutary principle of construction of statutes that to arrive at the true meaning of any particular phrase in it, that phrase is not to be viewed in isolation. The statute must be read as a whole. Indeed, this principle cannot be called in aid to alter the meaning of what by itself is clear and explicit, but the given phrase must be so construed, as far as it is possible, that any absurdity and mischief may be avoided. The consideration of the expression ''recruitment'' and matters concerning recruitment occurring in Section 14(l)(a) of the Act, divorced from the context in which it appears and without examining the provisions of other sections of the Act, can lead to absurdities. If the arguments of Learned Counsel for the Appellant were to be accepted that the tribunal can be approached even by persons who are not in service provided they have a grievance against ''recruitment and matters concerning recruitment'', then it implies that even a person who is not personally aggrieved would also be entitled to maintain an application under the Act in public interest. This is not possible. Such a person can only approach the High Court in exercise of the writ jurisdiction, and not the tribunal. Of course, public interest does require administration to be maintained smoothly and efficiently, but we are afraid the jurisdiction of the tribunal cannot be extended to adjudicate upon disputes in public interest, since the jurisdiction, authority and powers conferred on the tribunal are only to be exercised as contemplated by the provisions of the Act. Construed in this light, it is not possible to hold that the jurisdiction of the High Court would be not available to persons who are not in service when they have a grievance relatable to some service. Before the tribunal only the ''in-service'' persons can agitate in respect of matters covered under the Act.
In view of the judgment of Division Bench, it is not possible for me to accept the contention or uphold the preliminary objection of the Respondents.
Turning to the merits of the case, I am afraid that the Petitioner will not be entitled to get any relief in this matter. The question is, whether the appointment of the first Respondent is in accordance with the relevant rules. Rule 10(a)(iv) provides that, where it is necessary to appoint an officer against whom an enquiry into allegations of corruption or misconduct is pending, the appointing authority may appoint him temporarily pending enquiry into the charges against him and the competent authority shall have discretion to make regular appointment in suitable cases.
Thus, the rule contemplates the appointment of a person against whom an enquiry is pending. In the present case, criminal cases against the first Respondent are pending in the court of Sessions. The have not come to a conclusion. In those circumstances, the Government has made the appointment subject to the final result of the sessions cases. It has reserved its right to take further action against the first Respondent in the event of a finding being given against him in the sessions cases.
It is seen from the counter affidavit filed by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission and the State Government that all the relevant facts have been placed before the appointing authorities and the selecting authorities. The first Respondent is not guilty of concealing any particular matter. He has made a reference in the application itself to the pendency of the cases, and those facts were taken into consideration by the selecting authority and the appointing authority. In such circumstances, it is not possible for this Court to sit in appeal over the judgment of the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission or the State Government and decide that the first Respondent is not qualified. In this case it is stated by the Petitioner that there is a total disqualification of first Respondent for his being appointed by exercise of discretion by Respondents 2 and 3 during the pendency of some proceedings before the criminal court. The grievance is that concerned authorities have decided to exercise their discretion in favour of the first Respondent and appointed him to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police. The Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission has referred to the basis on which the first Respondent has been selected and stated that the marks obtained by him in the written test and oral test were taken into consideration and it has been found that he was suitable in all respects and that is why he has been selected. In such circumstances, it is not open to this Court to differ from that conclusion and hold that the first Respondent is not qualified.
However, the appointment has been made only temporarily, as the criminal cases are pending against him in the course of sessions. In view of the proceedings initiated by the first Respondent to quash the same and the matter having already been taken upto Supreme Court, the sessions cases are pending for such a long time. Naturally there will be no impediment now for the immediate trial and disposal of the sessions cases. In the circumstances. I direct the III Additional Sessions Judge, Madurai to take up for disposal S.C. Nos. 126/82, 169/83 and 21/84 and dispose of the same on or before 31-3-1995 and a report must be sent to this Court.
The writ petition is dismissed with the above observations.
No costs.